Hi all,
I'm currently implementing FN-DSA, and while doing so I went through
draft-ietf-cose-falcon-05 in some detail. Comments below.
1. The padded, fixed-length encoding is the default signature format (see
[2]). That gives 666 bytes for FN-DSA-512 and 1280 bytes for FN-DSA-1024.
NIST's recent plan to require fixed-point arithmetic [3] changes only the
internal computation, but this doesn't affect signature sizes. I think stating
the signature size is fixed, also makes sense.
2. Section 4 reuses the AKP key type from draft-ietf-cose-dilithium, where
priv is the seed. [1] states "Do not use seed as private key" for FN-DSA, and
discourages exporting the expanded form (FFT basis / LDL tree). The draft
should say explicitly that priv carries the encoded private key, not a seed,
and that the expanded form is out of scope.
3. If FN-DSA follows FIPS 204 and takes a context string, the draft should say
which value is used. I'd suggest the empty string, as in the ML-DSA document.
4. The current examples are round-3 Falcon output and won't match FN-DSA
output. I'd suggest replacing them with truncated placeholders until test
vectors are available.
5. Public key validation (Section 5.2). Besides the length, the draft could
require the decoding checks of the underlying specification, e.g. rejecting a
wrong header byte and, as in the Falcon specification, coefficients that are
not below q (it's more algorithm implementation side, but also easy check to do).
Editorial:
- Section 5.4 could simply defer to the RBG requirements in FIPS 206.
- The first two paragraphs of the Introduction say the same thing twice
("FN-DSA (formerly known as Falcon) is a lattice-based ...")
- The COSE registry descriptions and Section 4 still say FALCON512 /
FALCON1024; the algorithm names are FN-DSA-512 / FN-DSA-1024.
- Intro says "expected to be published in late 2026 early 2027"... given
NIST's switch to fixed point, I'd suggest rounding that date up (Ties to even,
of course).
- The Introduction says FN-DSA relies on NTRU-SIS. But NIST stated [4] that it
plans to update the FIPS 206 draft to reflect analysis from [5]. And that
analysis bases the security of FN-DSA on NTRU-ISIS. I'd suggest: "The security
of FN-DSA relies on the hardness of the NTRU-ISIS problem, an inhomogeneous
variant of the Short Integer Solution problem over NTRU lattices [5]."
Everything above is based on the Falcon specification and NIST's public
material on FIPS 206:
[1]
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/presentations/2025/fips-206-fn-dsa-%28falcon%29/images-media/fips_206-perlner_2.1.pdf
[2] https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/Dpr3tnTlKy0
[3] https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/7z-y5qp-W2Y
[4]
https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/1HXzjlMUU6Y/m/NEdiz9TqAQAJ
[5] https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1769
Once FIPS 206 is published, I'd be happy to contribute text for the points
above and to generate test vectors (keys, COSE_Sign1 and JWS examples) from my
implementation, if that would be useful to the authors.
Best,
Kris
--
Kris Kwiatkowski
Cryptography Developer
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