All,

I have run into a couple of questions related to the KDF context [1] used by
some existing registered COSE algorithms. The overall goal I have is to
constrain KDF use to simplify COSE integration into my application.

 

The first question is about recommendations on the use of supplemental
public info: the base specification in [1] doesn't give any specific
guidance about recommended minimum amount of context binding. But from some
implementations it appears that using COSE_KDF_Context.SuppPubInfo.other
with at least some kind of application-specific constant string is
recommended. It seems like leaving even that out is allowed by maybe.
discouraged? Is there also a common suggestion to include additional "other"
context data for key uniqueness, or is it really to use-case-specific to
have general recommendations?

 

The second question is about an application prohibiting KDF-related header
parameters: I would like to keep my use variations as simple and few as
possible so would prefer to prohibit the use of PartyU and PartyV header
parameters (-21 to -26). On the sender side this is quite easy to enforce
with existing COSE libraries, but for a recipient is a normative restriction
on specific header parameters reasonable or even enforceable with existing
libraries? Or is this a situation of the status quo being to mandate the use
(by a recipient) of existing header parameters when present?

There is some interesting text in the ML-KEM draft [2] about why those
algorithms have chosen to not make use of the header parameters, but my
question is about existing algorithms which already define how to use those
parameters when present.

 

Thanks for any feedback,

Brian S.

 

[1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053.html#section-5.2

[2]
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-05.html#section-5.2

 

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