>Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2000 18:06:22 -0500 (CDT) >From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: United States - Presidential Campaign > >Stratfor.com's Weekly Global Intelligence Update - 14 August 2000 >_________________________________________ > >Know your world. > >The Waning Power of Indonesia's President >http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0008112200.htm > >Kuwait Threatens Troop Mobilization >http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/0008112217.htm >_________________________________________ > >The Next President >The Unspoken Issue: The Impact of Globalization > >Summary > >Last week, The Weekly Analysis probed the underlying foreign policy >challenges of the American presidential election. This week, the >second part of this series examines the most potentially divisive - >and unspoken - issue of all: globalization. As the Democratic Party >meets in Los Angeles, this issue is at the root of the next >president's choices on foreign policy. And this is the one thing >neither major candidate will dare discuss. > >Analysis > >With the economy booming and foreign dangers distant, the American >presidential campaign is unlikely to attempt to move many voters >with issues of foreign policy. This reflects an elite consensus on >U.S. foreign policy: The international system is driven by >economics, which is increasingly global, integrated and >interdependent, and this is all for the good. This has been the >American elite consensus for a decade. > >But there is a powerful undercurrent running both through American >politics and politics abroad, one that angrily and profoundly >rejects this narrow economic prism for viewing the world. The speed >and power of the flow of capital in the last decade has raised >economies - and destroyed them. In the United States itself, a >small, noisy but potentially powerful movement is rising, rejecting >the cliche that a rising tide lifts all boats. Some, the leaky >ones, get sunk. > >The effects of globalization are among the most important legacies >of the last decade. And yet they are the ones that are either >accepted as undeniable fact by proponents, in multi-national >corporations and government, or swept under the rug. > >This is the case in the American presidential campaign: Both major >candidates running for office offer the same foreign policy. Only >one man will be president, and he will have to wrestle with the >effects of globalization, both at home and abroad. And yet neither >will talk about it. It is unlikely that at any time this week in >Los Angeles, Vice President Al Gore will stop to publicly dwell on >how badly the Thai economy has been ravaged, or how dislocated U.S. >workers will find their place in the information economy. >________________________________________________________________ >Would you like to see full text? >http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/081400.ASP >___________________________________________________________________ > >The primary mission of Washington's foreign policy has been to >prevent side issues - like political-military ones - from >interfering in the expansion of the world trading system. As a >result, questions over Taiwan or human rights have been essentially >shut out of the dialogue with China. Exceptions can be found in the >rogue nations, led by governments impervious to economic pain and >subject to sanctions and military action at the hands of the >international community. > >The result of this strategy is a remarkably contiguous U.S. foreign >policy since the end of the Cold War, whether steered by the Bush >or Clinton administrations. Both did everything possible to prevent >the disruption of relations with China. Both have done everything >possible to use institutions - like the International Monetary Fund >- to diffuse power from individual nations. Under Republican and >Democratic presidents alike, Washington led coalitions to war >against rogue countries like Iraq or Yugoslavia, or to control >dysfunctional economies, like Indonesia's. > >In the 2000 campaign, both George W. Bush and Al Gore are >completely committed to the pursuit of this same foreign policy. >This is the ideology not only of the American elite, but the >ideology of the global elite, as well. Indeed, it is not only an >elite perspective. In advanced industrial countries, this ideology >has mass appeal. > >But it does not have universal appeal. Throughout the world, there >are groups, though marginal, that are deeply opposed to this >ideology. Moreover, the application of this ideology is >increasingly difficult for major international leaders. Russian >President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin are >examples of leaders torn by a globalist ideology they genuinely >accept - but find increasingly painful to pursue at home. > >Two forces are in play against globalization. First and most >immediate, are the national interests abroad. It is possible to >quickly construct a patchwork map of places essentially wiped out >or left behind by globalization. This includes much of Northeast >Asia in 1997, all of Southeast Asia even today, the whole of South >Asia, with the possible exception New Delhi, nearly the entire >African continent and at one time or another huge swaths of Latin >America, including Mexico and Brazil. All in all, nearly 1 billion >of the earth's 2 billion people have been hit head-on by the wave >of creative destruction. > >Second, are the social movements within nations that represent >classes harmed by globalization and objecting to it on their own >ideological grounds. This opposition is far from dominant but it is >there, it is real and it can be heard. > >In fact, it promises to be loudly present outside the Democratic >National Convention in Los Angeles this week, where tens of >thousands of protestors will provide flashbacks of the World Trade >Organization protests in Seattle - only to be dismissed as a >meaningless movement of malcontents. Malcontents they may be. >Meaningless? In this election, almost certainly. But meaningless in >the long run? No. > >The central thesis of globalization is this: Removing barriers to >trade will increase the collective wealth of humanity. >Underpinning this are three prior assumptions: > >1. Economic well-being is by far the most important consideration >in social life. The ideology of globalization assumes that national >impulses are primitive, tribalist hangovers and that the desire of >say, Indians to have an economy not dominated by German >corporations is a disease to be cured. > >2. Economic growth is desirable regardless of social disruption. >The United States came into existence as a social disruption and >has institutionalized it. While it works in the United States it is >not clear that disruption will work equally well elsewhere. > >3. The distribution of economic benefits is less important than the >aggregate benefits of free trade. Unsophisticated advocates ignore >harm and look at total growth rates. More sophisticated advocates >acknowledge harm and emphasize the need for all to benefit - but >they ignore relative growth inside and between countries. > >In short, globalists are simply and willfully ignoring the >realities of politics. > >To them, nationalism is a bothersome annoyance. And yet, the most >important lesson of the 20th century is that the proletariat does >have a country and that national loyalty is more important than >class loyalty. Both world wars and the national uprisings against >the Soviet empire are proof enough. Ironically, it was the greatest >classical economist, Karl Marx, who memorialized a phrase now >essentially etched on Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue alike: >"Capital has no country." > >In reality, though, Marx and enthusiasts for globalization aside, >nations do matter. And within nations, the sense that leaders have >betrayed the national interest in favor of an internationalist >ideology also matters. This does not matter nearly as much during >times of wild prosperity - as the United States is experiencing >today - as it does during periods of economic pain. > >But even in a period of tremendous prosperity, witness the two >marginal candidates in the presidential election: Pat Buchanan and >Ralph Nader, two men with diametrically opposed personal and >political histories, who have arrived at very similar positions on >globalism and nationalism. The rhetoric differs; Buchanan sounds a >nationalist note where Nader sounds a class tune. But both strike >out at the consensus on globalization represented by Bush and Gore. > >These movements are certainly marginal today. That does not mean >they will remain so, however. The global economy is increasingly >out of synch, de-synchronized. The enthusiasm for globalization in >the United States is not reflected in Asia. In the heart of Europe, >in Austria, a major nationalist and definitely anti-globalist >movement has achieved striking electoral success in the midst of a >barrage of criticism from the rest of Europe. In Latin America, >indigenous movements, students and others have sounded their >suspicions. > >The kind of growth rates being experienced in the United States >today will not - cannot - last forever. What goes up must >eventually come down. Certainly, the core prosperity will continue >for several years, but given coming demographic shifts - the >impending retirement of the Baby Boomers in the United States - it >is reasonable to expect major secular shifts in the American >economy over the coming decade. > >And the withdrawal of vast amounts of money from the capital >markets will create a different political dynamic in the United >States - both at home and abroad. The great American geopolitical >choices in the coming decade are withdrawal, collective security >and balance of power. When things cool, choices will have to be >made - not merely about economics, but about security and politics. > >At that point, later in this decade, the advocates of globalization >and those suspicious of it will clash, both abroad and in the >United States. The next American president - unlike his two most >immediate predecessors - will have to wrestle with this powerful >conflict. For the first time the elite will find that their >approach to foreign policy is not universally supported; those >masses that have bought into it will begin to second guess >themselves - and their leaders. > >The two major parties will at that time be caught in the cross >currents. Republicans who helped foster a global economy will be >forced to defend it. But the Democratic Party will stand to lose >the most. After all, it has hammered an unwieldy coalition out of >the financial elite in New York and labor unions in Michigan. That >coalition will be stressed severely, when the dynamics of >globalization begin to change. > >Regardless of the party in power, the president - whether the >occupant of the White House in 2001 or his successor - will be >forced to readdress the foreign policy that has so easily >underpinned successive administrations. Coalitions will be harder >to forge, multinational institutions will be even more unwieldy. >Close allies will become fierce economic competitors. > >Already, these currents are building like eddies in the backwaters >of a great river, in places as disparate as Jakarta and Vienna. And >in Los Angeles, too. Whether you agree or disagree with the >demonstrators in Los Angeles is irrelevant. Listen carefully to >them. They will be vying for power in the United States in the >coming generation, and holding power elsewhere. The debate over >foreign policy will no longer be between left and right, but >between globalists and their critics. > > >(c) 2000 Stratfor, Inc. >_______________________________________________ >SUBSCRIBE to the free, daily Global Intelligence Update. Click on >http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp >UNSUBSCRIBE by clicking on >http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp >_______________________________________________ >Stratfor.com >504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 >Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 >Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ >Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ ((( GREAT DEAL: Home Depot: Home Improvement 1-2-3 on CD-ROM ))) Get it FREE! at: http://nettaxi.free-irewards.com ( plus S&H ) _______________________________________________ Crashlist resources: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/crashlist
