The US must use more than commercial ties with China and Russia to stop their alliances with rogue states, says Thomas Henriksen Published: March 15 2001 20:16GMT | Last Updated: March 15 2001 20:31GMT [The writer is senior fellow and associate director at the Hoover Institution] The agreement this week between Russia and Iran to deepen military ties lifts the curtain on a perplexing security challenge for the new Bush administration. It is the intensifying but little-recognised co-operation between rogue states and leading powers. The agreement, which may involve the sale of millions of dollars' worth of arms to Iran, is the latest example of an alarming trend. Last month's bombing by US and UK forces of Iraq's souped-up radar and command centres close to Baghdad, for example, was a response to another such agreement: among the main reasons for the strike was a growing threat from Iraqi anti-aircraft systems that, courtesy of Chinese advisers, was in the process of receiving a fibre-optic upgrade. This new dimension in containing Iraq heralds a different era in rogue state behaviour. Rogue regimes spread violence and terrorism as well as manufacturing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver these lethal payloads thousands of miles. Throughout the immediate post-cold war, rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran were viewed as isolated mavericks, loners that Washington could deal with individually without the added worry of existing ties to big states. This has changed. Both Moscow and Beijing returned to the cold war practice of employing proxy states to advance their agendas. But instead of pursuing an ideological goal of spreading communism, they utilise rogues for strategic and even commercial interests. Russian companies, for example, export for cash arms to Iraq and nuclear components to Iran, which threaten US interests and allies in the Middle East in a way that the Kremlin finds expedient. This way Moscow evens the political score for Nato's expansion eastward while demonstrating its need for due consideration in the corridors of power. Beijing facilitates North Korea's clandestine missile programme because this puts the US on notice for its sales of advanced aircraft and ships to Taiwan. In spite of declarations that it has no sway over its neighbour, China provides material assistance, returns North Korean escapees to Pyongyang and offers itself as a model for economic growth under a politically restrictive regime. A year ago, Kim Jong-il, the reclusive North Korean leader, made an unprecedented visit to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang, indicating a near-subordinate position toward China. Then he journeyed to Beijing. The North's sudden agreement to a head-of-state summit in June with the South was surely first blessed by Beijing. It is not difficult to discern the strategic rationale behind such manoeuvring: if tensions fall off on the Korean peninsula, there is little need of a strong US presence in the South. The North Korean supply of rocket engines to Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt and Iran raises hard currency, the North's international profile, and the ante for the US, which, since Bill Clinton's 1994 frame work agreement, has hoped to buy off this rogue's potential threat. For promising to suspend its nuclear programme, North Korea is to receive five billion-dollar nuclear reactors, financed mainly by South Korea and Japan. In addition, it will receive 500,000 tonnes of US oil a year until these facilities come online. Inter-rogue collaboration is another feature of the new security landscape. States as diverse as Pakistan, Syria and Libya buy missile technology from Pyongyang and work with North Korea to build delivery systems for deadly warheads. What options does this leave US policymakers? First and foremost, the US must recalibrate its policies to take account of changing realities. Since impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most pressing priority, it strengthens the case for an American missile defence system as well as a credible theatre missile defence - a regional equivalent of National Missile Defence - for strategic allies abroad. Only when the US feels secure from rogue missile firings or blackmail can it freely implement its foreign agenda and genuinely protect its allies. Second, the US must redouble its diplomatic exertions to halt Russian and Chinese exports of missile and weapons-related technology to rogues. Commercial engagement alone is not enough to nudge Moscow and Beijing towards free markets, human rights and peaceful relations. Finally, Washington must pursue forceful diplomacy that divides patrons from rogue regimes and neutralises rogues. Since circumstances differ, the steps to be taken against rogues can vary from muscular covert actions to topple a dictator to forms of economic and diplomatic engagement. But whatever the course of action, it must be sustained beyond the poll-driven photo-opportunity approach so characteristic of the Clinton presidency. _______________________________________________ CrashList website: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base
