In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Matt Crawford" writes:
>
> If you're going to trust that CryptoSat, inc. hasn't stashed a local
> copy of the private key, why not eliminate all that radio gear and trust
> CryptoTime, inc. not to publish the private key associated with date D
> before date D?
The minor answer is that I could postulate that CryptoSat sells slots for
various parties (including senders of time-delayed messages) to install their
own tamper-resistant boxes.
But the major answer is time scale -- I only have to trust CryptoSat for a
short period, while I have to trust CryptoTime for the entire delay period.
The real answer, though, is that you're probably right -- there's too much
temptation in this field to use technical mechanisms, when contract law will
suffice.
--Steve Bellovin
