Cryptography-Digest Digest #428, Volume #9 Tue, 20 Apr 99 11:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: Magenta and DFC descriptions added to web site (Thomas Pornin)
Introducing Absolute Word/Excel encrypted doc recovery ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
test (Steve Droz)
Re: Not a PGP Expert (Gurripato (x=nospam))
Re: AES R1 comments/papers available & my views ("Sam Simpson")
Re: Magenta and DFC descriptions added to web site (Terje Mathisen)
Re: FSE-6 Report: Slide Attack ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Anybody has a working copy of DIEHARD ? (sb5309)
Re: Not a PGP Expert (Geoff Lane)
Re: Phil Zimmerman Works for the NSA ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: How Many Sniffers? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Prime numbers generator (Bob Silverman)
Re: FSE-6 Report: Slide Attack (James Frey)
Re: True Randomness & The Law Of Large Numbers (R. Knauer)
Re: Question on confidence derived from cryptanalysis. ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: FSE-6 Report: Slide Attack (Fiji)
Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140 (Jim Felling)
testing encrypted files (Ronan Harle)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Pornin)
Subject: Re: Magenta and DFC descriptions added to web site
Date: 20 Apr 1999 09:44:04 GMT
According to John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> I have read in a recent post that DFC includes a key-dependent bit
> transpose
This is false. There is no such thing in DFC. It would be very bad
performance-wise anyway, and if Serge had wanted to include this sort
of thing, I would have crucified him.
You can believe me since I am the guy who coded the core ANSI-C
reference implementation that was sent to the NIST (the interface
with the NIST API was made by someone else).
--Thomas Pornin
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Introducing Absolute Word/Excel encrypted doc recovery
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 10:32:25 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Introducing our new service: Absolute Word/Excel (AWE) document recovery.
100% guaranteed encrypted file recovery for password protected Word documents
regardless of password length. Please visit our site at
http://www.pwcrack.com/ for more information.
Password Crackers, Inc.
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------------------------------
From: Steve Droz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: test
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 18:00:41 +0200
<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
tes</html>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Gurripato (x=nospam))
Subject: Re: Not a PGP Expert
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 07:32:41 GMT
On 19 Apr 1999 18:21:46 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Xcott Craver)
wrote:
>Geoff Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>If anyone, including the NSA, *really* wants your private key they won't
>>bother trying to crack your encryption keys.... They'll take you into a
>>small, sound insulated, back room and crack *you*. It's faster and
>>a whole lot less expensive.
>
The NSA might not be interested in my particular key unless
they have reason to think I am a Saddam supporter or similar. What
they do want to is to be able to read our messages, in plural, like
the FBI, who merely type a few keys on their computer and can have
access to our phone conversations. That is, their goal is to have
easy access to all or comms. from their office in Fort Meade.
We are helpless against the MIB if they are really after us;
if they point a gun to my 2-year-son�s head, well, there go all my
secrets. But let�s remember, they want to keep access to the Net in
general, not only to a particular conversation. That way, we need
only worry about some particular kinds of attacks: keyloggers,
trojans, weak crypto, and so on. The van full of electronic gadgetry
(VFOEG) is a last resort.
------------------------------
From: "Sam Simpson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: AES R1 comments/papers available & my views
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 12:30:30 +0100
David Crick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> As promised, NIST have published "all" (electronic?) Round 1
comments
> and papers on their web site:
>
> http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/round1/pubcmnts.htm
>
> (I see they have removed code from the papers... presumably they
> got a slapped wrist from NSA for their previous transgression? :))
>
> Lots of good stuff to read and think about. I have some preliminary
> observations. I'm sure they'll be more to follow but I'm hoping to
> provoke a discussion here :)
Interesting to see some authors ranking candidates:
Knudsen (in alphabetical order):
RC6 (32r)
Rijndael (16r)
Serpent
Preneel:
1. Rijndael
2. Serpent
3. RC6 (but I prefer the modified key schedule presented at the 2nd
AES
conference)
4. MARS
5. Twofish
Biham:
E2, Mars, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish.
Pete Mokros:
Twofish and Loki97
AKYMAN FINANCIAL SERVICES PTY:
1st Place: RIJNDAEL
2nd Place: CRYPTON
3rd Place: TWOFISH
(Note: some authors also created AES candidates<g>).
It would appear that TwoFish, Rijndael, Serpent, RC6 & possibly MARS
are generally perceived to be good candidates.
Generally, I thought it was nice that the emphasis was moved slightly
away from performance.
--
Sam Simpson
Comms Analyst
http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption &
Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site.
If you're wondering why I don't reply to Sternlight, it's because
he's kill filed. See http://www.openpgp.net/FUD for why!
------------------------------
From: Terje Mathisen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Magenta and DFC descriptions added to web site
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 13:18:42 +0200
Thomas Pornin wrote:
>
> According to John Savard ?[EMAIL PROTECTED]?:
> ? I have read in a recent post that DFC includes a key-dependent bit
> ? transpose
>
> This is false. There is no such thing in DFC. It would be very bad
> performance-wise anyway, and if Serge had wanted to include this sort
> of thing, I would have crucified him.
>
> You can believe me since I am the guy who coded the core ANSI-C
> reference implementation that was sent to the NIST (the interface
> with the NIST API was made by someone else).
I don't have quite the same qualifications as Thomas, but I did part of
the work on the PentiumPro optimization of DFC (together with Behr,
McGougan and Harley).
DFC is really quite straightforward, the only data-dependent operation
is an XOR with a table value, where the table is indexed with the lower
6 bits of the current round value.
The primary bit shuffling mechanism is a modular 64-bit multiply.
Terje
--
- <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Using self-discipline, see http://www.eiffel.com/discipline
"almost all programming can be viewed as an exercise in caching"
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: FSE-6 Report: Slide Attack
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 13:10:10 GMT
> The analyst does not have access to the inner workings
> of hardware with the key nor software with the key.
> The analyst knows the cipher design specifications.
> The analyst has, for an n bit key, more than 2^n/2
> matching plaintexts and ciphertexts. The cryptanalyst
> can check whether it is possible that F(P0)=P0'. This
> checking requires that a round is "weak" so that
> logic will rule out most candidate P, C pairs. The check is
> made feasible by knowing F(P0)=P0' AND F(C)=C' are
> simultaneously logically consistent for the same key.
You mentioned round. Does it use the input/output or the inner workings?
(One or the other!)
Why would you comprea F(P)=P' Wouldn't you want to compare matching pairs of
ciphertext/plaintext? Is there any known correlation between subsequent
blocks?
>
> Example: you are cracking DES and you have 5 billion
> pairs of ciphertext blocks and the matching plaintext
> blocks. Take the first plaintext and the second plaintext.
> Using digital logic decide whether you could encrypt the first
> plaintext with a key to get the second plaintext, which is a
> key that is consistent with the two matching slid ciphertexts.
> If logic shows that it cannot be done, then move on to the third
> plaintext. After a candidate slid pair is found, calculate any keys
> that makes it logically correct. Try that key on other pairs
> to confirm. One success will obtain some key bits, more bits can
> be obtained by more work on inner rounds, depending on the key
> schedule.
Ah, but finding a key knowing only that F(P)=C is rather hard for most
ciphers.
Again you mention inner rounds, does this attack the output/input or the
cipher?
Tom
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------------------------------
From: sb5309 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Anybody has a working copy of DIEHARD ?
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 17:26:28 +0800
Prof. Marsaglia's web site does not to seem to work fully.
Could you send a copy to me ? Best if you have a working copy on Win95,
I am up to speed with c/c++ yet.
Thanks.
mail to : [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Geoff Lane)
Subject: Re: Not a PGP Expert
Date: 19 Apr 1999 11:54:23 GMT
If anyone, including the NSA, *really* wants your private key they won't
bother trying to crack your encryption keys.... They'll take you into a
small, sound insulated, back room and crack *you*. It's faster and
a whole lot less expensive.
OTOH most users of PGP are using an unscreened PC. These give off
sufficient RF from various parts that it's trivial to monitor both
keystrokes and monitor display from some distance. Every time PGP asks for
a pass phrase it's broadcast to anyone who wishes to receive it within a
range of a few hundred feet.
--
Geoff. Lane. Manchester Computing
Today's Excuse:
Our POP server was kidnapped by a weasel.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Phil Zimmerman Works for the NSA
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 12:07:01 GMT
> Phil Zimmerman works for the NSA
>
> NAI (Network Associates) Now owns PGP.
>
> NAI pays the rent on its chick red granite office building by selling
> sniffers to the FBI and NSA.
>
> The poeple who trust PGP Are fools!
Oh dear shut up! Clue in loser, people like PGP because it's open, because
it's been reviewed, and because not only Phil has worked on it.
No one is going to buy your half assed home brew 'security' program.
And stop using Charles name!!!
Tom
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: How Many Sniffers?
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 12:09:06 GMT
> How Many Sniffers does NAI sell to the NSA and the FBI?
>
> How Many Sniffers does IBM own?
> How Many Sniffers does HP own?
> How Many Sniffers does Cisco own?
> How Many Sniffers does 3Com own?
>
>
Some homework for you. Go buy AC or any other good crypto book, read the
chapters on
DIFFIE-HELLMAN shared secret key agreement
ELGAMMA digital signatures
Then tell us how PGP is 'weak'.
Tom
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------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Prime numbers generator
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 12:17:57 GMT
In article <7feqqv$q2f$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hello all,
>
> Using this program you can generate all
> prime numbers in the diapason from 2 to
> 0FFFFFFFFh. The program runs ca. 10 hours.
(1) Prime numbers in this range are not terribly useful for
cryptographic purposes.
(2) 10 hours is horribly SLOW. By a factor of at least 5.
May I suggest that your code can use some optimization?
(3) A discussion of the algorithms involved would be useful. But
I think just posting slow code serves no useful purpose.
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
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------------------------------
From: James Frey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: FSE-6 Report: Slide Attack
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 05:32:11 -1000
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> This is a chosen plaintext attack? Or what? I mean if I give you C = E(P)
> and C' = E(P') then you don't know the values inside the rounds.
>
> How does it work then? Is there a paper available or even just text?
>
> Tom
>
> -----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
> http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/
Some ciphers have round functions that are simple enough to be
analysed as a combinatorial logic block with no ambiguity. The
key values can be calculated to produce, in one round only, the
slid pairs which are available in the known plaintexts. The birthday
paradox means that only about the square root of the full
plaintext space needs to be available to find a slid pair.
The one round offset of the two encrytion paths can be found given
enough known plaintexts. Then P1=P0' for a key that can be calculated.
For all 2^n/2 plaintexts, try keys that might make a slid pair.
The keys are not guessed, they are calculated precisely from the
slid pair constraint and the simple combinatorial logic of some ciphers
that is true for one round only.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: True Randomness & The Law Of Large Numbers
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 12:32:58 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 18 Apr 1999 20:37:00 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman
Rubin) wrote:
>>It is interesting to note that in Billingsley's book where he
>>discusses Chernoff's Theorem, he points out in balancing the error of
>>rejecting one hypothesis over another for the value of p, that as p
>>approaches 1/2 it becomes increasingly difficult to discriminate
>>between the p = 1/2 hypothesis and an hypothesis for a slightly
>>different value near 1/2.
>Why should this be surprising?
Not so much surprising as interesting.
The only surprising thing I find is how some people can trust
simplistic small sample statistical tests as a means to determine true
non-randomness with reasonable certainty, as if something so simple as
1-bit bias in a single sample somehow tells them everything they need
to know about the underlying process.
>It is a little easier to see in the case of a normal translation parameter,
>and the problem is extremely similar; the sample size needed for a given amount of
>discrimination is proportional to 1/Kd^2, where K is the Fisher
>information in a single observation, and d is separation.
Please provide a reference for this.
This seems to be a general statement about sample size and separation
regardless of the value of the translation. What I found interesting
above is that the discrimination difficulty gets larger as you
approach p = 1/2.
IOW as I interpret Billingsley's analysis, for a given value of t, the
difficulty of discriminating between p and p + t gets large when p
approaches 1/2 where the errors are balanced for either hypothesis.
Bob Knauer
"Our revels are now ended. These are actors, as I foretold you were
all spirits, and then are melted into air, into thin air. And like
the baseless fabric of this vision, the cloud-capped towers, the
gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, the great globe itself, yea,
and all that it inherits, shall dissolve. And like this insubstantial
pageant faded, leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff as dreams
are made on, and our little life is rounded with a sleep."
-- The Tempest
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 21:48:09 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Question on confidence derived from cryptanalysis.
I rise (type) to speak in support of the proposition. There are two
concepts from the field of economics that bear on this issue. The first
concept is marginal utility as applied to the efforts of the crypto
community. The second is the tendecy of the market to focus on a single
"best" product.
The marginal utility concept applies to a cruptologist of any level of
education/training/experience. It indicates that the value of an
additional increment to the effort invested so far in an "established"
cipher may be much less than tha value of that same effort applied to a
neglected cipher. The economic case is that a rich man's millionth
dollar (hundered billionth in Gates case) is worth less to the rich man
than the poor man's thousandth dollar is worth to the poor man. This
principle is absolutely fundamental to any economic analysis.
It is also fundamental and valuable in the field of operations reseach
in that the fundamental, and mostly provable, assumption is that there
is a "happy mix" that dominates all other mixtures of resource
deployments. That looking for, and focusing on, "the" critical resource
is too simplistic.
IMHO, diversity is a truly excellent thing in crypto. The field is
young. There is *lots* of room for innovation.
The tendency of the market to focus on a single (or few) best product(s)
is well established. The true operational basis for this is most often
simple laziness. The theoretical basis is that concentrated effort will
produce a better best than that same effort spread over a wide variety
of options. If one company can dominate a market it can achieve
economies of scale in production/design/etcetera.
The narrowing of the market is often seen in "industry shakeouts" where
a developing industry with lots of vendors ranging from garage scale to
fortune 10,000 scale merge/aquire/fail producing a "mature" market.
Most consumer/customers actually like the simplified option menu of the
mature market because fewer evaluations are necessary (laziness) and the
risk of a really bad choice has been eliminated because the minimum and
average quality of products in a mature market are usually much higher
than those of a widely diverse market.
IMHO, this tendency should be resisted because I believe that cipher
design does not benfit from economy of scale while cipher analysis
certainly does.
Two concepts for $0.2. (special discount today only)
Terry Ritter wrote:
>
> On Sun, 18 Apr 1999 18:48:37 -0400, in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> in sci.crypt Geoff Thorpe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I spent some hours responding to this huge article, and only at the
> end realized (I assume correctly) that most of the controversy was
> about something which I consider peripheral to the main issue. So I
> am going to separate that other stuff off and ignore it so we don't
> loose sight of the forest. This is not intended to disrespect the
> effort in the original posting -- as I said, I have already made
> comparable effort in the response you do not see. But nobody wants to
> read huge postings, and all the points get lost anyway.
>
> >Hello,
> >
> >Terry Ritter wrote:
> >> >You want to sound a cautionary note that we all risk being naive and
> >> >over-confident in our "cryptanalytic testing" of ciphers - excellent
> >> >point and it is well taken.
> >>
> >> No, the point is NOT well-taken. It is ignored and brushed off as
> >> trivial and known. Then everyone sticks their head in the sand again
> >> until I bring it up again. This has happened for years.
> >
> >Once again, we are in disagreement - philosophically and factually it
> >would appear. From your postings, I can understand why you think this,
> >but it is based on a premise I simply do not accept and will not no
> >matter how many times you repeat it. Namely, that repeated cryptanalytic
> >testing does not provide a measure of the tested strength of a cipher.
>
> OK, that is the peripheral cul-de-sac. I believe it, and believe it
> can be successfully argued, but it is a side-issue nevertheless.
>
> My main argument starts out that no matter how much analysis is done,
> there is always the *possibility* that a cipher may fail anyway. I
> doubt anyone disagrees with this.
>
> Since cipher failure is *possible*, we need to look at the
> consequences of failure: If this is to be the one standard cipher for
> society, the results of such failure would be *catastrophic*. Again,
> hardly controversial stuff.
>
> We can do something about this: We can innovate various procedures
> and protocols to avoid single-cipher failure. As a general concept,
> it is hard to imagine that even *this* is controversial. The actual
> technical details, of course, are arguable and changeable.
>
> The package I have proposed includes compartmentalizing our data under
> different ciphers, thus reducing the amount of data at risk of any
> single cipher failure. (This virtually requires us to change ciphers
> frequently.) I also proposed multi-ciphering as a matter of course
> (reducing the likelihood of failure), and having a growing body of
> ciphers from which to choose. Other proposals can of course be made.
>
> At this point, I see arguments for doing nothing (if the fix is too
> costly compared to the value at risk) and that the fix is worse than
> the original problem. The first depends upon the extent of the value
> at risk, which of course will include financial data, so the risk will
> be very, very high, without much argument. The probability of failure
> is the cul-de-sac argument itself, and may be hard to resolve. But
> even a very low probability may not be acceptable; it would not be
> acceptable to me.
>
> The second part arguments are technical, but we can include the
> best-tested cipher in the multi-cipher stack. In this case, I think
> most would agree that -- properly done -- the overall strength could
> not be weaker than the tested cipher. And I think most would agree
> that this would indeed help prevent the single-point cipher failure
> which (almost) everyone will admit is at least *possible*.
>
> Really, after going though this stuff at great length, I don't see
> much controversy here. No fireworks tonight: Sorry.
>
> ---
> Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
> Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
------------------------------
From: Fiji <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: FSE-6 Report: Slide Attack
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 09:28:37 -0400
>
> BTW, are chosen-plaintext attacks really pratical? I mean they make good
> theory but are they actually used 'in the field'?
I can think of many ways to create chosen-plaintext. Of course most of
these ways entail social engineering or automated protocols. *Hint* TCP/IP
will send numerous ICMP error messages if conditions are correct. Most of
these ICMP messages will contain parts of previous packets in their data
load. One can have a hayday with these down a VPN.
-Fiji
>
> Tom
>
> -----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
> http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
>
>
------------------------------
From: Jim Felling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1999 09:14:06 -0500
"R. Knauer" wrote:
> On Sat, 17 Apr 1999 17:57:39 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter) wrote:
>
> >>Gee, I was hoping you'd go off and develop such a method.
> >>We certainly need something better than "I tried random
> >>attacks and didn't find one that succeeded."
>
> >Gee, I thought you were serious.
>
> I sure hope that you know better now.
>
> >Since we do not have a complete theory of cryptanalysis, all
> >the work spent on cryptanalysis can never produce the true strength
> >value we seek.
>
> That statement is true for classical crypto, but it is not true for
> quantum computation of true random numbers. There is no cryptanalytic
> attack possible for keys generated in that manner.
>
> >And while it would be nice to have such a theory, we
> >have 50 years of mathematical cryptography which argues that there is
> >no such thing.
>
> That statement is true for classical crypto, but not for quantum
> crypto.
>
Why is this? What property of quantum phenomena frees it from external
coupling and resonance phenomena?
>
> Bob Knauer
>
> "I am a great mayor; I am an upstanding Christian man; I am an intelligent
> man; I am a deeply educated man; and I am a very humble man."
> - Marion Barry, Mayor of Washington DC
------------------------------
From: Ronan Harle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: testing encrypted files
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 15:44:16 +0200
Hi,
There is a small program, Stat95 (available on
http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jmott/stat95.zip , 32.8 Kb )
that makes a statistic analysis on the first 10 kb of an encrypted file,
and give some statistical data about it.
What I don't know is how reliable are these data, and how to interpret
them *properly*
Here is an example of what we get with a 36Kb file (HTML) encrypted with
Kryptology (small (350Ko) nice freeware, RC4, no idea about its
reliability but its small size makes it pretty useful sometimes...)
*************
Tests For Randomness - by Jack Mott - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jmott
Entropy: 7.981106 Ideal = 8 RC4=7.971716
Arithmetic Mean: 126.759024 Ideal = 127.5 RC4 = 128.004
Standard Deviation: 74.228766 Ideal = 74.9002 RC4 = 74.45
Percentage of following bytes >: 49.560000
Percentage of following bytes <: 50.040000
Percentage of following bytes =: 0.389961
Ideal: 49.8046875% >, 49.8046875% <, and .390625% =
RC4 = 49.52% >, 49.99% <, 0.478% =
Chi-Square Was:251.030797 Ideal = between 288.000000 and 224.000000
Monte Carlo Pi Was:3.160000 Ideal = 3.14159 RC4 = 3.122
Percent of 1 bits = 49.696280 Ideal = 50% RC4 = 49.85
Percent of 0 bits = 50.293721 Ideal = 50% RC4 = 50.14
Serial Correlation: 0.024246 Ideal: 0 RC4 = .0171
************
My problem is : what can I do with these infos ?
It seems to be interesting, but it's beyond my knowlegde...Mayday !
By the way, do you know any other program like this one ?
--
Ronan Harle ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
"The world is moving so fast these days that the person who says
it can't be done is generally interrupted by someone doing it."
--Fosdick
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