Power struggle takes on a wider aspect RUSSIA'S decision to "congratulate" the new Belgrade Government yesterday represents the final recognition that the transfer of power in Yugoslavia is irreversible. Strategically the Russians are probably the biggest losers from Slobodan Milosevic's downfall. They have supported the Yugoslav dictator through thick and thin, mainly because Moscow has no other allies in the Balkans. President Kostunica knows, however, that his country's future lies in forging relations with the West. Theoretically, Western governments suffer no handicaps: they have supported the Yugoslav opposition and have always promised that the country could be readmitted to the international community of nations once it rid itself of the dictatorship. Removing many of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia is also a relatively straightforward process. Almost everything else that follows is likely to prove much more complicated. Kosovo's Albanians are guaranteed to refuse any dialogue with Belgrade if this entails a return to the Yugoslav Federation, as President Kostunica is likely to demand. Nor is the West in any position to force the Croatian Government to readmit the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs evicted during the mid-1990s. More importantly, the fall of the last dictatorship in the Balkans raises much bigger questions about the West's priorities throughout the region. Much of the economic assistance pledged to the Balkans was on the assumption that Yugoslavia would remain beyond reach for many years; the transport infrastructure that the European Union is funding in the Balkans explicitly by-passes Serbia. If Yugoslavia is now to be supported, money will either have to be diverted from existing projects or the aid budget will have to be substantially increased. A dispute between the Americans and the Europeans over the reconstruction of the region is inevitable. There will also be a dispute over the future military commitment. Some of these problems might be alleviated by the improvement in Balkan co-operation that is likely to ensue. The region's states will be at peace for the first time since the end of communism. Even here the gain is more theoretical than real, for all Balkan countries compete for scarce Western investment, they all have a decrepit industrial base and a large but poor agricultural sector, and they all seek to join the same European institutions. There is no doubt that Mr Kostunica's priority is the consolidation of his regime at home. And the first challenge is his dilemma over Mr Milosevic's fate. The option of providing Milosevic with asylum in another country was only relevant as part of an arrangement that ensured a smooth transition of power, but no country is likely to consider Mr Milosevic's residence application now. The choices that the dictator faces are the international tribunal in The Hague, a trial at home or a swift death. Mr Kostunica ruled out the first option, while the others depend on what the Yugoslav security services will stomach. Mr Kostunica will not be able to avoid sorting out Yugoslavia's economic mess. The coalition that propelled him to power comprises no fewer than 18 parties, from the extreme Left to the extreme Right. Their sharpest disagreement is over economic reform. Mr Kostunica is aware that he is facing huge odds: all the mafias that built their fortunes out of smuggling goods during the years of the embargo on Yugoslavia and all the factory managers appointed by Mr Milosevic will be against him. Any meaningful economic reform will have to start by breaking up this class of parasites. And it will create millions of unemployed. The author is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London The Times 07.10.00 _______________________________________________ Crashlist resources: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/crashlist
