Anonymous writes:
> > 8. Receipt�freeness: A voter can't prove to a coercer, how he has
> > voted. As a result, verifiable vote buying is impossible.
>
> It appears that the votehere system does not satisfy this, since the vote
> is published in encrypted form, so the voter can reveal the plaintext in
> a verifiable way. Of course even if the system mathematically protected
> against this you could still sell your vote by voting at home while the
> vote buyer watched you.
Any time you're allowed to vote in a manner which a third party can
observe everything you observe, they can affect your cost of voting
one way or another.
It's much more fun to try to disprove a positive statement. So let's
try. Perhaps the voting is in a challenge-response form? Given a
number, the voting executes a pre-arranged algorithm on it, and votes
with the results of the algorithm. That would work, presuming that
the algorithm has enough bits of entropy to confound cryptanalysis.
There's a bunch of problems, though: the algorithm has to be
executable in someone's head, without any intermediate values being
transcribed. The algorithm has to be memorized. The algorithm has to
be coordinated with the vote-taking authority.
Does this sound like the pre-computer key distribution problem to you?
Sure does to me, so much so that I would say that this disproof
disproves nothing in a world where guys pick their girlfriend's name
as their password, and where people can keep 5+-2 things in their head
at any one time.
--
-russ nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://russnelson.com
Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | Government schools are so
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