Cryptography-Digest Digest #812, Volume #8 Tue, 29 Dec 98 22:13:03 EST
Contents:
Re: U.S. Spying On Friend And Foe (Anthony Stephen Szopa)
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From: Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: U.S. Spying On Friend And Foe
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1998 18:57:09 -0800
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Mark Adkins wrote:
> You know, I wasn't going to post this, but I've just caught part of a
> debate on C-SPAN regarding whether Jonathan Pollard should be released
> early, and I was offended by the sanctimonious bleating of people like
> David Klinghoffer of National Review, who have the audacity to compare
> the revelation of technical intelligence to a foreign ally by Pollard
> to the case of Aldrich Ames. The United States has some nerve! (For
> those who may be interested, I am neither Jewish nor pro-Israel. I
> simply find the hypocrisy of the United States Government appalling.)
> It's also enlightening to bear in mind what follows when considering
> U.S. Government proposals for cryptological systems and standards for
> domestic and export use. There is also some information regarding
> intelligence intercepts of Iranian (not Libyan) communications about
> the bombing of PanAm Flight 103.
>
> The article is particularly interesting since the United States spies
> on every country in the world except for Great Britain, Australia, and
> Canada -- see Ronald Kessler, _Inside The CIA_ (NY: Pocket Books,
> 1992) -- and quite frankly I'd be surprised if we abide even by those
> agreements. The position of the U.S. intelligence community has always
> been that since governments and leadership change, what is today a
> cooperative ally may tommorrow become obstructionist if not hostile
> ("obstructionism" being judged by the compliance of foreign leaders with
> the values and priorities of U.S. foreign policy) and that therefore it
> is a good idea to spy on allies as well as enemies since one cannot set
> up an espionage infrastructure in a foreign country overnight. We also
> spy on economic competitors like Japan. (Kessler, pp. 9-12) Generally
> speaking, these countries spy on us as well.
>
> What follows is the full text, including a sidebar article (which I
> have placed at the end of the main article) and footnotes, of an
> article by Wayne Madsen, an Arlington, VA based journalist specializing
> in computer security, privacy, and intelligence, who is also the author
> of _Handbook of Personal Data Protection_ (NY: Stockton, 1992). The
> article appeared in the Winter 1998 issue of CovertAction Quarterly,
> pp. 36-42. CAQ can be reached at (202) 331-9763 (voice), (202) 331-9751
> (fax), or [EMAIL PROTECTED] Their snail mail address is 1500 Massachusetts
> Avenue, N.W., #732, Washington, D.C. 20005. By way of disclosure to
> readers of this newsgroup, CAQ is an unabashedly left-wing periodical
> which sometimes produces intelligence-related articles of some interest
> and validity (and occasionally some embarrassing stinkers). As for this
> article, read it and decide for yourself.
>
> * * *
>
> CRYPTO AG: THE NSA's TROJAN WHORE?
>
> by Wayne Madsen
>
> copyright 1998 by CovertAction Quarterly
>
> It may be the greatest intelligence scam of the century. For decades
> the U.S. has routinely intercepted and deciphered top secret messages
> of 120 countries. These nations had bought the world's most sophisticated
> and supposedly secure commercial encryption technology from Crypto AG,
> a Swiss company that staked its reputation and the security concerns of
> its clients on its neutrality. The purchasing nations, confident that
> their communications were protected, sent messages from their capitals
> to embassies, military missions, trade offices, and espionage dens around
> the world, via telex, radio, teletype, and facsimile. They not only
> conducted sensitive albeit legal business and diplomacy, but sometimes
> strayed into criminal matters, issuing orders to assassinate political
> leaders, bomb commercial buildings, and engage in drug and arms smuggling.
> All the while, because of a secret agreement between the National Security
> Agency (NSA) and Crypto AG, they might as well have been hand-delivering
> the messages to Washington. Their Crypto AG machines had been rigged so
> that when customers used them, the random encryption key could be auto-
> matically and clandestinely transmitted with the enciphered message. (1)
> NSA analysts could read the message traffic as easily as they could the
> morning paper.
>
> The cover shielding the NSA-Crypto AG relationship was torn in March, 1992
> when the Iranian military counterintelligence service arrested Hans
> Buehler, Crypto AG's marketing representative in Tehran. The Iranian
> government charged the tall, 50ish businessman with spying for "the
> intelligence services of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
> States of America." (2) "I was questioned for five hours a day for nine
> months," Buehler says. "I was never beaten, but I was strapped to wooden
> benches and told I would be beaten. I was told Crypto was a spy center"
> that worked with foreign intelligence services. (3) Despite prolonged
> interrogation, Buehler -- who had worked for Crypto AG for 13 years and
> was on his 25th trip to Iran -- apparently maintained his ignorance. "I
> didn't know that the equipment was bugged, otherwise the Iranians would
> have gotten it out of me by their many 'methods'." (4)
>
> With millions of dollars in contracts and a major international spy
> operation at stake, the company was eager to make the incident and Buehler
> go away, even though the salesman had brought in 40 percent of Crypto's
> 100 million Swiss franc sales revenue. (5) Crypto bought Buehler's
> freedom with a $1 million payment to the Iranians, returned him to
> Switzerland, and then, astonishingly, fired him and ordered the
> bewildered salesman to repay the bond. The cover-up backfired, however,
> when current and former Crypto employees came to Buehler's defense and
> shared their firsthand knowledge of manipulated cipher equipment. "I
> hold proof of the rigging of code machines" said an unidentified former
> Crypto AG engineer. "Fifteen years ago, I saw American and German
> engineers doctoring our machines. (6) It took me some time until I was
> certain about the manipulations. The proof: technical documents...I
> put them in a bank safety deposit box. Then I informed the federal
> prosecutor's office in Berne. There were many conversations. Suddenly,
> these contacts were broken off and the affair petered out." (7)
>
> The engineer told another reporter: "the schemes and the cipher keys were
> created by them [NSA and BND (Bundesnacrichtendienst -- the German
> intelligence service)]. I immediately, discretely notified the Swiss
> prosecutors. There was an investigation. I was never able to find out
> the result. Today, the Buehler affair brings everything out in the open
> again. And, I'm afraid. What happened to Hans Buehler could happen to
> any other salesperson of Crypto AG. It's not a question of attacking
> this company; it's a question of saving lives..." (8)
>
> When the Swiss media began to reveal the background of Buehler's story,
> Crypto AG responded with a lawsuit in an attempt to quash the story and
> muzzle Buehler. (9) The suit was settled days before former Crypto
> engineers were to testify that they thought the machines had been altered.
> The parties agreed not to disclose the settlement and Crypto sought to
> reassure its clients. Informed sources in Switzerland and the Middle East
> confirmed that Crypto AG settled because it, and the NSA and BND, didn't
> want to reveal anything in court.
>
> Nevertheless, the damage to Crypto AG's credibility was already done.
> Customers from Saddam Hussein to the Pope grew nervous. Informed of the
> details around the Hans Buehler incident, the Vatican -- which uses Swiss
> cipher machines to secure diplomatic communications transmitted from the
> Holy See to the many papal nuncios around the world -- showed a marked
> lack of charity. An official branded the perpetrators "bandits!" (10)
>
> Although the Iranians may have been technically wrong about Buehler's
> complicity in the massive deception, they were right that something was
> rotten at Crypto AG. And even before the firing of Hans Buehler, some of
> Crypto's engineers were ambivalent about secret deals with the NSA. "At
> first, I was idealistic" said Juerg Spoerndli, who left Crypto in 1994.
> "But I adapted quickly. ...The new aim was to help Big Brother USA look
> over these countries' shoulders. We'd say, 'It's better to let the USA
> see what these dictators are doing.'" Soon, however, Spoerndli grew
> apprehensive over the manipulation. "It's still an imperialistic
> approach to the world. I don't think it's the way business should be
> done." Ruedi Hug, another former Crypto AG engineer, was also critical.
> "I feel betrayed," he declared. "They always told us, 'We are the best.
> Our equipment is not breakable, blah, blah, blah. ...Switzerland is a
> neutral country.'" (11)
>
> Apparently not. A document released in 1995 by Britain's Public Records
> Office indicates that Switzerland and NATO concluded a secret deal in
> 1956. The "Top Secret" document, dated February 10, 1956, with the
> reference "prem 11/1224," was written by the famous British World War II
> figure, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. While "Monty" was a vice-
> commander of NATO, he discussed a secret alliance with Swiss Defense
> Minister Paul Chaudet. In peacetime, Switzerland would be officially
> neutral, but in wartime, it would side with NATO. (12) A U.S. document
> released in 1995 shows Switzerland's importance to U.S. national security.
> A Presidential directive on national security prepared for President
> Truman states that "Switzerland...delivers precision instruments and other
> materials necessary for the armament of the USA and NATO countries." (13)
>
> Germany's BND, too, has apparently cooperated with the U.S. encryption
> rigging scheme through Siemens Defense Electronics Group of Munich. A
> previous director of Siemens called Crypto AG a "secret Siemens daughter"
> (14) while a former Crypto AG financial director said, "the owner of the
> firm [Crypto] is the Federal Republic [of Germany]." (15) The Siemens
> connection to Crypto was remarkably incestuous. Siemens provided
> technical assistance for the machine manipulation process. Suspicion
> about the German electronics giant's role in Crypto's operations was
> heightened when it was reported that Siemens helped raise the $1 million
> to spring Buehler from his Tehran prison cell. (16) In fact, after
> revelations of the Crypto-Siemens association hit the Swiss press,
> Crypto's managing director Michael Grupe informed the employees that the
> advisory board to Crypto's board of directors was being dissolved. The
> two advisors -- Alfred Nowosad and Helmut Wiesner -- were both full-time
> Siemens employees. With the world media describing the company as a
> silent partner of German and American signals intelligence (SIGINT)
> agencies around the world, Grube announced that "Crypto is changing its
> profile." (17)
>
> The German government's contribution to the encryption rigging scheme
> also included its pressuring another Swiss firm, Gretag Data Systems AG,
> to allow a "red thread" program to be installed in the encryption
> software. "Red threading" is the software equivalent of sending in a
> Trojan horse. (18) Once owned by AT&T, this encryption manufacturer was
> acquired in 1995 by Information Resources Engineering, Inc. (IRE), of
> Baltimore, Maryland. (19) Interestingly, IRE is staffed by a number of
> ex-NSA cryptographic engineers. (20) A third Swiss encryption company,
> Info Guard AG, was fully acquired by Crypto AG on June 16, 1994. Info
> Guard, which had been 50 percent owned by Crypto AG, primarily sells
> encryption units to banks in Switzerland and abroad. (21) Although
> German and American SIGINT agencies were involved in manipulating
> Crypto's cipher machines, Motorola, one of the NSA's major US
> contractors, performed the actual alteration, according to a former
> Crypto AG chief engineer who was personally involved in the manipulation
> process. (22)
>
> Once the cipher machines were rigged to include the secret decryption
> key, the BND and NSA codebreakers could use the transmitted key to read
> any message sent by Crypto AG's 120 country customers. One previous
> Crypto AG employee contends that all developmental Crypto AG equipment
> had to be sent for approval to the NSA and to the German Central Cipher
> Bureau (Zentralstelle fur Chiffrierung [ZfCH]), now the Federal
> Information Security Agency (Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der
> Informationstechnik [BSI], which is also Department 62 of the BND)
> in Bad Godesberg, near Bonn.
>
> In other cases, Crypto AG was apparently forced to market encryption
> equipment manufactured in the U.S., sent to Crypto and passed off as
> Swiss equipment. In the 1970s, as Crypto was moving from electro-
> mechanical to computerized crypto units, a former Crypto AG engineer in
> Switzerland inspected one of the first prototype computerized machines
> sent from the U.S. He remarked that since the code could be easily
> broken, he found the machine useless. But when he told his superiors that
> he could improve the encryption process if he was given access to the
> mathematical functions, two U.S. cryptographic "experts" refused to
> disclose the information. (23)
>
> According to a confidential Crypto AG memorandum, one of the NSA "experts"
> may have been Nora L. Mackabee, an NSA cryptographer who is now retired
> on a horse farm in Maryland along with her husband Lester, another retired
> NSA employee. Between August 19 and 20, 1975, three Crypto AG engineers
> huddled with Mackabee (identified as representing "IA" -- most likely
> "intelligence agency") along with three Motorola engineers and one other
> American, Herb Frank. One Motorola engineer recalled that Frank was
> probably from another U.S. intelligence agency based in northern Virginia
> but described him as a non-technical person who seemed to be making the
> administrative arrangements for Mackabee. (24)
>
> Crypto AG engineer Juerg Spoerndli, who was responsible for designing the
> firm's encryption equipment, had heard from older engineers about the
> visits in earlier years by mysterious Americans. He concluded that NSA
> was ordering the design changes through German intermediaries. He
> confirmed the manipulation and admitted that in the late 1970s he was
> "ordered to change algorithms under mysterious circumstances" to weaken
> his cipher units. (25)
>
> Although the Buehler incident lent credence to the NSA Trojan horse
> theory, it was not the first time that suspicions were raised. Tehran
> had become concerned in 1987 when U.S. officials claimed "conclusive
> evidence that Iran ordered the kidnapping" of ABC News correspondent
> Charles Glass. (26) Washington's alleged proof was coded Iranian
> diplomatic cables -- intercepted by the NSA -- between Tehran and the
> Hezbollah (Party of God) terrorist group in Lebanon via Iran's embassies
> in Beirut and Damascus.
>
> The next year, when a terrorist bomb brought down PanAm Flight 103 over
> Lockerbie, Scotland, it seems the NSA gained information by intercepting
> the communications of Iranian Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. It
> was apparently these messages that implicated Iran, not Libya. One
> intelligence summary, prepared by the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Agency,
> cites Iran's Mohtashemi as the mastermind. Released in redacted form
> pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by lawyers for
> the bankrupt Pan American Airlines, it states:
>
> Mohtashemi is closely connected with the Al Abas and Abu Nidal
> terrorist groups. He is actually a long-time friend of Abu Nidal.
> He has recently paid 10 million dollars in cash and gold to these
> two organizations to carry out terrorist activities and was the one
> who paid the same amount to bomb PanAm Flight 103 in retaliation for
> the U.S. shoot-down of the Iranian Airbus. Mohtashemi has also spent
> time in Lebanon. (27)
>
> An Israeli intercept of Iranian diplomatic coded communications between
> Mohtashemi's Interior Ministry in Tehran and the Iranian embassy in Beirut
> (where Mohtashemi once served as embassador) revealed -- more than two
> years before Buehler was arrested by Iran -- that the Shi'ite cleric
> transferred $1.2 to $2 million used for the bombing of PanAm Flight 103
> to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command
> headed by Ahmed Jibril. (28) Such revelations must have made the
> Iranians extremely suspect of the security of their diplomatic traffic.
> The role of Israel may be explained by a little-reported intelligence
> alliance. NSA maintains a link with the Israeli SIGINT entity "Department
> 8200" located in northern Tel Aviv at Herzliya. The SIGINT link is said
> to involve the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) base
> on Cyprus. Israel's ability to crack the Iranian Crypto AG codes
> indicates that Israel had access to the key decoding programs. The ease
> with which the West was reading Iranian coded transactions obviously meant
> that someone in Israel's SIGINT services possessed the decryption
> keys. (29)
>
> Then in 1992, Buehler was arrested. As the Swiss authorities struggled
> to put the pieces together, they at first believed that the Iranian secret
> services were retaliating for the arrest in Switzerland of Zeynold Abedine
> Sarhadi, an employee of the Iranian embassy in Berne and a nephew of
> former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Swiss police had arrested
> Sarhadi in early 1992 and were planning to extradite him to France to face
> trial for the 1991 assassination in Paris of former Iranian Prime Minister
> Shahpour Bakhtiar. On August 7, 1991, one day before Bakhtiar was found
> with his throat slit, the Tehran headquarters of the Iranian Intelligence
> Service, VEVAK, transmitted a coded message to Iranian diplomatic missions
> in London, Paris, Bonn, and Geneva, inquiring "Is Bakhtiar dead?" The
> Iranians concluded from Western press reports that British and American
> SIGINT operators had intercepted and decoded the message (as reported by
> L'Express of Paris) and knew that Tehran was behind the assassination.
> They realized that their code had been broken (30), looked to their Crypto
> AG cipher machines, and picked up Buehler. (31) According to one European
> source, they may also have been tipped off by Stasi files of the ex-East
> German regime that found their way to Iran and revealed the Crypto AG
> ruse.
>
> In any case, the Iranians immediately began grilling prisoner 01228-1
> about the role he and his company played in giving Iranian and Libyan
> codes to the U.S. (32) Iran knew that Bakhtiar's assassination had
> compromised the intelligence functions of the Iranian UN mission and
> embassy in Geneva. The NSA had already identified one of the assassins,
> Mohammed Azadi, from intercepts of his phone calls from a pay phone in the
> town of Annecy in Savoyand an Istanbul apartment, to the Iranian
> diplomatic mission in Geneva. (33)
>
> On December 6, 1994, a special French terrorism court convicted two
> Iranians of murdering Bakhtiar, but strangely, it acquitted Sarhadi.
> "Justice has not been entirely served [for] reasons of state," complained
> Bakhtiar's widow bitterly. Those "reasons" may have included a tacit
> agreement among France, Switzerland, the German BND, and the NSA to spare
> Sarhadi in order to avoid producing captured transmissions and to preserve
> the questionable secrecy surrounding the Crypto AG cipher manipulation
> program. (34)
>
> It was not only the "rogue states" that were targeted. During the
> sensitive Anglo-Irish negotiations of 1985, the NSA's British counterpart,
> the GCHQ, was able to decipher the coded diplomatic traffic being sent
> between the Irish embassy in London and the Irish Foreign Ministry in
> Dublin. It was reported in the Irish press that Dublin had purchased a
> cryptographic system from Crypto AG worth more than a million Irish
> pounds. It was also reported that the NSA routinely monitored and
> deciphered the Irish diplomatic messages. Later, during the Falklands
> War, British GCHQ operators were able to decrypt classified Argentine
> message traffic because the Argentinians were using rigged Crypto AG
> cipher machines. Former British Foreign Office minister Ted Rowlands
> publicly stated that GCHQ had penetrated Argentine diplomatic codes. (35)
>
> If it turns out that the extent of communications interception is as broad
> as suspected, the international implications are profound. Every country
> in the world that used secure communications is potentially affected.
> Some have sought to abandon Crypto AG, but found their options limited.
> The U.S. had at times required purchase of specific machines as a
> condition for favors. Pakistan was allegedly granted American military
> credits with only one provision, that it buy its encryption equipment from
> Crypto AG. (36) Additionally, "It is not unheard of for the NSA to offer
> preferential export treatment to a [U.S.] company if it builds a back door
> into its equipment," says one person with long experience in the field.
> "I've seen it. I've been in the room." (37)
>
> Several countries abandoned Crypto AG but failed to ensure secrecy. The
> Libyans switched to Gretag units after the NSA cited secret communications
> to allege Libyan involvement in the 1986 La Belle disco bombing in West
> Berlin. One senior U.S. official said the fact that the Libyans were
> making their codes more difficult to crack would "make our job tougher."
> (38) But the NSA seemed to have the Gretag base covered as well.
>
> According to one knowledgeable cryptographic industry expert, NSA's
> program to co-opt the services of encryption manufacturers probably
> extends to all those within reach of NSA operatives. U.S. cryptographic
> companies would be definite candidates for such participation. The NSA
> program also likely extends to companies in NATO and pro-U.S. countries
> which have close relationships with GCHQ, NSA, and the BND. Even neutral
> countries' firms are not off-limits to NSA manipulations. A former Crypto
> AG employee confirmed that high-level U.S. officials approached neutral
> European countries and argued that their cooperation was essential to the
> Cold War struggle against the Soviets. The NSA allegedly received support
> from cryptographic companies Crypto AG and Gretag AG in Switzerland,
> Transvertex in Sweden, Nokia in Finland, and even newly-privatized firms
> in post-Communist Hungary. (39) In 1970, according to a secret German BND
> intelligence paper, supplied to the author, the Germans planned to "fuse"
> the operations of three cryptographic firms -- Crypto AG, Grattner AG
> (another Swiss cipher firm) and Ericsson of Sweden. (40)_
>
> Securocrats often return to the boogeyman of "rogue" nations in order to
> justify the expense and ethical necessity of eavesdropping on all forms of
> international communication, but in reality many intercepts involve
> messages by neutral or allied nations. NSA's 1993 release of the World
> War II era "MAGIC" intercepts under FOIA pressure revealed that U.S.
> military intelligence read not only messages by Axis nations, but also
> intercepted and decrypted the top secret communications of Allied and
> neutral nations. (41) Switzerland was among the more than 30 countries
> whose messages were being read. (42) Since Swiss-made cipher machines
> were used by many governments at the time, it is likely that the U.S. has
> been reading such messages for over half a century. An early example is
> the use of top secret intercepts by the U.S. delegation to the 1945
> founding convention of the United Nations in San Francisco. (43)
>
> Fifty years of intercepted communications have given the U.S. and its
> co-conspirators trade, diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantages.
> By intercepting the "bottom line" negotiating positions of foreign
> governments, they have been able to shape international treaties and
> negotiations in their own favor. They will know, for example, the exact
> health status of the king of Saudi Arabia, the secret financial
> transactions of the president of Peru, the negotiating position of
> South Africa's trade delegation to the World Trade Organization, or the
> anti-abortion strategy of the Pope in the United Nations. Such
> information, presented daily to the president and secretary of state
> in their intelligence briefings, is extremely useful and allows the U.S.
> to play high-stakes diplomatic poker with a mirror behind everyone's
> back.
>
> END MAIN ARTICLE
>
> [sidebar article]
>
> CRYPTO'S CRYPTIC OWNERSHIP
>
> by Wayne Madsen
>
> copyright 1998 by CovertAction Quarterly
>
> The ability of the NSA to decipher classified foreign diplomatic and
> military intercepts would not have been possible without the assistance
> of Boris Hagelin, one of the 20th century's greatest cryptographers.
> Hagelin aided the U.S. during World War II when he sold 140,000 invaluable
> cryptographic machines to the U.S. Army. In the early 1950s, the Russian-
> born Swede founded the giant cryptographic firm, Crypto AG. By 1957,
> Hagelin had sealed a secret agreement with William Friedman, a legendary
> NSA cryptographer, to modify the crypto machines sold by Crypto AG to some
> 120 countries. (44)
>
> Although the official line is that Crypto AG is an independent Swiss
> company started and owned by Hagelin, there is strong circumstantial
> evidence that from the beginning, Hagelin was merely a figurehead
> controlled by the German intelligence service and "his" company was an
> intelligence front.
>
> According to the Zug canton Registry of Commerce, when his Steinhausen-
> based firm was organized on September 28, 1950, 48 out of the total 50
> shares were held by a secretive "brass plate" company with a mailbox in
> Vaduz, Liechtenstein, called the Establishment European Trading Company
> (German acronym, AEH). (45) The original shares were sold for 1,000 Swiss
> francs each. They have been managed by the KPMG Trust Company (KPMG
> Treuhandgesellschaft), a subsidiary of KPMG, the international accounting
> firm.
>
> Boris Hagelin owned only one share of Crypto's original 50 stock shares.
> Another privately held share was owned by Albert Dormann, a Crypto vice-
> director and attorney-of-record for AEH, who also worked for Credit Suisse
> Bank in Zug, where the 50,000 Swiss francs were deposited. AEH of Vaduz
> owned the remaining 48 shares (as a proxy for Germany). AEH is reportedly
> owned by the Federal German Estates Administration (Bundesvermoegensver-
> waltung). (46) In a 1993 interview with German television, Erich Schmidt-
> Eenboom, the author of a book on the German BND, said that the German
> Estates Administration is often used to "camouflage" the activities of the
> BND, especially in electronic eavesdropping matters. U.S. intelligence
> was involved at least since 1947 when the Dutch found that their Hagelin
> ciphers were bugged by the U.S. Army Security Agency, then based at
> Arlington Hall, Virginia.
>
> END SIDEBAR ARTICLE
>
> FOOTNOTES
>
> (1) Interview with former Crypto AG employee, Sept. 20, 1994
> (2) "The Case of Hans Buehler," Swiss Radio International, Sunday
> Supplement, May 14, 1994.
> (3) Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency: Rigging the Game,"
> Baltimore Sun, Dec. 10, 1995, p. 1A.
> (4) Frank Garbely, Interview with Hans Buehler, Swiss German Television,
> Polit Magazine, March 23, 1994.
> (5) Yvan Stefanovitch, "Hans Buehler, Espion Sans le Savoir (The Spy Who
> Didn't Know He Was A Spy), VSD April 14-20, 1994, p.50.
> (6) Ibid.
> (7) Frank Garbely, Interview with Hans Buehler, op. cit.
> (8) Stefanovitch, op. cit., p. 50
> (9) "Rendezvous: People and Places in Switzerland," interview with Hans
> Buehler by James Nason, Swiss Radio International, July 18, 1994.
> (10) Res Strehe, Verschlusselt (Enciphered), (Zurich: Werd Verlag, 1994,
> p. 199).
> (11) Shane and Bowman, op. cit., p. 9A.
> (12) "Montgomery memorandum casts shadow over Swiss neutrality,"
> Statewatch (London), Sept.-Oct. 1995, p. 12.
> (13) ibid.
> (14) "Geheimniskramer," Bilanz, March 1988, p. 147.
> (15) "Trojan Ear", Focus, March 28, 1994, p.38
> (16) Stefanovitch, op. cit., p. 83.
> (17) Hauszeitung ([Crypto AG's] House Journal) (translation), n. 15,
> Dec. 15, 1994.
> (18) Interview with former Crypto AG employee, Sept. 1994.
> (19) IRE Press Release, Nov. 6, 1995 <www.ire.com/nr/newrelea/g-tag.htm>
> (20) Author's observations from a 1993 visit to IRE headquarters.
> (21) Schweizerisches Handelsamtsblatt, n. 124, S.3634, June 29, 1994.
> (22) Garbely, op. cit.
> (23) Ibid.
> (24) Shane and Bowman, op. cit., pp. 8A-9A.
> (25) Ibid, p. 9A.
> (26) UPI, "NBC Says U.S. intelligence shows Iran ordered Glass's
> kidnapping," Boston Globe, July 2, 1987, p. 17.
> (27) U.S. Air Force Intelligence Agency intelligence summary SECRET NOFORN
> WINTEL message dated March 4, 1991, to various military commands involved
> with Desert Storm (O 041900Z MAR 91). "O" means the message had a
> precedence of Operational Immediate and "1900Z" means 1900 hours Greenwich
> Mean Time. NOFORN stands for Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals, while
> WINTEL is an acronym for Warning Notice - Intelligence Methods and Sources
> Revealed.
> (28) David Horovitz, "Israel Discovered: Iran Paid for Lockerbie,"
> Jerusalem Post, Sept. 21, 1989.
> (29) Interview with intelligence specialist in Tel Aviv, May 2, 1995.
> (30) Stefanovitch, op. cit., p. 36.
> (31) Ibid, p. 50.
> (32) Richard Norton-Taylor and Alex Duval Smith, "For Sale: Secret
> Codes with the Cracks Built In," The Observer (London), May 5, 1996,
> p. 22.
> (33) Louise Lief, "Murder, they wrote: Iran's web of terror," U.S. News
> and World Report, Dec. 16, 1991, p. 67.
> (34) "Indications but No Proof of Iranian State Terrorism," Neue Zuercher
> Zeitung, Dec. 8, 1994.
> (35) Conor O'Clery, "Irish coded messages broken by British," Irish Times
> (Dublin), Jan. 24, 1987, p. 2; and "America's Falklands War: A
> relationship sweet and sour," The Economist, March 3, 1984, p. 25.
> (36) Martin Stoll, "Trieb die Crypto ein Doppelspiel," Tages Anzeiger,
> July 5, 1994.
> (37) Shane and Bowman, op. cit.
> (38) William Beecher, Libya Reportedly Seeking to Thwart US Intelligence,"
> Boston Globe, April 22, 1986, pp. 1,5. See also, "Libyans Buy Message-
> Coding Equipment: Effort to Thwart US Intelligence Leaks Leads to Swiss
> Firm," Washington Post, Apr. 22, 1986, p. A8.
> (39) Interview with former Crypto AG employee, Sept. 20, 1994.
> (40) Bundesnacrichtendienst Paper dated Oct. 13, 1970, paragraph c.
> (41) Tim Weiner, "U.S. Spied on its WW II Allies," New York Times,
> Aug. 11, 1993, p. A9.
> (42) Among the countries included were Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile,
> China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
> Greece, Iran, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
> Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland
> , Syria, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
> (43) Beichohobunsho, ULTRA kokuren tanjo 50 nen me no shinjitsu (Secret US
> Documents on ULTRA: The Reality Aboutthe Birth of the UN, 50 years later),
> NHK Television program (Tokyo), Oct. 22, 1995; see also National Archives,
> Record Group 457, "MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries".
> (44) James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (New York: Penguin Books, 1983),
> pp. 408-9. According to a confidential source in Europe familiar with
> the cryptographic industry, Crypto AG's customers include or have included
> the former Kingdom of Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burkina
> Faso (and the former Upper Volta), Central African Republic, Chad, Congo
> (Brazzaville), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
> Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands,
> Pakistan, Phillipines, Qatar, Syria, the United Nations, Vatican City,
> Venezuela, Yemen, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Zaire.
> (45) Facsimile dated May 20, 1994, from a former Crypto AG employee.
> (46) Ibid.
>
> All text copyright 1998 by publisher CovertAction Quarterly and author
> Wayne Madsen. All rights reserved.
>
> Please preserve the full-text and footnotes with copyright notices
> (and THIS notice) and CAQ contact information if you copy this to
> non-commercial Web sites or other newsgroups or mail-lists. I am
> neither an employee nor a representative of CAQ or Wayne Madsen, and I
> am not authorized to give permission for any use of this article: I
> merely include this request as a courtesy to the author and publisher.
> Commercial and quasi-commercial sites and publications should of course
> seek the explicit permission of the publisher before attempting to include
> this article.
>
> --
> Mark Adkins ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Jellyfish.
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