'It is not the consciousness of men that determine their being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their
consciousness.' This statement of Marx is not meant as the
pronouncement of an intrinsic truth, but is part of the precis of
general methodological tenets characteristic of the materialistic
conception of history given in the Preface of 1859. This precis
indicates how the determination of men's consciousness by their
social being can be established in any particular instance. My
investigation is in strict keeping with the Marxian outline. But,
while in that outline the reference is to 'the legal, political,
religious, aesthetic or philosophical - in short, ideological forms'
in which men become conscious of their social conflicts and fight
them out, my preoccupation is with the conceptual foundations
of the cognitive faculty vis-�-vis nature which in one form or
another is characteristic of the ages of` commodity production from
their beginnings in ancient Greece to the present day. It is
for this purpose that I deem it useful to interpret the Marxian
concept of 'social being' in accordance with my notion of the
'social synthesis'. This will depend, of course, on how it justifies
itself as a methodologically fruitful concept.
In societies based on commodity production the social syn-
thesis is centred on the functions of money as the 'universal
equivalent', to use Marx's expression. In this capacity money
must be vested with an abstractness of the highest level to enable
it to serve as the equivalent to every kind of commodity that may
appear on the market. This abstractness of money does not
appear as such and cannot be expected to 'appear' as it consists of
nothing but form. Pure abstract form arising from the disregard
of the use-value of the commodities operated by the act of
exchange equating the commodities as values. That which
constitutes the appearance of money is its material, its shape and
size, and the symbols stamped on it; in short, all that make
money into a thing that can be carried about, spent and received.
But that which makes this thing 'money' in the sense of value and
of equivalence is of a quality radically different from all the
properties that can be seen or felt or counted or otherwise
perceived. The human labour that has gone into the production
of the thing serving as money and into the commodities it serves
to exchange determines the magnitude of their value, the
proportion in which they are exchanged. But to be labour
products is not a property which accrues to the commodities and
to money in the relationship of exchange where the abstraction
arises. The abstraction does not spring from labour but from
exchange as a particular mode of social interrelationship, and it is
through exchange that the abstraction imparts itself to labour
making it 'abstract human labour'. The money abstraction can
be more properly termed 'the exchange abstraction'.
The peculiar thesis, then, argued on the following pages is to
the effect that (1) commodity exchange owes its socially syn-
thetic function to an abstraction which it originates, (2) that the
abstraction is not of one piece but is a composite of several
elements, (3) that these elementary parts of the abstraction can
be separately defined, and (4) that, if this is done in sufficient
detail, these constituent elements of the exchange abstraction
unmistakably resemble the conceptual elements of the cognitive
faculty emerging with the growth of commodity production. As
conceptual elements these forms are principles of thought basic to
Greek philosophy us well as modern natural science. In this
intellectual capacity they can be labelled by the convenient
Kantian term of categories a priori, especially as this can all the
more drastically contrast our materialist account of` the cat-
egories with the idealistic one of Kant. Additional argument-
tation will attempt to show that not only analogy but true
identity exists between the formal elements of the social synthesis
and the formal constituents of cognition. We should then be
entitled to state that the conceptual basis of cognition is logically
and historically conditioned by the basic formation of the social
synthesis of its epoch.
Our explanation thus argues that the categories are historical
by origin and social by nature. For they themselves effect the
social synthesis on the basis of commodity production in such a
way that the cognitive faculty they articulate is an a priori social
capacity of the mind; although it bears the exactly contrary
appearance, that of obeying the principle of ego cogito. Kant was
right in his belief that the basic constituents of our form of
cognition are performed and issue from a prior origin, but he was
wrong in attributing this preformation to the mind itself engaged
in the phantasmagorical performance of 'transcendental syn-
thesis a priori', locatable neither in time nor in place. In a purely
formal way Kant's transcendental subject shows features of
striking likeness to the exchange abstraction in its distillation as
money: first of all in its 'originally synthetic' character but also in
its unique oneness, for the multiplicity of existing currencies
cannot undo the essential oneness of their monetary function.
There can be little doubt, then, that the historical-materialist
explanation adopted here satisfies the formal exigencies of a
theory of` cognition. It accounts for the historical emergence
the clear-cut division of intellectual and manual labour
associated with commodity production. And by accounting for
its genesis it should also help us in perceiving the preconditions of
its historical disappearance and hence of socialism as the road to a
classless society. As for Kant's idealistic construction, and that
his followers, it becomes clear that they serve to present the
division of head and hand as a transcendental necessity.
If this thesis can be argued convincingly it would dispose of the
age-old idea that abstraction is the exclusive privilege of thought;
the mind would no longer be enshrined in its own immanence. It
would give room for a completely different appreciation of
science and of mental labour generally laying all intellectual
activity open for an understanding of it in terms of the social
formation of its epoch and critically evaluating its conceptual
structure as well as its functional application in the light of the
pertinent social conspectus.
It is clear, on the other hand, that a thesis of this nature cannot
draw on factual evidence for its verification but must rely
primarily on arguments of reason. So also does the Marxian
theory of value and of surplus-value. The facts of history tell in its
favour only when viewed in the light of the categories established
by the Marxian analysis of the conditions that endow them with
the historical reality of valid facts. Our theory is directly
concerned only with questions of form, form of consciousness and
form of social being, attempting to find their inner connection, a
connection which, in turn, affects our understanding of human
history. The pivot of the argument lies with the structural form of
social being, or, more precisely, with the formal characteristics
attaching to commodity production and to the social synthesis
arising from it. Thus the Marxian critique of political economy
and our critique of bourgeois epistemology are linked by sharing
the same methodological foundation: the analysis of the com-
modity in the opening chapters of Capital and, prior to it, in the
'Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' of 1859. And
the salient point of the argument is that this link is one of formal
identity. Nevertheless, the difference in scope implies differences
in the procedure of the analysis which amount to more than mere
shifts of emphasis.
Marx was the first to discover the 'commodity abstraction' at
the root of the economic category of value and he analysed it from
the twofold viewpoint of form and of magnitude. 'The exchange
process gives to the commodity, which it transforms to money,
not its value, but its specific form of value', he states in the chapter
on 'Exchange'. The form and the magnitude of value spring from
different sources, the one from exchange, the other from labour.
The critique of political economy hinges upon the understanding
of how they combine to become the 'abstract human labour'
constituting at once the form and the substance of value. Thus
the commodity abstraction or, as we would say, the exchange
abstraction is interpreted by Marx foremost as being the 'value
abstraction- without involving the need to explore in any detail
the source from which the abstraction springs. This is in perfect
keeping with Marx's purpose of a critique of political economy.
For our purpose, however, we must concentrate in the first place
on the formal aspect of value, not only in preference to, but even
in separation from its economic content of labour. Or, to put it
differently, we have to proceed from the commodity abstraction
to the source from where the abstraction emanates and must
carry through a painstakingly accurate and detailed analysis of
the formal structure of exchange as the basis of its socially
synthetic function.
Thus, notwithstanding their common methodological foun-
dation, the critique of political economy and the critique
of philosophical epistemology have to pursue their tasks in complete
independence of each other, in strict accordance, that is, with the
diverse systematic nature of their subject-matters. The fields
economics and of natural science have not a term in common,
and it would be a hopeless endeavour to try to cope with the
critique of epistemology by grafting it on to the Marxian critique
of political economy. It must be undertaken as an investigation
standing on its own ground to be judged by its own standards.
This does not prevent both those critical pursuits from being
inseparably bound up with each other in the results they yield for
our understanding of history. The class antagonisms which
commodity production engenders in all its stages - in Marx's
terms 'the ancient classical, the feudal, and the modern
bourgeois modes of production' are intrinsically connected with
closely corresponding forms of division of head and hand; but
how this connection operates will become recognisable only
when the form analysis of the exchange abstraction
has been accomplished.
Part One
Critique of Philosophical Epistemology
One: T h e F e t i s h i s m o f I n t e l l e c t u a l L a b o u r
A critique needs a well-defined object at which it is directed: we
choose philosophical epistemology. What is the salient feature
which marks it as our particular object' Which philosophy most
significantly represents it and is most rewarding to criticise? From
the introduction it is clear that our choice has fallen upon the
Kantian theory of cognition. This does not, however, mean that
he reader must be a specialist in this particularly daunting
philosophy - far from it.
Marx clarifies the object of his critique as follows: 'let me
point out once and for all that by classical political economy I
mean all the economists who, since the time of W. Petty, have
investigated the real internal framework of bourgeois relations of
production, as opposed to the vulgar economists . . .'' Classical
political economy in the sense of` this definition culminated in the
work of` Adam Smith (1723-90) and David Ricardo
(1772-1823) and accordingly the discussion of their theories
bulks largest in Marx's critical studies for instance those
collected as Theories of Surplus Value. This does not, however,
oblige anyone to embark upon a study of Smith and Ricardo
before reading Marx, even though, conversely, it is essential to
have read Marx before looking at Smith and Ricardo. Marx's
work in economics starts where the peak of bourgeois economics
reaches its limits.
Can we draw any parallel to this framework of the Marxian
critique to elucidate our own undertaking in the field of
philosophical epistemology? I understand by this name the
epistemology which since the time of Descartes (I596--I650)
seized upon the newly founded natural science of the math-
ematical and experimental method established by Galileo
(1564 1642). Thus we describe philosophical epistemology as
the theory of scientific knowledge undertaken with the aim of
elaborating a coherent, all-embracing ideology to suit the
production relations of bourgeois society. This endeavour culmi-
nated in the main works of Kant (I724 I804�), especially his
Critique of Pure Reason. I therefore confine my main attention to
Kant's philosophy of science which I consider to be the classical
manifestation of the bourgeois fetishism of intellectual labour.
Smith and Kant have in common that each is the first to have
placed his respective discipline on a systematic foundation. Kant
might at his time have been introduced to an English public as
the Adam Smith of epistemology, and at the same period Smith
could have been recommended to a German audience as the
Immanuel Kant of political economy.
However, in the light of Engels's Ludwig Feuerbach and the
Outcome of Classical German Philosophy and his survey of 'the whole
movement since Kant' one might feel inclined to rank Hegel
(I770 - 1831) above Kant, especially since Ricardo is frequently
placed on a level with his contemporary, Hegel, in comparison
with Smith and Kant. While both the latter, in their own fields,
evolved the postulates which a fully fledged bourgeois society
should be expected to realise, Ricardo and Hegel, independently
of each other, faced up to the inherent contradictions revealed by
that society upon the achievement of this realisation, brought
about by the advent of the French Revolution of 1789-94 and its
Napoleonic aftermath. But there is one important difference
which sets Hegel on a plane apart from Ricardo. He discarded
the epistemological approach altogether and outstripped the
limitations of the critical standards of thinking observed by Kant
and adhered to by Ricardo in order to lift himself to the height of
'speculative and absolute idealism'. This gave him free rein to
carry philosophy to its consummation, but it makes him unsuited
as the object for my own critique.
Many a good Marxist will want to join issue with me on this
apparently disparaging treatment of Hegel. For was not Hegel,
after all, the discoverer of dialectics and does not Marx accept
him as such? 'The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's
hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present
its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious
manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted,
in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.'
True, this is what Marx says of Hegel in regard to the dialectic,
but some Marxists have joined issue with Marx himself for
leaving this vital subject so incompletely elucidated. I must say
that I have never felt quite convinced that to advance from the
critical idealism of Kant to the critical materialism of Marx the
road should necessarily lead via the absolute idealism of Hegel.
There should be the possibility of connecting Kant and Marx by
a direct route at least systematically which would also yield an
understanding of dialectics as the critical, and self-critical,
approach without first presenting it in the misleading guise of a
system of logic. Nevertheless 1 admit that the dialectic as evolved
by Hegel affords a way of thinking which is infinitely superior to
the fixed dualism of Kant. But the complaint about its dualism
can affect the Kantian mode of thought only as bourgeois
philosophy. And there it does it a service. For the unyielding
dualism of this philosophy is surely a more faithful reflection of
the realities of capitalism than can be found in the efforts of the
illustrious post-Kantians striving to rid themselves of it by
drawing all and everything into the redeeming 'immanency of
the mind'. How can the truth of the bourgeois world present ;;self
other than as dualism?
Hegel realised that the ideal of the truth could not acquiesce
with it as the ultimate state of affairs and he engaged on dialectics
as a road transcending the bourgeois limitations. Therein lies his
greatness and the importance of` the impulse that emanated from
the dynamic of this conception. Bur he could not himself step out
of the bourgeois world at his epoch, and so he attained the unity
outreaching Kant only by dispensing with the epistemological
critique, and hence by way of hypostasis. He did not make
'thinking' and 'being" one, and did not enquire how they could
be one. He simply argued that the idea of the truth *demands* them
to be one, and if logic is to be the logic of the truth it has to start
with that unity as its presupposition. But what is the kind of
'being" with which 'thinking' could be hypostatised as one, and
their unity be a system of logic? It was nothing more, and nothing
more real, than the 'being' implied when I say 'I am I', since after
all, 'am' is the first person singular of the verb 'to be' in its present
tense. And so Hegel starts his dialectics by a process of. the mind
within the mind. The Hegelian dissolution of the Kantian
antitheses is not achieved by dissolving them, but by making
them perform as a process. The Hegelian dialectics has no other
legitimacy than that it is a process occurring. Questioned as to its
possibility it would prove impossible. Adorno was perfectly right
saying: 'If the Hegelian synthesis did work out, it would only
be the wrong one.'
When Marx in the last of his Theses on Feuerbach wrote: 'The
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the
point however is to change it', Hegel must have been foremost in
his thoughts, because in his philosophy the very dialectics of the
real change is wasted on merely ontologising 'the Idea'. What
else could this Idea be as an outcome of the dialectic as Logic, but
the idealisation of the bourgeois world rising to the height of
'thinking' and 'being' embracing each other in the perfection of
the bourgeois State as the Prussian paragon of the constitutional
monarchy. A similar treatment is meted out to all the spheres to
which Hegel extended his speculation, that of the law, the mind,
aesthetics, religion, history and even nature. To them all the
same pattern of Logic could be made applicable by modifying
the kind of 'being' that entered into unity with 'thinking' in each
particular field.
I am well aware that stressing only its negative side distorts
Hegel's philosophy out of recognition by suppressing the immense
wealth and depth of content it owes to the revolutionary impulse
of the dialectic. Hegel's is a philosophy which might be said to be
wrapped in twilight from beginning to end, and I do not want my
few remarks to be misunderstood as being a general condem-
nation of this outstanding work. My concern is narrowly
confined to one question only: the treatment of the Kantian
epistemology by Hegel on the one hand and Marx on the other.
Thus it is easy to see what Hegel's interest was in dispensing
with the epistemological enquiry of Kant, but it was surely not
the Marxian interest to do likewise. The Hegelian motivation
was rooted in the mystification of the dialectic which aroused
Marx's criticism. Marx's elimination of the Kantian kind of
enquiry should not be understood simply as an imitation of
Hegel's. Marx must have had his own independent
reasons for it ,grounded in his materialistic conception
of the dialectic, not in the idealistic one of Hegel.
The Kantian enquiry was aimed at all explanation of the
phenomenon of the human intellect such as it manifested itself in
the mathematical science founded by Galileo and perfected by
Newton. What was wrong with Kant's enquiry was that he
looked into the nature of the human mind for an answer. Marx
could only be satisfied with an answer drawn from natural history
and the human departure from it in social and economic
developments arising from man's producing his own means of
livelihood. This kind answer could not possibly be gained from
Hegel's philosophy. But it is this answer that we have in mind
when we suggest a direct cut-through from Kant to Marx by way
of a critical liquidation of Kant's enquiry, rather than by purely
discarding it.
Two: C a n t h e r e b e a b s t r a c t i o n
o t h e r t h a n b y T h o u g h t ?
Forms of thought and forms of society have one thing in common.
They are both 'forms'. The Marxian mode of thought is
characterised by a conception of form which distinguishes it from
all other schools of thinking. It derives from Hegel, but this only
so as to deviate from him again. For Marx, form is time-bound. It
originates, dies and changes within time. To conceive of form in
this way is characteristic of dialectical though, but with Hegel,
its originator, the genesis and mutation of form is only within the
power of the mind. It constitutes the 'science of logic'; for-m
processes in any other field, say nature or history, Hegel
conceived only in the pattern of logic. The Hegelian concept of
dialectic finally entitles the mind not only to primacy over
manual work but endows it with omnipotence.
Marx, on the other hand, understands the time governing th
genesis and the mutation of forms as being, from the very first,
historical time -- the time of natural and of human history. ;
That is why the form processes cannot be made out
anticipation. No prima philosophia under any guise has a place in
Marxism. What is to be asserted must first be established by
investigation; historical materialism is merely the name for a
methodological postulate and even this only became clear to
Marx 'as a result of my studies'.
Thus one must not ignore the processes of abstraction at work
in the emergence of historical forms of consciousness. Abstraction
can be likened to the workshop of conceptual thought and its
process must be a materialistic one if the assertion that conscious-
ness is determined by social being is to hold true. A derivation of
consciousness from social being presupposes a process of abstrac-
tion which is part of this being. Only so can we validate the
statement that 'the social being of man determines his conscious-
ness'. But with this point of view the historical materialist stands
in irreconcilable opposition to all traditional, theoretical philo-
soppy. For this entire tradition it is an established fact that
abstraction is the inherent activity and the exclusive privilege of
thought; to speak of abstraction in any other sense is regarded as
irresponsible, unless of course one uses the word merely meta-
phorically. But to acquiesce in this philosophical tradition
would preclude the realisation of the postulate of historical
materialism. If the formation of the consciousness, by the
procedure of abstraction, is exclusively a matter for the con-
sciousness itself, then a chasm opens up between the forms of
consciousness on the one side and its alleged determination in
being on the other. The historical materialist would deny In
theory the existence of this chasm, but in practice has no solution
to offer, none at any rate chat would bridge the chasm.
Admittedly it must be taken into consideration that the
philosophical tradition is itself a product of the division between
mental and manual labour, and since its beginning with
Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Parmenides has been a preserve of
intellectuals for intellectuals, inaccessible to manual workers.
Little has changed here, even today. For this reason the
testimony of this tradition, even if unanimous, does not carry the
weight of authority for those who take their stand with the
manual worker. The view that abstraction was not the exclusive
property of the mind, but arises in commodity exchange was first
expressed by Marx in. the beginning of Capital and earlier in the
Critique of Political Economy of I859, where he speaks of an
abstraction other than that of thought.
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