Cryptography-Digest Digest #731, Volume #9       Thu, 17 Jun 99 14:13:04 EDT

Contents:
  Re: SLIDE ATTACK FAILS ("Matthew Bennett")
  Re: Book Usefulness Question (Jonathan Katz)
  Re: newbie question ("Anton Stiglic")
  Re: NIST annouces set of Elliptic Curves (John Savard)
  Re: please suggest papers (John Savard)
  Re: encrypt using ASCII 33 to 126 only? (Peter Gutmann)
  Re: SLIDE ATTACK FAILS (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
  Re: SLIDE ATTACK & large state SYSTEMS (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
  Re: RSA example with small numbers (Aidan Skinner)
  Re: Simple Prime Number Question ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
  Re: An Open Apology (Was: the student paradox) (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
  Re: the student paradox (wtshaw)
  Review:  "Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War" (Sundial Services)
  Re: just a quick check.. ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
  Re: the student paradox (wtshaw)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: "Matthew Bennett" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: SLIDE ATTACK FAILS
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 13:51:28 +0100

SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY wrote in message <7k20uv$120e$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
<snip>

A message like his really does encourage one to ignore everything else he
posts doesn't it?

If the author of a data security application spoke in such an unprofessional
way that Mr. Scott appears to do, I find it hard to imagine serious
investors being interested in his work.  It is a shame he underestimates the
intelligence of the majority of members of this group, an in doing so simply
wastes his own time.


/\/\/\//





------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jonathan Katz)
Subject: Re: Book Usefulness Question
Date: 15 Jun 1999 09:34:08 -0400


In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, consalus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
|> Alright.
|> I decided I want to learn about cryptography.
|> I got Applied Cryptography and read it.
|> I've been reading papers on simple ciphers.
|> Just recently, I found what seems to be a really
|> great paper on Tom St. Denis's site on cryptoanalysis.
|> Now, I'm finding myself with a sudden excess of cash, and
|> so I was looking at Handbook of Applied Cryptography
|> by Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone
|> (ISBN: 0-8493-8523-7).  I imagine somebody in here has read it
|> once or twice, and so I just thought I should ask: It is worth getting?
|> 
|> Thanks,
|> 
|> Kyle Consalus
|> 

It's a great reference book, but certainly not a book to learn cryptography from.
-- 
======================
Jonathan Katz
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

------------------------------

From: "Anton Stiglic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: newbie question
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 10:30:13 -0400

Alot of people seem to ask this question, so
here is how you do it:

to computer a^e mod n    you do the following
(in pseudo-C-code)

x = 1;
while (e > 0) {
  if (e is odd) {
     x = a*x mod n;
  }
  a = a*a mod n;
  e = e / 2;     */  use integer division /*
}
return x;



Why does it work?  Say we have a^e mod n  and that e is even,
a^e mod n = (a*a)^(e/2) mod n,  so the algo computes a*a and
divides the exponenent by 2.
Note that the final result will eventually go in x, when e will equal 1,
wich is even.  See next step.
Say we have a^e mod n and that e is odd,
a^e mod n = a*(a^(e-1)) mod n,
                                ^^^^
                              this is now even,
so the algo does x = a*x mod n, and then the stuff it does for an
even exponent.

The best thing is to just look it up yourselves to convince yourselves...


Anton Stiglic



------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: NIST annouces set of Elliptic Curves
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 15:07:16 GMT

Medical Electronics Lab <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:

>There are 2 formats, ascii and postscript.
>The postscript form has a lot of explanation,
>the ascii is just the curve data.

Thanks for the info: since I find postscript somewhat awkward to read,
I hesitated to download it. Now I'll take the time to deal with this.

John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/crypto.htm

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: please suggest papers
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 15:14:48 GMT

"Anthony" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:

>Please suggest some good published papers on "Public-Key Management and
>Distribution System", especially on Internet-based systems.  Thanks in
>advance!

There may be such papers in the literature on specific topics. But in
general, key management and distribution using public-key cryptography
is too straightforward to lead to anything in the literature that
deals with issues encountered in the usual case.

Basically, the trick is: before starting, ensure everyone in the
network has an authentic copy of the central authority's public key.
Then one needs to use sneakernet after everyone has generated their
own key pair, so that the central authority can be sure of everyone
else's public key - to supply them with signed certificates for those
keys.

After that is done, when A wants to send a message to B, A just asks
for B's public key, and the certificate, which A can check.

Possibly some of the earliest papers introducing public-key
cryptography will cover this material, however in general the
understanding of how to use PKC emerged gradually in practice some
time after the technique was introduced.

John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/crypto.htm

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann)
Subject: Re: encrypt using ASCII 33 to 126 only?
Date: 17 Jun 1999 14:52:16 GMT

"Kenneth N Macpherson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

>Hello,

>I am trying to find code (vb) that will take a string (all chars in range 33
>to 126 ASCII) and encrypt it again using chars in range 33 to 126.

>Any help with code, urls, (or even an algo) would be fantastic.

This comes up every six months or so, I posted code to do this here in early
1997 which lead to an interesting discussion on this sort of problem.  Do a 
Dejanews search on a subject line of "Encrypting data with a restricted range 
of values" to find the thread.  You can use the technique with any underlying 
cipher, I typically use 3DES.

Peter.


------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: SLIDE ATTACK FAILS
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 16:32:36 GMT

In article <7kaquh$cof$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Matthew Bennett" 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY wrote in message <7k20uv$120e$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
><snip>
>
>A message like his really does encourage one to ignore everything else he
>posts doesn't it?
>
>If the author of a data security application spoke in such an unprofessional
>way that Mr. Scott appears to do, I find it hard to imagine serious
>investors being interested in his work.  It is a shame he underestimates the
>intelligence of the majority of members of this group, an in doing so simply
>wastes his own time.
>
  
   By unprofessional way would that include the bragging of some professional
claimming it was dead years ago and that his pet slide attack shows that it is
dead. When he never bothered to test it. If that is professional then I will 
stay unprofessional.


David A. Scott
--
                    SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
                    http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
                    http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
                    NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: SLIDE ATTACK & large state SYSTEMS
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 15:11:18 GMT

In article <7k9l34$65o$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>In article <7k9ddl$1tng$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>  [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote:
>>   Then you would also assume that the German Enigma is safe. But
>> sorry it is not. The problem with a short key is that no one can prove
>> that it is secure. You make the same fallacy as the germans no one
>> does a full key seach. Unless it short like DES.  At the most if two
>> ciphers appear the same but one has a longer key then knowing
>> nothing else the longer keyed one is better period.
>>  There may even be a nice mapping function to map the short key
>> system to a method that is already broken.
>
>Well no, most systems with bad mapping have related keys and can be
>broken.  If the mapping is perfectly random (well with respect to the
>key) then it cannot be broken easily.  The problem is most ciphers have
>characteristics and that is where the mappings become weak.
    Problem is little grass hopper as soon as you code for a subset you
really no longer have anything that is perfectly random. You then set
up equations that can relate the key to the mappings but when you do
you leave the seeds for the NSA types to find patterns that related the
various plain text cipher text pairs to the keys them selves. When using
a subset this is no easy task. The smaller the subset one limits themselves
to the greater the likely hood the high paid PhD's at the NSA will find a 
pattern to exploit. In may method when you pick a big file for keyenc.key
and then use a small password of 128 to 256 bits of information you may think
that you have that much protection but I doubt it. In that if many messages 
are sent eventually they could find an easy pattern like they do in any small
key system. But then you can change the keyenc.key file and your in a totally
different part of  the soultion space making there job much harder.

>
>If a block cipher has a perfecting random mapping of all 2^128 16-byte
>pages ((2^128!) possible mappings, it would require a long time to find
>the key (which would be the mappings).  Of course such a cipher is
>insane as it would require 2^135 bits of ram (2^127 bytes).

    That is not true. Just because a full cipher could impliment all
possilbe mappings based on some key does not mean that every
every entry has to be in storage. And secondly assuming man kind
keeps making progress and the chinese don't use the nuclear bomb
designs that they bought from the Clinton's administration maybe in
a few hundred years some new technology will have computers with
such memories unless you know the absolute limits.

>
>However if the key schedule/round function can create such mappings
>then it would be ideally secure.
>
>If you are forced to try 2^127 possible keys that is quite secure.  You
   Problem is little grasshopper how can one prove that a forced search is
the best way. In general you can't.
>cannot build a computer fast enough.  BTW if you care to notice all AES
>ciphers can except keys of upto 256 bits which is 2^128 times harder to
>solve then 128-bit keys which should be out of reach for a long long
>time.
>
>I think what you really are reaching at is that for any 128-bit block
>cipher there are (2^128)! - 2^n mappings which are not possible (n =
>key size).  This is true, and certainly is a weakness of any cipher.
>However they rely on the fact that all mappings which are possible are
>impossible to identify, so by this logic you cannot say any mapping is
>invalid.  However even with your 'million byte key' there are mappings
>which are impossible...
   mine was built to do all of the 19bit single cycle mappings. I can do
every possible one. And little grasshopper. It is quite likely that any of
the AES methods could be mapped down to a subset of a cipher that 
is based on a single cipher that is made up of a single single 16 bit
S table and then the 128 bit inputs are grouped together in  8  16 bit
word chunks and with the proper combining could do exactly what the
the larger ones do. The only hard part is finding this combining and
even then you would be using only a subset of the S tables for the
16 bit lookup tables since the key space is so small for the AES 
candidates.  However my 19bit soution has to many mappings to
be reduced this way.

>
>Tom




David A. Scott
--
                    SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
                    http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
                    http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
                    NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Aidan Skinner)
Subject: Re: RSA example with small numbers
Date: 17 Jun 1999 15:49:34 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

On Sat, 12 Jun 1999 22:26:12 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 

>Curious, what is 'bc'?  Is that one of them GNU large num libraries?

from bc(1)

NAME
        bc - An arbitrary precision calculator language

the GNU large num library is called gmp (gnu multi-precision).

- Aidan
-- 
http://www.skinner.demon.co.uk/aidan/
Horses for courses, tac-nukes to be sure.

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Simple Prime Number Question
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 14:39:53 GMT

Thanks Douglas,

So you're saying that i = j mod k is to be interpreted as

((i-j) mod k) = 0

Right?

I understand about 'clock arithmetic', but if 1 mod n is always 1, then
why not just write = 1 as opposed to = 1 mod n?  That's what's
confusing me.

Thanks again,

Ron


In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
  "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Fermat's (Little) Theorem: If p is a prime and if a is any integer,
> > then a^p = a (mod p). In particular, if p does not divide a, then a^
(p-
> > 1) = 1 (mod p).
> > If I choose a=10, p=3, 10^3=1000 and 10 mod 3 = 1, and 1000 != 1....
> > And while you're at it, what is the definition of 1 mod n?
>
> The whole equation is taken modulo n, bit just the right-hand-side.
> i = j mod k means that (i - j) is exactly divisible by k.
> This is "clock arithmetic" and is explained in any introduction to
> number theory, such as Ore's book.
>


Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: An Open Apology (Was: the student paradox)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 16:27:20 GMT

In article <7k9qic$1mm$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "rosi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Hi, all,
>
>This has been heavy on my mind for some time. I should have given
>the apology long, long ago.
>
>A while back, we had a discussion about trust model started by
>Dr. Gerck's post. In one of my posts I said something very
>inappropriate. People did not pick on me for that (and Dr. Gerck
>was too nice to either). I said something like some of what Dr.
>Gerck showed 'echoed' some of my thoughts. The word 'echo'
>was the worst chosen one. I have no reason to imply (though
>unintentionally) that I thought about certain issues before Dr.
>Gerck did. Even if I did, which I strongly doubt, he could not have
>'echoed' mine. Most importantly, I never pursuited these issues
>rigorously. I owe this apology. I am genuinely sorry.
>
>However, it is my opinion that it is no big deal to have all-or-nothing.
>I filed my patent in 1997 in which the idea was used. I do not claim
>I had the idea first. It is just so obvious (with whatever tricks you do
>to achieve it). The first time I heard it being credited to Prof. Rivest
>was through a reply post to one of mine in which I in passing mentioned
>it in suggesting something else. Either before or after those posts, I
>learned that Peter Gutman (sorry if spelt erroneously) also had what I
>called bi-directional scrambling or backward-and-forward srambling. I
>am not too sure, but I have the impression that Peter also used the
>term backward-and-forward or something very similar. The only
>difference, hope I am not wrong, is that Peter uses encryption but I
>had it merely as a chaining operation. It could very well be that other
>people before us all had the same idea. It is obvious and not
>something hard to see or imagine.
>
>Another thing (sorry to bring it up again) is the S&w also by Prof.
>Rivest. That to me is no big deal either. If you go back and read one
>of the posts by Brian Olson, you will see that he ALMOST stumbled
>on it! I am not sure if he realized that or he as well did not take much
>interest for one reason or another. I can not imagine how many
>people could have had the same or similar ideas.
>
>There can be other things. Some obvious, but may not be easily put
>on rigorous grounds and proven to have the characteristics.
>Nontheless, they are to me obvious.
>
>As to the original post, a hard one. Life is vital with its non-static
>nature. There is a 'prescribed' route life takes, paradoxical or not. We
>all take it as we are all live creatures. Life has an end and acquiring
>knowledge etc., all that associated with life can not grow forever, and
>must, to me, obey the path charted out. Hope I do not sound like a
>doomsday advocate. Making mistakes, being stupid are all things
>dearest to us, just as being defiant to conventional wisdoms when the
>questions we put to them do not bring back satisfactory answers.
>
>If you independently thought up IT, you are to me about just as creative
>as the first one who did. You should not be ashamed that you are too
>late. You only need to be aware that you are previlleged (XOR is

   I don' think I was to late. I think Ron R. is credited with the words
"all or nothing encryption" I have been using the words "wrapped PCBC"
for many years. While my son in college many years ago we communicated
with exotic chaining methods that required chinaing dowm and the chaining
back. This required the encryption program and the decryption program to
read the file in both directions. However that seemed to bother me so I came
up with the fact one can think of the file as a cylinder and then you just do
a modifed form of PCBC around and around in a loop. This forces the file
to be decrypted only in the reverse direction. I fill I am the one who came
up with the idead of "wrapped PCBC" first and I have mentioned properties
such as that a one bit change inputt casues the whole file to change.
However I admit I was not first to use "all-or-nothing" that is something
between Ron and you. I did exchange mail wiht Ron when some noticed
his article and he wrote back a few times how ever I am not sure if he looked
at my code. But if you write to him he will write back.
 However I agree with you I think this is obvious and that many may have
proposed it in the past. It is just that in the far past it was not pratical
but it surprises me that the cypto people don't talk more about it. I think
it is beacause of the narrow mindedness of the open community. It is quite
likely the NSA has been using it for years. And as far as patents go it is 
quite possible the NSA may have already filed a secret patient. Where I 
worked before there where many secret patients so this is very possible.
However I have a feeling since Ron R. is so well known to the crypto
community that he will be the one credited for the term 
"all-or-nothing-encryption" even if you beat him in time.

 I am not sure how complete the dejamews archives are any more
but I see it shows the first time I used the term "wrapped PCBC"
in this group was "1997/03/02" I can't seem to find earlyer posting of much of 
anything but this was after I retired from government service and I have been
posting for many years before retirement.

>such a household term nowadays) and you are standing on others'
>shoulders. You should be proud of yourself, knowing exactly where the
>pride is set on.

   Well when in 1997 did you patenent "all-or-nothing-encryption" since you
mention pride comes from knowing exactly where the pride is set in, If Ron;s
paper is in 1997 what is the date of his and yours.

>
>Sorry for the verbiage.
>
>Thank you very much.
>--- (My Signature)
>
>Jim Gillogly wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>>"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>>> scott19u but every one said it was use less then I here that Ron R of
>>> RSA comes up with an all or nothing encryption idea. Guess who will
>>> get the credit.
>>
>>His paper was in 1997.  When was yours?  Are you claiming priority
>>for the PCBC chaining method, which was used in Kerberos?
>>
>>--
>> Jim Gillogly
>> 26 Forelithe S.R. 1999, 18:56
>> 12.19.6.5.1, 5 Imix 9 Zotz, Second Lord of Night
>
>


David A. Scott
--
                    SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
                    http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
                    http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
                    NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: the student paradox
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 11:38:47 -0600

In article <7k8gel$ngh$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> here is an interesting tidbit...
> 
> When most people start cryptography or any computer science course they
> have many ideas on how things are done (how to encrypt data, how to
> compress, how to sort, how to...).  Many of the ideas are naive to
> experts.  As the student learns more however they have less ideas and
> settle into accepted academia (or lines of thought).
> 
> So basically less knowledge = more ideas, more knowledge = worse
> ideas.  One might argue that there are less ideas but they are higher
> quality, but one could also argue that more knowleege = more tools for
> ideas... :)
> 
I resemble those remarks.  Forcing yourself to resolve certain problems,
and see how they were otherwise handled later, will draw you to the
conclusion that there are many more ways to do things than those that are
known.  If you use considerable effort and come to the same method of
handling a situation, this confirms the knowledge that was already known,
and shows that you understand why it is so.

If you present yourself with unsolved problems and solve them in some way,
you demonstrate to yourself the shallowness of accepted lines of thought.
-- 
"I want to make laws.  We don't make donuts here." --John Conyers

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 07:53:41 -0700
From: Sundial Services <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Review:  "Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War"

Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War 1941-1945
Leo Marks
Simon and Schuster, 1998.  ISBN 0-684-86422-3


If you like purely technical tomes about Bletchly Park, Enigma, and
machine encipherment, told from the British side where German codes are
always broken and the Abwehr is always "double-crossed," then you are
not likely to enjoy this book.

But if you can become engaged by a story where a piece of poetry can be
the difference between life and death, where the author is not and was
not ever at the top of the command chain, privy to everything, or
successful in scaling every bulwark of bureaucracy that exists even in a
desperate war -- then you will enjoy this book very much.

Mr. Marks was a British codeMAKER, creating ciphers for use by secret
agents in the field while trying to persuade certain of his superior
officers that the codes they were using with Dutch agents had been
broken -- as in fact they had been.  He portrays himself as an emotional
man, certainly as a fallible one.  He admirably resists the temptation
to depict his superior officers as stubborn or unenlightened; in fact he
does quite the opposite.

Marks' innovation in the war was the concept of printing "letter one
time pads" on pieces of silk that could easily be torn, swallowed, or
crumpled into an almost-invisible wad of cloth.  Thus the name of the
book, because every agent found himself, or herself, walking a tightrope
"between silk and cyanide."

Highly recommended.

-Mike Robinson �

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: just a quick check..
Date: 17 Jun 1999 10:38:20 PDT

On Thu, 17 Jun 1999 14:07:55 +0100, "Matthew Bennett"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>I'm considering this method over the check-phrase one simply because it
>appears to be more convenient, since the user would only need to enter one

I'm not sure about how much of a problem it would be to store the key
in the file, but read up on how Scramdisk determines whether a given
file is a valid scramdisk volume file. Briefly:

When Scramdisk creates a file, it generates a block of random data to
start. Then it makes a copy of the data so that the first two blocks
of the volume file are the same stuff. When the file's encrypted you
can't tell.

After getting your passphrases and hashing them, Scramdisk reads the
first two blocks of the file you've told it to mount. It decrypts them
according to the hash and compares the results. If they match then the
file is presumed good, mounted, and Windows hopefully sees the rest of
the volume as a valid FAT16 disk.

That's my understanding at least. It's all in the docs.

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: the student paradox
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 11:56:22 -0600

In article <7k9kis$623$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> In article <7k9e2l$1tng$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>   [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote:
> >    But even that is not good. Some ideas that where bad years ago may
> > my good today. Due to the fact computers are faster and you can count
> > on the whole file with out error during a transfer. In the old days
> encrypting
> > a whole file as a single block would not have been practical.
> >  Even the noble gas compounds where "proved impossible". When I was
> > in High School we saw a film on the elements and they had a bunch of
> > PhD's from standford do all kinds of stuff to make some compounds
> > from the noble gases. There conculsion was that it was folly to even
> try
> > because it was impossible and a foolish thing to try. Of couse like
> most
> > PhD types when they say something is impossible they were WRONG.
> 
> I think you unfairly stereotype phd types.  Not all of them have sticks
> up their asses.
> 
> As the previous post noticed, many people destroy their own ideas
> because they know they have been proven bad/wrong before.  I still
> think it is paradoxial that this occurs.  It's too bad people avoid
> abstract brainstorming, cause some really cool minds are out there.
> 
It is highly scientific to write ones thoughts down in some manner or
fashion for future reference.  Not only is this useful personally, if
dated, it allows one to counter claims that someone else was first with a
useful thought.  

You might chose to be less formal, I generally do.  I do have a loose file
of partial and incompleted ideas and projects which I try to review every
few months.  Even if you have a simple means of writing casual questions
down, that can be extremely helpful in recalling yourself to the
possibility of reconsidering them later.
-- 
"I want to make laws.  We don't make donuts here." --John Conyers

------------------------------


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