Cryptography-Digest Digest #811, Volume #9 Thu, 1 Jul 99 02:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: two questions ("Harvey Rook")
Re: How do you make RSA symmetrical? (Bill Unruh)
Re: Moores Law (a bit off topic) (Sam Trenholme)
Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length? (Sam
Trenholme)
Re: A slide attack on TEA? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length? (Greg
Ofiesh)
Re: two questions ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: two questions ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length? (Greg
Ofiesh)
Re: two questions ("rosi")
Re: How to find the period of a sequence ("Brian McKeever")
Re: Secure link over Inet if ISP is compromized. ("rosi")
Re: Good book for beginning Cryptographers? (Peter Gutmann)
Re: Project "Infinity" - replace 1 (one) with infinity ("rosi")
Re: Quasigroup engryption ("rosi")
Re: RSA or DIFFIE-HELLMANN ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length? (Jerry
Coffin)
Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: bareface ratio ("Gary M. Greenberg")
Re: A Quanitative Scale for Empirical Length-Strength ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: A Quanitative Scale for Empirical Length-Strength ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: two questions ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Why mirrors invert left-to-right (was: Kryptos article) (S.T.L.)
Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: two questions ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code? (S.T.L.)
Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code? (mercury)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Harvey Rook" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: two questions
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 16:14:16 -0700
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:7le239$qkn$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> <snip>
>
>
> So why isn't RC4 the wave of the future? Why jump on new ideas (which
> are slower, and presumably no more secure)?
>
> Just wondering...
Stream ciphers have two inherent security holes that require extra work to
plug.
1. Unless you are using a message digest with special properties (includes
the value of the key), or a digital signature, an opponent who knows the
plaintext can edit the message without getting caught. All you have to do is
go to the appropriate part of the data stream, xor with the plaintext value,
and then re-xor with the value you want. I don't need to know the key to do
this.
2. You can't use the same password twice. Yes you can prepend some random
bits to your key, but if you accidentally decrypt a file using the wrong
password, and then try to recover by re-encrypting it with the same wrong
password, you are out of luck.
So, to get the same security as a block cipher, you need a secure one way
hash function, and some weird key pre-processing. This extra work takes up
extra codes space, and makes stream ciphers slower. Remember, Two Fish and
RC6 are operating at about 19 cycles per byte.
The inherent security problems with stream ciphers, is the reason why block
ciphers will stay popular.
Harv
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Spam guard, the mail isn't cold, it's hot.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: How do you make RSA symmetrical?
Date: 30 Jun 1999 23:25:23 GMT
In <7ldqob$nes$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Fine, but is there anything you can add to "M^e mod N" to get a 64 bit
>> cyphertext? Enlarging N, reducing the exponent, or something like
>> that?
No. M^e mod N is of length either N or of length e*(Length of M)
whichever is shorter. So, you can get a 64 bit output by either making N
have 64 bits, or by making M less than 64/e. In the latter case the
system is trivially broken on a 10 dollar calculator in the length of
time it takes to key in the output. In th former case, the system is
trivially broken by factoring N. It will require an 1980's PC.
So yes, you can have a 64 bit output if you want it.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Moores Law (a bit off topic)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sam Trenholme)
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:07:33 GMT
>RSA-128?
I am sure he meant RC5-128.
- Sam
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length?
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sam Trenholme)
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:09:51 GMT
>Who is NIST?
http://www.nist.gov
And, much to the interest of people here:
http://www.nist.gov/aes
- Sam
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: A slide attack on TEA?
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:14:47 GMT
In article <7ldsf1$p6d$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner) wrote:
> So, _if you can find a slid pair_, you might be able to use this
> to attack TEA.
>
> But, I am suggesting that the use of "c" makes it very difficult
> to find a slid pair.
Could you not just filter out the c value? I am not to sure how the
slide attack works but filtering out a constant should not be hard
should it? Also in XTEA the key schedule is irregular so sliding
rounds is harder to do.
The attack may work on TEA but probably will not easily work on XTEA as
easily (if at all).
BTW has anyone tried to break XTEA or is it assumed secure? I only
know of one strong char which is the (x<<4)^(x>>5) which means any bit
change will propagate 9 bits some of times....
Hmm dunno enough of how to actually do the attacks to try...
Tom
--
PGP key is at:
'http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp'.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Greg Ofiesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length?
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 23:26:43 GMT
> Recall that NIST has just announced
> a set of elliptic curves for use within the
> US federal government. I really do not
> think they would do that unless they
> thought that ECC was good...
Who is NIST?
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: two questions
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:10:24 GMT
In article <rpve3.145$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sam Trenholme) wrote:
> My feeling is that block ciphers are preferred because they can, in
> addition to being able to do everything a stream cipher can do (OFB
makes
> a block cipher a stream cipher), can do things a stream chipher can
not
> do. For example, it is feasible to encrypt two different files with
the
> same key and IV with a block cipher, while doing so with a stream
cipher
> would be insecure. As another example, one can easily make a hash
out of
> a block cipher [1], provided the block cipher does not have any weak
keys.
Well first off it's not secure to use the same key for any symmetrical
cipher. The reason block ciphers are at least 64-bits is to avoid
frequency analysis. They are not immune to it. Imagine encrypting
files with >= 8 byte known headers...
That's one reason why programs like PGP use unique keys with each
message.
BTW making a stream cipher out of things like RC4 is rather easy. One
would have to avoid the class of weak keys though. Making hash
functions out of block ciphers is not normally a good idea. Even with
AES ciphers the block length is 128 bits which is considered to small
for hashes today.
If you want a hash use a hash. Tiger is a good example of one. If you
want data confusion (encryption) use a stream cipher.
Tom
--
PGP key is at:
'http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp'.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: two questions
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:06:40 GMT
<snip>
Ooops. The max key size is still log2(256!) but the max period is
2^1700 which is log2(256!) x 2^16. The max key size comes to 210 bytes
or so. If the key is longer there will related shorter keys (i.e it
would be possible to have a key of 50 bytes equal a key of 250 bytes...)
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Greg Ofiesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length?
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:41:06 GMT
> You can find an explanation in the book "Implementing Elliptic Curve
> Cryptography" which is probably at the level you want. The short
> answer is that elliptic curve math is harder than integer math. So
> far anyway, that might change someday :-)
I disagree. I just finished reading through that book, and while it is
good for learning how to implement ECDLP, it does not give side by side
comparisons on any front. The basic question asked inthe original post
is harder to answer in simple terms that we think. Just look at the
many posts that have attempted to. I know the answer, but I could not
say it any better than the others. It is not an easy answer. But the
posts here are pretty much all correct - from different views and
emphasis.
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------------------------------
From: "rosi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: two questions
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 21:00:51 -0400
Hi, all.
Just read a couple in this thread before jumping in.
Not much to say, just 'throw my arms up'.
But more seriously: If one wants to have a taste of stream cipher, one
can take, my intuition, a look at RC4u (see note). One may even have
a taste of 'what cryptography is about'. If anyone is serious about
breaking something, RC4u can be a good bendmark, IMO.
Note letter u is my coinage, referring to the one being publicly known
(and known to be output equivalent).
--- (My Signature)
William Tanksley wrote in message ...
>On Wed, 30 Jun 1999 04:50:07 GMT, Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>>William Tanksley wrote:
>>> DES-OFB uses a block cipher to generate a keystream, which is XORed
>>> into the plaintext. Obviously, any block cipher could be used in OFB
>>> mode.
>
>>Yes, but you're not using it as a block cipher any more, just as a
>>PRNG running totally independently of the input plaintext.
>
>Eh? Of course you're not using it as a block cipher -- the statement I
>was contradicting was, "it's impossible to make a block cipher into a
>stream cipher."
>
>Proof by construction. I like it ;-).
>
>--
>-William "Billy" Tanksley
------------------------------
From: "Brian McKeever" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How to find the period of a sequence
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 18:55:57 -0700
Well, it depends... You don't say what information you are given, ie
whether you have a generator and you want to know it's period (based on
repeated inner state), or someone else has a generator and you want to know
it's period (based on repeated output). I assume you mean the first case.
For this, there is a clever technique I picked up (don't recall where I read
it, but IIRC it was in a paper by Terry Ritter), where you have two
generators G1 and G2 initialized with the same internal state, but for each
one time you clock G1 you clock G2 twice. Then you wait for their initial
states to match again. In order to get the period of the loop they are in,
start a counter, and stop it when they match a third time.
Brian
cairus wrote in message <7ldfd5$ln5$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>Does anyone know which is the best
>algorithm to find the period of a given
>sequence (I remember something like
>the Floyd algorithm, but I forgot the
>details)?
>
>Thank you very much,
>Cairus
>
>
------------------------------
From: "rosi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Secure link over Inet if ISP is compromized.
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 21:19:47 -0400
Taking it as a bit of a game rather than something serious.
First, if I got you 'restrictions' correct, NO WAY.
Then, you can detect but only if the two at both ends 'know' each
other.In other words, formal systems won't do the work. Of course, as
others pointed out, maybe implicitly, authentication is the issue. A way
to authenticate 'implies' the possibility. We also assume that the most
hostile type of active attacks are not what we need to deal with (to
make this a meaning issue).
--- (My Signature)
Gene Sokolov wrote in message <7l9p68$o09$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>Let's assume that Alice and Bob both have dial-up Internet accounts. They
>want to establish a secure channel.
>
>Alice <--> ISP-A <--> Internet <--> ISP-B <--> Bob
>
>Do I understand this correctly, assuming that *all* their data is passed
>through ISP-A and ISP-B, there is absolutely no way to ensure secure
>communication between them if either of the ISP is controlled by the
>adversary? Alice and Bob would need another trusted channel to exchange
data
>before secure Internet link can be established.
>
>Gene Sokolov.
>
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann)
Subject: Re: Good book for beginning Cryptographers?
Date: 1 Jul 1999 01:25:04 GMT
Rayees S <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I would suggest Network Security: Private communication in a
>public world by Kaufman, Perlman and Speciner. It is the best book for
>beginners. Its language is lucid.
>Another book I have looked into is Cryptography and Network Security:
>Principles and Practice(2nd ed) by Stallings. It is best used as a textbook.
>It is up to date on some things. (http://www1.shore.net/~ws/Security2e.html)
>Bruce Schneier's work is a good reference work and makes easy reading too.
>HAC - Menezes is really useful if you really want to do some work on
>cryptography. Has all the nitty gritty details.
Another reference which you might find useful is my crypto tutorial,
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/, which is just over 500 pages
of slides on crypto and security protocols, techniques, and applications.
Peter.
------------------------------
From: "rosi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Project "Infinity" - replace 1 (one) with infinity
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 21:31:40 -0400
Anything up your sleeves? Please share with us. Thanks
--- (My Signature)
Markku 'Make' J. Saarelainen wrote in message
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>
>Just wondering, if anybody is working on any project to replace 1 (one)
>with infinity ....
>
>
------------------------------
From: "rosi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Quasigroup engryption
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 21:27:44 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message <7laai0$ddd$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[snip]
>
>here's a good question. where exactly do you look for better security?
>
Particularly good question. If one knows where to look, one does not
have to 'look for' it; if one does not look, one can not find any.
--- (My Signature)
>Tom
>--
>PGP key is at:
>'http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp'.
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: RSA or DIFFIE-HELLMANN
Date: 30 Jun 1999 22:15:52 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Given lambda(n)=L (GCD(p-1,q-1) where pq=n: p,q distinct primes) and
> having chosen e, it is easy to get d:
Ooops ... of course, L is not the greatest common divisor of p-1 and q-1,
but their least common multiple:
L=LCM(p-1,q-1)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jerry Coffin)
Subject: Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length?
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 21:58:43 -0600
In article <7le937$tfg$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
[ ... ]
> Who is NIST?
The National Institute of Science and Technology. It's what used to be called the
National Bureau of Standards. Basically, they standardize things for the U.S.
Government -- e.g. they wrote the current DES (the standard itself) and are
sponsoring the competition for what will become AES. In matters related to
encryption, the NSA has advisory and, ultimately, veto power over the decisions they
make.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 04:22:07 GMT
"Dr.Gunter Abend" wrote:
> If not more than 10% of the ciphertext looks like words, nobody can
> guess that these characters leak the true meaning of the message.
And if 90% of the ciphertext looks like words, nobody can guess that
those characters leak the true meaning of the message.
Because they almost certainly don't.
------------------------------
From: "Gary M. Greenberg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.perl.misc
Subject: Re: bareface ratio
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 01:00:20 -0400
Don Roby wrote:
>
[snip]
> Better approach:
>
> Q1: Can I use Y to do X?
> A1: No. Use Z instead.
> ...
> I'd rather see the fake answer as part of the original post, so it at
> least LOOKS like you've thought a bit yourself before posting. ;-)
>
Better still. Hold off on posting until the respondents submit their
corrections based on apriori knowledge of the problem you will have;
then simply test the solutions ;-}
maybe?
Gary
Putting out fire with gasoline
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A Quanitative Scale for Empirical Length-Strength
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 04:38:56 GMT
Jim Gillogly wrote:
> ... specific attacks on double transposition are still highly
> classified, and were redacted from the copy of Military
> Cryptanalytics III recovered by John Gilmore and Lee Tien ...
"General Solution for the Double Transposition Cipher" (Short
title SIGYIP) by Solomon Kullback (1934) was originally
classified SECRET. It underwent a series of inconsistent
changes in classification; at one time it was in the Friedman
collection at the Marshall Library, but was confiscated in the
disgraceful NSA raid on that collection. It was declassified
on 26-Jun-1996, and a copy is in Archives II (as well as in my
private collection).
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A Quanitative Scale for Empirical Length-Strength
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 04:40:54 GMT
Jim Gillogly wrote:
> In fact, I believe Courville showed that double transposition is
> equivalent to single transposition with a much longer key.
Sure, but that's a trivial observation that doesn't help crack the
system.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: two questions
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 05:12:10 GMT
Harvey Rook wrote:
> Stream ciphers have two inherent security holes that require extra
> work to plug.
Not in general, they don't.
> 1. Unless you are using a message digest with special properties ...
> or a digital signature, an opponent who knows the plaintext can edit
> the message without getting caught.
That's no more or less true for stream ciphers than for block ciphers.
And it is guarded against in essentially the same way.
The method you described applies only to KG systems, not to stream
systems in general. It's much like saying that DES sequential blocks
can be replaced with other blocks that were encrypted with the same
key -- sure, if you use it in a simplistic mode, so don't do that!
> 2. You can't use the same password twice.
That's no more or less true for stream ciphers than for block ciphers.
And it is guarded against in essentially the same way.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (S.T.L.)
Subject: Re: Why mirrors invert left-to-right (was: Kryptos article)
Date: 01 Jul 1999 05:21:45 GMT
<<The famous experiment that resulted in a Nobel Prize didn't exhibit P
violation>>
That's quite interesting, seeing as how the guys who award the Nobel Prize are
notoriously reluctant to award it for anything that might even smack of
kook-dom. They wait decades in some circumstances. All combinations of C, P,
and T symmetry are violated. Except for good old CPT.
-*---*-------
S.T.L. ===> [EMAIL PROTECTED] <=== BLOCK RELEASED! 2^3021377 - 1 is PRIME!
Quotations: http://quote.cjb.net Main website: http://137.tsx.org MOO!
"Xihribz! Peymwsiz xihribz! Qssetv cse bqy qiftrz!" e^(i*Pi)+1=0 F00FC7C8
E-mail block is gone. It will return if I'm bombed again. I don't care, it's
an easy fix. Address is correct as is. The courtesy of giving correct E-mail
addresses makes up for having to delete junk which gets through anyway. Join
the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search at http://entropia.com/ips/ Now my
.sig is shorter and contains 3379 bits of entropy up to the next line's end:
-*---*-------
Card-holding member of the Dark Legion of Cantorians, the Holy Order of the
Catenary, the Great SRian Conspiracy, the Triple-Sigma Club, the Union of
Quantum Mechanics, the Polycarbonate Syndicate, and People for the Ethical
Treatment of Digital Tierran Organisms
Avid watcher of "World's Most Terrifying Causality Violations", "When Kaons
Decay: World's Most Amazing CP Symmetry Breaking Caught On [Magnetic] Tape",
"World's Scariest Warp Accidents", "World's Most Energetic Cosmic Rays", and
"When Tidal Forces Attack: Caught on Tape"
Patiently awaiting the launch of Gravity Probe B and the discovery of M39
Physics Commandment #6: Thou Shalt Always Obey CPT Symmetry.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code?
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 05:28:41 GMT
mercury wrote:
> I am trying to discover an encryption algorithm
> by observing how it behaves.
It's not truly encryption; it is a hash into a single bit.
Too much information is lost.
> I should also point out that my problem, which is
> finding out what a group of numbers has in common,
> is ultimately a math problem.
Gee, and here I was supposing it was a problem in geology.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: two questions
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 05:05:23 GMT
David Wagner wrote:
> DES stimulated lots of study into cryptography. For a long time, DES
> was the only example of a modern cipher that was much good (I think;
> corrections welcomed).
The last time this question came up, that was also my suggestion.
DES did stimulate renewed *public* interest in cryptography (of
course, it was largely the result of a growing interest, particularly
for computer-based applications), and for some time it was the only
*well-known* example of a secure cryptosystem.
Meanwhile, behind the fence, stream ciphers continued to rule;
their theory was well-developed, they are simpler to implement,
and they are more versatile.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (S.T.L.)
Subject: Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code?
Date: 01 Jul 1999 05:19:41 GMT
Let me guess - you're cracking some sort of hardware protection, eh?
<<If you have the algorithm then you are not breaking a code. You are solving
an algebra equation.>>
Go look up the RSA algorithm and then "solve that algebra equation". Have fun!
This kajibberish is included for my own devious purposes. You need not read it:
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234
5678901234567890
-*---*-------
S.T.L. ===> [EMAIL PROTECTED] <=== BLOCK RELEASED! 2^3021377 - 1 is PRIME!
Quotations: http://quote.cjb.net Main website: http://137.tsx.org MOO!
"Xihribz! Peymwsiz xihribz! Qssetv cse bqy qiftrz!" e^(i*Pi)+1=0 F00FC7C8
E-mail block is gone. It will return if I'm bombed again. I don't care, it's
an easy fix. Address is correct as is. The courtesy of giving correct E-mail
addresses makes up for having to delete junk which gets through anyway. Join
the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search at http://entropia.com/ips/ Now my
.sig is shorter and contains 3379 bits of entropy up to the next line's end:
-*---*-------
Card-holding member of the Dark Legion of Cantorians, the Holy Order of the
Catenary, the Great SRian Conspiracy, the Triple-Sigma Club, the Union of
Quantum Mechanics, the Polycarbonate Syndicate, and People for the Ethical
Treatment of Digital Tierran Organisms
Avid watcher of "World's Most Terrifying Causality Violations", "When Kaons
Decay: World's Most Amazing CP Symmetry Breaking Caught On [Magnetic] Tape",
"World's Scariest Warp Accidents", "World's Most Energetic Cosmic Rays", and
"When Tidal Forces Attack: Caught on Tape"
Patiently awaiting the launch of Gravity Probe B and the discovery of M39
Physics Commandment #6: Thou Shalt Always Obey CPT Symmetry.
------------------------------
From: mercury <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code?
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 01:41:38 -0400
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sorry It took so long to reply, but I've spent the last twenty minutes downloading
your signature file. What is your server? Oh, AOL ... I see.
The algebra for RSA is quite easy to solve, once you understand how to
treat the MOD function algebraicly. The difficulty in breaking RSA is
not algebra, but in factoring. Perhaps when after you take an algebra
class, I can teach you how to solve this RSA equation for d:
e*d MOD (p-1)*(q-1) = 1
Can you say "Extended Euclidian Algorithm"? I knew you could!
-mercury
S.T.L. wrote:
> Let me guess - you're cracking some sort of hardware protection, eh?
>
> <<If you have the algorithm then you are not breaking a code. You are solving
> an algebra equation.>>
>
> Go look up the RSA algorithm and then "solve that algebra equation". Have fun!
>
------------------------------
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