Cryptography-Digest Digest #987, Volume #9 Wed, 4 Aug 99 22:13:02 EDT
Contents:
Re: How to keep crypto DLLs Secure? (Dmitri Alperovitch)
Re: ORB - Open Random Bit Generator ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Blowfish x86 assembler (Paul Rubin)
Re: How to write REALLY PORTABLE code dealing with bits (Was: How Big is a Byte?)
("Michael VanLoon")
Re: I need books ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: ORB - Open Random Bit Generator (Alwyn Allan)
Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there? (David Hamilton)
Re: Is the output of 3DES really pseudorandom??? (Alwyn Allan)
Re: Warning! The eclipse approaches... ("Alan J.
Laser")
Re: CFB mode with same initialization vector (Daniel Vogelheim)
Security of long term public DH keys? (Christoph Haenle)
DES Algorithm source code ("Alberto Daniel Pires dos Barros")
Re: Is breaking RSA NP-Complete ? (Nicol So)
Re: Is breaking RSA NP-Complete ? (Nicol So)
Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there? (Bob Silverman)
Re: Americans abroad/Encryption rules? (JPeschel)
Re: Is breaking RSA NP-Complete ? (Bob Silverman)
Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there? (Bob Silverman)
Re: OTP export controlled? (Isaac)
Re: Infallible authentication scheme (Kenneth Almquist)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dmitri Alperovitch)
Subject: Re: How to keep crypto DLLs Secure?
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 21:13:02 GMT
> I hadn't considered this much, for the fact that I assumed
>that the author of the program could take care of this himself. One
>solution to this follows:
All right, before this dicussion goes any further, I'd like to make one point.
Basically, you can do various things (i.e. checksums, etc) to make the
attacker's life difficult, but the end result is that it's ALL going to be
reversible. Some "solutions" may be more difficult to reverse than others, but
neverthless they can ALL be reversed and cracked. There is simply no way
around it. All programs can be disassembled and debugged and all it would
take is a smart cracker to NOP the encryption routine and reverse whatever
checks you've placed in your program.
Regards,
Dmitri Alperovitch
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.cdc.net/~dmitri/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ORB - Open Random Bit Generator
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 20:21:08 GMT
In article <7oa2jf$llk$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner) wrote:
> Why do you use MD2? It's slow, and serious concerns have been raised
> about its security (it was nearly broken at SAC one year). SHA1 is
the
> obvious choice these days...
>
> You appear to have applied DIEHARD to the output of the generator
after
> hashing. This is poor methodology -- any generator (even a counter)
will
> pass DIEHARD if you hash it first. You should apply your tests to the
> raw, unhashed output from your randomness source (the d_i, in your
terms).
>
Well if you compress (using MD2) more then 128 bits to form the output
it should be secure. You cannot really control the inputs from a
passive standpoint (unless you are holding the device). MD2 is
wellsuited because it's a simple 8-bit algorithm.
The inputs from a ADC are really not random (well they are random 1/n
th of the time, what is the value of n? I dunno). You would have to
assign say 10 milibits to each input bit from the ADC to make it
secure ... Also probably want to use a 'self-shrinking' style
algorithm to remove bias.
Unless the ADC input was random?
Dunno.
Anyways how does this chip work? Or is it a small bread board with the
MCU and resistor?
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Blowfish x86 assembler
Date: 04 Aug 1999 14:15:26 -0700
"Kasper Pedersen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On counterpane.com it is listed as being able to do encryptions at 18
> clocks/byte. This is 144 clocks pr. 16 rounds /9 clocks per round. Now, on
> the K6-2 the asm code from 'SSLey' required 16 clocks, and on the P-3 24 (!)
> clocks.
> After K6 optimization and pure chance on the P-x, I have got it down to 11
> on K6-2 and 12 on P-3.
> (The P2/P-3 might drop a clock or two when I get the time and a P-2 PC)
>
> Was the Pentium (-1) just better at this, or is there a really smart way?
> Does anyone have some even faster code that I can learn from?
The Pentium-1 ("P1") is a much less advanced processor than the K6 or
P2/P3. The P1 is basically two 486 pipelines stapled together. It
doesn't have out-of-order execution like the K6 or P2/P3. If the two
P1 pipes both contend for a resource such as a register or cache line,
or if a result is wanted that's not yet available, one or both pipes
simply stall. So to write optimal P1 code, you have to write in very
contorted ways to keep both pipes running. Code that's optimal on the
P1 will probably be suboptimal on the P2 or K6, and possibly worse
than just straightforwardly written code.
The best I was able to do on the P1 was about 16 cycles/byte, IIRC.
------------------------------
From: "Michael VanLoon" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
alt.folklore.computers,alt.comp.lang.learn.c-c++,comp.lang.c++,microsoft.public.vc.language
Subject: Re: How to write REALLY PORTABLE code dealing with bits (Was: How Big is a
Byte?)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 1999 12:23:22 -0700
John M. Gamble <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:7o8il7$mmk$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >Mr. Leo Yanki wrote:
> >>
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guenther Brunthaler) wrote:
> >>
> >> >... "byte" ... can have ANY number of bits
> >>
> >> A byte has exactly eight bits and can have 256 different values. A
general
> >> term for any size collection of bits is "binary number". Please
don't
> >> attempt to confuse people by trying to spread your personal
redefinitions
> >> of commonly used technical terms.
> >
> >Oh really. I'm using 5-bit baudot code on a 12-bit CPU with 6-bit
> >characters. An 8-bit byte is useless to me. _*YOUR*_ definition of
a
> >byte is not, and never will be definitive. It is probably based on
your
> >lack of experience with CPU architectures.
> >
> Wow. How old is this machine anyway?
... and is anyone actually using it for anything other than trivial
semantic games? :-)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: I need books
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 20:26:41 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Jeffery Nelson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm looking for good books to read that will help me to understand
the more
> complex sides of cryptography. I understand the "one time pad"
method, but
> Hash's elude me. I can get most any book so if you could tell me the
name
> and author...
Get either Applied Crypto (good beginners book) or the Handbook of
Applied Crypto (CRC Press) I heard that book is good too. It has free
online chapters as well.
Just look at past threads about free chapters ...
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 17:33:52 -0400
From: Alwyn Allan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ORB - Open Random Bit Generator
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > * Low power consumption (2 mA, 1 mA standby)
> At how many volts? Standard 5v?
Power consumption figures are at 2.5V and the conversion from HTML changed 1
ua (micro-amp) to 1 ma. The website is updated. All your other questions are
answered on it:
http://www.delanet.com/~apa/orb/
-----------== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
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======== Over 73,000 Newsgroups = Including Dedicated Binaries Servers =======
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Hamilton)
Subject: Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there?
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 21:51:10 GMT
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>(KidMo84) wrote:
>>What is the best file cryptography program out there that you can get
>>online or
>>purchase over the counter. Comparing Ease of use with Security of
>>encryption.
> Get scott19u.zip
Don't. Use PGP or Scramdisk instead.
This is because, from the cryptography point of view, David A. Scott and
his software are not to be trusted. Here are 6 reasons for this statement.
1) David A. Scott has poor native (English) language skills and this might
mean he has poor programming skills.
2) David A. Scott is fixated on code. He seems not to realise that
programming and cryptography are much more than just coding.
3) David A. Scott designed all the algorithms and code used in his software
and, with one exception, he can't remember the names of people who
'commented' on it. 'Commenting' isn't good enough anyway: formal inspection
processes are needed. The algorithms used in PGP and Scramdisk were developed
by teams of cryptographers with distinguished reputations.
4) With PGP, there are newsgroups and mailing lists that can help with
queries. Scramdisk has its own newsgroup as well. There are no such things
for David A. Scott's software.
5) David A. Scott said, in the past, that he would crack IDEA. But he now
studiously ignores questions asking whether he has succeeded. (Guess why.)
6) In the context of a dictionary attack, David A. Scott said he had seen
an attacker 'stumble' on a wrong passphrase that hashed to the same value
as the correct passphrase. David A. Scott subsequently declined to give any
information about the passphrase, the hashing algorithm, the dictionary
size or the method of word selection. His reason for declining to give this
information was that the attacker 'still works for the federal government'.
Would you entrust your security and privacy to David A. Scott and his
software?
David Hamilton. Only I give the right to read what I write and PGP allows me
to make that choice. Use PGP now.
I have revoked 2048 bit RSA key ID 0x40F703B9. Please do not use. Do use:-
2048bit rsa ID=0xFA412179 Fp=08DE A9CB D8D8 B282 FA14 58F6 69CE D32D
4096bit dh ID=0xA07AEA5E Fp=28BA 9E4C CA47 09C3 7B8A CE14 36F3 3560 A07A EA5E
Both keys dated 1998/04/08 with sole UserID=<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE=====
Version: PGPfreeware 5.5.3i for non-commercial use <http://www.pgpi.com>
Comment: Signed with 2048 bit RSA key
iQEVAwUBN6i1IMo1RmX6QSF5AQEHoQf/fsRcQfEvkpwTZ6ONS3gK6SML3g94b+Ma
tjJpl5VbLiCTq3udulnsVYXiAo30jQg2Qo989ADgg/cVmop1SDxQmZT34vGCrCud
6dJj8P5rlhtZGXfCF3WAFI0xHOw0x9BJUYBahOi8SVnSDrROfRFVrfEdCQrv6BU5
bBBFxbuS2kwpWT/MfCtb0phb9qaOtO/GsNnMt1YuD1lbIrV+t2sKUd0O917avPRf
yntq6X6u1jS5URY73VQmQzjL8P9sCKQ8G7O4u8b7GRLZRT85KxasGEUFgTK2UhDW
1bgSQY3RHRiwq9xBTkTiqkF8m2Q6YC4Wdzb/i0IF2UC7JHBM8xOPjA==
=LAbj
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 18:34:26 -0400
From: Alwyn Allan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is the output of 3DES really pseudorandom???
fungus wrote:
> Answer: No statistical test can ever tell you if a number is
> random - you can't prove a negative.
I can prove a negative. Here is a negative:
2 is not the largest prime.
Here is my proof:
3 is prime.
What's wrong with that?
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------------------------------
From: "Alan J. Laser" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
sci.geo.petroleum,alt.pets.ferrets,alt.sport.bowling,comp.os.ms-windows.ce,comp.os.linux.misc,soc.culture.europe,alt.prophecies.nostradamus,alt.catastrophism,alt.prophecies.cayce,alt.messianic,alt.atheism,sci.skeptic,sci.astro,sci.archaeology,alt.current-events.earth-changes
Subject: Re: Warning! The eclipse approaches...
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 16:13:19 -0700
Haha. "monsteriferous" I wonder what monster it is bearing?
Maybe some sort of bear monster... a bear-monster bearing comet.
Alan
reject wrote:
>
> That "monstriferous" Comet Lee will be seen during the
> solar eclipse this August 11th, followed by WWIII, the
> 1300-meter "King of Terror" meteoroid impact before 10
> October 1999, and *many* catastrophic events, including
> the >20 degree shifting of the polar axis before 2002!
> The Tribulation prophesied even by our Lord and Savior
> Jesus Christ is begun. ANSWER THIS: Are you prepared?
>
> Godspeed,
> Daniel
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Daniel Vogelheim)
Subject: Re: CFB mode with same initialization vector
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 23:13:36 GMT
Hi Paul,
>CFB is a stream cypher, i.e., it generates a pseudorandom
>bitstream which is XORed into the data. The bitstream
>is fixed for a particular choice of key and IV.
No... You seem to be thinking of OFB. OFB mode uses the last
pseudorandom block as the new IV, CFB mode uses the last ciphertext
block as the new IV. So the CFB pseudorandom stream is dependent on
key, IV and message text.
>So if you use the same IV twice, you use the same bitstream
>twice. If the attacker has both cyphertexts, he can XOR them,
>which cancels out the bitstream and gives him simply the XOR
>of the two plaintexts. English language plaintext only has
>a few bits of entropy per byte, so the XOR of two independent
>English strings can be broken.
All correct for OFB, but it only works for the first (non-equal) block
of data in CFB. Cf the other posts in this thread.
As I mentioned before, Schneier says:
"If the IV in CFB is not unique, a cryptanalyst can
recover the corresponding plaintext." (AC2, p.201)
This indicates to me that a similar attack exists for CFB with same IV
as well, but the OFB-method above just doesn't work here.
Thanks for the response,
Daniel
------------------------------
From: Christoph Haenle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Security of long term public DH keys?
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1999 00:08:01 GMT
Let p be prime, g be a generator. Suppose there is an oracle that
raises a challenge x to some private exponent b, e.g. computes
x^b mod n
for an arbitrary 0<x<p-1. Is it possible to find out about b by
repeatedly probing the oracle with carefully constructed values for x?
For example, the LSB of b can be obtained by sending
x = g^((p-1)/2) = -1
to the oracle. If x^b is 1, then b is even, otherwise odd. Likewise,
if 4|p-1, then g^((p-1)/4) exists, and we can find out about the
second least significant bit.
If (p-1)/2 is a prime, then I can only see how to get to know the
LSB. Does anybody know of an attack for this case?
During DH key agreement, each party generates a new random exponent
every time, so b changes every time and an attacker can not probe the
oracle repeatedly.
SKIP uses long-term public DH keys, but I guess the oracle would then
check the client's public DH-key certificate before blindly doing
anything with the derived master secret g^(ab). (Here, a is the
attacker's private DH exponent). It might be difficult for a client
to get multiple certificates (one for each probe).
-Chris.
------------------------------
From: "Alberto Daniel Pires dos Barros" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: DES Algorithm source code
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 1999 19:41:03 -0300
I'm looking for a DES Algorithm writed in COBOL/400 �any one have it?
Alberto
------------------------------
From: Nicol So <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is breaking RSA NP-Complete ?
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 20:18:43 -0400
Bob Silverman wrote:
>
> I have seen different definitions of NP-Hard. The definition I prefer
> is:
>
> A problem is NP-Hard if it is polynomial time reducible (in the sense
> of Karp reducibility) to the hardest problem in NP.
I think you meant it the other way around (you always reduce a problem
to something at least as hard).
The way I usually phrase the definition is:
A language L is NP-hard iff for all languages L' in NP, L' is
polynomial-time many-one reducible to L.
Nicol
------------------------------
From: Nicol So <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is breaking RSA NP-Complete ?
Date: Wed, 04 Aug 1999 20:26:38 -0400
Bodo Moeller wrote:
>
> Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > I have seen different definitions of NP-Hard. The definition I prefer
> > is:
> >
> > A problem is NP-Hard if it is polynomial time reducible (in the sense
> > of Karp reducibility) to the hardest problem in NP.
>
> My impression (derived from a possibly too small set of samples) was
> that nowadays most people agree that NP-hardness is about
> Turing-reductions ... isn't that also the definition that Garey &
> Johnson seem to prefer?
I could be wrong, but my impression is that people these days prefer
(polynomial-time) many-one reduction to (polynomial-time) Turing
reduction when dealing with NP-completeness. Do people have a different
preference when dealing with NP-hardness?
Nicol
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there?
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 1999 00:42:57 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (KidMo84) wrote:
> What is the best file cryptography program out there that you can get online or
> purchase over the counter. Comparing Ease of use with Security of encryption.
The question is meangless without some metrics.
Are you willing to trade easy use for better security or vice versa?
Are you willing to trade speed of encryption for more security? At
what point does the code become too slow? etc. etc. Clealry
RSA with a 10000 bit key would provide impressive security.
But it would be slow. Contrawise, RC5 with a 40-bit key would
be very fast. But it would be insecure.
How long do you need your data to be secure? How much is it
worth? etc. etc.
What do you mean by "BEST"?? Define your parameters!
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel)
Subject: Re: Americans abroad/Encryption rules?
Date: 04 Aug 1999 15:28:22 GMT
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel) I wrote:
>I doubt ROT -{n} would be of much of much concern, either.
Hmm, I seem to have stuttered.
Any way, ROT-13 does have a key, but it's not
much of a secret.
Joe
__________________________________________
Joe Peschel
D.O.E. SysWorks
http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
__________________________________________
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is breaking RSA NP-Complete ?
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 1999 00:58:10 GMT
In article <7oa987$cq9$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bodo Moeller) wrote:
> Bodo Moeller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> I have seen different definitions of NP-Hard. The definition I prefer
> >> is:
> >>
> >> A problem is NP-Hard if it is polynomial time reducible (in the sense
> >> of Karp reducibility) to the hardest problem in NP.
>
> Oops, it seems I did not read this definition too carefully before I
> posted my previous article. I don't think that you really prefer that
> definition, because even the easiest of problems can be reduced to
> hard ones, so even trivial ones would qualify as "NP-hard" by that
> definition. I read it the other way around, which is probably what
> you meant.
>
Yes. Thank you. I had not intended to allow taking an easy problem
and making it harder, but the way I worded the definition implies
one might do just that.
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there?
Date: Thu, 05 Aug 1999 00:52:07 GMT
In article <7oa6bq$u36$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > KidMo84 wrote:
> >
> > > What is the best file cryptography program out there that you can
> get online or
> > > purchase over the counter. Comparing Ease of use with Security of
> encryption.
> >
> > PGP. Get it at www.pgpi.com . Be sure to set the key size to 4096
> (not the
> > default 2048). 100% free.
>
> That form of implicit trust scares me. What makes a 1024 bit key less
> secure then a 4096 bit key? (And if you say ease of solving you have
> no clue about the crypto world).
How refreshing! A common sense reply! How rare in this newsgroup!
Anyone who thinks that even 2048 bits are needed is clearly
clueless about the subject.
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Isaac)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: OTP export controlled?
Date: 5 Aug 1999 00:47:34 GMT
On Mon, 2 Aug 1999 08:33:29 +1000, Dale Clapperton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message <7o1j6f$slt$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>>
>>But the key is the most important function in a OTP. In this case I
>>would say sending the key would be a violation.
>
>Oh right. So sending random data to someone is illegal?
>
It's not even necessary to feign innocence here. The key in a OTP
system serves exactly the same function as a session key in a
public key system, but no one claims that the transmission of the
session key is illegal.
The only reason the key seems to have such a hightened importance
in a OTP system is because the remaining part of the algorithm is
so small and trivial to express.
Isaac
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kenneth Almquist)
Subject: Re: Infallible authentication scheme
Date: 5 Aug 1999 01:54:58 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Michelle Davis) wrote:
> Authentication: The user attaches a timestamp to his ID, joins this to
> his secret key (320 bits), and pads it to 512 bits. This string is
> then 3DES-encrypted, using a key which is a derivative of the secret
> key. The result is hashed [using SHA-1], yielding a 160-bit message
> digest. The left 80 bits are sent to the authenticating entity, together
> with the ID and timestamp in unencrypted form. The authenticating
> computer performs the exact same operation: obtains the user's secret
> key through the procedure detailed in Key Generation; attaches the
> timestamp and ID; pads; encrypts; and hashes. The left 80 bits of the
> result are compared with what was sent by the user, and if equal, it
> authenticates.
My comments:
1) You are using 3DES as a hash function, so you are essentially
hashing twice. If you use a 192 bit key with 3DES, combined
with a 64 bit block to be encrypted, that means that each output
bit of the 3DES operation will depend on at most 256 bits of
input, so this is an imperfect hash. On the other hand, it is
probably good enough to prevent a flaw in SHA-1 (if one is
found) from being used to attack this protocol. That, I think,
is your point.
2) I don't understand the purpose of this protocol. The authenticating
entity knows that the 80 authentication bits came from the user, but
that doesn't tell it whether any other data bits also came from that
user.
Given that the user and the authenticating entity share a secret
key, it would seem to me that the obvious way to do authentication
would be to encrypt messages using conventional encryption. A
third party who doesn't know the key can try to attack this in
two ways. First, he can send garbage messages, hoping that they
decrypt into something intelligible. This can be blocked by
including a suitably long hash value (e.g. a check sum or CRC)
in each message. Second, he can resend old messages (a replay
attack). This can be blocked by including a time stamp in each
message, or better, by including a sequence number in each
message. (The initial sequence number is obtained by querying
the server.) If you use both of these methods, you do not need
to reserve space in the message for both values. Instead, just
xor them together.
Kenneth Almquist
------------------------------
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