> Wednesday, October 11, 2000 > > SERBS AND THE WEST: THE ROAD AHEAD > > by DR. VOJISLAV KOSTUNICA > > The question of what the Serbs have to agree to in > their > future relations with the Western world, and what they > must never accept, is central to our future. I'll try > to > offer an answer from the Serbian perspective, in the > full knowledge that a very different answer may be > given from the vantage point of Washington, Paris, > London or Brussels. We have to take into account the > structure of the contemporary world, especially the > position and power of the United States and Europe in > it, and -- above all -- we have to start with who we > are, and what we are, as "Serbs." In seeking an answer > we have to be free from self-delusion of any kind. > > The issue "what the Serbs have to accept and what they > must not" begs two further questions. The first > concerns the definition of the statehood of Serbia, > externally and internally. The second concerns the > terms for the lifting of all sanctions. > > The Serbs entered the twentieth century with two > states of their own, and they ended it without a state > they can call their own. Serbia cannot resolve its > relations with the outside world until and unless it > resolves its status from within. This concerns > Kosovo, Montenegro, possibly Sanjak and Vojvodina. > > Since May 31, 1992, Serbia has been subjected to > international sanctions on the basis of Resolution 757 > of the U.N. Security Council. Those sanctions were > imposed because it was claimed that Serbia and > Montenegro were the principal culprits for the war in > Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, to put it more precisely, > because they were alleged to have been responsible. > That war was halted at Dayton, but the key sanctions > have remained. There have been some changes in the > sanctions' "package" but they were not fundamental. > Various Serbian concessions - notably concessions made > by Slobodan Milosevic at the Dayton peace conference - > did not qualitatively ease the position of Serbia. > Even after Dayton Serbia remained surrounded by the > so-called "outer wall" of sanctions. > > Immediately following the end of the Dayton > conference, on November 21, 1995, the U.S. Department > of State issued a statement giving a summary of the > proceedings. In this statement, dated November 22, we > encounter, for the first time, this "outer wall of > sanctions" against Serbia, banning it from the > membership in international financial organizations > and denying access to all external sources of credit. > It was also the first revision of the Dayton agreement > by the United States, > because the "outer wall" was not even mentioned in > Dayton. It was stated that these sanctions would not > be removed until Serbia resolved a number of other > issues causing concern -- specifically including > Kosovo and cooperation with the war crimes tribunal at > The Hague, but not limited to those issues. > > The architects of the "outer wall" have never > explained it fully. That very term contained an > element of mystery. Does it mean that there is an > "inner wall" of sanctions, and what does it consist > of? Obviously, the "inner wall" is less important, > and from Washington we were told that the change of > regime in Serbia would lead to the lifting - or merely > suspension -- of those less important, cosmetic > sanctions, while the "outer wall" > would remain. Why didn't they commit to the lifting > of the "outer wall" if political changes occur in > Serbia? The answer is very simple: new concessions > would be sought, whether on territory - specifically > Kosovo - or on Yugoslavia's internal constitutional > arrangements that would lead to its further > fragmentation. That which had not been achieved > through Milosevic's action, or inaction, would have to > be conceded by those coming after him. That means > securing as much American > presence and influence in this part of the Balkans as > possible. > > Another demand, of course, concerns the so-called > "democratization." This does not necessarily entail > the > creation of democratic institution as such. No, this > entails finding obedient, pliant people who will > assume power, people whose equivalents in Bosnia and > the Republic of Srpska are known as the "pro-Dayton" > forces. Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the > Bosnian-Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), provides the > prime example of the relativization of "democracy" and > all democratic > institutions. Whether it is elections, the media, or > the functioning of elected bodies, the will of the > people in the Bosnian Serb Republic is irrelevant. > What matters is the will of the authorities in > Washington. > > If the "democracy" in today's post-democratic > societies is controlled, then the so-called democracy > in the post-communist societies that have been > grudgingly allowed into the First World is controlled > even more stringently, in fact dictated from the > outside. > > Legal forms have special importance in various peace > agreements that constitute the pax Americana. Those > agreements introduce into the rule of law everything > that is opposed to the rule of law: voluntarism, > insecurity, arbitrariness. Countless revisions of the > Dayton Agreement are a clear sign, as are the many > creative legal interpretations by the international > High > Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that this > does not sound too abstract, let me quote one > statement by Christopher Hill, the American diplomat > who was the author of several versions of the proposed > peace agreement on Kosovo. In the fall of 1998, Hill > stated that the U.S. plan for Kosovo must be worded so > as to provide different interpretations of the same > provisions by the opposing sides, without undermining > the agreement in the process. > > Milosevic's foreign policy had always oscillated > between > excessive uncooperativeness and excessive > cooperativeness, and always at the wrong moment. In > the first phase, back in 1992, Milosevic was - in the > memorable words of The New York Times -- the "butcher > of the Balkans." In the second phase, most notably > from the Dayton agreement until the > Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement on Kosovo in the fall of > 1998, Milosevic was a "guarantor of peace," a "tough > negotiator," a "strongman." > > Some authorities in Montenegro and in the Republic of > Srpska, and some opponents of Milosevic among the > opposition in Serbia, have also behaved very > cooperatively. It is noteworthy that communist > apparatchiks, young and old, have replaced one form > of Newspeak with another. They are well aware what > can be said and what is forbidden. One must not talk > of the NATO bombing and the subsequent conditions in > Kosovo, while one has to talk about the Serb > "culpability" and The Hague tribunal. In the > aftermath of the bombing this was the basis for > institutionalized relations between the European > Union, the United States, and the democratic > opposition in Serbia. Before that time, those > relations were based, for years on end, on the > triangle formed by the U.S., the E.U., and Slobodan > Milosevic; then it was reduced to the United States > dealing with Milosevic. > > The price for the lifting of all sanctions and the > final > settlement of our statehood must be as low as > possible. > It has to be paid, but with the least possible harm to > our national and state interests and to our national > dignity. We have to look for the Third Way, between > the extremely uncooperative position of Milosevic - > which was only reinforced by The Hague tribunal's > indictment - and the excessively cooperative position > of some of his political opponents. In one of his > papers Srdja Trifkovic has presented us with the > dilemma of "resistance or cooperation." I propose an > answer that could be summarized as both resistance and > cooperation. But in order to apply the Third Way > successfully, several preconditions have to be > satisfied. > > First of all, internal relations within the state have > to be settled, defined or re-defined regarding Kosovo, > Montenegro, and Vojvodina. But for Serbia to do this > properly, such decisions have to be democratic, > following due consultations with all political and > social forces, and to a large extent on the basis of > their consensus. > > Second, we have to retain the awareness of our > national > identity. In order for a nation to survive it has to > know what is its national interest. In order to > define its national interest it has to have a strong > national identity. This is a special problem since > some Serbs have lost their national identity, by > becoming "Yugoslavs," "Europeans," > "anti-nationalists," globalists, or else sub-national > regionalists. The Serbs have a weakened national > self-awareness, in addition to the perennial lack of > national > self-discipline. > > Even if the future Serbian political elites succeed in > avoiding the many traps that await them as they sail > between Scylla and Charybdis of the modern world, > between confrontation with the outside world and a > subservient attitude to it, we shall face yet another > major problem and obstacle. It is the distorted and > prejudiced picture of the Serbs that has been created > throughout the past decade in the Western media and > public. That picture equates the Serbs with the > Germans from the Nazi era, and Milosevic with Hitler. > It has been aptly branded by an American commentator > as the reductio ad Hitlerum. > > It is hard to tell who is the most radical Western > crusader against the bogey of Greater-Serbian > nationalism. Is it David Gompert, formerly Director > of European Affairs at the National Security Council > and now vice-president of RAND, who, writing in > Foreign Affairs way back in 1994, asked "How to defeat > Serbia?" > In that article Gompert stated that for years, decades > perhaps, Serbia would have to be subjected to > isolation and misery, that it would have to be > quarantined for as long as it takes to eradicate the > virus that Serbia carries within it. Because the > Serbs - as Gompert claimed elsewhere, in The New York > Times - should be treated as lepers. The sanctions > against Serbia do > not have to be hermetically tight, he said, provided > that they are permanent. > > Or is it another such crusader, James Gow, an expert > on war studies from London, who describes Serbian > nationalism as the hissing snake in the bosom of the > international community? [!] We should not forget > Richard Holbrooke, who described the Serbs on > television as "murderous assholes" and explained that > Serbia > and Montenegro remain internationally unrecognized > because they are not civilized enough to be admitted > into the community. > > Which of these crusaders should take primacy? How > about Daniel Goldhagen, Susan Sontag, Shlomo Avineri, > and many others, who allow for the possibility that > Milosevic is not quite Hitler, that the Memorandum of > the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences is not quite > Mein Kampf, that the Serbs did not quite try to > destroy one whole nation as the Germans had tried with > the Jews, but nevertheless - According to them the > Serbs, just like the Germans before them, need a > benign occupation, denazification of sorts, during > which democratic forces could emerge and grow strong. > Let me quote only one of this group, philosophy > professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, > Shlomo Avineri. He says > that the Germans were able to rejoin the community of > civilized nations after 1945 not only because they > became a democratic state under Allied occupation, but > also because they have come to comprehend the horrors > done in their name to Jews and others under Hitler's > regime - and that is the destiny of the Serbs, too. > > It is now quite clear that factually, politically and > legally the so-called humanitarian intervention by > NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was > not justified, that it was the intervention itself > that caused the humanitarian catastrophe, the > consequences of which will be felt for a long time. > This view is shared by an increasing number of > prominent commentators, from Noam Chomsky to Henry > Kissinger. This is the view of some Western media and > many international organizations, including the CSCE. > Even the chief protagonists of the air war, including > President Clinton himself, defend it with an > ever-slackening enthusiasm. It is hard to imagine > President Clinton going public today with an article > claiming that the war of nineteen NATO states > against Serbia was "just" and "necessary." > > Today and in the future the Serbs cannot count on any > "allies" in the old sense among the great powers. > They can count, however, on covert and overt allies in > the West, in Europe, and on the diffuse but ever more > prreviewent resistance all over the world to what has > come to be known as "benevolent global hegemony." They > can count on the growing awareness that the NATO war > against Serbia was mediated in the West by lies and > manipulations, by the creation of a twisted and false > picture about the Serbs that justified their > punishment by sanctions, bombs and indictments at The > Hague. > > The fact that it is increasingly obvious that the NATO > war against Serbia was neither just nor necessary > still has not greatly undermined that prejudiced, > almost racist image of the Serbs created in the > Western public. Even when the "outer wall" of > sanctions is removed, it will take a lot of skill and > effort to > alter this image of the Serbs. As our philosopher > Mihailo Djuric has said, our nation has no alternative > but to endure gallantly and with fortitude this latest > round of heavy suffering because this suffering is not > earned by guilt, it is allocated by judgment. Indeed, > the Serbs will not accept that which is unacceptable > only if they are not deracinated, that is to say, if > they have not ceased to be Serbs. > > __________________________________________________ _______________________________________________ Crashlist resources: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/crashlist
