Cryptography-Digest Digest #201, Volume #10 Wed, 8 Sep 99 15:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: simple key dependent encryption (Eric Lee Green)
Re: NSA and MS windows ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: GnuPG 1.0 released (JPeschel)
Re: arguement against randomness (Tim Tyler)
Re: Hash of a file as key (Jim Gillogly)
Re: simple key dependent encryption (Tom St Denis)
Re: Self decimated lfsr (Medical Electronics Lab)
Re: Cryptography Items and Issues ("Markku J. Saarelainen")
Ari Benbasat (Michael Heumann)
Re: Pincodes/Call me @ 4055980428/TERRY ALLEN / I WILL HELP YOU! ("Larry Snider")
Re: Hash of a file as key ("Gary")
Re: Linear congruential generator (LCG) ("Tony T. Warnock")
Re: Pincodes ("Larry Snider")
Re: Different Encryption Algorithms (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: compression and encryption ("Richard Parker")
Re: GnuPG 1.0 released (JPeschel)
Re: simple key dependent encryption (steve cator)
Source code (Erick Stevenson)
Re: compression and encryption (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: THE NSAKEY (David Wagner)
Re: _NSAKey (Guenther Brunthaler)
Re: THE NSAKEY (Guenther Brunthaler)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Lee Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: simple key dependent encryption
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 08:59:56 -0700
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> IF the key is as long as the file being encrypted it is a type of
> OTP (one time pad)
> It is very secure if used properly. That is if you use the key
> only once to encrypt and once to decrypt.
One thing to bear in mind is that a one-time-pad is secure only if the
pad material itself is random. Otherwise there will be statistical
information in the result that can be extracted and used to break the
code.
One weakness is if you have a poor pseudo-random number generator. I
recently noticed that one commonly-used PRNG had only 2**24 possible
starting states. What that means is that it can generate only 2**24
possible pads if started at OTP generation time. By pre-computing these
2**24 possible pads you will be able to decode messages in real time.
> It you use same key on more than one file it is considered
> very very weak.
"considered" is an understatement.
He is using the same key on successive blocks of the same file, which is
just as weak.
--
Eric Lee Green http://members.tripod.com/e_l_green
mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
^^^^^^^ Burdening Microsoft with SPAM!
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 12:02:13 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and MS windows
Geoff Thorpe wrote:
> [perhaps the gene pool could use some chlorine] ... David, I write
> crypto outside the US and the US export regulations make my job less
> competitive than it would be without the regulations. I don't know
> whether to feel sorry for the US or laugh,
Both of course.
> I guess it depends on who
> we're talking about. On the one hand US foriegn policy rightly invites
> ridicule and (at times) indignation, but on the other hand those
> responsible for such foreign policy and export regulation are largely
> the same, and are very distinct from the people who are hurt by all this
> - for them I have to feel profoundly sad. If you regard us all as
> "dumber countries" then I suggest you observe carefully who is allowed
> to export crypto product to who. Also, take a look at the post-graduate
> departments (especially maths, comp sci and other such sciences) in the
> US - they've got the money and facilities, but often have 50% or more
> international students (complete with scholarships) because not enough
> US kids want to educate themselves. Compare it on levels of education,
> culture, language, worldliness - doesn't really matter ... you might
> find that the US isn't as all-powerful as you might imagine. But why am
> I addressing that point? - those in the US who do know the difference
> would never try to make a point like those you just tried to put
> forward.
>
> On top of that, I use Linux myself and work with a whole raft of
> platforms - the list of which has Microsoft operating systems very near
> the bottom.
>
> So you'd probably expect me to agree with your points perhaps? David, I
> think you're a paranoid and what you say is so littered with mindless
> verbiage that when you manage to squeeze out one or two salient points
> they become completely lost in the massive noise you otherwise flood
> this list with.
>
> FYI: The main reason they make Xena (and Hercules, and upcoming movies
> like King Kong and Lord of the Rings, etc) in NZ is simply because it's
> cheaper to fly out there, hire competant people and make the program for
> a fraction of the cost they would have if they stayed at home within the
> confines of the sterile unionised facile monolith that is the US
> entertainment industry. Much like your posting, the US entertainment
> industry occasionally offers up something not entirely mindless, but it
> is usually buried so deeply within the sheer volume of muck that it is
> hardly worth the effort sifting for.
These are the typical symptoms of a climax culture.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel)
Subject: Re: GnuPG 1.0 released
Date: 08 Sep 1999 17:08:06 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel)
>Jim, it was either NAI or, maybe, PGP, Inc. that got permission
>to market PGP Mail overseas. Caused quite a fuss and a lot
>of specuIation -- I just can't remember dates.
Ah, it was PGP, Inc. that got the Commerce Department's. decision in late May
of '97.
The permission was more restrictive than I remembered, and Savard and Jim
are right.
This was the article I found. There are probably a lot more from around
that time.
"Pretty Good Privacy gets license for restricted export of strong encryption"
http://cnnfn.com/digitaljam/9705/29/pgp/
Joe
__________________________________________
Joe Peschel
D.O.E. SysWorks
http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
__________________________________________
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: arguement against randomness
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 1999 16:13:32 GMT
elarson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: It doesn't take a pompous genuis to see the randomness of Nature.
:
: A fly landing on your forehead, wave crashing on the beach are random
: acts. Yes they can be analyzed to death and patterns may surface, but
: the timing of these events are like snow flakes...All different.
If the universe is deterministic, all this is dead wrong.
Do you have a good reason to believe the universe operates
non-deterministically?
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
A company is known by the people it keeps.
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hash of a file as key
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 09:07:43 -0700
Jim Gillogly wrote:
>
> Gary wrote:
> >
> > Would using the hash of a file (just before its symmetric encryption with
> > the session date and time as salt) as a session key be a bad idea?
>
> Yes. It allows the attacker to determine whether a particular guessed
> message was sent.
I should add that the salt doesn't mitigate this problem: there are only
86400 seconds per day, which is a small keyspace. In fact, there are only
about pi * 10^7 seconds per year, which is still only about 25 bits of key.
--
Jim Gillogly
Sterday, 17 Halimath S.R. 1999, 16:04
12.19.6.9.5, 11 Chicchan 13 Mol, Fifth Lord of Night
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: simple key dependent encryption
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 16:11:14 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel) wrote:
> Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> >>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> >>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel) wrote:
>
> >> a) A polyalphabetic cipher with a mixed alphabet and a repeating key.
> >> b) Yes, you are wrong.
> >
> >Isn't it just a Vingere cipher?
>
> I think you could call it a modified Vigen�re.
Thanks for the spelling I forgot :)
Tom
--
damn windows... new PGP key!!!
http://people.goplay.com/tomstdenis/key.pgp
(this time I have a backup of the secret key)
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: Medical Electronics Lab <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Self decimated lfsr
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 12:12:21 -0500
Cairus wrote:
>
> I'm interested in the security of self-decimated lfsr. In the basic
> model [d,k], due to Rueppel, when the output of the lfsr is 0 the lfsr
> is clocked d times, otherwise k times (see Applied Cryptography, second
> edition, p.386). It is clear that this model is very insecure since each
> output bit reveals a state bit and the position of the next state bit to
> be copied to the output. It seems to me that this problem could be
> solved simply using different stage bits for the output and the feedback
> control and that in this case d and k could have the typical values 1
> and 2. However Rueppel (Contemporary Cryptology, p.106) suggests that d
> and k should be BOTH GREATER THAN 1. Could anyone help me to understand
> what is the difference with regard to the security?
If you clock the LFSR once per bit, you get a "standard" sequence.
If you clock it more than once, you skip thru the standard sequence.
Not skipping a step reveals the standard sequence, at least for 1
step. So a string of 0's gives you a good clue what the sequence
is doing (for the [1,2] case) and the attacker has a chance at
figuring out what the key was. By choosing d and k both > 1, you
make it harder to find the underlying "standard" sequence.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: "Markku J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Cryptography Items and Issues
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 12:20:13 +0000
It is the fact that the C.I.A. has renewed its mission to obtain trade secrets and
other business and economic intelligence by utilizing many different means:
clandestine, communication intel and others. This information is then provided for
specific U.S. commercial businesses. There is an active cooperation between various
U.S. intelligence agencies. I have personally witnessed the C.I.A. agent's effort
to market their services at the meeting of one professional society. In fact, the
C.I.A. tried to recruit overtly me back in 1998, but they failed miserably, and
prior to that tried to influence my behaviors covertly in many other ways. There
are certain telecommunication and high-tech companies that the C.I.A. is targeting.
In addition, they have established their presence in some professional societies.
Actually, there are hundreds and hundreds of additional facts more in the future.
======
"Encryption and many cryptography technologies are very important for any future
electronic commerce applications
and implementations. It is the recommendation to decline the acceptance of any
Wassenaar Agreement
(http://www.wassenaar.org) terms on encryption controls and to support the
strongest cryptography in all commercial Internet communications globally. The role
of the Internet is already critical in most international enterprises and
corporations. However, due to the open infrastructure and individuals' principal
lack of the security knowledge and consciousness, quite often critical business
messages are sent without any encryption protection, which makes corporations
extremely vulnerable. It is a common public knowledge that some specific
intelligence agencies are using the Internet and other intelligence collection
methods to acquire and collect specific technology and business intelligence for
specific commercial and business enterprises. Some of most popular encryption
applications have backdoors and their development projects have been supported and
influenced by certain specific intelligence-interest groups. In the future's
electronic commerce environment these encryption methods and technologies shall
become even more important for any corporation anywhere around the world and it is
highly recommended to avoid using any of the most popular and/or free encryption
applications for any business and commercial purposes."
------------------------------
From: Michael Heumann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Ari Benbasat
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 16:19:42 GMT
Hi,
sorry to post this kind of stuff here, but I don't know where else to
look after noone at Counterpane answered.
Does anybody have a working email address of Ari Benbasat (the Yarrow
programmer)? The address he gives in the readme files doesn't work.
Where else could I look for him?
Thanks,
Michael.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: "Larry Snider" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 12:18:16 -0400
Subject: Re: Pincodes/Call me @ 4055980428/TERRY ALLEN / I WILL HELP YOU!
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, on 09/06/99
at 06:25 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
=>
Hasn't the area code change from 405 to 580 out there in OK?
--
Larry Snider - Portsmouth, RI
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
FidoNet: 1:109/921.52
"That OS/2 Feller"
------------------------------
From: "Gary" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hash of a file as key
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 1999 18:53:08 +0100
Can anyone actually prove that using a cryptographically strong one way hash
of a file as the key to its symmetric encryption is weaker than using a
PRNG?
(Attacker only has resulting encrypted file and knowledge of the
algorithms/process used.)
------------------------------
From: "Tony T. Warnock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Linear congruential generator (LCG)
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 11:55:54 -0600
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The leading bits of a modulus 2^m LCG also show a pattern. The first
half of the cycle is same as the second half with the leading bit
reversed. The first fourth is the same as all the other fourths except
that the first two bits change, not regularly of course. The last bit is
0,1,0,1,..., bit 2^k has a cycle of 2*2^k.
For numerlical work, this is usually not a problem as only the leading
bits are used and computations are not run over a substantial amount of
the cycle. McLaren has a paper from a few years ago showing that using
as much as the .75 power of the cycle will give erroneous results. A
(long standing, at least 30yrs) rule of thumb is than one can only use
the square root of the cycle. A 32-bit LCG would only be good for 65556
computations.
The above assumes that no really bad features are present in the
multiplier. To get good results, at least 64 bits of modulus ought to be
used in most computations. It takes a bit of time to do the multiple
precision integer computations to do large modulus RNG's. "Ignorance is
expensive."
None of this applies to cryptography.
Tony
------------------------------
From: "Larry Snider" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 12:15:11 -0400
Subject: Re: Pincodes
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, on 09/07/99
at 01:10 PM, Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
=>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
=>>
=>>
=>>
=>> Getting older is not for Sissies!
=>>
=>> http://community.webtv.net/janfromtecuokla/FALLISCOMING
=>I don't look at pages that require cookies.
=>Greetings!
=>Volker
Cookie or not, that home page does absolutely nothing. Makes you wonder
what happens to the information once it leaves your computer...
--
Larry Snider - Portsmouth, RI
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
FidoNet: 1:109/921.52
"That OS/2 Feller"
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Different Encryption Algorithms
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 17:08:28 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Kostadin Bajalcaliev wrote:
>
>> Hello
>>
>> Usualy people do not publish comapration of algorithms, you can easy find
>
>There are a couple of benchmark comparisons
>
>here is just one:
>
>http://security.nsj.co.jp/products/cstv6/benchmark.html
>
At least wiht my browser it is impossible to read the page
the typing comes out as strange symbols on some of the
pages even after reloading. Are they using strant fonts?
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: "Richard Parker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: compression and encryption
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 16:36:54 GMT
"Shaun Wilde" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> should I compress my data before or after encryption? (binary data - with
> possibly repeated blocks i.e .exe etc)
>
> 1) If I compress before encyption the final data block is small.
> 2) If I compress after encryption the data block is much larger (hardly any
> saving as the encryption removes any repetitiveness
> that exists in the original data.)
>
> From the above I would say go for the 1st option, however I have a concern
> and it is as follows.
>
> If someone was trying to break the encryption all they would have to do is
>
> a) try a key
> b) try to decompress
> if decompression works - no errors - then the odds are on that thay have
> broken the code
> else repeat
>
> Which would lead to an automated attack, whereas the second approach would,
> in my opinion, require a more
> interactive approach - as you would need to know what sort of data exists in
> the original to know whether you
> have decrypted succesfully.
>
> Do I have right to be concerned or am I completely off track?
Shaun,
Consider the case where your adversary wants to recover your key and
knows the exact contents of your message before it was encrypted.
This scenario is called a "known-plaintext attack." Clearly this
adversary is in a better situation to recover your key than an
adversary who only knows that your message was compressed before it
was encrypted. An encryption algorithm that can successfully resist a
known-plaintext attack will resist an attack based on the knowledge
that the message was compressed.
Fortunately, secure block ciphers are designed to be immune to
known-plaintext attacks. One of the features of a block cipher
designed to be secure against known-plaintext attacks is a key size
sufficiently large that a "brute force" search of the keyspace, such
as the attack you describe, will be impractical due to the amount of
computational power required.
-Richard
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel)
Subject: Re: GnuPG 1.0 released
Date: 08 Sep 1999 16:53:25 GMT
Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>If they had, they wouldn't need to go through the rigmarole of
>printing a machine-readable book and selling it to someone who
>will scan it in overseas. They'd simply sell direct to the overseas
>customers.
Jim, it was either NAI or, maybe, PGP, Inc. that got permission
to market PGP Mail overseas. Caused quite a fuss and a lot
of specuIation -- I just can't remember dates.
The source code in another matter.
Joe
__________________________________________
Joe Peschel
D.O.E. SysWorks
http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
__________________________________________
------------------------------
From: steve cator <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: simple key dependent encryption
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 13:15:39 -0400
where can i find info on how it would be cracked? the key does not go with
the file.
c) does the key have to be discovered, or is there another method for
cracking the encrypted file?
steve cator
JPeschel wrote:
> steve cator <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> >i don't know much, if anything, about encryption. nonetheless, i have
> >written a simple encryption program to encrypt any type of file, and i
> >have a couple of questions about the nature of the encryption scheme.
> >
> >here's basically how it works:
> >
> >1. the user enters a key.
> >2. the program reads in a file, byte by byte.
> >3. the value of each byte is added to the next ascii value of the key,
> >and written back to the file.
> >
> >for decryption, the ascii value of the each key character is SUBTRACTED
> >from the byte. the program does not care what the key is, and will
> >subract values from the bytes dependent of the current key.
> >
> >my questions:
> >
> >a) what is this type of encryption called?
> >b) am i wrong in thinking this type of key dependent encryption would be
> >tough to crack?
>
> a) A polyalphabetic cipher with a mixed alphabet and a repeating key.
> b) Yes, you are wrong.
>
> John, Doug, and Jim are likely champing at the bit to tell you how to
> crack it. :-)
>
> Joe
>
> __________________________________________
>
> Joe Peschel
> D.O.E. SysWorks
> http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
> __________________________________________
------------------------------
From: Erick Stevenson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Source code
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 12:34:42 -0500
Greetings. I need source code for the highest exportable algor's. Can
anyone help me with this? VB, C++, Java whatever is fine.
Best regards,
Erick Stevenson
------------------------------
From: SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: compression and encryption
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 18:28:41 GMT
In article <7r62ck$lo4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <7r5oln$1qhq$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote:
> > In article <7r5jp2$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Shaun Wilde"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > >
> > >should I compress my data before or after encryption? (binary data
- with
> > >possibly repeated blocks i.e .exe etc)
> > >
> > >1) If I compress before encyption the final data block is small.
> > >2) If I compress after encryption the data block is much larger
(hardly any
> > >saving as the encryption removes any repetitiveness
> > >that exists in the original data.)
> > >
> > >From the above I would say go for the 1st option, however I have a
concern
> > >and it is as follows.
> > >
> > >If someone was trying to break the encryption all they would have
to do is
> > >
> > >a) try a key
> > >b) try to decompress
> > > if decompression works - no errors - then the odds are on that
thay have
> > >broken the code
> > This is ture if you use most compression methods. But if you
use
> > a "one to one" compressor any file can be the compressed results of
> > another file. Therefore all files that could result from guessing a
worng key
> > would be uncompressable. See
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
> > If your are like me you may have wondered wht PGP was not designed
with
> > this type of compression. I feel that a weak compressor can be used
as
> > a back door to help with the breaking of encryption.
>
> Technically DEFLATE can decompress any data but will not produce
anything
> useable if the input stream is invalid. With your definition DEFLATE
is
> 'one-to-one'. I don't see how this helps.... oh well.
>
As usual you are full of shit. You still lack the understanding
of anything mathematical. DEFLATE unless you have a version I don't
know about is not "one to one" by my defination as you claim.
Since you claim it is "one to one" have you ever tested it.
No you are to fucking busy shooting your mouth off. Show me
I am wrong I will admit it. You can't because you are full
of shit.
In case your Pee brain forgot what my defination is since
you claimed your using my defination. A "one to one" comprssion
is such that any file "A" can be compressed and when that
resultant compressed file is decompressed it comes back to "A".
Also any file "B" can be decompressed and when that resualtant
decompressed file is compressed it comes back to "B".
But you seem to lack the ability to test this by your self
and since the Two crypto gods that you so foolishly whorship
have not blessed this thread with a comment you think you can
attack becasue you are foolish enough to belive they would
comment on something like this if it was true. Well my the
boy friend it is not in there interest to let people know
about good crypto. Or methods that would help to keep things
secure if you think it is use there stuff and keep you mind
closed.
Again for those who are looking for a compression routine
that would be good as a first pass before encryption
go to http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm I
even have suggestion for those who have to use a weak
NSA (AES) type of encryption. You can compress though
your file in both directions. So that you can sort of
get the "all or nothing" effect. If you belive you
can find a better compression that conveys no info to
the attacker use it. But you can still reverse the file
and give it two passes of compression to make it a little
harder to break. You can get a revese file porgram with
source code in one of the zip files.
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: THE NSAKEY
Date: 8 Sep 1999 10:34:37 -0700
In article <7r6262$2hu4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (jerome) wrote:
> >http://www.counterpane.com/cpaneinfo.html lists d.wagner as a part of
> >counterpane personnel and b.scheiner is the president of counterpane.
> >
> >i don't take position in this debat, i simply show that cryptography
> >is a small world and it isen't exactly fair to say that an employee
> >and his president arent 'attached'.
>
> Yes if David Wagner showed to much independent thought he might
> be out a job.
Nonsense. First of all, I don't have a "job" (other than my grad
student position at UC Berkeley), and even if I did, I wouldn't pull
any punches for my employer, no matter who.
Right now, showing independent thought is precisely my job.
Is there a reason we can't debate the technical issue on its merits?
If my reasoning is flawed, tear it apart. Trying to attack the messenger
because you don't like the message he's bringing is rather pointless.
-- David Wagner
P.S.
Just for the record, I'm not an "employee" of Bruce Schneier.
I have done some consulting for him (as a consultant, not an employee),
but not lately. My main relationship to Counterpane is that I've
done a lot of research with those folks. And no, noone at Counterpane
has ever tried to take advantage of our relationship in any way.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guenther Brunthaler)
Subject: Re: _NSAKey
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 18:44:56 GMT
On 6 Sep 1999 08:38:51 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>It may not be NECESSARY for the government to have access to the OS at
>this level, but it surely would be convenient. It would be nice. It
>would be desirable.
I can only agree to all of your arguments 100 %.
And I think that's really the core issue: While it may not be
absolutely necessary, it will be at least nice, convenient, efficient
- and cheap for the NSA to have (and use) a copy of the MS master
keys.
And in the current situation, MS can very easily be blackmailed. As a
simply example, the Microsoft's 128 bit export clearance could be
revoked. This could be the death blow for Microsoft Money and Internet
Explorer in several countries.
Greetings,
Guenther
--
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Subject: get 0x2D2F0683
Key ID: 2D2F0683, 1024 bit, created 1993/02/05
Fingerprint: 11 71 47 2F AF 2F CD F4 E6 78 D5 E5 3E DD 07 B5
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guenther Brunthaler)
Subject: Re: THE NSAKEY
Date: Wed, 08 Sep 1999 18:24:07 GMT
On Wed, 08 Sep 1999 07:53:30 +0200, fungus
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Ask yourself why the hell the NSA would give cash to Netscape?
perhaps
NSA = Netscape Security Administrators
:-)
Greetings,
Guenther
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Note: the 'From'-address shown in the header is an Anti-Spam
fake-address. Please remove 'nospam.' from the address in order
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In order to get my public RSA PGP-key, send mail with blank body
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Subject: get 0x2D2F0683
Key ID: 2D2F0683, 1024 bit, created 1993/02/05
Fingerprint: 11 71 47 2F AF 2F CD F4 E6 78 D5 E5 3E DD 07 B5
------------------------------
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