That's a compilation of the discussion between me and Pat Hayes.
Please ask for interpretation of dead ends :). It all started from
the problem of having temporalized parts or not, and of course it
ended up with endurantism/perdurantism (aka 3D vs 4D)
--Aldo
PS the last (unquoted) text is mine
_____________________________________________________________________________
Some more clarification: our discussion seems to imply a strong
experimental part, which we are trying to carry out only through
thought experiments, then let's explicit them.
One can accept a pragmatic or natural-kind distinction between
object and process/event, without thereby buying into the
philosophical/ontological distinction between perdurant and
endurant. The latter is a theoretically biassed way of accounting
for the former.
that's good, provided that you give some minimal axiom to formally
discuss the difference (you can dismiss for example the partition
over the universe of part relations: what consequences can result
in a realistic domain modelling task?)
Well, that's why I said a natural-kind distinction. There may be no
actual axiom which is a clear basis for making the distinction, and
there doesn't need to be one. We can just make it, and tell people
to use their common sense (;-) to decide whether something fits
under either of the categories (or maybe both). Not a strategy that
would appeal to Aristotle or Kant, but so what? We aren't trying to
foundational metaphysics, right?
Not foundational metaphysics, but something that clarifies/encodes
one's commitments. Natural kinds can be axiomatized (with no
sufficient criteria).
If no axioms are provided, the distinction would blur most probably
in a short time (have you read Eco's "Kant and the Platypus"?),
because of discourse dynamics ... and if it blurs, any other one
could blur as well ... or if you want axioms for many others, why a
choice at this level should be so primitive that one must be silent
about?
If you want to *experiment* on sense shifting, that's a good beginning though.
With my colleague Massi Ciaramita, we have been discussing how to
design an experiment (there is a tradition in psycholinguistics,
going back at least to Rosch), and there is something that possibly
works for so-called "basic categories". And there are some
complications.
For these general notions, I don't think any experiment based on pure
names can work at all: subjects need to work over some intended
meaning, otherwise we get into a "family resemblance" chain, which
biases any such experiment.
E.g. figure out proposing either one of the following two lists of
words, asking to classify each word with either "object" or "event",
where the first item of the list is given (sentences in parentheses
can be considered as 'gedanken' (it's German, but never mind ;))
associations for the sake of our discussion, or used in the test
explicitly, in this case even without giving the first
classification):
object<-spoon (given)
.........<-water (I can take it with a spoon)
.........<-wave (it's made of water)
vs.
event<-sailing (given)
........<-sea-sickness (happens during sailing)
........<-wave (causes sickness)
I bet that a good percentage will keep object in the first list and
event in the second (by making similar associations)
notice that this frame effect (if any, I'm making an ideal experiment
of a test setting, which is not exactly science in this case) might
occur with most nouns, not only with literature cases like wave,
wind, fire, etc. E.g. (less intuitive, as expected, but think about
submitting images instead of words ...):
object<-piece of wood (given)
.........<-sawing machine (I can use it to cut the wood)
.........<-chair (I can produce it out of wood by using a saw)
vs.
event<-work (given)
........<-being tired (state that often occurs during work)
........<-chair (an affordance to take rest)
this could show that we are talking about two different ways of
partitioning reality, but also that they have a common gestalt.
Therefore, like the duck/rabbit figure, we can either choose to
represent ducks and rabbits separately with a relation linking them
at different times, or to represent temporal slices of a "dubbit" ...
ducks@t and rabbits@t will be more useful in some applications, while
dubbits in others.
Of course, if we choose some hard metaphysics addict, the results of
the test could be peculiar :)
There remains that the "scene settings" created to play those
linguistic games are definitely different, and much more important
than the distinction itself. Here I agree with you.
Nonetheless, with ducks@t and rabbits@t we need some part and
participation axioms, and temporal indexes, while with dubbits we
need snapshots and unity axioms to coreference them. Axioms are
needed anyway.
Are you still sure that a "pragmatic criterion" or "common sense" is
enough, whatever solution is adopted?
<snip>
Well, it makes very good sense in a lexicon, for essentially
lexical reasons. I don't think lexica have very much to do with
ontology design at all, however, at least the kind Im interested
in.
this goes against current best practices for ontology building
lifecycle, though
Ah, that is interesting. Can you elaborate? I wonder if there are
distinct methodologies of ontology building suitable for different
kinds of application.
of course yes, but I am saying that in case of large corporate or
organization ontologies, terminologies, thesauri and lexicon are an
obvious choice. Ontology learning is an alternative. Building from
scratch or eliciting from experts are better, but can be applied
mainly for small scale tasks, like core ontology building.
But aside from that claim, my point is more basic. I agree one
CAN handle all these cases in a DOLCE-style ontology by having
events and objects everywhere, ie basically by overloading. But
now I want to ask a purely pragmatic question: what is all this
duplication FOR? What purpose is served by distinguishing two
waves, and requiring the motion-across-the-ocean to apply to the
wave-object but the circular-motion-of-water to apply to
(actually to the objects included in) the wave-event, or the
flame-object to be eternal but the combustion to be going on in
the flame-process? None of this seems to me to be useful or
constructive or required for drawing any conclusions, and it
clearly gets in the way of applying the ontology to complex
cases. I wouldnt know where to start in trying to produce a
DOLCE ontology for, say, cellular biochemistry, where one has to
describe things like the Krebs cycle.
From here. Take this as a first contribution to a possible TF Note.
Interesting, thanks for sending it. And Ive been googling from
Acetyl CoA, quite fascinating.
It's complex, just the basic of it (very basic, I'm not a
specialist, although I'm working with biochemistry experts for a
DOLCE+-based ontology):
Process: Condensation
Phases (ordered process parts)
Temporally ordered? As in a sequence?
Yes
: Acetyl CoA condensation (1), Citryl CoA formation (2), Citryl
CoA hydrolyzation (3)
Participant substances: Citrate synthase (overall?), Acetyl CoA
(1), Oxaloacetate (1), Citryl CoA (2,3), Citrate (3), CoA (3)
Roles: Enzyme, played by Citrate synthase
OWL abstract syntax:
Class(Condensation partial
restriction(ProperPart someValuesFrom (Acetyl_CoA_condensation))
restriction(ProperPart someValuesFrom (Citryl_CoA_formation))
restriction(ProperPart someValuesFrom (Citryl_CoA_hydrolyzation))
restriction(TotalConstantParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf Citrate_synthase restriction(ClassifiedBy
someValuesFrom(oneOf(Enzyme))))
restriction(TotalTemporaryParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf Acetyl_CoA restriction(TotalParticipantIn
someValuesFrom (Acetyl_CoA_condensation))))
Interesting pattern. I am slightly suspicious of nested
restrictions. These all have a kind of circularity about them,
since they restrict values of a TemporaryParticipant to take
values in a set formed by restricting a TotalParticipantIn to have
values in the class being defined. I'm trying to understand this
intuitively. Is the idea that this process is a kind of
composition of three subprocesses, and what these restrictions do
is to 'place' the various reactants involved into the right
subprocess (?)
Right
<snip>
So this can be glossed as: there must be a temporary-participant
[substance involved which is] [the] Acetyl-CoA which participates
in the Acetyl_CoA-condensation [part of this process] (??) If so,
that last 'of this process' gets you out of OWL, right? Which is
what you are trying to sneak past with the 'total' vs. 'partial'
distinction? We've found similar issues here in a completely
different domain; you need something like 'role maps' to say this
stuff adequately, sigh.
Correct. No role value maps ... only reification can deal with that in OWL-DL
Blech, I'd prefer to give up on OWL than try to use reification seriously.
uhm, it can be logically boring, but there are reification ontologies
that seem to work nicely (btw, you're implying that the n-ary
relations note is junk ...)
restriction(TotalTemporaryParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf Oxaloacetate restriction(TotalParticipantIn
someValuesFrom (Acetyl_CoA_condensation))))
restriction(TotalTemporaryParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf Citryl_CoA restriction(TotalParticipantIn
someValuesFrom (Citryl_CoA_formation))))
restriction(TotalTemporaryParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf Citryl_CoA restriction(TotalParticipantIn
someValuesFrom (Citryl_CoA_hydrolyzation))))
restriction(TotalTemporaryParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf Citrate restriction(TotalParticipantIn
someValuesFrom (Citryl_CoA_formation))))
restriction(TotalTemporaryParticipant someValuesFrom
(intersectionOf CoA restriction(TotalParticipantIn
someValuesFrom (Citryl_CoA_formation))))
)
not enough anyway, because in OWL-DL you can't strictly express
coreference and time indexed properties.
Right. :-((
<snip>
More practically: do you think it's the same part-of relation applied to:
i) PatHayesYesterday -PART-OF-> PatHayesAsTemporalWorm
as to:
ii) PatHayesLiverYesterday -PART-OF-> PatHayesYesterday?
or even as to:
iii) PatHayesLiverAsTemporalWorm -PART-OF-> PatHayesAsTemporalWorm?
I think they have enough in common that it is worth drawing out
that commonality and making a single theory of it, yes.
Am I saying the opposite?
As I understand DOLCE, it renders such a single theory impossible.
Certainly I know that Simons' view of the distinction would rule
it out. If I am wrong, maybe you could explain what I would use,
in DOLCE, as the category of entities that would specialize into
endants and perdants and which would support the general parthood
theory (ie its quantifiers would range over that class.)
It is called "particular", "entity" if you prefer
But that is the top node of the entire taxonomy. I want to exclude,
for example, numbers and sets, which have no temporal extension.
those are in fact outside DOLCE (as datatypes), or inside, but as
"regions", which are particulars, but with no time; time is not
mandatory for the top node
<snip>
...objects that endure through time are extended in time, and can
be naturally described in the same way that anything else that is
temporally extended can be described. Me-yesterday is not present
today, of course (so if I go to a doctor and complain about my
liver, I'm usually taking about my liver at that time) but the
previous day of the cricket match is not happening today either.
The two cases seem exactly similar to me. I just don't see what
intuition or utility the distinction is supposed to capture.
you still have alternatives of comparable (?) complexity: temporal
slices, or temporal indexing of relations ... no special preference
from me, in general ... if you give me a case study, I can choose
with some discernment ...
<snip>
It is my belief that what this debate all boils down to in
ontological/formal practice is whether one prefers temporal
parameters syntactically attached to atomic propositions, or to
terms denoting things. The former is simpler, adequate for many
uses, and more in line with NL, but somewhat less general; the
latter is often a very neat way to state things like velocities or
trends (like an increasing osmotic pressure). I think we can allow
both, as long as we obey some rules of internal consistency.
that's glorious!
<snip>
--
Aldo Gangemi
Research Scientist
Laboratory for Applied Ontology
Institute for Cognitive Sciences and Technology
National Research Council (ISTC-CNR)
Via Nomentana 56, 00161, Roma, Italy
Tel: +390644161535
Fax: +390644161513
[email protected]
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