> > > MER WEEKEND READING: > > EXPOSING ISRAEL'S ORIGINAL SINS > > By Gideon Levy > > "Correcting a Mistake - Jews and Arabs > in Palestine/Israel, 1936-1956," by > Benny Morris, Am Oved Publishers, > 241 pages, NIS 64 > > > Oh, we were so good (and did so many bad things). We were so right (and > caused so many injustices). We were so beautiful (and our actions resulted > in so much ugliness). And oh, we were so innocent and spread so many lies - > lies and half-truths that we told ourselves and the rest of the world.We, > who were born afterward, weren't told the whole truth; they only taught us > the good parts, of which there were many. But, after all, there were also > dark chapters which we heard nothing about. Instead, we were fed lies - > there's just no other word for it. > > They lied when they told us that the Arabs of Lod and Ramle "asked to leave > their cities" (the head of the history department of the Israel Defense > Forces). They lied when they told us that the murderous Kibiya operation was > carried out by "enraged residents" (David Ben-Gurion). They lied when they > told us that all the "infiltrators" were bloodthirsty terrorists, that all > the Arab states wanted to destroy us and that we were the only ones who > simply wanted peace all the time. > > They lied; oh, how they lied. We didn't hear a thing about the horrific > massacre in Safsaf; and not a syllable was uttered about the deportation > plans. > > The Arabs were always the bad guys. We were the absolute righteous, or the > exclusive victims - or so we were told. Perhaps they didn't want to spoil it > for us; perhaps they didn't want to ruin it for themselves. The huge > celebration of a nation without a country that came to a country without a > nation, settled it, caused its barren wilderness to blossom and established > a glorious state - with exemplary, impeccable morality - should have been > complete. As large, true and deserving as it may be, however, this > celebration cannot be complete without recounting its entire history. > Historical mud-slinging > The time for telling the whole truth is well upon us. Over the past 12 years > or so - and much to the distress of the "old" historians, whose enterprises > are developing cracks - a number of "new" historians have taken up the > challenge. > > The rage with which the old historians are responding to the new historical > enterprise is, perhaps, the entire story: If they had questioned their > truths, which are beginning to crumble before their denying, repressive > eyes, it is doubtful whether they would be so angry. After all, if they are > so sure of themselves, why are they reacting so vociferously and making such > a fuss? History, as the saying goes, will be the judge ... won't it? > > As the doubts begin to surface, with Yitzhak Rabin, the banisher of the > Arabs of Lod and Ramle, admitting his deeds even before the historian who > tried to ignore and cover them up did, it is easy to understand the > mud-slinging campaign that the old historians are waging against their new > colleagues. With nowhere else to turn, this is their last resort. With no > other sanctuary available, patriotism, as per usual, becomes the safe > harbor. > > Benny Morris certainly has a large stake in the new historical enterprise, > even if it would have been better if he had let others determine that, "The > turning point ... came in 1988, heralded, inter alia, in the first article > in this compilation" (page 12). Morris' two earlier books - "Israel's Border > Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to > the Suez War" (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), and "The Birth of the > Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1948" (Cambridge Middle East Library, > 1987) - are foundations for an understanding of the roots of the > Israeli-Arab conflict. > > If you want to understand the Palestinian uprising in the territories, go to > these two books. If you want to understand why a settlement is impossible > without a solution to the refugee problem, go to Morris. All the > early-warning signs appear in his works. They show how our relationship with > the Arabs began. Everything that followed, up until this very day, is > anchored in their - and particularly our - original sins, which Morris and > his colleagues have exposed. > > Don't get me wrong. Among his colleagues, the new historians, Morris is > certainly the least political and most Zionistic. His name doesn't appear on > the protest petitions of the extreme left, and he defines himself as a > Zionist, without reservations. He is more concerned with his historical > findings than he is with their political and moral implications. Sometimes, > his findings appear to cause him a certain discomfort, but you won't catch > him voicing unequivocal moral assessments of his revelations, as chilling as > they may be, particularly not to anyone who didn't know an Avraham (or > Ibrahim) of those days. > > He hasn't written ideological articles either. As assiduous a researcher, > and as hard-working an in-the-field reporter (Morris began his professional > life as a journalist) as he was, he presents the story and leaves us to draw > most of the conclusions. > > Morris' conclusions, one can safely assume, are a lot more forgiving than > one would expect, and in this, lies his strength: Despite the claims leveled > against the new historians, Morris does not home in on a target before > embarking on his research. Neither does he hesitate to present findings that > contradict or weaken his basic theories. For Morris, the experience > determines the consciousness, and not vice-versa. A small ideologist and a > significant historian - that's Morris in a nutshell. > > His new book, "Correcting a Mistake," is a collection of articles that come > together to form a gripping, infuriating collage of injustices committed > between 1936-1956 by the Jewish community of Palestine, and thereafter, the > state, against the native Palestinians. > > No contrition > > This time, in contrast to his other books, Morris doesn't focus on one > particular issue. Contrary to the connotations stemming from the name of the > book, this is not an expression of contrition. Morris doesn't present new > findings to sweeten the previous bitter pills he asked us to swallow. Quite > the opposite: Regrettably, the opening of the archives, which had been > closed for some 50 years, and the exposure of new material has shed more > light on the picture, which Morris had painted, in shadow, and which now, > stirs up more fury than he first imagined. > > "The Deportations of the Hiram Operation: Correcting a Mistake" is the title > of the article from which the collection takes its name. "Sometimes a > historian must correct a mistake," Morris writes, and the reader is riveted. > Perhaps it never happened? Perhaps there were no deportations or massacres? > Perhaps Morris was wrong and everything was done by the book? > > Not a chance! Over a decade after the publication of "The Birth of the > Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1948," Morris reveals that he did, indeed, > make a mistake, but errors and omissions accepted. He believed Major General > (res.) Moshe Carmel and other sources, who told him that no deportation > orders were issued during the course of Operation Hiram, to be the dirtiest > there was. > > And now, the IDF archives have been opened and there we find a cable dated > October 31, 1948, signed by Major General Carmel and addressed to all the > division and district commanders under his command: "Do all you can to > immediately and quickly purge the conquered territories of all hostile > elements in accordance with the orders issued. The residents should be > helped to leave the areas that have been conquered." > > Perhaps this was the right thing to do; perhaps there was no alternative. > But why lie all these years? Why didn't they say: "Righteousness encountered > righteousness; a victim encountered a victim; and this was the inevitable > result. We had to deport them. It was either them or us." It's a lot more > convincing than lying about it. The only thing is, Carmel's deportation > order isn't the whole truth which Morris reveals in "Correcting a Mistake." > > Apparently, Carmel's troops carried out massacres in no less than 10 (!) > villages in the north of the country. They would gather the men of these > villages in the square, choose a few of them, sometimes dozens, stand them > up against a wall and shoot them. Because the IDF has kept the relevant > document under wraps, we know nothing about these massacres. We can only > hope that this nonsense, this outrageous practice of keeping things > confidential, passes from the world and that 52 years on, we will eventually > learn everything - where we went wrong and the evil things we did. > > Blood-chilling testimonies > > In any event, Morris presents a number of blood-chilling testimonies, first > hand, about the massacres carried out during Operation Hiram, the numbers of > which are different to and far more serious than any other operation. No, he > doesn't say that Carmel ordered the massacres; who knows, perhaps there's > another confidential document that does, and Morris will have to correct > another mistake. But, he deduces - based on the large number of incidents in > this particular operation, their similar nature, and the fact that no one > was punished in their wake - that the commanders understood Carmel's orders > to be a stamp of approval for acts of murder that would make the residents > of the villages flee. > > Up until a short while ago, one could have run into the pleasant-mannered > Carmel, who served as a government minister on behalf of the now-defunct > Achdut Ha'avoda and Ma'arach parties, sitting in the Beit Ariella municipal > library in Tel Aviv, seven days a week, and browsing through the newspapers > like one of the pensioners. He was also among the very good people who did a > number of very bad things. > > Terrible things were done after the War of Independence, too; for example, > in the town of Majdal in 1950. At that stage, Israel was already quite sure > of itself - big, but not big enough, as far as it was concerned. > > Some 10,000 Palestinians lived in Majdal before the war and, in October > 1948, thousands more refugees from nearby villages joined them. Majdal fell > in November and most of its residents and refugees fled wherever they could, > leaving some 3,000 inhabitants, mostly women and the elderly. Orders in > Hebrew and Yiddish were posted in the streets of the town, warning the > soldiers to be aware of "undesirable" behavior on the part of the town's > residents. "As was customary in such instances," the Israeli intelligence > officer wrote, "the behavior of the population was obsequious and > adulatory." > > Majdal was too close to Gaza for Israel's liking. In December 1948, IDF > soldiers "swept through" the town and deported some 500 of its remaining > inhabitants. In 1949, Yigal Allon demanded "to transfer all the Arab > inhabitants." Ben- Gurion objected. An inter-ministerial committee for the > "transfer of Arabs from place to place" - yes, we had one of those as well - > decided to thin out the population somewhat; another ministerial committee - > "on abandoned property" - decided to settle Majdal with Jews. > > >From committee to committee, Majdal was "Judaized," until, with 2,500 Jewish > residents, it became known as Migdal-Ad. > > In December 1949, more Arabs were deported so as to vacate a few more houses > - "abandoned property" - for a few more discharged soldiers. The IDF made > the life of those Arab who remained a misery, hoping they'd get the message. > The new commanding officer of the Southern Command, Moshe Dayan, rekindled > the ideas of his predecessor, Yigal Allon. > > "I hope that perhaps in the coming years, there will be another opportunity > to transfer these Arabs [170,000 Israeli Arabs - G.L.] out of the Land of > Israel," he said at a meeting of the Mapai faction, outlining its ideas > while in uniform. Dayan backed up his words with actions: He submitted a > detailed proposal for "the evacuation of the Arab inhabitants of the town of > Majdal." The chief of staff agreed and Ben-Gurion authorized the plan. The > government was circumvented, the Histadrut labor federation objected, and > Rabin informed the residents. > > The transfer began at the beginning of 1950, although the "official > operation" took off in June. There were still those who spoke of dispersing > the Arabs around the country; in the end, they were deported to Gaza. They > were loaded onto trucks and dropped off at the border - "deliveries," as > they were termed. Just to remind you again, the state already existed. The > last delivery of 229 people left for Gaza on October 21; the Egyptians > didn't bat an eyelid. > > Back in Israel, the officials pondered over how to distribute the > "abandoned" houses, most of which went to individuals who had some political > clout. In 1956, Migdal-Ad changed its name to Ashkelon. To this very day, > the former residents of Majdal live in the shacks and shanties of the > refugee camps in Gaza. > > How many Israelis know this story? How many have heard it before? How many > have ever thought of the refugees on whose destroyed homes the city of > Ashkelon was founded? > > 'Tearful assassin' > > But the most enlightening and probably most significant document presented > in the book is the journal of concerned-citizen Yosef Nachmani, perhaps the > original tearful assassin, certainly not the last. > > For 40 years, Nachmani spearheaded the Zionist enterprise in the Land of > Israel - a high-ranking member of the pre-independence underground, Haganah; > the director of the offices of the Jewish National Fund in Tiberias; and the > man responsible for purchasing and settling land throughout the Galilee and > Jezreel Valley regions. > > Nachmani's beliefs underwent numerous upheavals all through his life: At > first, he supported the transfer; then, he sobered up. At first, he was in > favor of adopting a harsh approach; then, his conscience started eating away > at him. At first, he dispossessed; then, he denounced. At first, he fired; > then, he cried. > > But above all, he was a fascinating observer. At least one particular > portion of his journal requires repeating here: " ... the acts of cruelty > committed by our soldiers. After they went into Safsaf, the village and its > people raised a white flag. They separated the men from the women, tied the > hands of some 50 to 60 peasants and shot and killed them, burying them in a > single hole. They also raped a number of the women from the village. > Alongside the wood, he [probably an eye-witness by the name of Freedman - > G.L.] saw a few dead women, among them one who was holding her dead child in > her arms ... > > "In Salha, which raised a white flag, they carried out a real massacre, > killing men and women, about 60 to 70 people. Where did they find such a > degree of cruelty like that of the Nazis? They learned from them." > > Bosnia? Kosovo? Chechniya? Rwanda? No, not at all; right here, and not that > long ago. > > Morris, as calculated as ever, concludes: "The fundamental change in the > thoughts and actions of Nachmani between 1947-1949 leaves the observer with > a sense of paradox and admiration and gives him a key to understanding > Zionism and its success. Zionism has always had two faces: a constructive, > moral, compromising and considerate aspect; and a destructive, selfish, > militant, chauvinistic-racist one. Both are sincere and real ... The > simultaneous existence of these two facets was one of the most significant > keys to the success of Zionism" - shooting and weeping. > > But, there were also incidents in which they shot - oh, and how they shot - > and didn't weep at all. And lied. This is the picture that emerges from the > chapter about the Israeli press at the time of the Kibiya affair, which > expresses the dark side of the then already five-year-old state: no longer a > community struggling to establish a country, but an orderly, victorious > state, thought of as a democracy, with David Ben-Gurion, who lies, > poker-faced, and its press, which brazenly conceals scandalous information > from its readers and even lies knowingly - all for the glory of the State of > Israel. > > "First of all, the facts," as Morris writes. On the night of October 12-13, > 1953, a group of infiltrators crossed the border into Israel, reached Yehud > and threw a grenade into the home of the Kanias family. The mother and her > two young children were killed. Retribution was two days in coming: Soldiers > from the IDF commando unit (Unit 101) raided Kibiya, going from house to > house, throwing in grenades and shooting indiscriminately. The result: 60 > dead, most of them women and children. > > The Israeli leaders did not make mention of most of these facts to the > public, but worse still - a thousands times worse - neither did the Israeli > press. The Mapai newspaper, Ha'dor, tried, at first, not to refrain from > reporting a thing about the massacre; the other newspapers offered partial > and even blatantly false versions of the story. > > Morris, on the article in Ma'ariv by the legendary Azriel Carlibach: "There > is hardly one sentence among Carlibach's words that does not defile, distort > or twist the truth, either explicitly or implicitly; whereas the words of > Radio Ramallah, as quoted in the Hebrew press, were almost all the simple > truth." > > Most of the press - aside from Kol Ha'am, and later Ha'aretz and Al > Hamishmar, all of which expressed reservations - reported that the Kibiya > killers weren't IDF conscripts, but rather outraged residents that went out > to seek vengeance. Unit 101 or outraged residents? The press and then prime > minister David Ben-Gurion knew, Morris writes, that this was a > propaganda-like lie. > > I read this chapter twice - once, before the outbreak of the "Al-Aqsa > Intifada"; and then again, a short while thereafter. After my first reading, > I was incensed by the Israeli press of old - a collaborator and distorter - > and I took pride in the long way it has come since then. > > After my second reading, and in the wake of the way in which the new > Intifada has been covered by sections of the Israeli media, I was faced with > the following question: Have we really changed, or perhaps, in testing > times, does the Israeli press return to its bad old place of being the > state's trumpet, just as it was in Kibiya, just as Morris describes? Then, > the press inflamed passions by giving prominence to the Israeli victims > (relatively few) and playing down the Arab ones (tenfold more), greatly > enhancing the Israelis' sense of being the victim, the exclusive sufferers. > > So, is there anything new under the sun? > > The things that Morris writes about the Kibiya press hold true, in part, for > the press of the past few days: "As a whole, the press approached the Kibiya > operation as an enlisted press, justifying, no matter what, government > policy and the actions of the IDF ... The feeling was that if the entire > world was denouncing [Israel], then the press here must unite, to beautify > and repel the criticism." > > Some things never change. > > Isn't it best for us to know about all these things? Isn't it important for > us to know about all these things, particularly now, in such difficult > times? That's where it all started. That's how it all began > > Ha'aretz � - 3 November 2000 > _______________________________________________ Crashlist resources: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.wwpublish.com/mailman/listinfo/crashlist
