The Yugoslav president is far from the puppet the west had hoped for, reports our foreign affairs specialist Simon Tisdall Thursday March 8, 2001 Vojislav Kostunica, the man who replaced Slobodan Milosevic as Yugoslav president after last autumn's "people's power" revolution, is proving to be a bit of a disappointment to many in the west. In a speech this week in Banja Luka, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kostunica said that US and European leaders should stop fretting about Milosevic's extradition to the Hague war crimes tribunal and focus instead on ethnic Albanian violence in and around Kosovo. Unlike Milosevic, Kostunica is a genuine democrat. When he came to power, that seemed more important to outsiders than his avowedly nationalist outlook. Serbia's desperate need of western economic assistance after years of sanctions and Nato's devastating 1999 bombing campaign also suggested that Kostunica would be a compliant partner in restoring regional stability. Instead, Kostunica has doggedly adhered to his strongly held view that the Serbs were the principal victims of the Balkan wars of the past 12 years. He has repeatedly criticised Nato peacekeepers for their actions in UN-administered Kosovo (which remains sovereign Yugoslav territory) and for failing, in his view, to combat Albanian "terrorism" in Serbia's Presevo valley and the adjoining border with Macedonia. And despite the increasingly furious protestations of Carla Del Ponte, the war crimes tribunal's chief prosecutor, Kostunica continues to argue against the extradition of Milosevic. Ms Del Ponte described Kostunica as an "unreconstructed nationalist' this week and said she had found him "hostile" during a recent meeting in Belgrade. She threatened to seek punitive measures through the UN if Yugoslavia persisted in obstructing her work. Some leading Serb politicians believe Milosevic must be surrendered to the Hague. An opinion poll published last week suggested most Serbs agree. But others say he should be tried at home on charges ranging from attempted murder to fraud, that convincing evidence will take time to collect and that extradition requires a new act of parliament. Ms Del Ponte gives such arguments short shrift. Her tribunal has no shortage of evidence against Milosevic relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity, she says. So just hand him over. The US takes a similar view. It has set the end of this month as a deadline for at least the commencement of cooperation with the Hague. If the deadline is missed, it threatens to withhold $100m (#70m) in aid. There was speculation meanwhile about a possible compromise under which Milosevic would be surrendered to the tribunal but allowed to stand trial in a special session on Serbian soil. Kostunica's comments in Banja Luka that the west, distracted by the Milosevic case, was failing in its principal task of bringing "prosperity and peace" to Kosovo, will further alienate the Nato allies. There is also more than a touch of hypocrisy here. Given Serbia's deplorable record with respect to Kosovo's Albanians, and in dealing with Muslim populations in general, Kostunica's sudden concern for Kosovan welfare looks unconvincing to say the least. Despite serious security problems on Kosovo's borders with Macedonia and Serbia and continuing ethnic Albanian violence within the province, the presence of the 42,000 peacekeepers has enabled the UN administration to make considerable progress. The west also continues to provide large amounts in aid, bilaterally and more broadly through the EU's Balkan Stability Pact. The US coordinator for assistance to eastern Europe, Larry Napper, told a Kosovo donors' meeting in Pristina last month that Washington had pledged more than $700m in 1999 and that up to $94.3m was available in 2001, depending on what other donors provided. He noted that more than 3,000 police officers have now been trained by the UN. Napper said the US assessment was that "the economic and political situation in Kosovo has greatly improved since we last met in November, 1999" - a statement even Kostunica would be hard-pressed to rebut. Speaking at a Balkan summit convened in Skopje, Macedonia, last month, Chris Patten, the EU's external affairs commissioner, also said progress had been made. And he directly addressed Kostunica's concerns. "We have strongly condemned the violent and illegal terrorist actions by ethnically motivated extremist armed groups in south Serbia which could destabilise the region," Patten said, in a clear reference to ethnic Albanian insurgents in Presevo. "It is time for every Kosovar to make a stand against violence and outlaw its perpetrators." Since Napper and Patten spoke, Nato has stepped up border patrols, extended cross-border surveillance, moved up reinforcements and agreed to hand over control of parts of the Presevo buffer zone to Kostunica's forces. The Nato operation, known as K-For, is still open to criticism - particularly when it comes to the reluctance of US commanders to take risks. But Kostunica's claims that the west is ignoring the security situation and Kosovo's prosperity and merely obsessing instead about Milosevic clearly do not hold water. Clues to Kostunica's behaviour must be sought elsewhere. For a start, as Yugoslav president, his domestic powers are very limited. After last December's opposition victory in Serbia's parliamentary elections, he risks being eclipsed. So he needs to make his presence felt. Second, he wants to hold together what remains of his country. Montenegro's moves towards independence, which may take a leap forward after this April's elections, are an affront to his nationalist credo. Independence threatens further to erode his power-base - and Yugoslavia's very existence. But he knows that the west, too, is nervous about a Montenegrin secession. The same goes for the prospect of an independent Kosovo. Third, Kostunica knows that in his tussles with the west, he can count on Russia's support. Vladimir Putin has taken over from Boris Yeltsin as a champion of Orthodox Slavs. He weighed in this week, saying Nato's peacekeeping problems proved the west should never have intervened in Kosovo in the first place. Kostunica also knows that Belgrade's support is critical if the 1995 Dayton power-sharing agreement in Bosnia, presently under threat from breakaway Croat hardliners, is to continue to work. The reason he was in Banja Luka this week was to sign an agreement signalling closer ties with the Bosnian Serbs. Kostunica may be calculating that ultimately, Nato and the west will need a viable, friendly Yugoslavia more than they need the truculent, unbiddable Albanians they intervened in Kosovo to protect. Historically speaking, this has usually been the case. And it may be so again, notwithstanding the war of 1999. In this bigger drama, the ultimate fate of Milosevic plays but a small part. Email _______________________________________________ CrashList website: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base
