VENEZUELA'S FOREIGN POLICY: DEFIANCE SOUTH OF THE BORDER
by Steve Ellner
Typically, State Department officials grit their teeth when Venezuelan
President Hugo Ch�vez challenges U.S. foreign policy, but he occasionally
provokes a sharper reaction. For example, in August Ch�vez was the first
Western nation head of state to visit Iraq since the U.N.-imposed boycott
went into effect ten years ago. State Department spokesperson Richard
Boucher called the trip "irritating" and "a bad idea." Foreign Minister Jos�
Vicente Rangel retorted by labeling the U.S. attitude "hypocrisy." He added
that in the past the U.S. government maintained cordial relations with both
military and Communist regimes, and so "why can't we do the same?" In a
nation-wide broadcast the day after he returned, Ch�vez mocked Boucher's
statements suggesting the use of body cream "to alleviate the irritation."
This was not the first time that a State Department official lost his-her
patience and disregarded Washington's official policy of restraint toward
Ch�vez. Earlier this year, Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Peter Romero told Spanish reporters: "In Venezuela, you don't see a
government in charge -- only plebiscites, referendums and more elections.
They tell us 'wait,' but we gringos are not exactly known for our patience."
Actually, Romero had reason to be irked. Ch�vez had just snubbed a U.S.
offer to send marine corps engineers and bulldozers to repair the highway
connecting Caracas with coastal areas devastated by heavy flooding on
December 15 of last year. Ch�vez feared that the sheer number of U.S.
military personnel reaching as many as 1000 would set a dangerous precedent.
In previous weeks, U.S. ambassador John Maisto had assured the State
Department that the plan for aid would win Ch�vez over to closer relations
with the U.S. In the aftermath of the rebuff, Maisto's strategy seemed
ingenuous. Indeed, if Ch�vez is under the sway of anyone, it is foreign
minister Rangel, three-time socialist presidential candidate whose
nationalistic sentiment has not dimmed over the years.
In spite of the radical thrust of his movement - as embodied in the nation's
new constitution which went into effect this year -- Ch�vez has carefully
eschewed anti-U.S. rhetoric. Instead, Ch�vez, like Peru's Alberto Fujimori,
lashes out at the nation's traditional political parties, which he holds
responsible for the nation's social and economic woes. In another similarity
with Fujimori, Ch�vez relies heavily on military officers who are well
placed in his government and party. Ch�vez himself was a middle-level
officer who led an abortive coup against the corruption-ridden government of
Carlos Andr�s P�rez in February 1992.
Ch�vez's opposition to sanctions against Peru following the allegedly
fraudulent elections of May 28 reinforced the comparisons with Fujimori in
the U.S. press (in spite of basic policy differences between the two
leaders) and at the same time further irritated Washington. Venezuela, along
with Mexico, played an activist role in blocking U.S. efforts in the OAS to
impose hemispheric sanctions on Peru. Ch�vez then attended the summit of the
Andean Community of Nations (CAN) in Lima, hosted by Fujimori. In an
indirect reference to U.S. proposed actions against Fujimori, Ch�vez
declared: "Rather than accepting the imposition of models and economic
policies, what we should do is march in the direction of a system of
international relations based on equality and mutual respect."
FROM OVERT U.S. HOSTILITY TO RESTRAINT
The U.S. attitude toward Ch�vez at the beginning of his political career was
hardly indulgent. Following Ch�vez's decision to run for the presidency in
the 1998 elections, the State Department turned down his request for a visa
to allow him to explain his platform to multinational representatives in New
York and Washington. Madeleine Albright pointed out that according to U.S.
law Ch�vez was ineligible due to his participation in the 1992 coup. She
failed to mention, however, that the U.S. did grant a visa to the number
two-man in the coup attempt, Francisco Arias C�rdenas. In one respect, U.S.
flexibility paid off as the more tractable Arias broke with Ch�vez and was
his main rival in special elections held on July 30. During the campaign,
Arias criticized Ch�vez's defiant attitude toward the U.S. and his kind
words for Cuba.
The rejection of Ch�vez's visa request boomeranged. Just after the request
was denied, Ch�vez's popularity soared and he soon replaced former Miss
Universe Irene S�ez as front runner. The lesson was not lost on Ambassador
Maisto: Ch�vez thrives on controversy and as any populist he creates an "us"
vs. "them" dichotomy. The "them" included the pro-establishment parties, big
business, the media and even the Church. Maisto was intent on avoiding
inclusion of the U.S. in the enemy camp.
At the time of Ch�vez's election in December 1998 and throughout his first
year in office, Maisto used cogent arguments to swing over Romero and others
in the State Department to his policy of cautiousness and wait-and-see.
First, a hostile approach to Ch�vez was not recommendable due to his
widespread popularity. In contrast to Salvador Allende who had won with one
third of the vote, Ch�vez captured 56 percent in the presidential elections
of 1998 and he did even better in three elections held last year and the one
held on July 30. Second, Ch�vez's economic policy has yet to be clearly
defined. What the State Department most appreciates is that after pushing a
proposed moratorium on the foreign debt as presidential candidate, Ch�vez
has stayed within the bounds of the agreement with the IMF negotiated by his
predecessor. Shortly prior to the July 30 elections, Ch�vez held foreign
creditors responsible for subjugating Third-World nations to perpetual
poverty, but added: "We are paying off the debt because we want to continue
to interact with foreign lending agencies."
Finally, some political analysts close to the State Department have pointed
out that as a consequence of Ch�vez's electoral victories the nation's
traditional parties have collapsed like a house of cards. One political
scientist told the CIA at a closed meeting it helped organize titled
"Forecasting Implications for Venezuela" outside of Miami last November,
"For all his prankishness, Ch�vez is what separates Venezuela from political
chaos."
Of much greater concern to Washington than Ch�vez's rejection of aid
following the December 15 calamity is his negative response to repeated U.S.
requests for permission to use Venezuelan airspace to combat drug
trafficking. Previous Venezuelan governments had unofficially authorized
individual DEA-sponsored flights, a policy that was never publicly
acknowledged. Following the U.S. departure from Panama' Howard Air Force
Base, the Pentagon has developed plans to use airports in the Dutch islands
of Aruba and Curazao off the Venezuelan coast to patrol the area. Last year
anti-drug czar Barre McCaffrey met with Ch�vez in Caracas and informed him
of the 18 flights from Colombia into Venezuelan airspace which drug
traffickers average per month, warning that the latter country risked
becoming the "weak link" in the hemispheric war on drugs.
Carlos Romero, who left the Foreign Ministry last year and teaches diplomacy
at the Central University explained Ch�vez's unbending position to me this
way: "Ch�vez as an army officer does not understand the Pentagon's fixation
on 'electronic war,' fought from the air and observed on monitor screens,
which was first put in evidence in the Persian Gulf conflict. This is why he
fails to take the U.S. request all that seriously."
Actually, another explanation goes a long way in accounting for Ch�vez's
attitude. One of the issues that lurked behind the February 1992 coup was
the fear among military officers that the armed forces in Latin America
could be virtually phased out as an institution due to dramatic
international changes such as "globalism," the end of the Cold War and
shifting U.S. priorities. In the face of the break-down of barriers among
nations in this "postmodern" world, the military's hitherto sacred mission
of defense of national security would seem to have lost its relevance.
Since Reagan's second administration U.S. preference for democracy abroad,
and its resultant distrust of the military in third world countries, has
been more evident than in the past. The perception that the U.S. is no
longer interested in the traditional model of the armed forces is reinforced
by the decline in U.S. military aid to Latin America (with the exception of
Colombia) over the last decade. Some U.S. government officials feel that the
Latin American armed forces, rather than defend borders, should take charge
of combating crime and specifically the drug trade in all its phases. In the
case of Venezuela, they consider the police force irreparably corrupt and
thus unable to perform adequately these tasks.
The military officers who participated in the February 1992 coup and another
revolt 10 months later fervently defend the military's traditional role as
guardians of national security. Nationalist sentiment underpins their
arguments: With the foreign take-over of strategic industries through
privatization, widespread corruption and total government incompetence, what
is at stake is not only national security but the broader issue of national
sovereignty. Rear Admiral Hern�n Gruber Odrem�n, who led the second coup in
1992, has written extensively in the press about the new role which
politicians backed by the U.S. are allegedly thrusting on the Venezuelan
armed forces. For the military, patrolling streets is nothing less than "an
offense to national honor." Gruber adds: "The apparent fate of our armed
forces recalls what happened to its counterpart in Panama," which was
completely dismantled following the U.S. invasion in 1989.
Gruber, who President Ch�vez named governor of the Federal District, told me
in his office: "The United States can not expect the Venezuelan military to
commit suicide by renouncing its commitment to defending national integrity.
In fact, that function is plainly spelled out in our new constitution. I
sometimes ask myself whether the United States simply wants to erase
national borders south of the Rio Grande."
Ch�vez rejects U.S. air missions because otherwise he would be tacitly
belittling the capacity of his nation's Air Force to patrol its own borders.
Ch�vez has defended the Venezuelan military's record in combating drug
trafficking and maintains that it is adequately equipped to do so. Venezuela
's representative in the OAS, Virginia Contreras, claims that in so many
words Barre McCaffrey told Ch�vez what should come as no surprise to anyone:
the U.S. would never allow a foreign country to do what it is requesting of
Venezuela.
Some Venezuelan government officials have raised the possibility of
exploring alternative arrangements, including greater interchange of
information between the two nations and training programs to boost capacity.
Nevertheless, the State Department has failed to pick up on these
propositions. In private, Venezuelan government officials express fear that
allowing U.S. Air Force planes to fly on the Venezuelan side of the border
will add a new explosive ingredient to the Colombian guerrilla conflict.
NEW REALITIES
Joint efforts like these fit in with the concept some specialists in
Inter-American relations have been advocating as appropriate for the
post-Cold War era. In a recent book, Joseph Tulchin of the Wilson Center and
Francisco Rojas Aravena, director of the Chilean think tank FLASCO, argue
that in the absence of a visible enemy at large, Latin American governments
are presented with a "window of opportunity."
Specifically, they see "regional partnership" as a corrective to the
paternalism which has traditionally characterized Washington's attitude
toward its neighbors to the south.
In certain respects, this view is shared by Foreign Minister Rangel, an
outspoken critic of U.S. unilateral decision making. Rangel decries the U.S.
certification program in which the State Department evaluates the efforts of
foreign governments to combat the drug trade. Rangel proposes that an
international commission of recognized authorities take charge of the
evaluation process. The proposal may find acceptance among State Department
officials, who generally prefer pressuring foreign governments behind the
scenes for anti-drug measures. Indeed, the certification program, which was
initiated in 1986, was inspired by the crusading spirit of the Republican
right in Congress.
Late last year, the New York Times speculated that Venezuela would be
"decertified" due to its rejection of U.S. flights over its territory.
Caracas thus breathed a sigh of relief in March when the State Department
recommended to Congress continued certification.
Rangel takes the same stand on the U.S.'s unilateral evaluation of human
rights. Rangel, who forcefully denounced state repression throughout his
long career as a journalist and politician, told me: "We definitely do not
oppose the outside review process with regard to human rights, but too often
these efforts are tainted by political considerations." Rangel criticized
the State Department's annual report on human rights presented to Congress
in March for failing to recognize the advances and innovations in Venezuela'
s new constitution in this area. Subsequently, Rangel questioned the role of
the Carter Center and other private foundations in evaluating and making
recommendations for the Peruvian elections of May 28 and the Venezuelan ones
of July 30. "Governments can not be placed in the same arena as the private
sector," Rangel argued, "since they are singularly responsible for
undertaking actions" when human rights are at stake.
Other differences with Washington lay behind the startling remarks by the
State Department's Peter Romero in Spain and the more recent ones by Richard
Boucher. The new Venezuelan constitution defines the nation's democracy as
"participatory," a term which Foreign Minister Rangel has gotten the OAS to
ratify as a model for the entire hemisphere. The phrase is not at all to the
liking of the U.S. representatives in the OAS, some of whom consider it
nebulous and others synonymous with "mob rule." One U.S. embassy official in
Caracas cynically remarked: "Participatory democracy can mean just about
anything, and that's why Ch�vez and Fujimori like the term so much."
The U.S. prefers the more limited, mundane concept of "representative
democracy," which centers on elections and political parties, as opposed to
participatory democracy's emphasis on popular assemblies, social movements
and continuous referendums. For the State Department, the term
representative democracy is more manageable for the purpose of censuring
governments such as that of Peru, which violate electoral norms or act
arbitrarily against political parties.
The Venezuelan delegation to the OAS got the organization to create a
special commission to deal with the topic, which organized the conference
"Analysis and Reflections on Participatory Democracy" held in Washington
last April. Foreign Minister Rangel and other top Venezuelan government
spokesmen addressed the conference and stressed Ch�vez's commitment to
participatory democracy which, according to them, replaced the nation's
previous system of representative democracy based on a coterie of corrupt
leaders belonging to the traditional parties.
In another area of friction, President Ch�vez lashed out at the "Plan
Colombia" of massive military aid for threatening to "Vietnamize" the
conflict. Caracas has declared itself neutral in the Colombia guerrilla war,
a position which some in Washington and Bogot� view as tacit support for the
guerrillas. Ch�vez claims that the position is dictated by two imperatives.
First, Venezuela has successfully negotiated with the guerrillas the release
of Venezuelans kidnapped in the veritable no-mans land on the Colombian side
of the border. Even Ch�vez's presidential rival, the pro-U.S. Francisco
Arias C�rdenas, as governor of the western state of Zulia, established close
ties with the ELN guerrilla force in order to help resolve individual
problems along the border. In addition, Venezuela has offered its services
to both sides in Columbia to negotiate a peace agreement, an objective of
special significance for Venezuela given the extensiveness of their common
borders.
Other sources of conflict have soured U.S. relations with Venezuela since
Ch�vez's election. In March, Venezuela voted against censuring China, Iran
and Cuba in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights for the second year in a
row. Indeed, a key element of Ch�vez's third-worldism is his rejection of
foreign interference in internal affairs, at least under normal
circumstances. Foreign Minister Rangel told me: "Interventionism is often
motivated by good intentions but it can not override the principle of
national sovereignty. Interventionism may be justified, but only in the case
of a military coup."
On his frequent trips abroad, President Ch�vez embraces the concept of a
"multi-polar" world. When Ch�vez returned from his tour of OPEC nations in
August, he called for the formation of regional blocs in order to achieve a
"necessary balance" on the world scale. He went on to indicate that North
America and South America are separate blocs, thus implicitly rejecting U.S.
plans to bring Chile and even Venezuela into NAFTA under terms dictated by
Washington.
Strengthening OPEC also forms part of Ch�vez's "multi-polar" vision.
Immediately after his election as president in December 1998, Ch�vez,
announced that Venezuela would not compete with Saudi Arabia in the U.S.
market. He also put an end to his predecessor's policy of spurning
OPEC-assigned production quotas and scrapped plans to sharply increase the
nation's productive capacity. Oil prices immediately picked up. In
recognition of Ch�vez's new leadership role in OPEC, Venezuela was awarded
the presidency of the organization.
On his historical tour of ten OPEC nations in August, Ch�vez recalled a
remark made by Ronald Reagan about OPEC in 1986 when oil prices plunged.
Ch�vez stated: "We should never again allow ourselves to be 'put to our
knees.'" The purpose of the trip was to personally invite all of OPEC's
heads of state to the organization's Second Summit on September 27-28 in
Caracas. The meeting was an initiative of the Ch�vez government, as was the
"price band" system in which member nations increase or reduce production in
order to ensure that prices oscillate between 22 and 28 dollars. At the
summit, Ch�vez proposed the creation of an OPEC bank to serve as an
alternative to multilateral lending agencies for the world's poorest
nations.
Beyond the host of differences that separate Venezuela and the United
States, two basic developments trouble Washington. First, Ch�vez's third
worldism may catch on throughout Latin America and the rest of the world. On
August 30, The New York Times pointed out that the State Department would
much prefer to see Brazil's discrete Fernando Henrique Cardoso as the
continent's top leader than the "firebrand" Hugo Chavez whose foreign policy
contains "anti-American elements." Second, more than any other OPEC nation,
Venezuela is responsible for oil price hikes and under Ch�vez has emerged as
the organization's driving force. Of course, the revitalization of OPEC that
Venezuela has fomented and the resurgence of third worldism are
interrelated.
In the face of the growing tension between Washington and Caracas throughout
1999, Peter Romero took flack from the Pentagon which considered Ch�vez's
rejection of U.S. aid in the wake of the December 15th hurricane a slap in
the face for this country. Romero, a 23-year career diplomat, is
particularly vulnerable because his appointment by Clinton in July 1998 has
yet to be confirmed by Congress. Romero's unusually blunt remarks in Spain
may have been a face-saving device. Indeed, Ambassador Maisto told Foreign
Minister Rangel that Romero made them in his own name, an opinion that was
seconded by Clinton's Special Assistant for Inter-American Affairs, Arturo
Valenzuela.
Nevertheless, another opinion was voiced by the New York Times, which
interpreted Romero's remarks as a warning to Ch�vez on the part of the
Clinton administration. They may have also signaled a stiffening of the U.S.
position and the triumph of the hard-liners in Washington, who include not
only Pentagon officials but several ex-ambassadors to Venezuela. This
interpretation was reinforced by the replacement in August of Ambassador
Maisto by hard-liner Donna Hrinak coming from Bolivia.
Peter Romero's remarks in Spain came close to approximating the infamous
stereotype of the Ugly American in the prophetic book published 42 years
ago. Romero may justify himself by pointing out that globalism's newfangled
morality gives him the right to insist on standard norms for democracy and
even political behavior in general throughout the world. He may also
consider that a new hard line from the U.S. is what is needed to force
Venezuela into step. Certainly if the issue were possible electoral fraud as
it was in Peru, Romero's statement would have produced less controversy and
have been unanimously defended by Washington policy makers. But in this
case, tension stems from Venezuela's effort to redefine democracy with the
aim of making it more authentic, and its assertion of an independent foreign
policy. A nudge from the U.S. -like the fatuous remarks of Ambassador Louis
Sears in The Ugly American - far from being timely may backfire by
aggravating differences and radicalizing positions.
Steve Ellner is the co-editor of The Latin American Left: From the Fall of
Allende to Perestroika (Westview). He has taught economic history at the
Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela since 1977 and has written scores of
articles as well as three books on Venezuelan history and politics.
END
_______________________________________________
Crashlist resources: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/crashlist
