Cryptography-Digest Digest #818, Volume #9 Thu, 1 Jul 99 21:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: Quantum Computers (David A Molnar)
Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox (Andrew Carol)
Re: Quantum Computers (David A Molnar)
Re: Quantum Computers (Greg Ofiesh)
Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length? (William
Tanksley)
Re: How do you make RSA symmetrical? (Gilad Maayan)
Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox (David Bernier)
additive RNGs ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox (Coen Visser)
Re: Reference Implementation of Quadibloc S ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: MP3 Piracy Prevention is Impossible (Gilles Fayad)
Re: How do you make RSA symmetrical? (S.T.L.)
Re: Project "Infinity" - replace 1 (one) with infinity ("Markku 'Make' J.
Saarelainen")
A survey paper on authentication (Helger Lipmaa)
Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox (S.T.L.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Quantum Computers
Date: 1 Jul 1999 20:43:42 GMT
Greg Ofiesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> And can you give me directions to the QC literature?
A good starting place is John Preskill's course in
quantum computation, at
http://www.theory.caltech.edu/people/preskill/ph229
because it is aimed at students who haven't actually
seen the material before.
A bit of looking around will get you to the
quant-ph preprint archive at Los Alamos. This
is another good place to go looking. In particular,
they have Lov K. Grover's paper describing his
algorithm, which has a nice nuts-and-bolts working
through of the matrices to show how it works.
You should also be able to find Peter Shor's
landmark "Polynomial-time algorithms for
factoring and Discrete Log on a quantum computer."
I find it pretty heavy going, but then again I'm
learning the quatum physics as I go along.
You'll want your favorite linear algebra textbook
with you, too.
By the way, even though it is promisingly titled,
the "What Makes QCs Powerful?" on that page
struck me as being more confusing than helpful.
Also check out www.openqubit.org for some
interesting stuff on quantum computer simulation.
-David Molnar
------------------------------
From: Andrew Carol <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 14:34:22 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Robert C. Paulsen, Jr.
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Maybe your point but not mine. I am trying to discuss John Savard's
> "small, but finite, probability" that an unfortunate key is used. The
> fact that the likelyhood of it happening is vanishingly small does not
> necessarily invalidate the possible "paradox". It doesn't matter how
> less likely it is than some other scenario.
There is no paradox, a true OTP leaks NO information. There is no way
an attacker can have any more than exactly ZERO percent confidence that
a message has any particular true interpretation.
If I encode "ATTACK AT DAWN!", the odds of the enemy seeing "ATTACK AT
DAWN!" is the same as them seeing...
"NO ATTACK TODAY"
"SNUGGLE AT DAWN"
"ENEMY IS NEARBY"
"SUPPLIES GONE.."
"COMMANDER DEAD!"
"TIME TO GIVE UP"
"EAT CHEESE WIZ?"
"GFHS GK OWUUTFT"
"MY AUNT IS FAT!"
"MONKEYS TYPINGS"
Or any other random 15 character string. If you received one of the
above, (or any of the other possible 1.39x10^36 messages), would you
give it any particular credence? If so, I would dearly hope for
someone with your charactistics as an advesary...
Oh well....
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Quantum Computers
Date: 1 Jul 1999 22:13:14 GMT
Greg Ofiesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Well, you can make that claim, but don't forget that I have yet to have
> one person point me to a document that "proves" I am wrong. I have had
> someone suggest that I look at the QC literature. Where is it? Who
> has it? What on earth is he talking about?
Hopefully my other post should show up on deja or whatever your
news server is soon. It has a pointer to a web site which
has many useful links and notes on quantum computation.
I would guess that by "QC literature" the previous poster
meant the kind of papers which find their way into the
Los Alamos archive and physics journals. Your friendly
local technical library may have such things. Your
even friendlier quant-ph archive certainly does.
As to proving wrong your claim about a QC capable of
decrypting a large key, I'd suggest looking for
papers on two topics
* the characterization of BQP
* decoherence and why building large QCs is
a serious engineering challenge.
I don't know if a proof that no such QC is possible yet
exists. Maybe you can tell us all when you find it.
> And who has been studying QCs on this forum? I read a lot of people's
> opinions going back and forth (and it is fun to read the responses,
> don't get me wrong), but I have no clue who has what background or
> expertise, or who has done ANY in depth studying in this field like my
> brother has.
I haven't done the kind of studying your brother has. I just
prepared a fairly mediocre report on the topic for a freshman
calc class. In the process I came across John Preskill's site
a collection of PhD theses I've been meaning to read and haven't
yet, and the quant-ph archive. This makes me an interested
student.
So I am trying to give references and pointers to what I've
seen, in the hopes that you and others will come to
your own conclusions. Since I sure as heck can't claim
100% certainty in mine.
> So give me a break. And give me the facts. That's all I ask. Give me
> the facts that counter my brother and I will throw them back into his
> face. Arm me! I want to counter my brother! PLEASE! (If you can.)
Again, I'd suggest checking up on "decoherence." There's
also a talk by Preskill called "Quantum Computing : Pro and Con"
which brings up some of the more important stumbling blocks
to building a QC. Like many talks, it reflects the bias of
its author (Preskill wants to build a QC), but in a manner
which is perfectly appropriate and easy to identify.
-David (whose writing style is deteriorating)
------------------------------
From: Greg Ofiesh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Quantum Computers
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 22:34:56 GMT
> So why don't you do some reading, instead of scare-mongering?
Because scare-mongering is more fun?
No seriously, I looked at all your posts. When I said that I did not
know of anyone's credentials to comment on my assertion, I was talking
about those who posted back to me. However, I thought you made a good
point. Rather than ask all of you, I should just look using the search
engine - dah! (It's times like these that I ask myself why I bother
getting up in the morning.)
But I am curious. You are so certain that I am wrong (and dumb), yet
you are so patient. Why? I mean, I would not bother writing back if I
were you.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (William Tanksley)
Subject: Re: Why Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is stronger with shorter key length?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 21:33:48 GMT
On Thu, 01 Jul 1999 06:10:06 GMT, Greg Ofiesh wrote:
>> > Who is NIST?
>> The National Institute of Science and Technology.... In matters
>Then how can anyone take their recommendations seriously? I thought
>this would be the answer and I would never touch what they recommend.
Because their recommendations are widely scrutinized. IF they're
crackable, none of our people have found the crack.
--
-William "Billy" Tanksley
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Gilad Maayan)
Subject: Re: How do you make RSA symmetrical?
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 21:51:05 GMT
On Thu, 01 Jul 1999 04:21:30 -1000, Ed Yang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>Yes. The 20 bit input would be padded with 108 leading zeros
>whether you like it or not. You would decrypt it and get 108
>leading zeros and 20 bits of the correct plaintext.
Okay, I get it. The question is, how does this affect processing time?
The main reason I'm asking "which hammer to crush my testicles with",
as someone put it, is that my specific application is hampered by
severe hardware restrictions. I'm using a processor that can barely
compute M^e, where M is 20 bits. Naturally, even the slightest
increase in plaintext size enormously increases the number of
mathematical operations required. Now, if you encrypted your message,
padded with all zeroes, would my pathetically slow microprocessor be
doing 20 bits^n, or 768bits^n? Also, would you have to physically add
the zeroes, or could you simply exponentiate, say, "93751"?
------------------------------
From: David Bernier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 22:52:11 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] () wrote:
> The One-Time Pad is the one theoretically perfect cipher. Provided it
is
> applied in strict accordance with the theoretical conditions.
>
> One must use a key that is truly and genuinely random.
>
> Now, there is a small, but finite, probability that the random key
will
> happen to be 000000...
>
> If one uses such a key, one is sending one's message in plaintext.
>
> If one refuses to use such a key, one is causing one's key to be
> nonrandom, hence one is spoiling the perfection of the one-time-pad.
I agree so far..
> This qualifies as a genuine paradox, and as such may well be fruitful,
> just as paradoxes in mathematics and physics have occasionally led to
new
> paradigms.
I don't see any paradox. If the plaintext P is thought of as
a vector of n bits, the key K as a random n-bit vector independent of
P and unknown to the interceptor or attacker, then the ciphertext
C is the bitwise xor of K and P, or
C = K + P (where 0+0=0, 0+1=1, 1+0=1 and 1+1=0)
(C is an n-bit vector).
If we take a probabilistic approach where the attacker "knows"
(in the absence of the knowledge of C) that a given possible
message v_i has a probability of q_i ,
or Prob[ P = v_i ] = q_i for i = 1 to 2^n
(with q_1 + q_2 + ... +q_{2^n} = 1) ,
then Prob[ P = v_i, given that attacker knows C] = q_i
= Prob[ P = v_i , before attacker knows anything about C].
In other words, the degree of belief (for the attacker) that
P is v_i is the same whether he/she knows C or not, where v_i is
any of the 2^n possible n-bit plaintexts.
So it doesn't matter if attacker sees C or
************************************************************************
*********** [n *'s ].
David Bernier
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: additive RNGs
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 23:01:28 GMT
I decided to play with Additive RNGs today (fionaci type). I have some
questions:
1. What is the quickest way to do the shift? I.e S[0] = S[1]. S[1] =
S[2]. I am using a memcpy (because I have a 32 element array). It is
rather quick...
2. What is the cycle length for various array sizes. I know for four
element arrays it is 7.5(2^n) which I did thru brute force. I would
like to know if there is an algorithm to find the multiplier for
various array sizes...
3. Are all LFSR polynomials good for this type of RNG? For the 4
element I used 'S[3] + S[0]' (4th and 1st)... I tried a 32 element
array but it didn't finish...
4. The additive generator is linear? Is it at least statistical sound?
5. Are there any good references (papers or sources) for them? I
would like to compare mine to theirs.
Thanks in advance,
Tom
--
PGP key is at:
'http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp'.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Can Anyone Help Me Crack A Simple Code?
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 23:30:44 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
<<snip>>
> What I am doing is not illegal.
I think we'll have to take that at face value, although finding the
algorithm to generate serial numbers which are normally sold by the
black box company sounds pretty illegal to me. Are you helping them
strenghten their algorithms, or are you going to write a serial number
generator, and sell serial numbers instead of the black box company?
> Almost all numbers fail. There are very few
> "good" number codes. I might say there are
> somewhere between 10 and 1000 "correct" codes,
> but I am only guessing here.
If you need to keep updating your serial numbers, and if this black box
company is selling the product to the masses, I would believe it is
much higher than what you guess.
> The key is only good for one specific color light
> The key is date coded, so it must be used within
> a certain amount of time.
Good to know that those numbers have a date encoded in them somewhere..
Now, do you have the expiry dates of the numbers you have posted? Have
you tried to compare differences of parts of the numbers with
difference between the dates in days? hours? seconds?
> The key will only make the light come on a certain
> number of times. After that, the Black Box
> Logs that the key has been used and will not
> accept the same key again.
Not necessarily. As I said, the serial numbers may have the dates
encoded inside. Logging is unnecessary in this case. Or do you buy a
key for one month, which starts at the time of key entry. I.e. if I buy
a key for one month (assuming a onemonth key exists), and enter it one
month later. Is it going to work for one more month?
> The light bulbs have a built-in microchip. This
> chip configures the Black Box for whichever light
> bulb is being used. With the exception of this
> chip, the electronics are identical in all Black
> Boxes. (I MAY be able to retrieve the information
> off of this chip. I may have answered the question
> of where the algorithm is right here. I'll look
> into this further.) The lightbulbs are only
> installed or changed at the Black Box company.
Now, THAT's a pretty strange way of doing things. Why make intelligent
light bulbs which control the general behavior of the machine instead
of having a CPU, which controls dumb light bulbs which can only give a
certain color of light? Beats me. It must have sounded like a good idea
when they designed the darn thing. :-)
> I've even taught quite a bit to the Black
> Box technitions, who always seem to be the last to
> know.
Hmmm.. It seems you know these guys pretty well.. Is this a bet on
breaking their algorithm? I bet. ;-)
> Yes, there is the possibility that there is
> a huge table somewhere which contains all random
> codes for all color lights for all dates until
> 2999, but once again, I highly doubt it.
Me too..
> Phil Zimmerman does not work for the Black Box
> company. It is logical to assume that the
> Black Boxes take a ten digit code and run it
> through an algorithm which converts it to a date
> and color code, or returns an error if it is
> not a "good" code.
You mean the light bulbs do that.. Hehe.. I still cannot accept those
light bulbs with intelligence.
> So I can get codes. The 6 ten digit keys I
> posted are for the exact same color/date
> combination.
D'uh! There goes my theory of having a simple julian-date-in-a-serial
theory.
> Cracking crackable codes.
Not without any clue, and certainly not using six almost identical
keys. You usually need much more than that. In all your keys, the
number 8 takes quite a high percentage. But you cannot say this is a
general rule simply by looking at six numbers.
Anyway. Here are a few things to try:
1. Try to swap digits on different places.
2. Try to increment one digit, and decrement another at different
places in the key.
3. Try to add small constants to some digits so that it will not change
the sum of digits mod 10.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Coen Visser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 23:44:59 +0000
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> Coen Visser wrote:
> If the statistics of all M's differ much, that means that in the
> best situation the analyst could recover all M's (each completely).
> Now how does he, having achieved this, decide which is the real
> message?
Theoretically, I don't know. It is an interesting idea to hide
fake data in your encryption. But practically
speaking you can count on the adversary to select the most
usefull information. Consider an encrypted file which, after being
cracked, gives us 10 chapters of the Koran and 1 chapter describing
the design of an experimental nuclear warhead. What would be the
secret? The strength of your scheme lies in the strength of the OTP.
You just need OTP (+) M_fake (+) M_secret. Adding more than 1 M_fake
doesn't make things much safer. Improving the OTP does.
Regards,
Coen Visser
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Reference Implementation of Quadibloc S
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 22:56:28 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] () wrote:
> Incidentally, today is the national holiday of Canada, now known as
> "Canada Day".
Were you on the hill today? Heard there was a good show planned for
tonight.
Anyways do you have a offline copy of your quadiloc to read? The
online webpage is hard to follow.
Tom
--
PGP key is at:
'http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp'.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Gilles Fayad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: MP3 Piracy Prevention is Impossible
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 17:00:57 -0700
Anyone with good pointers on watermarking techniques?
Thanks - Gilles
Harvey Rook wrote:
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> >
> > If the file is encrypted, one will have to rerecord it to make a digital
> > copy (e.g. using LOOPBACK as the sound source, which takes the output from
> > the player as input ... or physically take the line-out from one computer
> > to the line-input of the other). This involves (one) conversion from
> > digital to analog and back again. The "watermark"/"serial number" will
> > have to be strong enough to be resistant to conversions to analog and even
> > filtering (if one wants to use an equalizer to boost the bass, for
> > example). It will have to be audible. And so embedded in the sound that it
> > cannot be removed (with filtering, say to remove all the lowest order bits
> > in a 16 bit sound file).
> >
> > Yes ... one could put in such a watermark (someone shouting in the back of
> > the music: "this copy has serial number 0000" over and over).
> >
>
> Water marks that survive digitial to analog to digital conversion, do exist.
> Essentially what you do is take a fourier transform of the song, tweak the
> transform, and then calculate the inverse fourier transform.
>
> If done properly, the result is inaudible, and can't be removed using simple
> filters.
>
> Harv
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Spam Guard, the mail isn't cold, it's hot.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (S.T.L.)
Subject: Re: How do you make RSA symmetrical?
Date: 02 Jul 1999 00:29:07 GMT
<<Okay, I get it. The question is, how does this affect processing time?
The main reason I'm asking "which hammer to crush my testicles with",
as someone put it, is that my specific application is hampered by
severe hardware restrictions.>>
Then RSA may be a real bad idea for you.
<<I'm using a processor that can barely
compute M^e, where M is 20 bits. >>
You mean the full expansion of M^e, or just M^e mod N? If you are taking M^e,
and THEN doing mod N, you are crippling yourself. I can compute (300-digit
number)^(another 300 digit number) mod (yet another 300 digit number) on a
system that can hold 614 digits maximum at any time. It's a matter of your
algorithm.
<<Naturally, even the slightest
increase in plaintext size enormously increases the number of
mathematical operations required.>>
It _shouldn't_. The actual determiner of operations is the number of "1"s in
your exponent when written in binary, and of course the size of your modulus.
NOT the plaintext.
<<Now, if you encrypted your message,
padded with all zeroes, would my pathetically slow microprocessor be
doing 20 bits^n, or 768bits^n? Also, would you have to physically add
the zeroes, or could you simply exponentiate, say, "93751"?>>
Plaintext is irrelevant: does not change computation speed (much). By the way,
the microprocessor that *I* run RSA on is a 10MHz Motorola 68000. With a Texas
Instruments ROM attached. I don't see how much crappier a processor can get.
:-)
-*---*-------
S.T.L. ===> [EMAIL PROTECTED] <=== BLOCK RELEASED! 2^3021377 - 1 is PRIME!
Quotations: http://quote.cjb.net Main website: http://137.tsx.org MOO!
"Xihribz! Peymwsiz xihribz! Qssetv cse bqy qiftrz!" e^(i*Pi)+1=0 F00FC7C8
E-mail block is gone. It will return if I'm bombed again. I don't care, it's
an easy fix. Address is correct as is. The courtesy of giving correct E-mail
addresses makes up for having to delete junk which gets through anyway. Join
the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search at http://entropia.com/ips/ Now my
.sig is shorter and contains 3379 bits of entropy up to the next line's end:
-*---*-------
Card-holding member of the Dark Legion of Cantorians, the Holy Order of the
Catenary, the Great SRian Conspiracy, the Triple-Sigma Club, the Union of
Quantum Mechanics, the Polycarbonate Syndicate, and People for the Ethical
Treatment of Digital Tierran Organisms
Avid watcher of "World's Most Terrifying Causality Violations", "When Kaons
Decay: World's Most Amazing CP Symmetry Breaking Caught On [Magnetic] Tape",
"World's Scariest Warp Accidents", "World's Most Energetic Cosmic Rays", and
"When Tidal Forces Attack: Caught on Tape"
Patiently awaiting the launch of Gravity Probe B and the discovery of M39
Physics Commandment #7: There Are No Privileged Reference Frames.
------------------------------
From: "Markku 'Make' J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Project "Infinity" - replace 1 (one) with infinity
Date: Thu, 01 Jul 1999 19:48:25 +0000
Check out the same subject in sci.physics ....
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> "Markku 'Make' J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Just wondering, if anybody is working on any project to replace 1
> (one)
> > with infinity ....
>
> Je ne comprend pas. De quoi est-ce-que vous parlez?
>
> Seems my french is still in tact. What are you talking about dude?
>
> Tom
> --
> PGP key is at:
> 'http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp'.
>
> Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
> Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Helger Lipmaa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: A survey paper on authentication
Date: Fri, 02 Jul 1999 06:26:48 +0300
Some days ago I finished a survey "Digital Signatures and
Authentication" which covers a range of themes, starting from questions
like ``what is the difference between digital and handwritten
signatures'', and then covering the basics of digital signatures,
public-key infrastructure and time-stamping. The survey ends with some
recent results on time-stamping. It is written for people with no
cryptographic (and only minor mathematic) background.
All comments (by e-mail) are welcome.
Helger Lipmaa
http://home.cyber.ee/helger
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (S.T.L.)
Subject: Re: The One-Time Pad Paradox
Date: 02 Jul 1999 00:36:50 GMT
<<The "paradox" is merely that people can choose to interpret random
data; sometimes random data will carry an interpretable message;
sometimes the message will even be correct.>>
But it can be wrong (overwhelmingly more likely). Even if the Adversary sees
"ATTACK AT DAWN", he CANNOT judge whether that is right.
A) A true OTP can never, ever, ever leak ANY sort of information. The
Adversary's guessing is IRRELEVANT.
B) The Adversary can probably tell with high certainty when your true OTP
breaks down. If the OTP is not actually broken down, no information is leaked.
-*---*-------
S.T.L. ===> [EMAIL PROTECTED] <=== BLOCK RELEASED! 2^3021377 - 1 is PRIME!
Quotations: http://quote.cjb.net Main website: http://137.tsx.org MOO!
"Xihribz! Peymwsiz xihribz! Qssetv cse bqy qiftrz!" e^(i*Pi)+1=0 F00FC7C8
E-mail block is gone. It will return if I'm bombed again. I don't care, it's
an easy fix. Address is correct as is. The courtesy of giving correct E-mail
addresses makes up for having to delete junk which gets through anyway. Join
the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search at http://entropia.com/ips/ Now my
.sig is shorter and contains 3379 bits of entropy up to the next line's end:
-*---*-------
Card-holding member of the Dark Legion of Cantorians, the Holy Order of the
Catenary, the Great SRian Conspiracy, the Triple-Sigma Club, the Union of
Quantum Mechanics, the Polycarbonate Syndicate, and People for the Ethical
Treatment of Digital Tierran Organisms
Avid watcher of "World's Most Terrifying Causality Violations", "When Kaons
Decay: World's Most Amazing CP Symmetry Breaking Caught On [Magnetic] Tape",
"World's Scariest Warp Accidents", "World's Most Energetic Cosmic Rays", and
"When Tidal Forces Attack: Caught on Tape"
Patiently awaiting the launch of Gravity Probe B and the discovery of M39
Physics Commandment #7: There Are No Privileged Reference Frames.
------------------------------
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