Cryptography-Digest Digest #35, Volume #10 Thu, 12 Aug 99 16:13:02 EDT
Contents:
Re: NIST AES FInalists are.... ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Infallible authentication scheme (David P Jablon)
Re: language confusion, would it work? (John Savard)
Re: Better combiner than PHT? (D. J. Bernstein)
Re: NIST AES FInalists are.... (Tim Lavoie)
Re: Depth of Two (John Savard)
Re: frequency of prime numbers? ("karl malbrain")
Re: frequency of prime numbers? ("karl malbrain")
Re: Future Cryptology (Paul Koning)
About Algorithm M ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: solitaire, cryptonomicon ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Correlations in RC6 (Lars Knudsen)
Re: Depth of Two (Jim Gillogly)
Re: brute force crackers unethical? (Patrick Juola)
Re: frequency of prime numbers? (Anton Stiglic)
Re: frequency of prime numbers? ("karl malbrain")
Re: Pls help me wade through the terminology (fungus)
Re: Future Cryptology (Patrick Juola)
Positive News About JAWS Technologies (John Savard)
Re: Future Cryptology (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: NIST AES FInalists are....
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 14:07:28 GMT
In article <7oteqh$21k2$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote:
> Just because it might be weak at 31 rounds does not mean that
> they don't have much more advanced methods to know that it was weak at
> 31. It is quite likely they used a different method. If they used a
> different method they know have both techniques.
Let's not forget the NSA did use SKIPJACK themselves ...
> There may be more smart people out side the NSA but the NSA has more
> money and computers. Plus they have the advantage of years worth of
spying
> on all cipher developmenet while the Phony Ivory tower types have
very limited
> resourses. For example I am sure the NSA has studied my methods to get
> what knnowledge they can from it. While all people like Dave Wagner
are to
> fuckin lazy to look at it. Yes he can spout off saying his Slide
Method makes
> it dead but when put to the test it shows he was speaking in lies.
His kind
> don't have the time to look at all the stuff out here. The NSA does
have the
> time money and a large team that looks at everything. Plus part of
there game
> is to keep the phony crypto people in the dark and tricking them to
research
> in the wrong direction.
Or in your case no research at all.
Tom
--
PGP 6.0.2i Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp
PGP 2.6.2 Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key_rsa.pgp
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David P Jablon)
Subject: Re: Infallible authentication scheme
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 15:09:07 GMT
I'd like to dispel a common myth ...
Export regulations are no problem for strong password authentication.
Even EKE-class techniques are freely exportable, as long as you're
just using the password-authenticated DH exchange to protect the password.
It's only when the derived key is used for subsequent session protection
that export rules become a hindrance.
U.S. crypto regulations are interpreted according to how a system
is used, and not just the underlying techniques. It is in fact
easy to build an encryption system using "just" MD5 and XOR,
which would be blocked by export regulation.
======================================================
David P. Jablon
Integrity Sciences, Inc.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<http://www.IntegritySciences.com>
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Eric Lee Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Michelle Davis wrote:
>> There is no challenge-response channel in this scheme.
>
>I don't get it. How do you intend to deal with replay attacks, then? [...]
>
>Even if you have a cryptographically significant authentication key with
>appropriate entropy at both ends as vs. a simple passphrase as sole
>source of entropy, you still need some way of dealing with replay
>attacks, which is generally going to require some sort of challenge
>provided by the recipient that is then added into your incoming packets
>so that the recipient knows you're not a bogon replaying an earlier
>stream.
>
>And if you're going to do that, you might as well go Diffie-Hellman or
>derivative to do the key exchange and challenge exchange. Unless you're
>in the United States, of course, in which case brain-dead export laws
>can make that a tedious exercise in bureaucracy (as vs. hashed schemes,
>which don't need special export clearance).
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: language confusion, would it work?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 15:07:25 GMT
"JvA Networks (DK)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>But that would still require a human interaction, right?
Even if that were the case, by now the message would be "deciphered", so even if
decryption were automated, the message would be reaching human eyes at this
point.
Look more closely at my original reply, since it shows why what you propose
won't be very effective, while it can be turned around inside-out and in that
case contribute. A pseudo-plaintext guise is useful at the very end stage,
because it makes it harder for automated harvesting to pick up encrypted text;
but at the beginning, before encryption, you want to strip out all redundancy,
not introduce some unnecessarily. If you're looking up words in a dictionary,
you might as well code them as random characters, not text-like strings which
involve redundancy.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (D. J. Bernstein)
Subject: Re: Better combiner than PHT?
Date: 12 Aug 1999 12:44:58 GMT
Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm looking for a function f: S^2 -> S^2 s.t. if you choose values for
> any two of (a, b, c, d), there exists values for the remaining two
> s.t. (c, d) = f(a, b) .
The simplest answer for even lengths is
(a0,a1,b0,b1) |-> (a0 + b0,a1 + b1,a1 + b0,a0 + b0 + b1).
This takes just four additions (or xors), which is the fastest you can
expect for a mixing operation if a0, a1, b0, b1 occupy four registers.
---Dan
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tim Lavoie)
Subject: Re: NIST AES FInalists are....
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 16:03:19 GMT
In article <7ot0jq$lf$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [ snip ] If the NSA can read my
>letters so be it (or the Canadian counterparts ...).
Sure, but there's no reason to make it any easier for them now, is there?
A sturdy envelope is always better than a postcard after all.
Besides, I'd be happier anyway if e-mail and other electronic traffic
had the same kind of legislative protection afforderd to my Snail Mail.
--
Labor, n.:
One of the processes by which A acquires property for B.
-- Ambrose Bierce, "The Devil's Dictionary"
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Depth of Two
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 16:00:32 GMT
"Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Here is an
>excerpt to whet your appetite:]
Thank you very much.
For those to whom this excerpt may not be comprehensible, I supply a few notes
to explain some of what is going on:
>The properties to be discussed are very
>much akin to indirect symmetry
The reference here is to _indirect symmetry of position_.
Indirect symmetry of position applies to the case of a polyalphabetic cipher
produced by a slide where both alphabets are mixed alphabets:
if, for one position of the slide, plaintext q and p become ciphertext X and Z
respectively, then q and p are the same distance apart on the plaintext part of
the slide as X and Z are on the ciphertext part of the slide.
If one has plaintext equivalents for X and Z in other alphabets, or ciphertext
equivalents for q and p in other alphabets, then one can determine other pairs
of letters that are also the same distance apart on either slide.
More detail is present at
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/pp010103.htm
>By Friedman square is meant one
>in which the square is constructed by means of a sequence which runs
>down the diagonal rather than across the rows as in a Vigen�re square.
>Figure 1 illustrates such a square with the diagonal sequence running
>from upper right to lower left.
If you look very closely at this square, you note that starting from the upper
right-hand corner is the sequence CVBNMIO...
and the sequence CVB... also starts, going in the same diagonal direction, from
the other occurences of the letter C in the table.
>JAVTMBUHODLQEPYKWZISXRFVEC
>SBZLNIJAFQWRYXPEUODCTGBRVK
>NUQMOKSGWETXCYRIAFVZHNTBPD
>IWLAPDHERZCVXTOSGBUJMZNYFM
A single rotor will generate a tableau with displaced normal alphabets going
down the diagonals. Thus, a Friedman square is relevant to rotor machines
because it represents the cipher such a machine produces where only one rotor is
moving.
If the alphabets shown are actually enciphering alphabets, for the plaintext
alphabet abcd... running along the top, a rotor machine could produce such
alphabets if its entry permutation is the identity permutation, and it is the
entry rotor that is the only one moving. For the case when only the exit rotor
is moving, it is the deciphering alphabets that would form a Friedman square
(with the exit permutation running along the top, whatever it is).
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
Reply-To: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: frequency of prime numbers?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 09:55:33 -0700
Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> karl malbrain wrote:
>
> > As Bob S has illustrated, you have to take BOTH sides of this
contradiction
> > at ONCE: P is also provably COMPOSITE (because it's not in the list),
hence
> > a contradiction with your proof that P is PRIME. Karl M
>
> P was not said to be prime. He was saying that P + 1 was not divisible by
any
> of
> our finit set of primes, thus this set is invalide.
Thank you, I meant that P+1 is COMPOSITE as the other half to the
contradiction P+1 is PRIME. Karl M
------------------------------
Reply-To: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: frequency of prime numbers?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 10:06:24 -0700
Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> The correct way of saying it would be:
>
> Definition of prime: p is prime if and only if it is divisible by itself
and 1.
> Then you conjecture that there is only a finit set of integers satisfying
this
> definitions: {p_1, p_2, ..., p_n}.
>
> You show that P = p_1*p_2*...*p_n + 1 satisfies the definition of a
prime,
> thus there is a contradiction. The contradiction is certainly not the
definition
> of prime, (...)
Yes it is. The <<definition>> now includes the conjecture as an additional
property. It doesn't matter which comes first. The contradiction is that
under the <<definition>> P is both PRIME and COMPOSITE at once. Karl M
------------------------------
From: Paul Koning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Future Cryptology
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 12:56:39 -0400
Anonymous wrote:
>
> Hello All,
>
> I surmise that frequently used encryption software such as PGP (Idea) , has
> probably been broken by the NSA, (I have no proof of this, but then again
> there is no positive proof that these algorithms are in fact still secure).
It's possible, but that doesn't make it likely.
Note that recent versions of PGP support more than one cipher, so if
you're
worried about IDEA you can use something else.
paul
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: About Algorithm M
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 18:01:16 GMT
1) I know Algorithm M is simple to describe but is there a formal
treatment or description of it anywhere online?
2) Is there any relation to the size of the delay and degree of the
underlying PRNG (say when using a LFSR)? If so what is the rate at
which the attacker can learn the underlying PRNG state?
3) Are there any formal cryptanalysis of ciphers that use Algorithm M?
Thanks,
Tom
--
PGP 6.0.2i Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp
PGP 2.6.2 Key
http://mypage.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key_rsa.pgp
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: solitaire, cryptonomicon
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 17:10:25 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> > Also. I wrote some code a few years back to brute force
> > RC4. It could break 3-bit RC4 in less than a second, 4-bit RC4 in
> > 2 to 10 minutes, and I extrapolated 5-bit RC4 would take two weeks.
>
> I guess you can't mean "try all possible permutations of cards" since
> that would clearly be impractical (54! > 2^237). Do you mean some
> sort of hypothesis-making, backtracking permutation search engine?
> You could probably write a Prolog program to do it...
>
Right, hypothesis making, backtracking. For RC4, if you
guess m[i] and m[a], that tells you m[m[i]+m[a]] (because
that's a reported result) and the next value of a. So you
get 1 value free for every 2 you guess, or better if there
are collisions. You backtrack when a reported result
disagrees with a previous guess. I haven't tried it for
Solitaire yet.
I have a new trick I'd like to try. When I tried RC4 before,
I started at result 0 and walked forward. The search spent
most of its time on deep branches. I could instead account
for results i..i+4, then try both i+5..inf and i-1..0. It's
unlikely both directions will be unusually deep.
- Bob Jenkins
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Lars Knudsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Correlations in RC6
Date: 12 Aug 1999 17:47:12 GMT
Reply-To: Lars Knudsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Willi Meier and myself have written a paper on the AES candidate RC6.
See
http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/aes.html
or download the paper
http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/papers/rc6.ps
Lars Knudsen
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Depth of Two
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 11:35:25 -0700
John Savard wrote:
>
> "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>
> >Here is an
> >excerpt to whet your appetite:]
>
> Thank you very much.
Yes!
> If you look very closely at this square, you note that starting from the upper
> right-hand corner is the sequence CVBNMIO...
>
> and the sequence CVB... also starts, going in the same diagonal direction, from
> the other occurences of the letter C in the table.
>
> >JAVTMBUHODLQEPYKWZISXRFVEC
> >SBZLNIJAFQWRYXPEUODCTGBRVK
> >NUQMOKSGWETXCYRIAFVZHNTBPD
> >IWLAPDHERZCVXTOSGBUJMZNYFM
>
> A single rotor will generate a tableau with displaced normal alphabets going
> down the diagonals. Thus, a Friedman square is relevant to rotor machines
> because it represents the cipher such a machine produces where only one rotor is
> moving.
Interesting. For what it's worth, the generating sequence appears to be
a straight keyboard... not quite our QWERTY one:
QWERTZUIOASDFGHJKPYXCVBNML
I note that there are two E's and no G on the top row. Both E's
are in their correct diagonal sequence. Also no N and two V's,
the latter also in their correct sequence. What's <that> about?
--
Jim Gillogly
20 Wedmath S.R. 1999, 18:29
12.19.6.7.18, 10 Edznab 6 Yaxkin, Fifth Lord of Night
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: brute force crackers unethical?
Date: 11 Aug 1999 10:49:20 -0400
In article <7oqvv2$djj$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Andrew Whalan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Anyhow, in a nutshell, I would just like to be reassured that I am not
>acting in an unethical fashion to write a brute force cracker, as IMHO at
>least, it is a valid (but annoyingly time consuming) method of
>cryptanalysis.
I don't think the problem is with whether or not you were doing
an unethical form of cryptanalysis. I think the problem was whether
you were doing cryptanalysis at all. A lot of SA's get rather nervous
when students get too close to the edges of their security perimeter.
(Quite justifiably, too. I'd probably not be happy if you brought
a firearm into my house, irrespective of whether or not you've
got a note from the local sheriff authorizing you to carry. And
*especially* if you didn't tell me about it beforehand and I
only learned about it when you whipped it out to show my kids. The
local cops don't like it if you are carrying around lockpicks even
if they can't prove you had burglarous intent.)
So, yes, it's a legit form of cryptanalysis. And it may not exactly
be unethical -- but it's certainly not smart unless you keep someone
informed about what you're doing.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: frequency of prime numbers?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 14:30:57 -0400
karl malbrain wrote:
> Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> >
> > The correct way of saying it would be:
> >
> > Definition of prime: p is prime if and only if it is divisible by itself
> and 1.
> > Then you conjecture that there is only a finit set of integers satisfying
> this
> > definitions: {p_1, p_2, ..., p_n}.
> >
> > You show that P = p_1*p_2*...*p_n + 1 satisfies the definition of a
> prime,
> > thus there is a contradiction. The contradiction is certainly not the
> definition
> > of prime, (...)
>
> Yes it is. The <<definition>> now includes the conjecture as an additional
> property. It doesn't matter which comes first. The contradiction is that
> under the <<definition>> P is both PRIME and COMPOSITE at once. Karl M
No, a definition is a definition, it is an axiom in a theory. You consider an
axiom to
be an _absolut truth_. When putting axioms togheter, you form theorems.
Some
statements, said to be theorems, are in fact false, du to some contradiction.
A definition is never false.
You have to understand what you set down as beeing _absolut truth_ (axioms)
so as to base a theory, in this theory you comme up with theorems and
contradictions
stating that certain theorems are not true.
This is basic mathematical logic, if you don't understand this, you probably
should not
be joining a discussion about a proof that uses contradiction.
Anton
------------------------------
Reply-To: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: frequency of prime numbers?
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 12:19:14 -0700
Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> No, a definition is a definition, it is an axiom in a theory. You
consider an
> axiom to
> be an _absolut truth_. When putting axioms togheter, you form theorems.
> Some
> statements, said to be theorems, are in fact false, du to some
contradiction.
> A definition is never false.
>
> You have to understand what you set down as beeing _absolut truth_
(axioms)
> so as to base a theory, in this theory you comme up with theorems and
> contradictions
> stating that certain theorems are not true.
No one said that the definition of prime is false. Thanks to the
contradiction it now includes the PROPERTY that there is no largest.
The question at hand is the NATURE OF CONTRADICTIONS. Karl M
------------------------------
From: fungus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Pls help me wade through the terminology
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 21:58:09 +0200
Jim Felling wrote:
>
> > What kind of algorithm do I need if I'm required to generate a
> > secure "passcode" given a known "seed number"? In my application,
> > an authorized technician wishes to make a modification to the
> > internal programming of an automobile ECU. The ECU performs an
> > authentication proceedure wherein the technician is given a "seed
> > number" (based on the internal clock) and must input a corresponding
> > "pass code." The technician gets the pass code by calling the
> > manufacturer with the seed number
>
>
>
> If you are looking for a simple method(fast, compact, not hugely secure,
> but will stop the casual duffer)
>
> 1) Generate a random number R in a short(few bytes -- easily searchable
> range), append this to the serial number S. Hash this using a
> reasonably fast and secure hash.(Depending on your need for
> security/speed, anything from a CRC hash(fast, but not very resistant to
> determined attack), to SHA or MD5(slower, but very secure))
I think you may be overemphasising the "speed" factor here.... ;-)
Seriously though, almost *any* crypto algorithm will do the trick.
Security won't be a major concern, as nobody will have enough
messages to work on an attack.
Your concerns should be more about the usability of the system
than anything else. A five or six digit number would be enough
for security and small enough to be written on a greasy scrap
of paper, or shouted across a noisy workshop.
Generate a random number, encrypt it with the algorithm of choice[*]
then calculate the remainder of the number when divided by 100000
(for five digits).
--
<\___/>
/ O O \
\_____/ FTB.
[*] DES would be fine, or even TEA if you want something small.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Future Cryptology
Date: 12 Aug 1999 15:48:25 -0400
In article <7ouj9v$3ta$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Here is a good question, do you want a or b?
>
>a) NSA hackers to read your private medical/banking transactions
>
>OR
>
>b) Stop thieves and pesky hackers from stealing the information and
>making your life a living hell.
>
>If you can answer the question (either A or B, and 'neither' is not a
>good answer) then you know what you are talking about.
>
>Believe it or not, the NSA is NOT out to get you. However there are
>millions of other criminals who ARE out to get you.
I don't believe that it's at all a good question; I'm not sure a
cryptosystem exists that will protect me from the NSA but not
from "thieves and pesky hackers [sic]."
Any cryptographic system strong enough to protect me against the NSA
will almost certainly protect me from the thieves and hackers.
I similarly don't necessarily trust the NSA -- my threat model *does*
include corrupt members of the US Federal Government, and I don't
believe that the walls between the various adminstrative units of
the Fed are watertight.
So "neither" seems to me to be a very rational answer.
>My point is, it's not enough to say 'can the NSA crack IDEA?', but more
>like 'can people break system X remotely, discretely and
>efficiently?'. If one person writes software to break a system, a
>million people could be using it in under a year ...
So when did the NSA stop being "people"? If the NSA has the
capacity to break a system in such fashion, that's *NOT* to be
encouraged.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Positive News About JAWS Technologies
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 19:34:21 GMT
Many people will remember the Calgary company that offered $5 million to anyone
who could break a message encrypted by their L5 cipher with a 4096 bit key.
Of course, as their algorithm wasn't disclosed, this engendered a predictable
reaction.
However, I attended today a presentation they held here in Edmonton in
conjunction with OA, an ISP and computer retailer (a large one that supplies
comprehensive services to business clients), and learned that - as of last
November - they have reached patent pending status on the algorithm, and thus
they are intending to reveal it once patent protection is in place. (I know that
isn't quite worded right, since that is sort of a given.)
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Future Cryptology
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1999 20:40:17 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> IDEA is not really popular anymore. Most people have PGP 5 or greater
>> and use other ciphers such as 3DES and CAST.
>>
>> Here is a good question, do you want a or b?
>>
>> a) NSA hackers to read your private medical/banking transactions
>>
>> OR
>>
>> b) Stop thieves and pesky hackers from stealing the information and
>> making your life a living hell.
>>
>
>Sorry, this really isn't the place for another holy war, but the appropriate
>term would be "crackers", not hackers.
>
>> If you can answer the question (either A or B, and 'neither' is not a
>> good answer) then you know what you are talking about.
>>
>> Believe it or not, the NSA is NOT out to get you. However there are
>> millions of other criminals who ARE out to get you.
>
>Well, this brings up an interesting point. They may not be out to get YOU,
>but how do you know they don't deem certain people as a risk? I mean if you
>think about it, if you have all that techonlogy and man power, why not
>follow the potential trouble makers too? I'm a prime candidate for that.
>Late teens, above average IQ (153), very skilled with a computer (been using
>dos since 8, and UNIX since 10), a white hat hacker, programmer, and uses
>encryption for EVERYTHING (including simple personal messages). They may
>not be out to get you, but they might be out to get me. =)
>
The fact is with all the Money the NSA gets they have to do something.
Obviously spying on the Red Chinese is a low priority with all the moeny
they funnel into the appropriate pockets. So they will have nothing better
to do then follow the whims and dictates of those in power. It is very likely
that those in power do not trust the common man and will do everything
in there power to keep power. The best way to do that is to keep spin
doctoring the media through the press. And to keep tabs on free thinkers
so they can be eliminated if they might some day become a threat. We
are not really that far away from a Nazi type of government. But this time
they will spin it such that people will be fooled into thinking that we are
actually being more free and secure. The only way people of the world
can be free is for open communications that are beyond the spying and
whims of those in power. It should be a right of all world citizens to be able
to communicate with one another in private. With out fear of being
political correct.
Again I say wake up and smell the coffee AES is a joke. Those short
key methods do nothing but play into the hands of a powerful few.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
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