On Thu, 2003-02-20 at 08:52, Matt Pavlovich wrote: > No, no. Do the same challenge/response mechanism, but instead of using > the clear password as the shared secret, use the SHA1 (or other) hash of > the password. ... > The server never knows the clear password, and any man in the middle > would need to know the hash of the password in order to break it.. which > is the equal of needing to know the password in the current CRAM-* > methods.. (maybe stronger as you may get the 'triple des effect').
You just worked out that storing the hash of the password in that case is functionally the same as storing the original plain text password. The security risk involved with storing the plain text password is that instead of an attacker grabbing the password from the transmission, he can get it from the server if he compromises that (The question is: which is more secure, your server or your network?). If the server stores and uses a hash of the password, an attacker can still steal the hash and use that for authentication. ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.net email is sponsored by: SlickEdit Inc. Develop an edge. The most comprehensive and flexible code editor you can use. Code faster. C/C++, C#, Java, HTML, XML, many more. FREE 30-Day Trial. www.slickedit.com/sourceforge _______________________________________________ courier-users mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/courier-users
