Short question: Rights are often given according to some codified law which is operationally defined and perhaps more comparable to a plan while the concepts in the philosophy of law is whats behind?
Christian-Emil ________________________________________ From: Crm-sig <[email protected]> on behalf of Robert Sanderson <[email protected]> Sent: 21 August 2017 20:57 To: George Bruseker Cc: crm-sig; David Newbury Subject: Re: [Crm-sig] End of Existence for Rights? Thanks for the clarifications George! In my view, that’s (b) – the concept of a legal privilege which continues to exist far longer than it is enforced by any legal construct that enacts that right. For example, the concept of owning slaves in the USA certainly existed before it was law, and there are hundreds of millions of people who carry that concept in their memory, reinforced daily by society. The concept of that legal slavery exists today, but the legal construct that enables slavery does not. It would be very strange to assert “The legal right of owning a person as a slave exists in the USA today”… whereas it is very much true that the concept of the law exists. The time frame for the existence of the concept is necessarily open-ended (if there is a CRM description, there is a carrier), and the beginning is also pretty much impossible to know with any certainty. Did they conceive of slavery in North America before there was a USA for it to apply in? Probably? The creator of the concept is also different from the creator of the legal construct. It’s a matter of public record as to the activity that made the concept a legal right, and also the activity that ended the existence of that legal right. The location of the creation of the concept and the location of the creation of the right are also different. Or, to use a much easier example … the concept of the ownership of a painting continues to exist after the legal ownership that it is the concept of has ended. The museum director might be the creator of that concept, but her legal team might be the creator of the legal ownership. For “specifically real legal privileges” … what about proposed rights that never come into effect? There is memory and carrier of the concept, but no legally binding construct. History is, of course, littered with proposed bills that never become law. And for use cases, we have tons of them :) especially in the Provenance Index and related provenance research. Here’s a few obvious (hopefully) ones: * The duration of the legal right of ownership of an object by an organization * Partial gifts: where the organization owns a share in the object, and the donor owns the rest * Ad-hoc art dealer shared ownership: Where two or more dealers purchase an object, and divide the proceeds when it is sold according to the original amounts paid * Discover all of the known ownership rights of paintings in effect in 1856 (as opposed to having been conceived before 1856) * Discover all of the agreements put in place by a particular team or agent (as opposed to having been conceived by someone) To avoid creating a new “Legal Right” class versus the current “Concept of a Legal Right” class, I still feel that the easiest solution is to add a timespan during which the right was in effect to the current class. We can do that in an extension, but it would be nice to exhaust all possible avenues in the core ontology before doing that. I’ll split the passive activity to a different thread, but thank you (again) for bringing it up as we have run into that as well in this context of ownership. Rob On 8/21/17, 5:30 AM, "George Bruseker" <[email protected]> wrote: Dear all, I will try to succinctly state my ideas on the matter. In terms of the last question: > > Either > > (a) A Right _is_ a legal privilege, and thus it can stop existing when the legal privilege that it models no longer exists (counter to the conceptual object argument) > Or > > (b) A Right is the concept _of_ a legal privilege, and thus it can be one that is not justified by law, such as the most basic case of the necessary existence of the Right after the sale of the object by the holder of the Right. > > It cannot be both. Which is it? > If the dilemma derives from my previous post, it’s not exactly what I meant to imply. A right IsA Conceptual Object in the CRM sense that it is a product of the mind and fits in the class hierarchy of such real world objects and should be consistent to the modelling thereof. The beginning of existence of a conceptual object relates to its being formulated as a thought and probably somewhere documented. As a well established principle of CRM, instances o conceptual object to not cease to exist until there is no more knowledge of them. Therefore, I would argue that the begin condition of a legal right should be specified in the scope note of E30 to make clearer when it begins and to specifically indicate that this is not when the right comes into force (be extension not when it goes out of force), but rather when the right is formulated. It may be the case that in the scope note which we should enrich, the specific conditions of such a formulation of a right should be further refined in order to detail under what conditions the specific subclass of Conceptual Object that is Right can be said to come into existence. The formulation might speak of how such a begin is not only thinking abstractly of having the right over the Mona Lisa but rather must be asserted as an idea within an known legal framework or according to an established principle or some such under which the Actor in question could conceivably claim/assert this right. I did not intend to say with my remarks that a Right is _merely_ the idea or concept of a right (although I can see how it might have read that way). Rather, I meant to say that because a right has been formulated/claimed (in the restricted sense I mention above) it may have come into existence and yet not be in force (meeting the conditions above of ‘being thought about’ and ‘being formulated by an actor who acts within some known legal framework or principle whereby they can reasonably be assumed to assert such claim). Likewise, once it has gone out of force, I would think that the instance of E30 Right has not ceased to exist but is merely our of force (we did not lose our knowledge about it which I believe is what we would intend if we said that it had ended to exist… there are no more carriers). Quoting from E28 scope: "They (ALL instances of E28 including instances of its subclasses -G.B.) cannot be destroyed. They exist as long as they can be found on at least one carrier or in at least one human memory. Their existence ends when the last carrier and the last memory are lost." So, my intended point was that the begin and end conditions of right are not when it is valid/in force but something else. With regards to Rob's proposal on typing then: > I agree with George that a new property to assert that the [notion of the] Right applies over a particular timespan would be the easiest solution. Then has_type can be used to distinguish between actually legal Rights, and ones that are not legally valid or binding. This would also make the sale of stolen objects significantly easier to model – it is the creation of a Right, with a has_type for its illegal status, that applies during the period until the item is discovered to have been stolen. I don’t think it is necessary. The class, I think, really should pick out just those instances in the world of conceptual object that are specifically real ‘legal privileges concerning material and immaterial thing or their derivatives’. Of course these could be contested. That would be another good use of node (to document some argument for example that it is not valid, as per, I think, Steve’s suggestion). The overall issue should be clarified, in my opinion, by a more robust scope note that specifies the identity, unity, begin and end conditions of existence of instances of E30 Right. With regards to the subsequent modelling question of: >> >> In terms of activities, I don’t think that quite fits, even with the problematic-in-RDF P16.1. I could assert that Stephen possesses the reproduction rights for the Mona Lisa … that doesn’t imply that Stephen carried out any activity. I think that this raises an additional question of the scope note of E7. The scope note of E7 Activity and its label suggest ‘action’ to many users of the CRM: 'This class comprises actions intentionally carried out by instances of E39 Actor that result in changes of state in the cultural, social, or physical systems documented. This notion includes complex, composite and long-lasting actions such as the building of a settlement or a war, as well as simple, short-lived actions such as the opening of a door’ Yet the scope note also indicates, and it is fundamental to many CMR based models, that we are not speaking of some constantly on-going act. The Peloponnesian War lasted 30+ years but there were intervals in which it was not ‘happening' at all. It would still be an instance of E7 to my understanding. What an instance of E7 does necessarily imply to my reading, is some conscious intention towards something (that can be perceived by 3rd parties and therefore documented). So, to my mind, so long as this is the case with the data under discussion (people aren’t taking up rights unbeknownst to themselves), then the E7 used specific object proposal that Steve proposes would function. In fact, in this case, where it seems that the issue under investigation is indeed active participation in arts dealing (if I understood correctly) and who actively used what and in what amount, it seems quite appropriate. The whole thing does raise the issue of whether we make this potential passivity of an instance of E7 action more clear in the scope note. As to Rob’s seconding of my proposal for ‘validity time’ relations on E30: >> I agree with George that a new property to assert that the [notion of the] Right applies over a particular timespan would be the easiest solution. Thanks for the seconding. It is true as Steve remarks that we should have use cases or there is no point to model it, but I think there are such use cases and that it would be worth discussing at a SIG. I think the semantics would be different that the 'E7 used object' modelling, since something can be in force and not used (see Greek anti smoking law). This seems to turn toward the questions that were being raised in the last SIG about modelling ‘planned activities’ in relation to E29 Design or Procedures, I believe and could be raised in relation to this? Finally, with regards to the implementation issue and the .1s in RDF, do you or have you tried to use the CRMpc solution? Sorry for the length and hope it was a useful contribution to the conversation. Best, George > Rob > > On 8/20/17, 6:46 AM, "Stephen Stead" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Robert > I am unclear how your thought experiment of "conceiving" of a right fits into the definition of an instance of E30 Right as a "legal privilege". Is your experiment is to consider what we might do about contested knowledge about instances of E30 Right; to consider fraudulent instances of rights that might be represented in knowledge systems as instances of E30 Right or as the basis of defining a new class or classes? If the later do you have any examples from documentation systems that we could draw on? > > To aid my understanding of your sample snippets could you include the Class and Property identifiers. The sample for the lament cloth (from the website) is very clear, if a little more verbose, but would make your examples easier to follow for me. > > Your assertion that an instance of E39 Actor P105R has right on E22 Man Made Object implies that you believe that instance of E39 Actor did perform the activity of holding the right and this can then be represented with an instance of E7 Activity. The case of you believing this statement to be untrue is dealt with using CRMinf. > Rgds > SdS > > PS Representing this in RDF is an implementation issue not a modelling one and the SIG has given guidance on possible Open and Closed World resolutions to the problem. > > Stephen Stead > Tel +44 20 8668 3075 > Mob +44 7802 755 013 > E-mail [email protected] > LinkedIn Profile https://www.linkedin.com/in/steads/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Sanderson [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 15 August 2017 17:23 > To: [email protected]; 'George Bruseker' <[email protected]> > Cc: 'crm-sig' <[email protected]>; David Newbury <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Crm-sig] End of Existence for Rights? > > > Dear Stephen, George, all, > > To make sure that we’re on the same page, if Rights are to be treated as concepts rather than the legal application of the concept, then I can conceive of the Right that I personally own Van Gogh’s “Irises”. Not even that I am claiming to own the painting, just the notion of a theoretical ownership. I can write that down on a piece of paper and sneak it into our archive, ensuring that there is at least one carrier of this Right. Thus, I could legitimately assert the existence of a Right, which applies to Irises and is possessed by me … correct? And the creation of the idea is unrelated to the claimed period over which the rights are asserted to be possessed – I can conceive of my ownership lasting precisely 15 minutes, in the future. So the utility of “Right” as a class is very limited – it has nothing to do with the actual legal right of ownership (despite the scope note), it is instead an idea of ownership that makes no claim about reality. > > If this is a correct understanding, it would be good to update the scope notes for E30 to clarify that it’s not the actual legal privileges in any meaningful sense. > > > The full extent of what we’re trying to capture is the situation where different parties have (legally or just by agreement between them) hold different shares in the object. For example, a partial gift to a museum, where the value transfers over time from the donor to the museum (for tax reasons, one imagines), or for situations where art dealers collaborate to purchase an object, and then share the profits of sale in the same proportions (a good example of distinct ownership versus physical custody!). > > In order to capture the proportion of ownership as a Dimension, we were very happy that has_dimension has a domain of Thing … and thus can be used with Conceptual Object and Right. Right can be partitioned with has component from E89. Thus: > > _:r1 a Right ; > applies_to <painting> ; > possessed_by <group> ; > has_component [ > a Right ; > has_dimension [ > a Dimension ; > has_value 70 ; > has_unit <percentage> ] ; > possessed_by <member1> ] , > [ > a Right ; > has_dimension [ > a Dimension ; > has_value 30 ; > has_unit <percentage> ; > possessed_by <member2> ] . > > <group> a Group ; > has_current_or_former_member <member1>, <member2> . > > Thus, to avoid the transfer of a Right (which cannot be modeled, per previous discussions), we create and destroy hierarchical Rights similar to the example above. > > I agree with George that a new property to assert that the [notion of the] Right applies over a particular timespan would be the easiest solution. Then has_type can be used to distinguish between actually legal Rights, and ones that are not legally valid or binding. This would also make the sale of stolen objects significantly easier to model – it is the creation of a Right, with a has_type for its illegal status, that applies during the period until the item is discovered to have been stolen. > > In terms of activities, I don’t think that quite fits, even with the problematic-in-RDF P16.1. I could assert that Stephen possesses the reproduction rights for the Mona Lisa … that doesn’t imply that Stephen carried out any activity. > > Rob > > > On 8/15/17, 4:42 AM, "Stephen Stead" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Dear Rob, George and all, > George is absolutely correct that the right is the conceptual object of the right itself regardless of whether it is current or not. I do not agree that we need some new link from the right to time. The simple construct is to use an E7 Activity that uses a specific object (P16) (The right) and has a participant Actor in a specific role. If the right is on another object then that object is also a used specific object (remember P16.1 mode of use is also available). I think this covers the scenarios that Rob is trying to deal with but would be very interested to see if there are other problem situations. > TTFN > SdS > > Stephen Stead > Tel +44 20 8668 3075 > Mob +44 7802 755 013 > E-mail [email protected] > LinkedIn Profile https://www.linkedin.com/in/steads/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Crm-sig [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of George Bruseker > Sent: 15 August 2017 09:08 > To: Robert Sanderson <[email protected]> > Cc: crm-sig ([email protected]) <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Crm-sig] End of Existence for Rights? > > Dear Rob et al., > > I would say that the modelling of conceptual object and its begin/end relation is correct also in this instance. It is not the existence of the right qua concept that terminates when the right over something expires. I would argue that the right can exist before it comes into validity or goes out of it. A right qua power over x lasts as long as its validity. We seem to have an equivocation of what we want to invoke by this class, the right qua concept or qua power over. Might want to think more about the scope note. But modelling wise, I think it might be addressed by having a new property for validity period which would define the limits of the right qua power and be distinct from its existence. > > As an example to support my case, I would say that Michael Jackson’s Right over the Beatles Catalogue from 1985-2006 continues to exist qua conceptual object to this very moment (there are many carriers of this idea and we are referring to it now), but its validity period has definitely expired and is more or less known. > > Other ideas? > > Best, > > George > > >> On Aug 15, 2017, at 12:44 AM, Robert Sanderson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> Dear all, >> >> We are looking to express a Right that applies to an Object, such as Ownership. As the Right only applies for a limited duration, we had though to create the Right as part of the Acquisition of the Object and then to have it be taken out of existence by the subsequent Acquisition. Thus the Right, which as previously discussed is specific to the people and objects involved, would only be documented as existing when the specific people actually own the Object. >> >> However, Rights are Conceptual Objects, which state in their scope notes: >> >>> They [Conceptual Objects] cannot be destroyed. They exist as long as they can be found on at least one carrier or in at least one human memory. Their existence ends when the last carrier and the last memory are lost >> >> So although Rights are Persistent Items and can thus have an End of Existence, the scope note for Conceptual Object clarifies that they only actually have an End of Existence when there is no memory of them. This means for all practical purposes that it can never be used, as if there is no memory of it, then there could be no description in CRM of it. >> >> This means that we cannot ascribe an end to the Right without ignoring the scope notes for Conceptual Object? Or is there another method to provide time-limited scope to the application of the legal privileges that the E30 embodies? >> >> Many thanks, >> >> Rob >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Crm-sig mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig > > > _______________________________________________ > Crm-sig mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig > > > > > > _______________________________________________ Crm-sig mailing list [email protected] http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig
