Dear All, The major contribution of the California School, embracing Gunder Frank, must surely now be seen as both 1) the establishment of some long-term equivalence between Europe and China (poss the West and the Rest) on major overall indicators, 2) the estab of the notion that large areas of Asia etc esp China were at least equivalent on many items to advanced areas of Europe over the long swing and 3) that Europe then enjoyed advantages derived from the Rest, in silver, slavery, cotton etc, through colonialism, trade or otherwise which created a 19thc gulf between Europe and the Rest. The recent book by Ken Pomeranz gioves much of the quantitative and logistical weight required of the Frankian position. So far so good. But there is much sliding around here. The indicators vary, are often romantic in the extreme, and I do not see how they uncompromisingly identify circa 1800 as the turning-point. I favour, for good non_landes reasons, the eighteeth century as being Europe's period of advancem,ent, and to illustrate this with reference to institutions of information diffusion and sites of skill, new urban locations and sites of social experiment, which together provide supply-side, often uncosted, factors that then fed into new forms of industrial manufacturing production. Stimulants may well have been short-term and Pomeranz-like, but response at low price was some function of institutions and technologies, which were changing rapidly during the 18thc in Europe, but not elsewhere. I do not seek or require a Landes-type long-term cultural argument to get to that result. Doeas the group remain convinced of the 1800 turning point or does it not? May we really measure average incomes, calorie intakes etc between massive and complex systems over long time back into a quite disctant past? How does any average exert itself at a particular point against another system - perhaps a system arriving with good sailing ships, manouvers and accurate fire-power to areas not of the most developed in Asia etc, that is , direct entries were being made in small coastal locations by western packages of extreme advancement.that is western armaments were only periodically tested against the real might of China or anywhere else, it is this which leads to advancement over others, cvolonial gains etc all useful to the industrialisation of europe a la Pomeranz. Basically the Calif School seem to agree that silver, slaves, cotton etc were all important inputs to the euro-turn (although I note some differences within that group on this) and then the importance of the 19thc switch from wood etc to coal, steam etc. But both were built in the 18thc and stemmed from technique applications and diffusions - colonial silver, slaves etc were only inputs via technique, and this is more true of the wood-coal switch. Added demands merely yield bottle necks, other paths, or price rises in the absence of supply-side improving factors. My contention is that the latter arose in the 18thc in europe and were in no way logical consequences of a long-term european cultural advantage or superiority. Something Happened, but it did so in the 18thC. Ian Inkster at [EMAIL PROTECTED] _______________________________________________ Crashlist resources: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/crashlist
