CRYPTO-GRAM
March 15, 2010
by Bruce Schneier
Chief Security Technology Officer, BT
[email protected]
http://www.schneier.com
A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.
For back issues, or to subscribe, visit
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.
You can read this issue on the web at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-1003.html>. These same essays and
news items appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog at
<http://www.schneier.com/blog>, along with a lively comment section. An
RSS feed is available.
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
In this issue:
Al-Mabhouh Assassination
Small Planes and Lone Terrorist Nutcases
News
The Doghouse: Demiurge Consulting
Schneier News
TSA Logo Contest Winner
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Al-Mabhouh Assassination
I've been fascinated by the assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud
al-Mabhouh -- not the politics, but the tactics -- mostly because the
Dubai police released surveillance video of the assassins moving around
the city. (The actual assassination took place in a hotel room, and
there's no video of that.)
I used the story as a news hook for a CNN.com essay on surveillance
cameras. Here's the first paragraph:
On January 19, a team of at least 15 people assassinated Hamas leader
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. The Dubai police released video footage of 11
of them. While it was obviously a very professional operation, the
27 minutes of video is fascinating in its banality. Team members
walk through the airport, check in and out of hotels, get in and
out of taxis. They make no effort to hide themselves from the
cameras, sometimes seeming to stare directly into them. They
obviously don't care that they're being recorded, and -- in fact
-- the cameras didn't prevent the assassination, nor as far as we
know have they helped as yet in identifying the killers.
A former CIA field officer wrote an interesting essay on the al-Mabhouh
assassination:
The truth is that Mr. Mabhouh's assassination was conducted
according to the book -- a military operation in which the
environment is completely controlled by the assassins. At least 25
people are needed to carry off something like this. You need "eyes
on" the target 24 hours a day to ensure that when the time comes
he is alone. You need coverage of the police -- assassinations go
very wrong when the police stumble into the middle of one. You
need coverage of the hotel security staff, the maids, the outside
of the hotel. You even need people in back-up accommodations in
the event the team needs a place to hide.
I found this conclusion of his incredible:
I can only speculate about where exactly the hit went wrong. But I
would guess the assassins failed to account for the marked advance
in technology.
[...]
Not completely understanding advances in technology may be one
explanation for the assassins nonchalantly exposing their faces to
the closed-circuit TV cameras, one female assassin even smiling at
one.... The other explanation -- the assassins didn't care whether
their faces were identified -- doesn't seem plausible at all.
Does he really think that this professional a team simply didn't realize
that there were security cameras in airports and hotels? I think that
the "other explanation" is not only plausible, it's obvious.
The number of suspects is now at 27, by the way. And:
Also Monday, the sources said the UAE central bank is working with
other nations to track funding and 14 credit cards -- issued
mostly by a United States bank -- used by the suspects in
different places, including the United States.
We'll see how well these people covered their tracks.
This is my first blog post, which got a lot of reader speculation:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/al-mabhouh_assa.html
The surveillance video, in three parts
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JghQ0ZcRfQs&feature=player_embedded
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8XDhnEJ-N0&feature=player_embedded
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWxjxTaWytE&feature=player_embedded
My CNN.com essay:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-309.html
The surveillance camera industry rebuttal:
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/surveillance-industry-responds-bruce-schneier
or http://tinyurl.com/ybmanxq
More speculation on how the assassins got into al-Mabhouh's hotel room:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/03/breaking_in_to.html
The former CIA's officer's essay:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704479404575087621440351704.html
or http://tinyurl.com/ye2dtpp
More commentary on the tactics:
http://www.thecoldspy.com/middle-east/assassination-tango-mahmoud-al-mabhouh-2/
or http://tinyurl.com/yzoa4r9
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7034933.ece
or http://tinyurl.com/yl99yyb
Speculation that it's Egypt or Jordan. I don't believe it.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1153316.html
Mossad?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/19/ian-black-mossad-dubai
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/03/01/uae.murder.probe/index.html?hpt=T2
or http://tinyurl.com/yfo4lry
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Small Planes and Lone Terrorist Nutcases
A "Washington Post" article concludes that small planes are not the next
terror threat. What this analysis misses is our ability to terrorize
ourselves. After all, who thought that a failed terrorist incident --
nobody hurt, no plane crash, terrorist in custody -- could cause so much
terror?
On the face of it, Joseph Stack flying a private plane into the Austin,
TX IRS office is no different than Nidal Hasan shooting up Ft. Hood: a
lone extremist nutcase. If one is a terrorist and the other is a
criminal, the difference is more political or religious than anything else.
Personally, I wouldn't call either a terrorist. Nor would I call Amy
Bishop, who opened fire on her department after she was denied tenure, a
terrorist.
I consider both Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber) and Bruce Ivins (the
anthrax mailer) to be terrorists, but John Muhammad and Lee Malvo (the
DC snipers) to be criminals. Clearly there is a grey area.
I note that the primary counterterrorist measures I advocate --
investigation and intelligence -- can't possibly make a difference
against any of these people. Lone nuts are pretty much impossible to
detect in advance, and thus pretty much impossible to defend against: a
point Cato's Jim Harper made in a smart series of posts. And once they
attack, conventional police work is how we capture those that simply
don't care if they're caught or killed.
Washington Post article:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/19/AR2010021905765.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yeeegrn
Joseph Stack:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,586929,00.html
Nidal Hasan:
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1938415,00.html
Discussing the difference:
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/02/23/newsweek/index.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yzjvgxx
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/02/22/muslim-activists-question-terrorism-definition/
or http://tinyurl.com/yc59c24
http://correspondents.theatlantic.com/lane_wallace/2010/02/what_qualifies_as_terrorism.php
or http://tinyurl.com/y9ghefd
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/02/19/austin-plane-crash-suicide-or-terrorism/
or http://tinyurl.com/yfffsnc
Amy Bishop:
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/crime/2940-prof-kills-three-at-uah-a-gun-free-school-zone
or http://tinyurl.com/ye8vw69
Theodore Kaczynski:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Kaczynski
Bruce Ivins:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/20anthrax.html
John Muhammad and Lee Malvo:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DC_snipers
Jim Harper's blog posts:
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/11/10/the-search-for-answers-in-fort-hood/
or http://tinyurl.com/yhbcb9g
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/11/11/fort-hood-reaction-response-and-rejoinder/
or http://tinyurl.com/y997ngc
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/11/17/fort-hood-that-no-such-attack-ever-occurs-again/
or http://tinyurl.com/yfqw64p
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
News
I had no idea this was being done, but erased answers are now analyzed
on standardized tests. Schools with a high number of wrong-to-right
changes across multiple tests are presumed to have cheated: teachers
changing the answers after the students are done.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/education/12georgia.html
A new Trojan Horse named Spy Eye has code that kills Zeus, a rival botnet.
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9154618/New_Russian_botnet_tries_to_kill_rival
or http://tinyurl.com/ybkrgrj
Interesting blog post, with video demonstration, about an improved tool
to open high security locks with a key that will just "form itself" if
you insert it into the lock and wiggle it a little. The basic technique
is a few years old, but the improvements discussed here allow the tool
to open a wider variety of locks than before.
http://blackbag.nl/?p=1122
There was a big U.S. cyberattack exercise last month. We didn't do so well.
http://www.darkreading.com/security/cybercrime/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=222900775
or http://tinyurl.com/y9mqfj9
http://www.thenewnewinternet.com/2010/02/16/more-must-be-done-to-prepare-us-for-cyber-attack/
or http://tinyurl.com/ydv6e5f
This debit card skimmer is installed inside gas pumps. There's nothing
the customer can detect.
http://www.sacbee.com/crime/story/2420301.html
"LVMPD found that one of these skimmers can be installed in eight
minutes flat." Also, pictures.
http://bobarno.com/thiefhunters/2009/06/new-skimmers/
Mark Twain on risk analysis, from 1871:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/mark_twain_on_r.html
Just declassified by the NSA: "A Reference Guide to Selected Historical
Documents Relating to the National Security Agency/Central Security
Service, 1931-1985." Formerly "Top Secret UMBRA." From my quick scan,
there are minimal redactions.
http://www.governmentattic.org/3docs/NSA-SelHistDocs_1931-1985.pdf
It's a really creepy story: a school issues laptops to students, and
then remotely and surreptitiously turns on the camera.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/remotely_spying.html
Hitler and cloud computing: a funny video by Marcus Ranum and Gunnar
Peterson.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VjfaCoA2sQk
Nice essay by Tom Engelhardt on fear of terrorism:
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175206/
Similar sentiment from Newsweek:
http://www.newsweek.com/id/233591
Crypto implementation failure? I originally thought this AES-encrypted
USB memory stick was one, but a blog reader corrected me.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/03/crypto_implemen.html
On March 2, the White House published an unclassified summary of its
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI).
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/03/comprehensive_n.html
Interesting paper: "A Practical Attack to De-Anonymize Social Network
Users."
http://www.iseclab.org/papers/sonda-TR.pdf
News article:
http://www.darkreading.com/insiderthreat/security/client/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=223100436
or http://tinyurl.com/yldt8uf
Moral: anonymity is really, really hard -- but we knew that already:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/04/identifying_peo.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/05/on_the_anonymit.html
Good legal paper on the limits of identity cards: Stephen Mason and
Nick Bohm, Identity and its Verification."
http://www.stephenmason.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/bohm-mason-identity.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/ycmhvsm
Eating a flash drive: how not to destroy evidence/
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/2010/0302101flash1.html
IARPA -- the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, the U.S.
intelligence community's answer to DARPA -- wants a trust detector.
It's good to dream.
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-02/us-spooks-want-better-gauge-trust-matter-life-and-death
or http://tinyurl.com/yhpvxnk
Interesting commentary by Marc Rotenberg on Google's Italian privacy case:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-rotenberg/brandeis-in-italy-the-pri_b_481115.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yk9ofss
A hollowed-out U.S. nickel can hold a microSD card.
http://www.boingboing.net/2010/02/16/hollow-spy-coins-for.html
Pound and euro coins are also available.
https://makersmarket.com/sellers/82-brian-dereu
Old blog post about this:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/12/hollow_coins.html
Nose biometrics:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8543292.stm
A guide to Microsoft police forensic services was leaked online.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/03/guide_to_micros.html
Over at Wikibooks, they're trying to write an open source cryptography
textbook.
http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cryptography
Interesting paper on typosquatting:
http://www.benedelman.org/typosquatting/typosquatting.pdf
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2010/02/17/measuring-typosquattings-perpetrators-and-funders/
or http://tinyurl.com/ygnya9y
Cartoon: why DRM doesn't work:
http://www.bradcolbow.com/archive.php/?p=205
Google in The Onion:
http://www.theonion.com/content/news/google_responds_to_privacy
This USB combination lock is a promotional security product designed by
someone who knows nothing about security. The USB drive is "protected"
by a combination lock. There are only two dials, so there are only 100
possible combinations. And when the drive is "locked" and the connector
is retracted, the contacts are still accessible. Maybe it should be
given away by companies that sell security theater.
http://www.staplespromotionalproducts.com/ProductDetail.aspx?id=2953
The Spanish police arrested three people in connection with the
13-million-computer Mariposa botnet.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100303/tc_afp/spaincanadausitinternetsoftwarecomputercrime
or http://tinyurl.com/ykv2bza
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/04/mariposa_police_hunt_more_botherders/
or http://tinyurl.com/ycursrx
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f6960e5a-2711-11df-b84e-00144feabdc0.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/click/rss/1.0/-/2/hi/technology/8547453.stm
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article7047853.ece
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10462718-245.html
http://defintel.blogspot.com/2009/10/mariposa-botnet-analysis.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
The Doghouse: Demiurge Consulting
They claim to be "one of the nation's only and most respected security
and intelligence providers" -- I've never heard of them -- but their
blog consisted entirely of entries copied from my blog since December
24. The posts were credited to "Anonymous," and weren't linked back to
my blog. They didn't even cull the posts that were obviously me: posts
about interviews I've given, for example.
I contacted them last month and asked that they stop stealing my blog
posts. I got an apologetic e-mail in response:
Please accept my apologies about the republishing of your blog
posts.
Quite honestly our web development team was tasked with finding
some interesting content to keep the blog component of our firm's
website compelling and up to date; it is clear that they took my
request out of context. Ironically, I rarely even look at my own
firm's website!
I have had them stop the republishing immediately. I know of you
by reputation, truly respect your work and thank you for being so
gracious in your request; you very well could have been obtuse.
Again, I personally apologize for this situation.
Best,
Karim
Karim is Karim Hijazi, whose e-mail sig file identifies him as
"Principal/Founder." Despite the nice e-mail, nothing happened for a
week. They didn't steal any new posts, but they didn't take down the
old ones either. I suppose I could have sued them, but public ridicule
seemed more fitting.
So I posted the above information to my blog. The stolen posts
immediately came down, with this message in their place:
Speaking to the team that handles the blog component of the
Demiurge website, I have learned not only have they been able to
find at least 23 other websites syndicating content from Mr.
Schneier's blog, but there are more than three websites offering
full blog post syndication links including Schneier's blog.
Further, why would you find it offensive if we find your content
very interesting to our clientele? If we really were trying to
make it look like our content, don't you think we would have
scrubbed it? Besides all the links went back to your bloody
blog... just more viewers for you. You weren't thinking when you
tried to flame us Bruce.
All you had to do was ask us to stop syndicating, which we did.
That's now gone, and there's a reworked website.
http://www.demiurgeconsulting.com/
Blog entry:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/the_doghouse_de.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Schneier News
I finally have control of my Facebook page. There'll be nothing on it
that isn't on my blog or Crypto-Gram, but some of you might prefer
following my writing from there.
http://www.facebook.com/bruce.schneier
I also have a Twitter account, although I've never posted. And a
Twitter feed for my blog, which simply announces and links to each post.
http://twitter.com/schneier
http://twitter.com/schneierblog/
Interviews:
http://www.v3.co.uk/v3/news/2258899/rsa-2010-q-bruce-schneier
http://www.simple-talk.com/opinion/geek-of-the-week/bruce-schneier-geek-of-the-week/
or http://tinyurl.com/yl7ro58
I'm speaking via video link at the 2nd Annual Data Protection
Conference, in Dublin, Ireland.
http://www.ics.ie/index.php/component/option,com_eventlist/Itemid,61/id,41/view,details/
or http://tinyurl.com/ycjfs35
I'm speaking at the CACR Higher Education Security Summit in
Indianapolis, IN, on April 1.
http://www.indiana.edu/~uits/cacrsummit10/
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
TSA Logo Contest Winner
In January, I announced a contest to redesign the TSA logo. Last week,
I announced the five finalists -- chosen by Patrick Smith from "Ask the
Pilot" and myself -- and asked you all to vote on the winner.
Four hundred and seven votes later, we have a tie. No really; we have a
tie. Rhys Gibson and "I love to fly and it shows" have 135 votes each.
(It's still a tie at 141 votes each if I give half credit for all
split votes.) Both are well ahead of the third place winner, with 81
votes. There were a few ambiguous comments that could possibly break
the tie, but rather than scrutinize the hanging chad any more closely,
I'm going to appeal to the judges to cast the deciding votes.
Although both logos are excellent, both Patrick Smith and I vote for
Rhys Gibson.
Congratulations.
Contest announcement:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/01/tsa_logo_contes.html
Semi-finalists:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/tsa_logo_contes_1.html
Winner:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/tsa_logo_contes_2.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Since 1998, CRYPTO-GRAM has been a free monthly newsletter providing
summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer
and otherwise. You can subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address
on the Web at <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. Back issues
are also available at that URL.
Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM, in whole or in part, to
colleagues and friends who will find it valuable. Permission is also
granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM, as long as it is reprinted in its entirety.
CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the
best sellers "Schneier on Security," "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies,"
and "Applied Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish, Twofish,
Threefish, Helix, Phelix, and Skein algorithms. He is the Chief
Security Technology Officer of BT BCSG, and is on the Board of Directors
of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent
writer and lecturer on security topics. See <http://www.schneier.com>.
Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not
necessarily those of BT.
Copyright (c) 2010 by Bruce Schneier.
