Cryptography-Digest Digest #934, Volume #8 Wed, 20 Jan 99 07:13:04 EST
Contents:
Re: Java speed vs 'C' (was Re: New Twofish Source Code Available)
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: SSL - How can it be safe? ("tiglath")
Re: Thanks (was: RC4 questions (8bit/16bit) and CipherSaber-1) (nnburk)
Re: Edupage coverage of Flannery story (David A Molnar)
Re: An idea for an Encryption Algorithm ... thoughts please. (Christopher)
Re: Trying to find simple, yet effective implementation of crypto... (Christopher)
Re: Cayley-Purser algorithm? (Anthony Naggs)
Turing Machines For Sale ("J. Staphros")
french law about cryptography
Re: Help: a logical difficulty (Josh Kortbein)
Re: french law about cryptography (Gurripato (x=nospam))
Re: A little ditty, only slightly irreverent... (Gurripato (x=nospam))
Re: A little ditty, only slightly irreverent... ("Sam Simpson")
Re: french law about cryptography ("Sam Simpson")
Re: Metaphysics Of Randomness (R. Knauer)
Re: Dumb Question: Relationship between RSA and Factoring ("Sam Simpson")
Re: Dumb Question: Relationship between RSA and Factoring (Dean Povey)
Re: french law about cryptography (Mok-Kong Shen)
(fwd) DES Challenge III Broken in Record 22 Hours ! (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Cayley-Purser algorithm? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Metaphysics Of Randomness (Coen L.S. Visser)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Java speed vs 'C' (was Re: New Twofish Source Code Available)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 02:25:36 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ian Miller) wrote:
> In article <781vl4$qrv$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Actual this is not true. Good assembly language is dam hard to bet.
> In the short term, only.
>
> >I have seen old code written on old univacs fly circles around the
> >newer compiled stuff even though the newer univacs have a larger
> >instruction set.
> This is entirely predictable if the compiler code generators have not been
> brought up to date. Once they have been the old assembly code will loose
> out.
>
> >Also the newer compliers the designers have not
> >given much thought to good design.
> On this I disagree radically. The compiler design is now a very well
> understood art, and modern processors are designed (among other criteria)
> to be easy to optimise for. The best modern compilers generate first rate
> code.
>
Actually I can give a modern example I was using a real key
for my original scott16u but I never could get the C code to
come with in a factor of ten of the speed of good assembly.
The best compliers do not come close to good assembly if
one wants speed period.
C is nice and portable but it still is a dog compared to
assemble code.
David A. Scott
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
============= Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ============
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
------------------------------
From: "tiglath" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: SSL - How can it be safe?
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 22:32:23 -0500
Stefek Zaba wrote in message ...
>> ..................................... My company cannot afford to buy
the
>> Oracle SSL
>> product and want me to write an encryption module to insert suitably
between
>> Oracle
>> based applications clients and servers. I am starting from first
>> principles. My weakness in
>> cryptology is somewhat compensated by long UNIX and C experience. With a
>> some help from
>> here I hope to develop something serviceable. I think I can find free
>> existing C libraries for most
>> of the functions I will need.
>
>Run, don't walk, to the SSLeay site. You may find it best to build or (if
>such a beast is now included in the distribution - it's a while since I
looked)
>use a general TCP relay, allowing your DB and app code to run unmodified,
and
>have the relays at client and server ends provide the crypto.
>
>
Many thanks for your helpful explanations and pointers. It seems it all
hinges on the initial digital certificate. It is necessary to use an
external, established service like Verisign to issue valid certificates, or
can one set up a certification facility inside one's operation? And if so
how?
Many thanks
------------------------------
From: nnburk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Thanks (was: RC4 questions (8bit/16bit) and CipherSaber-1)
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 20:19:05 -0600
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Thanks K!!!!!
nnburk wrote:
>
> On 24 Dec 1998 12:03:44 +0100, Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > ...
> > Also, thanks to Mr Schneier for comments found on his web site that
> > prompted me to put lots of memset(key,0,256); statements throughout my
> > CipherSaber-1 program, such that upon termination I don't leave little
> > bits of the key lying around in memory. I would highly recommend this to
> > anybody else writing their own CipherSaber-1.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > K
>
> Would you be kind enough to direct me to the specific location of the
> comments re: memset(key,0,256)?
>
> Thanks in advance!!!
>
> N
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Edupage coverage of Flannery story
Date: 20 Jan 1999 04:20:43 GMT
Matthew Skala <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It's a surprise to hear that Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman were "students"
> when they created RSA... I was pretty sure they were all professors, and
> not all at MIT, in 1977. Is that my error, the Times's, or Edupage's?
I had been under the impression that they were graduate students or
post-docs involved with MIT while the actual design of the algorithm took
place. I think I read an interview with one of them that described who
read Diffie and Hellman's paper and decided to try for the idea,
which one made up possible new schemes, and which one found the
(many and varied) holes in them before finally stumbling on RSA.
In any case, they were supposed to have offices just down
the hall from each other.
[not that any role was exclusive. although it would be
interesting to match such 'designations' with the later
careers of R, S, and A.]
If anyone has a better memory and can reference such an interview
directly, that would be much appreciated.
-David Molnar
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Christopher)
Subject: Re: An idea for an Encryption Algorithm ... thoughts please.
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 05:17:59 GMT
I think the 15 or 16 bits refers to the seed and PRNG used to set up the
table of 256 values.
In article <78310t$7hj$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Rats"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Thanks for your thoughts.
>
>You wrote that the method I've described would only give you a 15 or 16 bits
>of security. How did you come to this conclusion?
>
>You also said cyclic alphabetic substitution is something you exploit quite
>successfully. Can you tell me what methods you would use for attacking a
>system like this. For that matter are you willing to try and "dechiper" some
>stuff I send you that has been "encrypted" using a basic system like this?
>
>Thanks in advance.
>
>Rats
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Christopher)
Subject: Re: Trying to find simple, yet effective implementation of crypto...
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 05:19:29 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Darren New
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> So you would be advised to avoid IDEA or RC4 as your
>> conventional encryptions as they would cost money;
>
>I'm pretty sure the RC4 algorithm is in the public domain. "RC4" is a
>trademark, but that's a different thing. Do you have reason to believe
>RC4 as an algorithm is patented anywhere? I heard it was a leaked trade
>secret.
>
I thought it was impossible to patent an idea, only a product.
------------------------------
From: Anthony Naggs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Cayley-Purser algorithm?
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 04:31:11 +0000
After much consideration Derek Bell decided to share these wise words:
>
> I suspect that Bruce has seen so many stories that were based on
>exagerrated media reports, he may be just a bit cynical of another story in the
>papers that doesn't contain much technical detail.
Until the actual detail is published it makes sense to be sceptical.
Although the judges of the Irish Young Scientist of the Year competition
called in an outside expert to look at Sarah's submission, the reports
I've seen say she/he was a mathematician rather than a cryptographer.
So although she can check Sarah's math she probably doesn't know much
about cryptanalysis.
> Personally, I think there may be something in it, as Dr. Michael Purser
>has experience in crypto; he used to give lectures on crypto here in TCD's
>maths dept; I think he was also involved with Baltimore Technologies.
AFAIUI he was the founder!
>> But the sad truth of the matter is if was good I think the
>>NSA would have been able to keep the lid on it.
>
> Like they did with RSA? :-)
Oh dear, is David still being paranoid? Perhaps he'd like to tell us
how much the NSA offered him to keep updating scott911u.zip? (Well tell
you, as he is in my 'killfile'.)
--
BAD COMPUTER! That's my registry file you've trashed.
------------------------------
From: "J. Staphros" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Turing Machines For Sale
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 21:55:49 -1000
I have built a small number of Turing Machines in my garage and now I am
ready to sell the first production run. They come with either paper tape
or magnetic tape operation. The prices are $2,000 and $1,800 US dollars,
respectively. They are guaranteed to halt. Options include binary and
ternary operations. The tapes cost $12 each for open reel forms, or $35
for closed loop format. Call 1-900-818-9743 for details, each call costs
$200 per second. The voicemail system will lead you through the product
selection menus, and you should use touch-tone phones, since the
pulse-dial receptionist will pick up after 45 seconds.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ()
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: french law about cryptography
Date: 20 Jan 1999 02:01:21 GMT
19 jan 1999. the french prime minister announced that the gouvernement
will allow the key size up to 128bytes.
the original text in french:
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/D190199.HTM
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Josh Kortbein)
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Help: a logical difficulty
Date: 20 Jan 1999 08:28:44 GMT
Mike McCarty ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: )As an aside, I once wrote a program to sort English transliterations of
: )Russian names according to the Russian collating sequence. There was an
: )essential ambiguity in that the letter "TS" and the sequence of letters
: )"T""S" both occur in Russian names.
: How did you handle the hard and soft signs? Usually they are both
: transliterated as apostrophe ("'").
I've been told by my Russian professor that the hard sign is almost
never used in modern Russian. Perhaps he handled the signs pragmatically
and assumed there would be no hard signs. :)
Josh
--
In mathematics you don`t understand things. You just get used to them.
- Johann von Neumann
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Gurripato (x=nospam))
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: french law about cryptography
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 08:39:26 GMT
On 20 Jan 1999 02:01:21 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] () wrote:
>19 jan 1999. the french prime minister announced that the gouvernement
>will allow the key size up to 128bytes.
>
>the original text in french:
>http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/D190199.HTM
Good for the gauls! Now the rest of European governments cannot
try to follow suit under the excuse "other countries do; see, for
example, our neighbors in France..." Glad that the country of the
egalit� is finally catching up to his reputation.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Gurripato (x=nospam))
Subject: Re: A little ditty, only slightly irreverent...
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 08:33:47 GMT
On Mon, 18 Jan 1999 20:52:00 +0000, Withheld <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>
>Mary had a crypto key
>She kept it in escrow
>So everything that Mary wrote
>MI5 were sure to know
>
>--
>Withheld
Watch out, Sam Simpson might sue you for using his favorite
slogan (only it was the Feds on him!)
------------------------------
From: "Sam Simpson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A little ditty, only slightly irreverent...
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 09:01:42 -0000
Derived from one of these I'd suggest?
"Mary had a little key (It's all she could export),
and all the email that she sent was opened at the Fort."
-- Ron Rivest
"Mary had a crypto key, she kept it in escrow,
and everything that Mary said, the Feds were sure to know."
-- Sam Simpson, July 9, 1998
Sam Simpson
Comms Analyst
-- http://www.hertreg.ac.uk/ss/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi
Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site.
Withheld wrote in message ...
>
>Mary had a crypto key
>She kept it in escrow
>So everything that Mary wrote
>MI5 were sure to know
>
>--
>Withheld
------------------------------
From: "Sam Simpson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: french law about cryptography
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 09:40:49 -0000
The Wassenaar agreement covers export of cryptography - not use. My
understanding of the recent developments in France are that they are simply
lifting the current ban on strong crypto (without a license).
I assume they will continue to implement the export controls in line with
the Wassenaar agreement.
Sam Simpson
Comms Analyst
-- http://www.hertreg.ac.uk/ss/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi
Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site.
Paul Rubin wrote in message ...
>In article <783ddh$qph$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>>19 jan 1999. the french prime minister announced that the gouvernement
>>will allow the key size up to 128bytes.
>>
>>the original text in french:
>>http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/D190199.HTM
>
>TRES interessant! But what will happen to the Wassenaar agreement?
>
>Thanks, Jerome.
>
>--Paul
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: Metaphysics Of Randomness
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 11:15:03 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Wed, 20 Jan 1999 02:37:23 GMT, Darren New <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>No. I'm saying that it is impossible to actually build a piece of
>hardware that will run a program for which you cannot tell whether it
>will halt. If your program only has a finite space to work in, then you
>can write another program that will tell you whether it will halt.
I wonder how this relates to the definition of a TRNG. In order for a
TRNG to be capable of outputing all possible sequences of a given
length equiprobably, must it have an "infinite space" to work with?
Does the radioactive TRNG have an infinite space by virtue of the fact
that the probability that a decay occur in t -> t + dt is a constant
independent of time, and therefore the decay can occur at infinite
time? Or does it mean that the wavefunction for the radioisotope has
an infinite number of possible states? Is there something being
"computed" behind the scenes in Quantum Mechanics?
In any event, it is a tenent of crypto that you will fail to generate
a true random number with a finite state machine, which implies - as
you have pointed out for the Turing Machine - that one must have a
system with an infinite number of states to get true randomness.
>Right. I'm assuming you know how the proof goes.
The only proofs I have seen are in Penrose and Chaitin, and depend on
Cantor's diagonal method.
>Actually, the precise
>definition is that there is no one program which, when given encodings
>of all turing-complete programs, can determine whether every one reaches
>a particular state (the halt state) or not. Obviously, it's possible to
>design programming languages that you can prove always lead to halting
>programs, but these have functions (like Ackerman's function) which
>cannot be computed by programs in those languages.
What is an Ackerman function? Does it have any applicability to the
origins of randomness?
Bob Knauer
"Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin it. Boldness has
genius, power and magic in it."
--Goethe
------------------------------
From: "Sam Simpson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Dumb Question: Relationship between RSA and Factoring
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 09:13:21 -0000
Further to this response, you may wish to look at the paper:
D.Boneh, R.Venkatesan, "Breaking RSA may not be equivalent to factoring",
Eurocrypt '98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1233,
Springer-Verlag, 1998.
Which provides evidence that certain instances of RSA cannot be equivalent
to the IFP. This is contrary to the belief by some that RSA and IFP are
equivalent.
Sam Simpson
Comms Analyst
-- http://www.hertreg.ac.uk/ss/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption & Delphi
Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site.
Gurripato (x=nospam) wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>On 18 Jan 1999 00:52:50 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dean Povey) wrote:
>
>>Okay, call this a dumb question but...
>>
>>That the security of RSA is equivalent to factoring is only a conjecture,
but
>>would it be fair to say that any method of recovering the private key is
>>equivalent to factoring (as p and q can be efficiently computed from
>>e, d and n).
>>
> The problems is, factoring seems to be the only workable
>strategy, but it is NOT proved that RSA security is defined by the
>factoring problem. That is, there might be some other strategy that
>works better than factoring (one that the NSA would certainly love to
>know, if they don�t already).
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dean Povey)
Subject: Re: Dumb Question: Relationship between RSA and Factoring
Date: 20 Jan 1999 10:32:39 GMT
"Sam Simpson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>Further to this response, you may wish to look at the paper:
>D.Boneh, R.Venkatesan, "Breaking RSA may not be equivalent to factoring",
>Eurocrypt '98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1233,
>Springer-Verlag, 1998.
>Which provides evidence that certain instances of RSA cannot be equivalent
>to the IFP. This is contrary to the belief by some that RSA and IFP are
>equivalent.
Thanks for the reference.
I actually wasn't asking whether breaking RSA was equivalent to factoring,
merely whether _recovery of the private key_ is equivalent to factoring.
I am aware that there may be other methods of obtaining plaintext from
ciphertext which may not be equivalent to factoring. But I am just
interested in recovering the private key.
Hope that helps.
--
Dean Povey, | e-m: [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Cryptozilla:
Research Scientist | ph: +61 7 3864 5120 | www.cryptozilla.org/
Security Unit, DSTC | fax: +61 7 3864 1282 | Oscar - PKI Toolkit:
Brisbane, Australia | www: security.dstc.edu.au/ | oscar.dstc.qut.edu.au/
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: french law about cryptography
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 12:44:03 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> 19 jan 1999. the french prime minister announced that the gouvernement
> will allow the key size up to 128bytes.
>
> the original text in french:
> http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/D190199.HTM
The following is a translation provided by Enzo Michelangeli.
============================================
The third legislative initiative concerns cryptography. With the
development of electronic espionage instruments, cryptography appears
as an essential instrument of privacy protection.
We had, one year ago, made a first step towards liberalization of
cryptographic instruments. At that time I had announced that we were
going to make one further. The Government has, since then, heard the
players, questioned the experts and consulted its international
partners. We have today become convinced that the legislation of 1996
is no longer suitable. In fact, it strongly restricts the usage of
cryptography in France, on the other hand, for all that, without
allowing the public powers to fight effectively against criminal
actions of which encryption could facilitate the dissimulation.
In order to change the orientation of our legislation, the Government
has thus retained the following orientations, that I have discussed
with the President of the Republic:
- To offer a complete freedom of use of cryptography
- To remove the compulsory nature or third-party escrow of encryption
keys
- To supplement the current legal framework by the introduction of
obligations, together with penal sanctions, concerning the handing-over
to the legal authorities, when they require it, of the cleartext
version of encrypted documents. At the same time, the technical
skills of the public authorities will be significantly improved.
Changing the law will take many months. The Govenment has decided
that the main obstacles holding up the citizens from protecting the
confidentiality of their communications and the development of
electronic commerce be lifted without waiting. Also, waiting
for the announced legislative changes, the Government has decided
to raise the the the threshold of cryptology the use of which is
free, from 40 bit to 128 bit, considered by the experts a level
suitable to ensure durably a very high security.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: (fwd) DES Challenge III Broken in Record 22 Hours !
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 12:52:34 +0100
RSA Code-Breaking Contest Again Won by Distributed.Net and
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
DES Challenge III Broken in Record 22 Hours
RSA DATA SECURITY CONFERENCE, SAN JOSE,
Calif., January 19, 1999 -- Breaking the previous record of
56 hours, Distributed.Net, a worldwide coalition of computer
enthusiasts, worked with the Electronic Frontier Foundation's
(EFF) "Deep Crack," a specially designed supercomputer, and
a worldwide network of nearly 100,000 PCs on the Internet, to
win RSA Data Security's DES Challenge III in a
record-breaking 22 hours and 15 minutes. The worldwide
computing team deciphered a secret message encrypted with
the United States government's Data Encryption Standard
(DES) algorithm using commonly available technology. From
the floor of the RSA Data Security Conference & Expo, a
major data security and cryptography conference being held in
San Jose, Calif., EFF's "Deep Crack" and the Distributed.Net
computers were testing 245 billion keys per second when the
key was found.
First adopted by the federal government in 1977, the 56-bit
DES algorithm is still widely used by financial services and
other industries worldwide to protect sensitive on-line
applications, despite growing concerns about its
vulnerability.
RSA has been sponsoring a series of DES-cracking contests to
highlight the need for encryption stronger than the current
56-bit
standard widely used to secure both U.S. and international
commerce.
"As today's demonstration shows, we are quickly reaching the
time when anyone with a standard desktop PC can potentially
pose a real threat to systems relying on such vulnerable
security," said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security,
Inc. "It has been widely known that 56-bit keys, such as those
offered by the government's DES standard, offer only marginal
protection against a committed adversary. We congratulate
Distributed.Net and the EFF for their achievement in breaking
DES in record-breaking time."
As part of the contest, RSA awarded a $10,000 prize to the
winners at a special ceremony held during the RSA Conference.
The goal of this DES Challenge contest was not only to recover
the secret key used to DES-encrypt a plain-text message, but
to
do so faster than previous winners in the series. As before, a
cash prize was awarded for the first correct entry received.
The
amount of the prize was based on how quickly the key was
recovered.
"The diversity, volume and growth in participation that we
have
seen at Distributed.Net not only demonstrates the incredible
power of distributed computing as a tool, but also underlines
the fact that concern over cryptography controls is
widespread," said David McNett, co-founder of
Distributed.Net.
"EFF believes strongly in providing the public and industry
with
reliable and honest evaluations of the security offered by
DES.
We hope the result of today's DES Cracker demonstration
delivers a wake-up call to those who still believe DES offers
adequate security," said John Gilmore, EFF co-founder and
project leader. "The government's current encryption policies
favoring DES risk the security of the national and world
infrastructure."
The Electronic Frontier Foundation began its investigation
into
DES cracking in 1997 to determine just how easily and cheaply
a hardware-based DES Cracker (i.e., a code-breaking machine
to crack the DES code) could be constructed. Less than one
year later and for well under U.S. $250,000, the EFF, using
its
DES Cracker, entered and won the RSA DES Challenge II-2
competition in less than 3 days, proving that DES is not very
secure and that such a machine is inexpensive to design and
build.
"Our combined worldwide team searched more than 240 billion
keys every second for nearly 23 hours before we found the
right 56-bit key to decrypt the answer to the RSA Challenge,
which was 'See you in Rome (second AES Conference, March
22-23, 1999)'," said Gilmore. The reason this message was
chosen is that the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
initiative proposes replacing DES using encryption keys of at
least 128 bits.
RSA's original DES Challenge was launched in January 1997
with the aim of demonstrating that DES offers only marginal
protection against a committed adversary. This was confirmed
when a team led by Rocke Verser of Loveland, Colorado
recovered the secret key in 96 days, winning DES Challenge I.
Since that time, improved technology has made much faster
exhaustive search efforts possible. In February 1998,
Distributed.Net won RSA's DES Challenge II-1 with a 41-day
effort, and in July, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
won RSA's DES Challenge II-2 when it cracked the DES
message in 56 hours.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Cayley-Purser algorithm?
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 1999 11:21:42 GMT
In article <77p1dt$i59$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In article <77n0hf$pa5$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Much as I
> > respect her modesty, I thing we should call it the Flannery
> > cryptosystem.
>
> If the doomsayers are proven correct and that there is
> a fatal flaw in the algorithm, it will probably become
> known as "The Blarney Encryption Method". ;-)
>
Actually if its all hype why label it with a name that
makes the irish look bad. How about a cool name like
ROTTENFISH that sounds better.
David A. Scott
P.S. If its good RSA4U has a nice ring to it.
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
============= Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ============
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Coen L.S. Visser)
Subject: Re: Metaphysics Of Randomness
Date: 20 Jan 1999 12:04:42 GMT
Darren New <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Yes but calculating could take a very long time if the complexity of your
>> algorithm is too great. See [1] for details.
>These are turing machines. You have all the time in the world. ;-)
>If you start worrying about the *efficiency* of your turing machines, or
>their speed, you have to start worrying about how long that infinite
>tape is going to get, too. :-)
Well there is infinite and then there is infinite: the number of integers is
smaller than the number of reals. I'm not sure on this one but the time t(n)
it takes to approximate the first n bits of Omega could well grow faster
than any recursive function. In that case there is no TM program that could
find the first n bits of Omega for any given value of n.
There is probably a proof in [1] (which is a *very* good book on this subject)
but I [ or even better, you ;-) ] would have to look it up.
Regards,
Coen Visser
[1] An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications
Second Edition
Ming Li & Paul Vitanyi
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