Cryptography-Digest Digest #28, Volume #10 Wed, 11 Aug 99 13:13:04 EDT
Contents:
Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . . (Dave Hazelwood)
Re: brute force crackers unethical? (Charles Blair)
Re: Construction of permutation matrix (Patrick Juola)
Re: NIST AES FInalists are.... (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: brute force crackers unethical? ("Andrew Whalan")
Crypto 99 shock - the chosen conference attack! (Ross Anderson)
Re: brute force crackers unethical? ("Andrew Whalan")
Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . . (Lee Winter)
Cipher-Feedback Mode ("Chris Gillespie")
OT: malformed HTML [used to be Re: AES finalists to be announced] (Mitchell Morris)
Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help (Paul Crowley)
Re: brute force crackers unethical? (fungus)
Re: Cipher-Feedback Mode (John Savard)
Re: brute force crackers unethical? (wtshaw)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dave Hazelwood)
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.c++
Subject: Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . .
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 13:21:28 GMT
The fact is that Microsoft sucks. They have produced an OS that at
best makes security very difficult and at worst invades YOUR privacy.
Then, they abuse their OS position to FORCE their IE upon you and
they won't take not for an answer by allowing you to easily get rid
of it.
No, they TIE-IT-IN to almost everything they do so that you can't
do without it even if you really don't need IT.
IBM was sued by the Justice Department in the 70's for doing
one millionth of what MS does today. IBM won but it was a long
trial and a close call.
If MS wins now.....we will all lose...they will get more arrogant...
more abusive.....more agressive...and in the end after everyone else
is gone...YOU will pay MORE for the garbage they give you
because they will be the only show in town.
Wake up. People who are pro-Microsoft are the same people who
spend half their lives reloading MS software that has failed them
because nobody knows why it no longer works???? Oh...just
reboot! Oh just reload! Oh just buy a new computer! Isn't that
some joke?
Real people expect Software that works! That protects their
privacy, respects their decisions to use other peoples Apps,
and in general improves their productivity while at the same
time does not require they spend twice the productivity they gain
rebooting and reloading MS software.
Arrgh...give me ANY alternative and I'll take it!
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guenther Brunthaler) wrote:
>On 7 Aug 1999 18:41:27 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] () wrote:
>
>> Why does Microsoft ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE me to install and use their
>>Internet Explorer (IE) before I can even install their Visual C++ compiler?
>
>Haven't you have heard of all those rumours about the various built-in
>backdoors of IE?
>
>If those rumours were true, then the reason for such a requirement is
>straightforward: In order for MS to be able to steal your sources and
>personal data anytime they would like to, your have to install IE in
>order to enable them to do so.
>
>I do however not say that those rumours may be true - they are just
>that: rumours.
>
>However, it certainly would not be hard for MS to include such
>backdoors into IE, especially with regard to the current MS vs. the
>government lawsuit: MS could enable certain secret services to access
>the built-in IE backdoors, if the government agrees not to sentence MS
>in turn (or at least not in an extent that was too painful for MS).
>
>But those are also just rumours, of course.
>
>Although all of them could easily be true from a technical viewpoint.
>
>But the basic question is: How much do YOU trust MS?
>
>
>Greetings,
>
>Guenther
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Charles Blair)
Subject: Re: brute force crackers unethical?
Date: 11 Aug 1999 13:49:57 GMT
"Andrew Whalan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I just recently lost a tutoring job at a university, in a nutshell, for
>writing a brute force cracker for the Unix crypt function as a student and
>then demonstrating it whilst holding the position of a tutor (although not
>tutoring at that point in time) to a fellow data security student.
Historically, bearers of bad news always run risks. The insecurity
of a part of the computer system is an unwelcome truth that people in
authority did not want to hear about. One could argue about whether
your actions could have led to somebody learning about the weakness
who otherwise would not have known, but my perception is that is really
window dressing.
I assume you're a graduate student. If your campus has an organization
that represents TA's, you might see whether they would want to get involved
on your behalf. On the other hand, things could be worse. They haven't
tried to take more disciplinary action against you, and maybe you have
better things to do than seek further confrontation on this particular
issue.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Construction of permutation matrix
Date: 11 Aug 1999 09:48:47 -0400
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
wtshaw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In article <7opcg7$9qn$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>(Patrick Juola) wrote:
>
>> >Not always in choice-complete manner, as when you need five choices, you
>> >must allow for eight.
>>
>> Not if you're doing the five-fold choice repeatedly. Suitable coding
>> will allow a stream of equiprobable elements from the set 1..5 to
>> be coded in the optimal number of bits. You simply amortize the extra
>> bit-fraction from this choice to the next one.
>>
>> 1960's technology....
>>
>You solution may work, but it is not simple. Why not be appropriate to
>start with?
Several reasons :
i) My system is almost certainly more efficient than yours.
ii) My system integrates better with other technologies.
iii) My system uses a "common currency" for analysis and so the results
of my information-theoretic analysis in terms of "bits" are directly
comparable to anyone else's bits. If you build a system and analyze
it in terms of five-way choices, there's no way of directly comparing
the system to one based on binary decisions except by reducing to
a commmon decision scheme -- which is basically the same as redoing
your analysis in bits to begin with.
The last point is the most salient -- bits are the simplest *analytic*
units (probably followed by 'nats', which are equiprobable choices
over a space of e = 2.718... choices). You can build any damn thing you
like, based on whatever bizarre constraints you have in the problem
at hand. But if you want your analysis to make sense, you want to
describe it in the most general terms for comparison. How often
have you seen a speedometer measuring in "furlongs per fortnight",
or rulers marked in "sqrt(acres)"? And do you think there's a reason
for this?
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: NIST AES FInalists are....
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 15:00:58 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>> This alone is one reason overseas companys would be foolish to
>> use any of the AES candidates. The NSA will not doubt design special
>> hardware just for the decoding of messages that overseas companies
>> are dumb enough to use one of the AES methods.
>
>But if one of the candidates is too tough to crack even with skill,
>cleverness, and hardware assistance, then it wouldn't be so foolish.
>The problem is, we don't know whether that is the case, and the AES
>evaluation process doesn't seem designed to enlighten us there.
Rest assured that if there was an entry that the NSA felt to strong
for it to attack it would never be allowed to see the light of day in the
AES game. The AES is all about getting exposure for weak methods
that the NSA can break. Do you think any of this stuff will be approved
for US government TOP SECRET messages. Hell no this code will be
hyped for use by the average person. Why do you think the US is still
trying to prevent the free sending of crypto source out of the US. The
US government has a vested interest in getting people to foolishly use
weak crypto.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: "Andrew Whalan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: brute force crackers unethical?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 00:08:12 +1000
> > Anyhow, in a nutshell, I would just like to be reassured that I am not
> > acting in an unethical fashion to write a brute force cracker, as IMHO
at
> > least, it is a valid (but annoyingly time consuming) method of
> > cryptanalysis.
>
> But was it your job to crack the passwd file? There is nothing new
The thing is I didn't! It was a brute force cracker, and a poor-mans one at
that. It was too slow and inefficent to be a real contender at the system
scale.
> about UNIX passwd cracking, so it had no intellectual value.
> Presumably, you had agreed to conditions of use that forbid your
> engaging in such activity. So it is understandable that not keeping
> your promise was viewed as evidence that you wouldn't set a good
> example for students of ethics.
>
> Basically, one would need a *lot* more information to form a valid
> judgment of the merits of your case, essentially work for an
> independent investigator, not a newsgroup.
I was after the opinions of the general public, my peers if you would.
Ethics are primarly determined by society IMHO.
> P.S. The UNIX system should be using a shadow password file, with a
> low-bandwidth query port, which would render passwd cracking
> infeasible.
I believe it is, but as I would never do anything to subvert system security
it wouldn't affect me.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ross Anderson)
Subject: Crypto 99 shock - the chosen conference attack!
Date: 11 Aug 1999 13:45:39 GMT
A company called IIR Limited has organised a conference called Crypto 99
which is NOT the one we are expecting to take place next week at Santa
Barbara.
If you want to learn how to detect, monitor and control crypto ...
reduce the likelihood of an outbreak and comply with legislation ...
assess cutting edge technologies for the removal and destruction of
crypto ... and benefit from the ideas of the world's leading crypto
experts (Messrs. Fricker, Hall, Watkins, Mold, Clancy, Clay-Chapman,
Robertson-Kelly, Rose and Lightfoot), then this conference is
apparently the one for you.
(Sounds like spook heaven, doesn't it :-)
More at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/crypto.html
Ross
------------------------------
From: "Andrew Whalan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: brute force crackers unethical?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 00:12:20 +1000
> >I would just like to be reassured that I am not
> >acting in an unethical fashion to write a brute force cracker, as IMHO at
> >least, it is a valid (but annoyingly time consuming) method of
> >cryptanalysis.
>
> Brute-force cracking isn't cryptanalysis, and writing a brute-force
> cracker isn't unethical. Reassured?
Proof by exhaustion is still a proof isn't it? Cryptanalysis is the
reversing of any encryption isn't it. Admitadly, you would try other means
where possible, but if there were none...
> Your fellow data security student likely mentioned your cracker
> to the administration. Words like cracker, crack, hacker, and the
> like tend to send administrators (and the public) into a panic.
Yeah, 'Key Exhaustion' is a better term i think. :) I think it is the 'acker
in the words ... "I know, i might quack the system" ... even that has a bad
ring to it, damn phonetics ;)
> You did inform them that there are faster and better UNIX pwd
> crackers already freely available, and that that they are useful
> for finding weak passwords, didn't you?
I should have mention the shoddy job i did on the coding... it would have
been ages before it broke a password, were I to try to use it in that
regard.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 09:28:13 -0400
From: Lee Winter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.c++
Subject: Re: Why does MS-Visual C++ ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE . . .
Paul Lutus wrote:
> MSIE reads some special Microsoft-proprietary compressed HTML files. The
> help files are in this format.
So it is not an HTML browser, it's a propietary tool. I suppose the implication
that "IE is necessary" is an accident when the truth is that IE is irrelevent,
but a bag on the side of IE is necessary.
>
>
> --
>
> Paul Lutus
> www.arachnoid.com
>
> Lee Winter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> >
> >
> > Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
> >
> > > Guenther Brunthaler wrote:
> > > > On 7 Aug 1999 18:41:27 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] () wrote:
> > > > > Why does Microsoft ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE me to install and use
> their
> > > > >Internet Explorer (IE) before I can even install their Visual C++
> compiler?
> > > > Haven't you have heard of all those rumours about the various built-in
> > > > backdoors of IE?
> > >
> > > Don't be ridiculous! The main reason IE is required is that the
> > > Visual Studio help system is now based on HTML, and IE contains
> > > the modules needed to support that.
> >
> > Is there something specific about the HTML help files that requires IE or
> will any
> > HTML viewer suffice?
> >
> >
> >
------------------------------
From: "Chris Gillespie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Cipher-Feedback Mode
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 14:29:25 +0100
The description of Cipher-Feedback mode in Aplied Cryptography has left me a
little confused. I understand it up to the point of the first char having
been XOR'd with the first byte of the IV, but loose the plot thereafter.
Does anyone know of any other explainations of CFB or can explain the
process themselves?
Thanks in advance,
Chris.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mitchell Morris)
Subject: OT: malformed HTML [used to be Re: AES finalists to be announced]
Date: 11 Aug 1999 13:13:12 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
First, let me apologize for quoting so much material just to complain
about something completely off-topic.
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mike Just wrote:
[snip]
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.61 [en] (WinNT; U)
>X-Accept-Language: en
>MIME-Version: 1.0
[snip]
>Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
[snip]
>
><!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
><html>
>Well, I hope that being "primarily" a designer does not exclude one from
[snip]
><br> Free crypto
>newsletter. See: <a
>href="http://www.counterpane.com">http://www.counterpane.com</a></blockquote>
></html>
>
Maybe I missed something in the HTML4.0 spec, but isn't the <BODY> tag still
required? Completely ignoring the fact that posting HTML to Usenet is
sometimes considered a faux pas ("as is posting off-topic rants," he said
hypocritcally), wouldn't you imagine Nyetscape could have gotten this right
by now?
+Mitchell
--
Mitchell Morris
Life is an endless struggle full of frustrations and challenges, but
eventually you find a hairstylist you like.
------------------------------
From: Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Twofish --> Can Someone Help
Date: 10 Aug 1999 22:56:42 +0100
Robert Harley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > uint32 gf8_mul(uint32 a, uint32 b, uint32 m) {
[...]
>
> If you want to multiply over some small finite field, would it not be
> a lot quicker to pick a generator of its multiplicative group and make
> two small tables, one of discrete logs and one of powers.
Yes, of course. The routine illustrated is meant to show the
principle of the thing.
Brian Gladman's collection of clean and high-performance AES
implementations provide excellent illustrations of how to do these
ciphers well:
http://www.seven77.demon.co.uk/cryptography_technology/index.htm
hth,
--
__
\/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Got a Linux strategy? \ /
/\__/ Paul Crowley http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ /~\
(I hope my cancel of the previous version of this article propogates)
------------------------------
From: fungus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: brute force crackers unethical?
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 17:36:30 +0200
Andrew Whalan wrote:
>
> Anyhow, in a nutshell, I would just like to be reassured that I am not
> acting in an unethical fashion to write a brute force cracker, as IMHO at
> least, it is a valid (but annoyingly time consuming) method of
> cryptanalysis.
>
For writing it? No, you should have been congratulated for pointing
out weaknesses in the system...(people get paid to do this work!)
If you'd made the program available to the public or used it for
any kind of personal gain then I could understand the situation.
As it is, it seems you've been a victim of some burocratic "zero
tolerance for hacking" rule.
PS: unix password crackers are widely available on the Internet,
and have been for many years.
--
<\___/>
/ O O \
\_____/ FTB.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Cipher-Feedback Mode
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 15:17:51 GMT
"Chris Gillespie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>The description of Cipher-Feedback mode in Aplied Cryptography has left me a
>little confused. I understand it up to the point of the first char having
>been XOR'd with the first byte of the IV, but loose the plot thereafter.
>Does anyone know of any other explainations of CFB or can explain the
>process themselves?
CFB works this way:
To encipher a block of plaintext,
take the previous block of ciphertext, encipher it in your block cipher, and XOR
the result with that current block of plaintext.
This way,
1) an error in the recieved ciphertext propagates only to two blocks of the
message;
2) since a quantity, depending only on the previous block, is XORed to the
current part of the message, one can do this on a byte-by-byte basis, without
having to hold incoming bytes until a full block is assembled.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: brute force crackers unethical?
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 08:09:13 -0600
In article <7oqvv2$djj$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Andrew Whalan"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I can understand loosing the position over the alleged breach in conditions
> of use of computer systems on campus but one of the biggest arguments was
> that what I did was unethical and as such I should not be tutoring a subject
> on ethics.
>
You should not be teaching people that groundless trust is a virtue. If
security is bad, knowing it is bad is no sin, while doing nothing to
really fix the problem is a crime.
No, according to the info you gave us, you performed a professional
service, much better than having them surprised by discovering that the
system has been *serviced* by a unknown hacker.
People just hate to fix things, even discover that they have to fix
things. You are the messenger, kill the messenger...not too academic, I'd
say. I bet the problem does not even get addressed unless you spread the
knowledge of how bad it is, which might not be immediately the *best*
thing for you to do. Try to work toward a longer range solution, if you
can find someone intelligent enough to talk to.
--
Sometimes you have to punt, and hope for the best.
------------------------------
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