Meyer Wolfsheim <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> The only reasons I see for having a security system (be it an encryption
> product, or a physical access device) with a large discrepancy in the level
> of security that the individual components provide is either:
[snip reasons a, b and c]
I'm sure you've thought of this, but there's also a reason (d):
because the most convenient component for a particular application is
vastly more secure than you need. When using a cipher as a component,
you might as well use a ludicrously strong one like Rijndael or
Blowfish, because there's nothing to be gained from using a weaker
one. Good locks are more expensive than bad ones, but strong crypto
is free.
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