Cryptography-Digest Digest #18, Volume #10 Mon, 9 Aug 99 14:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: Challenge: mental authentication ("Lassi Hippel�inen")
Re: AES finalists to be announced (Anssi Bragge)
Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . . (Pete Becker)
Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help (Paul Crowley)
Re: Construction of permutation matrix ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
what is a single cycle sbox ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: challenge revisited ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: AES finalists to be announced ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help (Robert Harley)
CFP: Financial Cryptography 2000 (Fcrypt2000)
Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . . (Sundial Services)
Re: what is a single cycle sbox (John Savard)
Re: Cracking challenge ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Challenge: mental authentication (Lincoln Yeoh)
Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . . (Lincoln Yeoh)
Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there? (Jerry Coffin)
Re: Construction of permutation matrix (wtshaw)
Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . . ("Paul Lutus")
NIST AES FInalists are.... (Bruce Schneier)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Lassi Hippel�inen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Challenge: mental authentication
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 13:54:20 +0300
John Savard wrote:
>
> So, the question remains open: can such a system be designed where a
> large number of users, each of whom is not to be able to get into
> another user's account, be (mechanically!) assigned a
> challenge-response protocol of their own?
>
> If we relax the conditions, and allow the user to have a piece of
> paper, where no one is looking over his shoulder, but the line is
> tapped, then the problem becomes easier.
>
> John Savard ( teneerf<- )
> http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
I think the question is still pretty ill defined. How much calculating
(or some other reasoning) capability is a user expected to have? Even
defining a metric for that capability seems difficult!
Also, as a practical implementation matter, what limitations are set on
the user interface? Text or graphic display? Any extra devices allowed?
Anyway, since we are dealing with humans, things are not purely
mathematical any more. Psychology and physiology must also be
considered. Even an ordinary keyboard can be used to measure response
time to a challenge, or intervals between keypresses.
At the moment I don't believe in provably secure authentication (between
the service and the user's brain), because the problem space is so
foggy. At least someone should first define the exact environment.
"Good enough" security is feasible, though. Physiometric systems are an
example, but the user interface is more complex than keyboard+display.
And even they don't authenticate the brain, only some body part that is
assumed to be connected to its original owner...
-- Lassi
------------------------------
From: Anssi Bragge <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: AES finalists to be announced
Date: 09 Aug 1999 13:59:01 +0200
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> Yes. Because even though you talk a lot you couldnt crack an egg let
> alone a very simple cipher message.
If someone talks a lot about cryptography, and does know what
they are talking about, why the hell do people start bombing them with
random binary data to 'decode' to prove that they know what they are
talking about...? (uhh air in, breath!)
Getting ridiculously lucky and decoding some random message
proves nothing. I know my share of cryptography (which is not much),
why should (for example) I prove that by cracking something?
abe
--
Anssi Bragge
UBS AG http://www.ubs.com/
Bahnhofstrasse 45, CH-8045 Zuerich, Switzerland
Tel: +41 1 236 0485 / Fax: +41-1-236 41 41 / GSM: +41-76-388 7722
------------------------------
From: Pete Becker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.c++
Subject: Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . .
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 08:17:23 -0400
Paul Lutus wrote:
>
> You don't get the *complete* help system. You still have help screens,
> abbreviated ones. They are in HTML. This requires MSIE.
>
Non sequitur. There are many applications other than MSIE that can
display HTML.
--
Pete Becker
Dinkumware, Ltd.
http://www.dinkumware.com
------------------------------
From: Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help
Date: 9 Aug 1999 09:58:05 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> Hi,
>
> Has anyone of u really tried understanding the
> Twofish Algorithm??
>
> My problem is how to multipy matrices of RS * m
> over GF(2**8) for w(x)=x**8 +x**6+ x**3+ x**2+
> 1 ? can someone tell me how is this matrix
> multiplication over Gf to be performed??
I have a brief description of this on my Web pages at
http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/postings/news-546.txt
but basically the code looks like this:
uint32 gf8_mul(uint32 a, uint32 b, uint32 m) {
uint32 res = 0;
while (b != 0) {
if (b & 1)
res ^= a;
b >>= 1; a <<= 1;
if (a & 0x100)
a ^= m;
}
return res;
}
Take out the second "if" and replace the ^= with += and it's a normal
multiply for non-negative integers.
--
__
\/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Got a Linux strategy? \ /
/\__/ Paul Crowley http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ /~\
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Construction of permutation matrix
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 13:10:47 GMT
In article <7oci1d$kmp$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> A 'complete' method would be this
>
> 1. Make two n element lists, one empty (P list), and one containing
> all numbers from 0 to n-1 (S List)
>
> 2. for i = 0 to (n-1) do
> 3. t = log2(n - i) new bits from the key
> 4. P[i] = S[t]
> 5. remove S[t] from S and replace with last element of S
> 6. next i
>
> If you can extract fractions of bits and have log2(n!) bits of key
this
> will be complete (all permutations are possible).
>
> Tom
Replace step #3 with
t = KEY mod 256-i, KEY /= 256-i
Where KEY is the log2(n!) bit key stored as a bignum. This logic will
allow you to use bignum libaries and get the same effect.
Tom
--
PGP 6.0.2i Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp
PGP 2.6.2 Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key_rsa.pgp
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 13:06:42 GMT
In article <7olrks$rfe$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Has anyone of u really tried understanding the
> Twofish Algorithm??
>
> My problem is how to multipy matrices of RS * m
> over GF(2**8) for w(x)=x**8 +x**6+ x**3+ x**2+
> 1 ? can someone tell me how is this matrix
> multiplication over Gf to be performed??
>
> Trying this site in desperation, so if anyone of
> u is offended, my apologies.
Look at their C optimized code.
Tom
--
PGP 6.0.2i Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp
PGP 2.6.2 Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key_rsa.pgp
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: what is a single cycle sbox
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 13:23:43 GMT
I noticed Dave Scott uses the terminology 'Single Cycle' in defining
his sboxes. Does this mean an n x n sbox can be called recursively 2^n
times and end where you started?
If so he might want to know that only 1/3% of all possible permutations
are single cycle. Not a big open keyspace if you ask me. On 8-bit
boxes this is 2^1675.76 instead of 2^1683.99, about 256 times smaller.
Tom
--
PGP 6.0.2i Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp
PGP 2.6.2 Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key_rsa.pgp
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: challenge revisited
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 1999 14:10:10 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Its been 6 day and Little Tommy has not cracked fortom.cpt.
> Can lttle genios not crack it. 4 others already has cracked this easy.
Look, you're just being obnoxious. If Tom SaintDenis had *accepted*
your uninvited challenge, then it would be fair to deride him for
not succeeding. However, it is *not* fair to pick on him if he
can't be bothered to work on your uninvited problem. I'm a trained
cryppie, yet my own policy is not to respond to such challenges; I
pick what I want to work on (and what I have *time* to work on).
Having said that, it does appear that Tom is merely a HS student,
with more interest than actual experience in the subject. I recall
from my HS days that it seemed that students knew everything and
adults knew nothing.. But the adults got smarter as I grew up.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: AES finalists to be announced
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 14:26:44 GMT
In article <7ochg6$k7l$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> I have been informed by NIST that the five or so AES finalists will be
> announced next Monday at 10 am. My Frog algorithm, as expected, will
> not be one of them.
The AES finalists are:
MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent and Twofish.
Interestingly enough these are exactly the ones I foretold in my report
about the Second AES conference, published in this newsgroup - except
for a sixth, E2, which I thought would make too.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Robert Harley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help
Date: 09 Aug 1999 16:08:49 +0200
Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> uint32 gf8_mul(uint32 a, uint32 b, uint32 m) {
> uint32 res = 0;
>
> while (b != 0) {
> if (b & 1)
> res ^= a;
> b >>= 1; a <<= 1;
> if (a & 0x100)
> a ^= m;
> }
> return res;
> }
If you want to multiply over some small finite field, would it not be
a lot quicker to pick a generator of its multiplicative group and make
two small tables, one of discrete logs and one of powers.
For non-zero inputs, read the logs from the log table, add them modulo
the group size and then read the power from the other table (NB:
handle zero inputs separately).
Bye,
Rob.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Fcrypt2000)
Subject: CFP: Financial Cryptography 2000
Date: 09 Aug 1999 15:36:48 GMT
Final Call for Papers
Financial Cryptography `00
February 21-24, 2000
Anguilla, BWI
submission deadline Sep. 24, 1999
Original papers are solicited on all aspects of financial data
security and digital commerce in general for submission to the Fourth
Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC00). FC00 aims to bring
together persons involved in the financial, legal and data security
fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Relevant topics
include
Anonymity Protection Infrastructure Design
Auditability Legal/ Regulatory Issues
Authentication/ Identification Loyalty Mechanisms
Certification/ Authorization Payments/ Micropayments
Commercial Transactions Privacy Issues
Copyright/ I.P. Management Risk Management
Digital Cash/ Digital Receipts Secure Banking Systems
Economic Implications Smart Cards
Electronic Purses Trust Management
Implementations WaterMarking
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS: Directions for electronic submissions are at
http://www.fc00.cs.uwm.edu/esub.html, or send a cover letter and 12
copies of an extended abstract to be received no later than September
24, 1999 (or postmarked by September 17, 1999 and sent via airmail) to
the Program Chair. The extended abstract should start with the title,
names of authors, abstract, and keywords followed by a succinct
statement appropriate for a non-specialist reader specifying the
subject addressed, background, main achievements, and significance to
financial data security. Submissions are limited to 15 single-spaced
pages of 11pt type. Notification of acceptance or rejection will be
sent to authors no later than December 3, 1999. Authors of accepted
papers must guarantee that their paper will be presented at the
conference. Send submissions to:
Yair Frankel, FC00 Program Chair
231 North Avenue W. PMB #341
Westfield, NJ 07090, USA
email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
phone: (908) 233-8737
PROCEEDINGS: Proceedings of the conference will be published by
Springer Verlag in their Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
series. Preproceedings will be available at the conference, but final
versions will not be due until afterwards, giving authors the
opportunity to revise their papers based on presentations and
discussions at the meeting. Instructions and deadlines for submission
of final papers will be sent later to authors of accepted papers.
Program Committee:
Dan Boneh, Stanford
Joan Feigenbaum, AT&T Labs - Research
Yair Frankel (Chair), CertCo
Stuart Haber, InterTrust STAR Lab
Philip MacKenzie, Lucent Bell Labs
Ueli Maurer, ETH Zurich
Clifford Neuman, University of Southern California
Kazue Sako, NEC
Dan Simon, Microsoft
Paul Syverson, Naval Research Laboratory
Win Treese, Open Market, Inc.
Nicko van Someren, nCipher
Important Dates:
Submissions Due: Sep. 24, 1999
Notification: Dec. 3, 1999
Conference: Feb. 21-24, 2000
Electronic submissions:
See http://www.fc00.cs.uwm.edu/esub.html for directions.
Electronic Submission Chair:
George Davida, UWM
General Chair:
Donald Beaver, CertCo
Local Arrangement Chairs:
Vince Cate, Offshore Information Services Ltd
Rafael Hirschfeld, Unipay Technologies
Further Information about conference registration and on travel,
hotels, and Anguilla itself will follow in a separate general
announcement. FC00 is organized by the International Financial
Cryptography Association. Additional information about FC00 may be
found at http://fc00.ai .
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 08:47:25 -0700
From: Sundial Services <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.c++
Subject: Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . .
Phlip wrote:
> > Don't be ridiculous! The main reason IE is required is that the
> > Visual Studio help system is now based on HTML, and IE contains
> > the modules needed to support that.
>
> I implore Guenther and all others who would postulate conspiracy
> theories about MS to consider their past track record. PLEASE DON'T
> GIVE THEM ANY NEW GOOD IDEAS!!!!
I think that the best take on all of this lies in a comment made by the
Judge himself... to the effect that, "you mean that if someone wanted
to buy thousands of copies of your product without a browser, say for
valid security-related concerns, then they absolutely could not buy that
from you?"
I don't know about you, but I don't like all the evil things that people
are coming up with to abuse the capabilities of these "highly feature
laden whether you like it or not" browsers and e-mail programs... which,
thanks to MS's determination to "own the net," cannot be turned off
within their software. As for me and my software, my attitude remains,
"this computer belongs to ME."
And I think that, in the end, it is the market itself and not the
Federal Court which will make that judgement against them.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: what is a single cycle sbox
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 16:06:12 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote, in part:
>I noticed Dave Scott uses the terminology 'Single Cycle' in defining
>his sboxes. Does this mean an n x n sbox can be called recursively 2^n
>times and end where you started?
Yes, but it means more than that: during the 2^n times, you never get the same
substitute twice.
>If so he might want to know that only 1/3% of all possible permutations
>are single cycle. Not a big open keyspace if you ask me. On 8-bit
>boxes this is 2^1675.76 instead of 2^1683.99, about 256 times smaller.
It limits the keyspace, but it does in a sense restrict the S-box to "nice"
values. Short cycles in an S-box can, under certain circumstances, be a
weakness.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Cracking challenge
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 12:00:22 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Its been 4 day and Little Tom boy have NOT cracked fortom.cpt. He cant.
> 2 of you peoples has mailed me the good answer. Thanks yous for not
Ok, this flaming contest is getting old. This is almost as bad as hacking
boards. Your messages (yes including this one too) is only cluttering up
the news group, and it's really annoying.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lincoln Yeoh)
Subject: Re: Challenge: mental authentication
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 16:11:27 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Fri, 06 Aug 1999 12:30:44 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Robert Scott) wrote:
>To be specific, suppose that the application is an ATM.
>The user walks up to the ATM and types in his name or account
>number on a keyboard. Then the ATM displays some kind of a
>challenge on a screen. The user looks at the challenge,
>does some thinking, and in less than, say, 30 seconds,
>he enters a response. If it is the correct response, the
>ATM will consider him authenticated and give him the service
>he requests.
Given most of the public don't like thinking or remembering I'd suggest
using iris scanning instead. www.iriscan.com
Already being used for ATMs by a bank in britain.
Link.
****************************
Reply to: @Spam to
lyeoh at @[EMAIL PROTECTED]
pop.jaring.my @
*******************************
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lincoln Yeoh)
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.c++
Subject: Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . .
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 16:17:39 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sun, 08 Aug 1999 09:55:57 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Guenther Brunthaler) wrote:
>However, it certainly would not be hard for MS to include such
>backdoors into IE, especially with regard to the current MS vs. the
>government lawsuit: MS could enable certain secret services to access
>the built-in IE backdoors, if the government agrees not to sentence MS
>in turn (or at least not in an extent that was too painful for MS).
>
>But those are also just rumours, of course.
>
>Although all of them could easily be true from a technical viewpoint.
>
>But the basic question is: How much do YOU trust MS?
>
Try this: compile a reasonably sized program. Copy the executables
generated. Compile it again without changing the source code. Compare the
executables.
I prefer gcc...
Have fun..
Link.
****************************
Reply to: @Spam to
lyeoh at @[EMAIL PROTECTED]
pop.jaring.my @
*******************************
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jerry Coffin)
Subject: Re: What is "the best" file cryptography program out there?
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 1999 09:48:54 -0600
In article <7ojv5c$kdt$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
says...
[ ... ]
> Thanks for the info. I am not in the 'game' that much. Well I still
> don't believe that massive multi ghz machines will be used in key
> searches any time soon.
I suspect that 5 years from now, machines that run at less than a
megahertz will be restricted to a few low-end economy boxes and
embedded markets. It's not that anybody will be building a lot of
specialized machines just for cracking AES (or whatever) it's just
that the normal machine by then will be that much faster.
> What I would like to know is how fast can you
> get CMOS (or whatever they use in CPUs) to run before it loses
> consistency (electrons become covalent and jump wires ...)?
I don't know enough about fabrication technology to be able to give
any hard and fast numbers, and for that matter I'm not sure anybody
has any truly hard and fast numbers. IIRC, when I talked to my boss
(who does know fabrication extremely well) about this general area a
while back, he figured the basic techniques had been worked out for
the next 10 years or so.
In reality, I think the rate at which we reach new technology levels
is going to start to slow down a bit. The reasons are more economic
than technical though -- the problem is that the cost of building a
fabrication facility goes up considerably with each new level of
technology you work with. To give an idea of the degree of
difference, consider that a 2 micron fab used to cost around $50
million US to build. Getting to .2 microns costs around a billion
dollars US. You simply have to sell a LOT of chips before you can
afford to make the kind of investments we're looking at anymore.
In any case, we're starting to get a long ways away from encryption
techniques, so I'd probably better shut up already.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Construction of permutation matrix
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 11:38:54 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> wtshaw wrote:
> > > it is the amount
> > > of information in the simplest nontrivial discrete choice (Boolean,
> > > YES/NO).
> > Which is only a small part of what logic can be involved in choices.
> > Trying to make everything in to yes/no is left to the uneducated and the
> > legal profession.
>
> SIMPLEST. SIMPLEST. SIMPLEST.
Wait just a dang fangle minute here pardner. If a choice is not simply
yes or no, it is not a simple bit choice. Have you not ever heard, "Yes,
no, or don't care," as in, "Are you far or against apathy."
Something analog, like the speed that you might drive is certainly not a
single bit choice, except for a few people I know, not-moving, or
all-out. Here, the simplest bit choice is not reasonable. Logic should
imply reason.
--
Sometimes you have to punt, and hope for the best.
------------------------------
Reply-To: "Paul Lutus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "Paul Lutus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.c++
Subject: Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . .
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 1999 09:19:33 -0700
Non sequitur. Only MSIE can reside within MSDev as a component. I discovered
the same thing in my program Arachnophilia, to my dismay. :)
--
Paul Lutus
www.arachnoid.com
Pete Becker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Paul Lutus wrote:
> >
> > You don't get the *complete* help system. You still have help screens,
> > abbreviated ones. They are in HTML. This requires MSIE.
> >
>
> Non sequitur. There are many applications other than MSIE that can
> display HTML.
>
> --
> Pete Becker
> Dinkumware, Ltd.
> http://www.dinkumware.com
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: NIST AES FInalists are....
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 1999 18:01:41 GMT
AES is the Advanced Encryption Standard, the encryption algorithm that
will eventually replace DES. In 1997, the U.S. government (NIST,
actually), solicited candidate algorithms for this standard. In June
1998 (the submission deadline), fifteen groups submitted algorithms.
NIST asked for comments on the fifteen algorithms, with the intention
of pruning the list to five finalists. The comment deadline was in
June, and finally NIST has released the list of five finalists.
The envelope, please... The five AES finalists are Mars, RC6,
Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish.
NIST spent a good deal of time explaining their rationale, and it is
worth reading their report on their first-round analysis.
The next step is to choose among the finalists. NIST is again
soliciting comments on the algorithms, and there will be a third AES
Candidate Conference in New York in April, 2000, held in conjunction
with the 7th Fast Software Encryption workshop.
Every sci.crypt reader should get involved. There is a lot more to
picking an encryption standard than security. Any of these finalists
would be a good choice with respect to that criterion. Any algorithm
that becomes a standard will be used in all sorts of applications,
from bulk encryption on computers to IPSec to pay television to smart
cards to garage door openers. If you are using cryptography and care
at all about performance--speed, latency, gate count in hardware,
whatever--look at the five finalists and figure out which ones meet
your performance needs. Then tell NIST. AES is likely to be around
for a couple of decades; it would be nice if NIST has some input from
its eventual users.
NIST Round 2 page:
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/round2/round2.htm
FSE 2000:
http://www.counterpane.com/fse.html
Performance comparison of AES candidates:
http://www.counterpane.com/aes-performance.html
**********************************************************************
Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098
101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis, MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590
Free crypto newsletter. See: http://www.counterpane.com
------------------------------
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