Ray Hirschfeld <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> There are a number of results in the crypto literature on receipt-free
> voting, most recently (that I'm aware of) one presented by Kazue Sako
> at last month's Eurocrypt 2000. Receipt-freeness means that voters
> cannot demonstrate to third parties how they voted, and thus addresses
> the bribery and coercion issue.
If I recall those presentations correctly, they made the assumption
that there is some separation between the voter and any coercer. Or
more precisely, that the voting system is able to send at least one
*private* message to the voter. If the coercer can watch all
communication between the voter and the system, the receiptfree-ness
doesn't help at all.
And that's more or less an abstract way to say that you still need the
voting booth.
/Niels
