Cryptography-Digest Digest #151, Volume #10 Tue, 31 Aug 99 23:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: WT Shaw temporarily sidelined (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran. ("Steven Alexander")
Re: Pincodes ("ME")
Re: Can I export software that uses encryption as copy protection? (Paul Crowley)
Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran. (Paul Rubin)
Re: 2 person data exchange - best method? (Paul Crowley)
Re: Unpatented Public/private key system (John Savard)
Home Invasion Bill Drives U.S. Computer Users across border (Anonymous)
Schneier/Publsied Algorithms (Mixmaster)
Re: Which of these books are better ?
Correction to Uhr Box Description
Re: solitaire, cryptonomicon (Jon and Deanna)
Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran. (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: public key encryption - unlicensed algorithm ("shivers")
Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran. ("Steven Alexander")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: WT Shaw temporarily sidelined
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 1999 22:17:53 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(JPeschel) wrote:
>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)writes:
>
>>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel) wrote:
>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) writes:
>>>
>>>>But he is in the hospital, and IIRC he is of advanced age.
>>>
>>>I'd heard WT is in his fifties, and that better damn well not
>>>be advanced age! :-)
>>>
>>>Anyway, I have a virtual vodka chilling for him in the ice-box.
>>>
>>>Joe
>>>
>>>
>> Thats nice Joe But I have a real beer I can give him if I
>>get to see him. None of that low octane diet virtual crap.
>>Did you ever notice the recent studys saying how good alcohol
>>is for ones health. He my actaully need a few beers.
>>And I may have found the cure he needs. But it would
>>help to know the problem first.
>>
>Sorry, Dave, that's the best I can do. Texas is quite a ways
>from me, and ever since my car accident I need to hang on to all
>of my real vodka.
>
>Joe
Well maybe he would apreicate the thought. I however would either
want a real visit or nothing. But please bring German beer when visiting
me in a hospital. But hey is anyone going to tell me which hospital
he is in. Or does he not want visitors to cheer him up. IF it is near by
I could visit him. IF he needs treatment for something that the US does
not allow. I could even give him a left to Mexico. Where medicine is more
available and the HMO's haven't destroyed the medical system yet.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: "Steven Alexander" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran.
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 1999 15:38:00 -0700
Thanks, I appreciate the help. One more question though: How do I handle
addition/subtraction with signed integers in Fortran so that they will
behave like unsigned integers in C? TEA for instance uses a slew of
addition operations, how would I use them without causing unforseen results.
If you have any old Fortran source that would illustrate this I would
appreciate it. Thanks again in advance.
-steven
------------------------------
From: "ME" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Pincodes
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1999 09:17:30 +1000
Comments below
John Savard wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>"JuDa$" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>
>>I need help to break pincodes, can somebody help me please ?
>
>a) Why do you think that anyone would want to help you steal money
>from people's bank accounts, and
>
>b) what makes you think there is a code to break: surely it would be
>safer to store a hash of the PIN number at a central site than on the
>magnetic stripe of the card.
Many banks do - although the "hash" is actually the output of a keyed
encrypt function on the PIN plus some card specfic data.
>Of course, if the bank absolutely insists on letting people withdraw
>some small sum of money when the lines are down, they could still
>protect against hackers as follows:
>
>1) Record only a hash of the PIN on the card, not the PIN itself.
Many banks do - although the "hash" is actually the output of a keyed
encrypt function on the PIN plus some card specfic data.
There is some overlap with the banks that use central processing. This
allows on-line and "stand-in" processing.
The key is often different to that used in my previous comment above - often
scheme based.
>2) Encrypt that hash - with one of a thousand or more keys, stored on
>a hard disk at each bank machine - with an indication of which key to
>use placed on the card.
>
"you" is the conceptual person who managing bank risks.
Interesting - now there is a massive key management problem, with your
customer security/confidence in you as a bank dependent upon the machine
integrity of ATMs owned and maintained by third parties
>That ought to protect against a dictionary-search attack.
PIN retry values also do a pretty effective job at lower cost, especially
when centrally maintained.
Lyal
>
>John Savard ( teneerf<- )
>http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Can I export software that uses encryption as copy protection?
Date: 31 Aug 1999 22:50:42 +0100
Eric Lee Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I'll just point out that encrypting license key files is pretty
> pathetic, since MD5 or some other similar message digest gives you the
> same level of security (i.e., you have a secret key embedded somewhere
> in your program, the license key file includes an MD5 digest, you MD5
> the file along with your secret and if it does not match the embedded
> digest then they've fiddled with the license key and you are "BAD"). The
> only thing that encrypting the license key file gives you that MD5'ing
> it doesn't is that you cannot view the contents of the license key file
> with an ASCII text editor if it's encrypted. To me, that's a
> disadvantage, since it makes your license generator harder to debug.
If a cracker breaks open a public-key-based licensing scheme, they can
release modified versions of the binary for which certificates can be
more easily generated. But if they break open a secret-key-based
system, they can issue false certificates or release a program to do
so; these certificates work on unmodified versions of the program.
Schemes that require the cracker to use a modified binary can make
their lives a lot harder: many programs are designed to break in
subtle and erratic but fatal ways if the binary is modifed.
I agree that real digest-based signatures are more appropriate than
encryption.
--
__
\/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Got a Linux strategy? \ /
/\__/ Paul Crowley http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ /~\
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran.
Date: 31 Aug 1999 20:16:39 GMT
In article <S5Wy3.9525$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Steven Alexander <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>As a project for a Fortran programming class, I would like to build a
>utility that can encrypt files using one of 2-3 different algorithms. I
>would like to use DES as one of them not for its security value(56bits is
>too damn short) but because it seems to be a good learning tool for
>cryptographers and cryptanalysts alike. Anyway, it does not seem that
>Fortran natively supports unsigned integers which will completely botch my
>implementations. If anyone has any information on using unsigned integers
>in Fortran or implementing any cryptosystem in Fortran I would greatly
>appreciate their help. I'm not asking for anyone to write my homework, I
>just want to know how it can be done. Thanks in advance.
There is a Fortran implementation of DES in the first (but not the
second) edition of "Numerical Recipes", by Press, Teukolsky et al.
------------------------------
From: Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 2 person data exchange - best method?
Date: 31 Aug 1999 22:40:16 +0100
"Shaun Wilde" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Can I get away with message splitting (interlock-protocol?)? Is there any
> problems with this? Is there anything better?
The interlock protocol can only be defeated by an entity capable of
passing a somewhat restricted Turing test, ie a human or an AI. I'm
pretty sure it's the best you can do in the circumstances you
describe.
--
__
\/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Got a Linux strategy? \ /
/\__/ Paul Crowley http://www.hedonism.demon.co.uk/paul/ /~\
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Unpatented Public/private key system
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 1999 20:28:12 GMT
"Micha�l Chass�" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
> I'd like to know some Public/Private key system that aren't patented
>(that I can use on the public domain) and, if possible, references to have
>informations about them.
The patent on Diffie-Hellman has expired.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1999 02:47:20 +0200 (CEST)
From: Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Home Invasion Bill Drives U.S. Computer Users across border
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy.anon-server
Privacy Concerns - http://www.angelfire.com/biz/privacyconcerns/index.html
Home Invasion Bill Drives U.S. Computer Users to Canadian Privacy Firm
Zero-Knowledge Systems
MONTREAL--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 24, 1999--Zero-Knowledge Bombarded
With Requests to Release Freedom(TM) Following Disclosure of 'Cyberspace
Electronic Security Act' A US Justice Department proposal to secretly
enter its citizens' homes and disable security features on their computers
has driven tens of thousands of Americans to request privacy protection
from Canadian privacy firm Zero-Knowledge Systems, the company announced
today.
"This has created a huge wave of concern among computer users in the
US," said Austin Hill, president of Zero-Knowledge Systems. "We've
received emails, telephone messages and thousands of Freedom beta signups
from people looking to secure their privacy. It's ironic that a Canadian
company is being flooded by requests to protect American citizens from
their own government."
Zero-Knowledge is currently beta-testing its much-anticipated
Freedom(TM) technology, which provides total privacy for Web, email,
newsgroup and chatroom activities by encrypting data and rerouting it
through independently-operated servers scattered throughout the world.
Heralded by many privacy advocates as the only fully trustworthy privacy
solution, Freedom will be available commercially in fourth quarter 1999.
According to published reports, the Justice Department will seek
authorization through the Cyberspace Electronic Security Act for FBI and
local police to covertly enter private homes and disable computer
encryption programs. The law would dramatically increase police powers by
allowing agents to tamper with personal computers in order to
surreptitiously monitor personal communications.
"It's disappointing that US consumers must look to other countries
for protection from a government they feel is overstepping its
investigative authority," said David Sobel, general counsel for the
Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, DC. "The United
States should be in the forefront of privacy technology, not trying to
circumvent it."
Headquartered in Montreal, Zero-Knowledge benefits from Canada's
support for the development of strong privacy solutions, in contrast with
the US Government's stringent controls on encryption and privacy
technologies.
About Zero-Knowledge Systems, Inc.
Founded in 1997, Zero-Knowledge Systems
<http://www.zeroknowledge.com> is the first and only company providing a
total privacy solution for all Internet activities. Zero-Knowledge is
dedicated to protecting its customers' privacy and freedom on the Internet
through mathematics, cryptography and source code. More information on
this issue is available at http://www.zeroknowledge.com/cesa.
CONTACT:
Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc.
Dov Smith, 514/286-2636 ext. 248
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
1
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 1999 18:00:50 -0700 (PDT)
From: Mixmaster <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Schneier/Publsied Algorithms
Hello Bruce
How is it posible that some of your published algorithms...2fish have bugs in your
source code?
There are only two possible explanations for this:
1. A legitimate mistake was made...but no correction was ever published for it...or
have you published the correction on your site..
2. A deliberate bug was placed in your source code by some unknown person...
Which leads me to this point:
How can we in the crypto community EVER Trust any Publsihed Source Code without
extensive testing and debugging... I wonder if you thought of this.
Are there any published TEST VECTORS for your algorithms...and possibly other
Algorithms...which treat the algorithm as a black box...etc...do you know of any such
TEST VECTORS..
But please Bruce...explain to us How is it that there are bugs in your own published
algorithms...I did see some messages about this topic few months back..and have you
made any corrections to them
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ()
Subject: Re: Which of these books are better ?
Date: 1 Sep 99 01:49:24 GMT
JPeschel ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: If it's available as an export to your country, you should
: really get the Dobbs crypto CD. The CD contains all
: of the books you mention and a few more. It costs around
: 100 US dollars.
I believe it may be so available now, since some of the ads in recent
issues of Dr. Dobb's no longer mention that it is limited to the U.S. and
Canada.
John Savard
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ()
Subject: Correction to Uhr Box Description
Date: 1 Sep 99 01:48:12 GMT
Well, after Frode Weierud noted that the Uhr box had 40 settings, and not
60, and described some of its properties, I had come up with a possible
reconstruction of how it might have worked.
He noted at the time that I wasn't quite exactly right, and that he was
working on a publication about the Uhr box.
Well, the latest issue of Cryptologia (which also contains a paper written
by myself and a co-author about the SIGABA!) contains a paper by one Heinz
Ulbricht, who has apparently beaten Frode to the punch.
As a result, I have made the appropriate corrections to my description of
the Uhr box at
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/ro020402.htm
although my original hypothetical reconstruction is also still mentioned.
As it was wrong, I only left one of the diagrams of that reconstruction on
the page; I haven't drawn any diagrams of the real Uhr box just yet.
John Savard
------------------------------
From: Jon and Deanna <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: solitaire, cryptonomicon
Date: Wed, 01 Sep 1999 01:24:14 GMT
To answer the book related question, Solitaire is referred to as
Pontifex in the book. This is a system developed by Enoch Root,
presumably well after W.W.II since Root has R. Waterhouse run it by the
Secret Admirer's to check it's security. The only link to the W.W.II
part of the story is that Root was in W.W.II as well as modern day. So,
Pontifex is a new system (in the story) that Root has devleoped in his
spare time as it were.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I just read Stephenson's Cryptonomicon and wondered a few things.
>
> Solitaire is a secure crypto algorithm computed by shuffling
> a deck of cards in a certain way. It is painfully slow, so
> most messages are under 50 characters long. How much more
> secure is it than using the deck of cards as a one-time pad?
> That would be faster and less error-prone.
>
> Also. I wrote some code a few years back to brute force
> RC4. It could break 3-bit RC4 in less than a second, 4-bit RC4 in
> 2 to 10 minutes, and I extrapolated 5-bit RC4 would take two weeks.
> Real RC4 (8 bit) wasn't breakable that way. Solitaire resembles
> RC4, and 54 cards is somewhere between 5 and 6 bits. I've been
> meaning to revisit that brute force approach and see if it works
> on Solitaire, but haven't done it for months, so maybe I'll never
> get around to it. (It's only practical on the plain random numbers.
> Adding a message on top makes things much harder.)
>
> Also. Half the book was about codebreakers in WWII and the other
> half was present day. The best schemes in the WWII half were based
> on Riemann Zeta functions. I'm not sure quite what those are,
> something complex-number intensive, but they definitely aren't
> Solitaire. So where did Solitaire come from in that book? Was it
> a secret cipher the Societas Eruditorum used or something? There
> wasn't any apparent link between Solitaire and WWII in there.
>
> - Bob Jenkins
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
> Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran.
Date: Wed, 01 Sep 1999 03:20:18 GMT
In article <FRYy3.10585$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Steven Alexander"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Thanks, I appreciate the help. One more question though: How do I handle
>addition/subtraction with signed integers in Fortran so that they will
>behave like unsigned integers in C? TEA for instance uses a slew of
>addition operations, how would I use them without causing unforseen results.
>If you have any old Fortran source that would illustrate this I would
>appreciate it. Thanks again in advance.
>
>-steven
>
>
Again addition is trival in most 2's complament system. You can when numbers
over flow they just wrap a round. Think binary.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: "shivers" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: public key encryption - unlicensed algorithm
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1999 03:02:16 +0100
>What you want is server-gated cryptography (SGC), a system that allows
>current Netscape and Microsoft browsers (even the 40 bit versions) to
>do 128-bit SSL when a special server certificate is installed. It's
>almost certainly not worth the hassle of implementing your own
>cryptography in Java, which even if it works is likely to worsen the
>user experience by slowing down the transaction with the public key
>calculation. Note also that generating good random session keys in an
>applet is slow and/or difficult.
This sounds usefull - however I have no control over what server software
our ISP uses - sounds like fun though ;)
>
>See http://www.verisign.com/server/prd/preq.html for info about
>obtaining SGC certificates.
>
>That said, if you, the server, and the users are all in the UK, you're
>out of reach of both the RSA patent (RSA is patented only in the US) and
>of the US cryptography export restrictions. The UK has some export
>restrictions but from what I understand, they are much more relaxed
>than the US's.
would be good - but our provider is in the US - the only place to get decent
facilities at a nice price ;)
Which again brings up the export problems...
Shane Wright
ProActive Computing
------------------------------
From: "Steven Alexander" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Implementing crypto algorithms in Fortran.
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 1999 20:03:44 -0700
Thanks.
-steven
------------------------------
** FOR YOUR REFERENCE **
The service address, to which questions about the list itself and requests
to be added to or deleted from it should be directed, is:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can send mail to the entire list (and sci.crypt) via:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
End of Cryptography-Digest Digest
******************************
