John Gilmore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> What are you guys talking about? Differential power analysis doesn't
> require any physical attack, nor does it deal with voltage
> variations. (You are probably thinking of Shamir's fault-injection
The usual setup for DPA involves a 10 Ohm resistor which sits in the
power supply and measuring the voltage across that resistor. The
countermeasure we're talking about is an on-chip capacitor that
smoothes the power consumption, or a power supply inside an
tamper-resistant package such as the Dallas iButton, which essentially
serves the same purpose.
> algorithms. Paul Kocher's team has developed some countermeasures,
> see the end of the technical discussion linked from:
Making it impossible to measure the power consumption _is_ one of the
countermeasures discussed there.
Andreas
--
"Niemand hat die Absicht, eine Firewall einzurichten"
-- Peter Berlich <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, dasr
