The New Zealand example has a kind of counterpart in the so called Droit Moral/Moral Rights connected with IPR. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_rights). Moral Rights is not limited in time. By decorating a Mona Lisa copy in a offending manner you can taken to court accussed for violating Leonardo's Moral Right. Who posesses the rigths? Leonardo who died 500 years ago?
Chr-Emil ________________________________________ From: Crm-sig <[email protected]> on behalf of athinak <[email protected]> Sent: 27 March 2017 08:04 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [Crm-sig] An interesting case of rights to think about.. Deal all, I agree with all of you - basically, this case was a good example to use in order to question models of ownership or transfer of custody relating to rights and actors, that's why I mentioned it, BRs Athina Kritswtaki Στις 2017-03-25 20:41, martin έγραψε: > Dear Franco, > > I think your analysis is exactly up to the point. I think the question > is not so much, if the CRM is interested in modelling such a thing, > obviously it is out of scope so far, but to understand the distinction > between human terms and the actual concepts they represent. Clearly, > the identification of the river with a human being is a metaphor, > which shows how far stretched such metaphors can be, but still be > operational if suitably interpreted, otherwise the Maori wouldn't have > won the case. That does not mean, that we should extend E39 Actor with > this river, nor that the Maori confuse rivers with human actors. > Therefore I do not see a need to change the scope note, even if it > were in scope. Rather, we have to do with another instance of an even > more abstract phenomenon, that might be very interesting to understand > some time. > > For me, this is a didactic example not to be fooled by surface > language terms in ontological analysis. George Lakoff, in "Women, Fire > and Dangerous Things" describes this "prototype effect", i.e, how a > core metaphor, such as "human being", can be extended in different > ways, with NO COMMON CORE meaning. > The question is always which definition of the behaviour of instances > of some concept answers which question. > > You write: "In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note > e.g. that the person(s) having property rights on something may not be > an actor because may be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by > definition, cannot perform intentional actions. In this case, how do > we document ownership? And what is the (CRM) relationship of the > guardian to the ward? " > > This touches a fundamental question of exception handling. Since these > persons are accidentally handicapped and not a systematic life form, > I'd argue that they fall under the "potentially capable of intentional > action", and hence are actors. > > To be discussed, a very nice topic of logic versus reality, intension > versus potential. > > All the best, > > Martin > > On 25/3/2017 1:37 μμ, Franco Niccolucci wrote: > >> Dear Oyvind >> >> I was interested from the question raised by Athina as well, and >> started writing a reply similar to yours, but there remained some >> doubts, so I left it in my large drawer of open issues. >> >> I understand you suggest (as I planned to do) to model the river as >> an E40 Legal Body. i.e. a subclass of E39 Actor, which, according to >> its scope note, "comprises people, either individually or in groups, >> who have the potential to perform intentional actions of kinds for >> which someone may be held responsible. The CRM does not attempt to >> model the inadvertent actions of such actors.” >> >> Now, although the statement by the NZ government quoted in the >> article refers to the “liability” of the river, is there any >> intentionality in e.g. a flood? Can the river be called in court for >> the damages? I do not think so. In my opinion, but we should ask >> Maoris, the river has rights but no intentionality. It is similar to >> natural persons who are "unfit to plead", for example because of >> mental insanity or for young age, and so cannot be held responsible >> for their acts: they cannot have a “mens rea” (guilty mind). >> This consideration applies to bad behaviour, but of course it >> applies to good one as well: for them there is no merit or guilt in >> doing things. Nevertheless, such people have rights: even animals >> do. They can even hold “legal rights”, for example they may own >> things, with guardian(s) to act as trustees on their behalf. >> >> Obviously the river guardians have to do anything possible to avoid >> disasters, but cannot be held responsible for acts of God. So, what >> is the difference between them and a river authority? This deprives >> the news of much of its appeal: a National Park has similar >> “rights” although not defined as a person, which are managed by >> its director, the government or whatever. The Maori river story >> seems much more a political/philosophical question rather than a >> legal one. >> >> However the example, beyond the picturesque news, shows that either >> there is a need of rephrasing the above-mentioned scope note; or >> that the CRM is not interested in such situations (I would go for >> the latter). >> >> If so, who P75 possesses the E30 rights: the guardian, who may be >> held responsible, or the rightful right owner, who cannot? The E40 >> scope note suggests it is the guardian, and probably the same holds >> for the Maori river. >> >> In any case it should be explained in the E40 scope note e.g. that >> the person(s) having property rights on something may not be an >> actor because may be incapacitated to be liable and thus, by >> definition, cannot perform intentional actions. In this case, how do >> we document ownership? And what is the (CRM) relationship of the >> guardian to the ward? >> >> In sum: >> the river guardians -> E39 Actors >> the river itself -> E? >> the guardians towards the river -> P? >> >> Best regards >> >> Franco >> >> Prof. Franco Niccolucci >> Director, VAST-LAB >> PIN - U. of Florence >> Scientific Coordinator >> ARIADNE - PARTHENOS >> >> Piazza Ciardi 25 >> 59100 Prato, Italy >> >> Il giorno 25 mar 2017, alle ore 11:15, Øyvind Eide >> <[email protected]> ha scritto: >> >> Dear Athina, >> >> I have not moved beyond the article (thanks for posting it, it is a >> very useful addition to other complex land right issues!) but by >> reading that it seems like the river has the right of a legal >> person, not an individual. Is that right? If so, the river can be >> seen as an organisation, in line with the (and connected to) a group >> of people (the Whanganui iwi). Or it can be seen as an organisation >> connected to the two guardians, who will speak on behalf of the >> legal person (the river). >> >> Can this be seen as similar to, for instance, a trust? Then a lawyer >> appointed to speak on behalf of the trust would be in line with the >> two guardians of the river. >> >> All the best, >> >> Øyvind >> >> On 20 Mar 2017, at 12:57, athinak <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Dear all, >> >> relating to the rights triangle P75,P104, P105 we proposed, here is >> an interesting case of right holding: >> > https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being >> [1]. >> The approach of the tribe is unique: the river is granted legal >> rights as human-being; can we apply this (rights possessed by >> river?) in the model? is there a possibility to find an equivalence >> between human's behavior and a behavior of a phenomenon and in what >> way? is there a generalization missing? >> think about this, >> BRs >> >> Athina Kritsotaki >> _______________________________________________ >> Crm-sig mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig [2] >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Crm-sig mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig [2] > > _______________________________________________ > Crm-sig mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig [2] > > -- > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > Dr. Martin Doerr | Vox:+30(2810)391625 | > Research Director | Fax:+30(2810)391638 | > | Email: [email protected] | > | > Center for Cultural Informatics | > Information Systems Laboratory | > Institute of Computer Science | > Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas (FORTH) | > | > N.Plastira 100, Vassilika Vouton, | > GR70013 Heraklion,Crete,Greece | > | > Web-site: http://www.ics.forth.gr/isl [3] | > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Links: > ------ > [1] > https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being > [2] http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig > [3] http://www.ics.forth.gr/isl > > _______________________________________________ > Crm-sig mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig _______________________________________________ Crm-sig mailing list [email protected] http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig
