Cryptography-Digest Digest #794, Volume #9 Mon, 28 Jun 99 19:13:04 EDT
Contents:
Re: one time pad (Greg Ofiesh)
Adults Only! 73777 ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Question on LIBDES ("Marc Hoeppner")
Re: one time pad ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Encryption Survey - Results - May, 1997 ("Markku J. Saarelainen")
Encryption Survey - Results - October, 1996 ("Markku J. Saarelainen")
Re: one time pad ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Greg Ofiesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: one time pad
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 19:17:54 GMT
> And saying that an OTP is provably secure can be accurately
> interpreted to mean that no sudden collapse _of the cipher_
> is possible in the way that PKC is theoretically vulnerable
> to advances in applied math.
This is one of the points I have been trying to articulate all this
time. That while OTPs are provable only in theory, the others are not
provable at all, and in fact in theory are crackable given enough and
proper resources (which WILL come in time).
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: sci.comp-aided,sci.cryonics
Subject: Adults Only! 73777
Date: Monday, 28 Jun 1999 13:20:43 -0600
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Free 18 Year Old Girl Pics (48 total pics):
http://3511359008/sindex.html
cU'A4rSWzR
------------------------------
From: "Marc Hoeppner" <*spam*[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Question on LIBDES
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 23:28:56 +0200
Hi,
I am trying to understand the libdes version 4.01 of Eric Young, but there
is something that I must have overlooked in the des_enc.c. The final inner
function des_enc doesn't seem to use the key schedule at all which is
abviously nonsense. Could someone please enlighten me?
void des_encrypt(data, ks, encrypt)
DES_LONG *data;
des_key_schedule ks;
int encrypt;
{
register DES_LONG l,r,t,u;
#ifdef DES_PTR
register unsigned char *des_SP=(unsigned char *)des_SPtrans;
#endif
#ifndef DES_UNROLL
register int i;
#endif
register DES_LONG *s;
r=data[0];
l=data[1];
IP(r,l);
/* Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is
* done outside the loop. This required the
* des_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated 1 bit to the right.
* One perl script later and things have a 5% speed up on a sparc2.
* Thanks to Richard Outerbridge <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
* for pointing this out. */
/* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */
/* shift left by 2 */
r=ROTATE(r,29)&0xffffffffL;
l=ROTATE(l,29)&0xffffffffL;
s=(DES_LONG *)ks;
/* I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the
* inner loop */
if (encrypt)
{
#ifdef DES_UNROLL
D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 0); /* 1 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 2); /* 2 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 4); /* 3 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 6); /* 4 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 8); /* 5 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,10); /* 6 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,12); /* 7 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,14); /* 8 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,16); /* 9 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,18); /* 10 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,20); /* 11 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,22); /* 12 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,24); /* 13 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,26); /* 14 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,28); /* 15 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,30); /* 16 */
#else
for (i=0; i<32; i+=8)
{
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+0); /* 1 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+2); /* 2 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i+4); /* 3 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i+6); /* 4 */
}
#endif
}
else
{
#ifdef DES_UNROLL
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,30); /* 16 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,28); /* 15 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,26); /* 14 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,24); /* 13 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,22); /* 12 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,20); /* 11 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,18); /* 10 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,16); /* 9 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,14); /* 8 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,12); /* 7 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,10); /* 6 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 8); /* 5 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 6); /* 4 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 4); /* 3 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r, 2); /* 2 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l, 0); /* 1 */
#else
for (i=30; i>0; i-=8)
{
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i-0); /* 16 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i-2); /* 15 */
D_ENCRYPT(l,r,i-4); /* 14 */
D_ENCRYPT(r,l,i-6); /* 13 */
}
#endif
}
/* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */
l=ROTATE(l,3)&0xffffffffL;
r=ROTATE(r,3)&0xffffffffL;
FP(r,l);
data[0]=l;
data[1]=r;
l=r=t=u=0;
}
Marc
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: one time pad
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 22:04:34 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> So, given that it is and will remain impossible to prove a negative,
> that there are no weaknesses in a key generator, we can conclude that
> there cannot be perfect cipher systems. LIke Godels proof of the
> incompleteness of mathematical logics, we can now take this lack of
> provability for granted.
No, you might however conclude that that one line of argumentation
is incapable of achieving a proof.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 21:55:06 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> ... What happens if he doesn't know for sure that the sender uses
> an OTP? His best guess will be that the sender possibly forgets to
> encrypt his message.
No, because the previous zillion times he made that assumption it
turned out to be incorrect.
------------------------------
From: "Markku J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Encryption Survey - Results - May, 1997
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 17:33:47 +0000
SURVEY SUMMARY : ENCRYPTION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY
MAY, 1997
Note: This survey summary contains raw survey results that have NOT been
analyzed, evaluated or prioritized. The results are based on comments
and opinions (all of which may not be facts) that were received from
many individuals who responded to the original (October 1996) survey.
*****************************
QUESTION 1: In your opinion, what are main developments in the adoption
of encryption technologies in commercial enterprises since October,
1996?
*****************************
"The continued government attempts to get 'key recovery', and a certain
amount of reluctant willingness from business."
"Purely for e-commerce reasons have there been any advancements. The
rest of the encryption world (privacy/freedom etc.) have been
appallingly backward and most governments will tend to hold them back."
"Network Computers (NCs)."
"Slight easing of export restrictions. Development of several payment
protocols. Increasing adoption of retail commerce over the net as
evidenced by recent IPO of Amazon.com."
"There is some movement towards more advanced mathematics. The market
is searching for patent free/royalty free encryption. Governments are
attempting to halt it, but are failing miserably."
"Electronic payment via The Internet."
"C2's bypass of the export regulations. The broader adoption of SSL.
Eudora plugins for PGP."
"-SSL has been widely used for the securing of data for a number of
on-line Internet banks. -Encrypted tunneling products which extend the
corporate Intranet/LAN are now becoming widely available. -Smart cards
are finally appearing in North America. In Canada alone Visa Cash,
Exact (Proton?), and Mondex are going through trials. -SSL is now widely
used to protect credit card transactions on a number of internet retail
sites -The US government continues to support key escrow for exported
encryption. -Major players (i.e. banks, IBM, MS, HP, VeriFone) are
taking steps to integrate SET into their range of products. -Future
browsers are going to allow smart cards to Interface with the Internet."
*****************************
QUESTION 2: In your opinion, what are 5-10 main barriers currently that
may prevent the successful implementation and utilization of encryption
technologies in commercial enterprises?
*****************************
"-Legislation and government intervention for strong encryption.
-Unfamiliarity with the technology will produce mistrust of its
reliability. -Safe key-management processes are difficult to achieve.
This will reduce the security of cryptography and thus its usefulness
for many applications. -Cryptography is not user-friendly right now.
Until it becomes so than it is unlikely to achieve widespread usage.
-Licensing fees for cryptographic algorithms are not cheap. Until
patents expire for things like the RSA public key algorithm the costs
of developing reliable cryptographic products will remain high. - There
are a large number of cryptographic products with no clear standards in
sight."
"Export regulations."
"Lack of perceived need."
"Lack of expertise among engineers and technicians."
"a) Lack of interest in security b) Concentration on cost c) Lack of
ready-to-use cheap tools d) Legislation and potential legislation e)
Patents and licensing issues"
"Government inadequacies in legislation, Vendors propensity to hand
private keys to government (extrapolate that to insecurity when a person
working for a vendor is bribed to give out a private key), Costs, Public
reluctance in encryption (FUD factor)"
"Threats to roles of traditional players (e.g., SET's effect on card
issuers)., Seamless integration into products., Education of users.,
Regulatory obstacles. Widespread availability."
"1) ease of use, 2) cost of real security, 3) an understanding of
security details, 4) a lack of understanding the difference between
cryptography and security 5) uncertainty as to what the government rules
are"
"- exportability (permissions are needed if a product implements
cryptography, and 2 or more versions of the software has to be build), -
patents (can't exploit algorithms without negotiating royalties)"
"The governments export restrictions on strong cryptographic
algorithms."
" It is not a question of availability of software, but of
interoperability between systems made/sold in different regions of the
world."
"Government FUD. Ease of use. Cost of training etc. Worry about leakage
of secrets."
*****************************
QUESTION 3: What are activities and projects that can be initiated and
taken to lower and reduce above barriers (see the question 2.)?
*****************************
"a) Wider accurate publication of security lapses.
b),c) Cheap tools fitted for a job. I just read a Sun catalogue
where much of the software (including security software)
has laughable prices. Get a straightforward Virtual
Private Network from 100 pounds for a start.
d) Do strong lobbying and occupy lawmaker's time with other stuff
when they seem to be going in the wrong direction.
e) Wait for some important expiry dates.
Have more reasonable contact with license-holders.
Bypass licenses by producing new methods that get less
restriction."
"Continued integration into key products such as Netscape and IE.
Perhaps even into OSes."
"Lowering the barriers to deploying certification authority
infrastructures for use w/in intranets. (in terms of cost, ease of
administration, etc.), Further efforts at deregulation."
"Lobby governments, Do not place restrictions for vendor based key
management, Push for totally private key systems"
"A not for profit, global, public education group should be created
whose purpose is to help educate businesses. Secondarily it should
educate the public on the issues of privacy, but the primary goal should
be to get all businesses (mainly the small ones) to understand that
simple pains can give a great deal of security, and that the cost is
worth the money and time saved from fraud and theft."
"An e-mail program that a "stoned hippy" could use and still not leak
information is needed. It would not allow too much flexibility, but it
would give "the masses" a hands on feel for what security is and how
crypto plays a role in their everyday life. Six year old kids and their
grandmothers could be using even this simple security level for e-mail.
It would go a long way because people will ask many questions, and they
will get many answers. It would more rapidly diffuse the information
and education over the populace (world wide)."
"Develop simple and user-friendly ways to use cryptography and manage
keys effectively."
"Reduce the ability for corporations to patent cryptographic processes,
key-management techniques, and anything other than completely unique
cryptographic algorithms. We don't need research into new cryptography
we need open access to refinements of what exists. If people can
patent those refinements then it reduces the access people have to
these new technologies at the expense of society at large."
"Eliminate export barriers on strong encryption."
"Education (public): crypto is used for authentication as well as
privacy. It is *not* military or espionage technology. It is
(required) enabling technology for tomorrow's information superhighway."
"Education (professional): principles of information security taught in
all relevant courses. (e.g. computing, telecom, electronics, etc)."
============== Results of the original survey in October, 1996
============
SURVEY SUMMARY: Encryption in Commercial Enterprises
October, 1996
by
M. J. Saarelainen
SURVEY METHODS BRIEFLY: Three specific questions were sent to several
mailing lists and news groups. The great number of responses was
received. These responses were compiled as received to the list (without
any priorities) below. No detailed analysis or evaluations were
completed at this time. Please, review these questions and responses and
let me know, if you like to add, remove or change something. Thanks.
=======
QUESTION 1. In your opinion, what are the 5-10 most significant
applications of encryption technologies currently in commercial
enterprises?
RESPONSES (# of responses = 29) TO QUESTION 1:
1. Secure E-Mail / Secure E-mail SMTP/POP3 mail client
2. Secure Internet-Shopping
3. Encrypt the entire internet ( encrypting routers etc. )
4. Encrypted file systems - partition for laptops
5. Encrypted voice (cellular, cordless, wireline, voice-over-internet)
6. Secure FAX
7. Point-to-point encrypted links, for corporations using the Internet
as a WAN.
8. EDI (both encryption & authentication), Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI)
9. Secure FTP client/server software
10. Secure FTP client only software
11. Secure UNIX FTP server software
12. Secure File based encryption for HD and Floppy
13. Accounting departments need to ensure their data can't be changed
14. Engineering needs to ensure competition doesn't easily steal ideas
15. Secure login (and insecure, in the case of Unix)
16. Network traffic encryption
17. Local file/data protection (incl. backup protection)
18. Protection of proprietary information while allowing company use of
it.
19. Crypto applications as an element in the information security system
20. Regional and national electric power exchanges between companies
21. Large investment banks who want to coordinate across their own
organizations and others in significant numbers
22. Healthcare cries out for encryption
23. The military for sensitive non-classified information.
24. Law enforcement is a natural for the internet, if they could agree
on a common security solution.
25. Online banking, online sales and commerce, data protection on
commercial database servers, secure transfer of govt. information, ie.
tax information on citizens.
26. The most widely spread encryption technologies are pgp and
proprietary hardware solutions by different providers like Cylink etc.
SSL is now upcoming.
27. Protection and storage of Archives
28. Person to person communication within an organization.
29. Secure remote communications (over the Internet)
========
QUESTION 2. In your opinion, what are 5-10 main barriers currently that
may prevent the successful implementation and utilization of encryption
technologies in commercial enterprises?
RESPONSES (# of responses = 22) TO QUESTION 2:
1. Cryptic user interfaces
2. ITAR regulations, Government regulation or restrictions of use of
strong encryption, Government export restrictions for strong encryption.
3. Ignorance ( pegasus provides REAL encryption )
4. Lack of knowledge of resources available to Business.
5. Misunderstanding that encryption is complicated.
6. Misunderstanding that encryption is costly.
7. General lack of knowledge as to how to write *strong* encryption
8. Lack of integration of strong encryption so that the user must
learn/know too much in order to use it properly
9. General lack of understanding of the necessity of *strong* encryption
10. Difficult to use
11. Slow speed
12. Complexity makes choices difficult since no one can be a full expert
13. Workers have to wait for a supervisor
14. A lack of understanding of the technology
15. The lack of good cost-benefit analysis data
16. On the product development side, few companies have both the
engineering and the marketing/industry expertise to successfully make
good secure products which meet real market needs and demands
17. Key Management. The ability for a user to gain authentification for
use of cryptographic programs, to access information for which that
person is authorized. Passwords can be forgotten, or copied, verifying a
user easily is very difficult.
18. Lack of standards, and most of all lack of good certification
services.
19. The second barrier derives from a missing standard interface in
E-Mail, ftp ... solutions.so transparently embed widely spread
encryption
20. Lack of knowledge of encryption is a big hurdle to it's
implementation. Non-technical people are required to evaluate the use
of a technological product they may not understand completely. It's
difficult to put your trust in an algorithm when you don't understand
how it works.
21. Many enterprises may not be aware of how easy it is to begin using
encryption within their organization.
22. Many organizations may not recognize the need to protect information
within their organization. Some may not be aware of how easy it is to
tap into electronic communications.
========
QUESTION 3. What are activities and projects that can be initiated and
taken to lower and reduce above barriers (see the question 2.)?
RESPONSES (# of responses = 27) TO QUESTION 3:
1. Integrated mail reader with PGP capabilities, easy to use
2. Spreading awareness of how useful strong crypto really is.
3. Spreading awareness of exactly *why* governments seeks to prevent the
spread of crypto.
4. Writing strong encryption software and placing it in the public
domain.
5. Proving by actual demonstration that existing encryption is
inadequate.
6. Encouraging wealthy crypto advocates to speak freely.
7. Education of users and vendors of the issues
8. Lobbying of governments by aforementioned enlightened users/vendors
9. Different products need to be created which can interoperate
transparently to the user, but not deliver data unless operator is valid
10. Smart cards which attach to every terminal, the cards go with the
person and they can validate themselves at any terminal
11. Overcoming the complexity barrier requires patient teaching of each
client
12. A set of brochures and pamphlets needs to be created which describes
most systems in use for a particular level of security
13. A major project would be to simply educate the managers of most
companies about crypto, to remove the magic and bring the whole thing
down to earth
14. Manufacturers need to go to more trouble talking with customers
before designing products and be more creative in finding ways to meet
market needs
15. Security companies also need to audit themselves and demonstrate
that they are trustworthy
16. Better turnkey low-cost enterprise-wide solutions to common problems
(network encryption, for example) are needed.
17. Make applications easier to use, Build easy to use encryption into
applications so that it is smooth or even transparent to users
18. Universal standards for dual key encryption
19. Reduce strength of encryption to increase speed
20. Large groups of customers must get together and dictate standards to
the security industry.
21. The first thing is to implement a transparent interface to
encryption function to all data transfer services.
22. The second would be to get all suppliers of encryption technologies
to confirm to this standard.
23. I think the best thing is to initiate a workgroup at The Open Group
responsible for encryption interfaces.
24. Public Software such as PGP should be widely available. The more
people are experienced with this software the more likely they are to
use and trust it.
25. Making software like PGP widely available means more than just
making sure copies of it are accessible. It also means making it
user-friendly enough.
26. Education is also required. I find that very few people really know
about these issues.
27. People need to promote awareness of the current situation.
========
------------------------------
From: "Markku J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Encryption Survey - Results - October, 1996
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 17:29:27 +0000
SURVEY SUMMARY: Encryption in Commercial Enterprises
October, 1996
by
M. J. Saarelainen
SURVEY METHODS BRIEFLY: Three specific questions were sent to several
mailing lists and news groups. The great number of responses was
received. These responses were compiled as received to the list (without
any priorities) below. No detailed analysis or evaluations were
completed at this time. Please, review these questions and responses and
let me know, if you like to add, remove or change something. Thanks.
=======
QUESTION 1. In your opinion, what are the 5-10 most significant
applications of encryption technologies currently in commercial
enterprises?
RESPONSES (# of responses = 29) TO QUESTION 1:
1. Secure E-Mail / Secure E-mail SMTP/POP3 mail client
2. Secure Internet-Shopping
3. Encrypt the entire internet ( encrypting routers etc. )
4. Encrypted file systems - partition for laptops
5. Encrypted voice (cellular, cordless, wireline, voice-over-internet)
6. Secure FAX
7. Point-to-point encrypted links, for corporations using the Internet
as a WAN.
8. EDI (both encryption & authentication), Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI)
9. Secure FTP client/server software
10. Secure FTP client only software
11. Secure UNIX FTP server software
12. Secure File based encryption for HD and Floppy
13. Accounting departments need to ensure their data can't be changed
14. Engineering needs to ensure competition doesn't easily steal ideas
15. Secure login (and insecure, in the case of Unix)
16. Network traffic encryption
17. Local file/data protection (incl. backup protection)
18. Protection of proprietary information while allowing company use of
it.
19. Crypto applications as an element in the information security system
20. Regional and national electric power exchanges between companies
21. Large investment banks who want to coordinate across their own
organizations and others in significant numbers
22. Healthcare cries out for encryption
23. The military for sensitive non-classified information.
24. Law enforcement is a natural for the internet, if they could agree
on a common security solution.
25. Online banking, online sales and commerce, data protection on
commercial database servers, secure transfer of govt. information, ie.
tax information on citizens.
26. The most widely spread encryption technologies are pgp and
proprietary hardware solutions by different providers like Cylink etc.
SSL is now upcoming.
27. Protection and storage of Archives
28. Person to person communication within an organization.
29. Secure remote communications (over the Internet)
========
QUESTION 2. In your opinion, what are 5-10 main barriers currently that
may prevent the successful implementation and utilization of encryption
technologies in commercial enterprises?
RESPONSES (# of responses = 22) TO QUESTION 2:
1. Cryptic user interfaces
2. ITAR regulations, Government regulation or restrictions of use of
strong encryption, Government export restrictions for strong encryption.
3. Ignorance ( pegasus provides REAL encryption )
4. Lack of knowledge of resources available to Business.
5. Misunderstanding that encryption is complicated.
6. Misunderstanding that encryption is costly.
7. General lack of knowledge as to how to write *strong* encryption
8. Lack of integration of strong encryption so that the user must
learn/know too much in order to use it properly
9. General lack of understanding of the necessity of *strong* encryption
10. Difficult to use
11. Slow speed
12. Complexity makes choices difficult since no one can be a full expert
13. Workers have to wait for a supervisor
14. A lack of understanding of the technology
15. The lack of good cost-benefit analysis data
16. On the product development side, few companies have both the
engineering and the marketing/industry expertise to successfully make
good secure products which meet real market needs and demands
17. Key Management. The ability for a user to gain authentification for
use of cryptographic programs, to access information for which that
person is authorized. Passwords can be forgotten, or copied, verifying a
user easily is very difficult.
18. Lack of standards, and most of all lack of good certification
services.
19. The second barrier derives from a missing standard interface in
E-Mail, ftp ... solutions.so transparently embed widely spread
encryption
20. Lack of knowledge of encryption is a big hurdle to it's
implementation. Non-technical people are required to evaluate the use
of a technological product they may not understand completely. It's
difficult to put your trust in an algorithm when you don't understand
how it works.
21. Many enterprises may not be aware of how easy it is to begin using
encryption within their organization.
22. Many organizations may not recognize the need to protect information
within their organization. Some may not be aware of how easy it is to
tap into electronic communications.
========
QUESTION 3. What are activities and projects that can be initiated and
taken to lower and reduce above barriers (see the question 2.)?
RESPONSES (# of responses = 27) TO QUESTION 3:
1. Integrated mail reader with PGP capabilities, easy to use
2. Spreading awareness of how useful strong crypto really is.
3. Spreading awareness of exactly *why* governments seeks to prevent the
spread of crypto.
4. Writing strong encryption software and placing it in the public
domain.
5. Proving by actual demonstration that existing encryption is
inadequate.
6. Encouraging wealthy crypto advocates to speak freely.
7. Education of users and vendors of the issues
8. Lobbying of governments by aforementioned enlightened users/vendors
9. Different products need to be created which can interoperate
transparently to the user, but not deliver data unless operator is valid
10. Smart cards which attach to every terminal, the cards go with the
person and they can validate themselves at any terminal
11. Overcoming the complexity barrier requires patient teaching of each
client
12. A set of brochures and pamphlets needs to be created which describes
most systems in use for a particular level of security
13. A major project would be to simply educate the managers of most
companies about crypto, to remove the magic and bring the whole thing
down to earth
14. Manufacturers need to go to more trouble talking with customers
before designing products and be more creative in finding ways to meet
market needs
15. Security companies also need to audit themselves and demonstrate
that they are trustworthy
16. Better turnkey low-cost enterprise-wide solutions to common problems
(network encryption, for example) are needed.
17. Make applications easier to use, Build easy to use encryption into
applications so that it is smooth or even transparent to users
18. Universal standards for dual key encryption
19. Reduce strength of encryption to increase speed
20. Large groups of customers must get together and dictate standards to
the security industry.
21. The first thing is to implement a transparent interface to
encryption function to all data transfer services.
22. The second would be to get all suppliers of encryption technologies
to confirm to this standard.
23. I think the best thing is to initiate a workgroup at The Open Group
responsible for encryption interfaces.
24. Public Software such as PGP should be widely available. The more
people are experienced with this software the more likely they are to
use and trust it.
25. Making software like PGP widely available means more than just
making sure copies of it are accessible. It also means making it
user-friendly enough.
26. Education is also required. I find that very few people really know
about these issues.
27. People need to promote awareness of the current situation.
========
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: one time pad
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1999 22:08:43 GMT
Greg Ofiesh wrote:
> The US Military, I was told, uses OTPs for their most sensitive
> communications (what ever those are).
Not normally, no.
The basic problem has always been transmittal and management of the
volume of key material that OTP systems require. Therefore, they
have been used only for relatively low-volume channels where the
stakes are extremely high, for example spy reports and the Hot Line.
Which aren't exactly military applications.
------------------------------
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