Cryptography-Digest Digest #264, Volume #10 Sat, 18 Sep 99 16:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: VICTORY??? (was: crypto export rules changing) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: FPGAs (Tim Tyler)
Wincrypt for NT and Win95/98 ("Terry Mechan")
Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks (Tim Tyler)
Re: Mystery inc. (Beale cyphers) (Curt Welch)
Re: arguement against randomness (Curt Welch)
Re: VICTORY??? (was: crypto export rules changing) (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: More New Stuff COMPRESS before ENCRYPT (Tim Tyler)
Re: More New Stuff COMPRESS before ENCRYPT (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Crypto 3.5 (JPeschel)
Re: Second "_NSAKey" (Geoff Thorpe)
Re: More New Stuff COMPRESS before ENCRYPT (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: some information theory (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon: Crypto Cop-Out ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: VICTORY??? (was: crypto export rules changing)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 12:32:49 -0400
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> Don't worry Ben the AES product will be weak enough that the NSA will
> be able to read the message encrypted with it.
I'm so sick of you saying that the AES candidates are weak. If they are so weak
scott, then why don't you break them? All of them.
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: FPGAs
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 16:00:51 GMT
Arthur Dardia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:> I've recently acquired 5 Xilinx FPGAs. [...]
:> Can anyone point me to any resources on how to program these?
FWIW, there's a large number of programmable logic links at:
http://www.alife.co.uk/links/hardware/
:> Would I be able to write code for these in C++ or Perl? Or, must I write
:> it in ASM.
Hardware Description Languages are perhaps the most common method
of programming FPGAs. Schematic diagrams (and other methods of circuit
design) are sometimes employed.
The nearst thing to a C compiler is perhaps Handel-C - by
Embedded Solutions: http://www.embedded-solutions.ltd.uk/
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ignore previous tagline.
------------------------------
From: "Terry Mechan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Wincrypt for NT and Win95/98
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 17:46:50 +0100
Wincrypt for NT and Win95/98
Download from
http://www.tmechan.freeserve.co.uk/wincrypt.html
--
Regards
TJM
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 16:05:14 GMT
David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Gary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:> Problem:
:> Given an n bit number X and a set {B1,B2,...,Bn} of n bit numbers;is there a
:> subset whose elements collectively XORed give X?
:>
:> Can the general problem be solved easily?
: Yes. Gaussian elimination will solve it in O(n^3) time.
...assuming it has any solutions in the first place, that is.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Drilling for oil is boring.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Mystery inc. (Beale cyphers)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Curt Welch)
Date: 18 Sep 1999 16:49:24 GMT
Niteowl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Dr. Matyas wrote a paper after much apparent research and thinks the
> version of the DOI used was from "An Historical, Geographical,
> Commercial, and Philosophical View of the American United States"
> published in 1795 by W. Winterbotham. The version of the DOI there does
> 'correct' many of the numbering errors seen in B2.
Interesting of course that the document was published 25 years before 1821
(the time of the encoding according to the story) and some 90 years before
the publication by Ward in 1885. It seems that someone creating a hoax
in 1885 wouldn't likely be using a 1795 publication as their source for the
DOI.
So I guess this means that Dr. Matyas examined many different versions
of the DOI and _only_ that publication was found to contain a version
of the DOI which so closely matched the errors?
I actually find it surprising that anyone would publish a modified
version of the DOI. Do you know what the differences were (in the 1795
publication) and have any understanding of why it was changed? i.e., just
sloppy work (typos etc) or some type of intentional editing?
--
Curt Welch http://CurtWelch.Com/
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Webmaster for http://NewsReader.Com/
------------------------------
Subject: Re: arguement against randomness
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Curt Welch)
Date: 18 Sep 1999 16:47:52 GMT
"elarson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The question I have is how do you monitor a natural event in
> such a way that random numbers may be derived and processed on a
> computer?
Very simple. Computers have access to lots of natural events that can (and
are) used to generate ramdom numbers. They are mostly based on measuring
the time between events -- like the time between keystrokes typed by the
user. Or the time between arrival of packets on a network.
If you have access to a unix system check to see if it has a /dev/random
device (the random(4) man page). This does exactly what you have asked
about.
Some people have built hardware random number sources for computers. One
technique is to digitize a noise source.
You can also take data streams (like a usenet news feed) and extract random
numbers from that.
--
Curt Welch http://CurtWelch.Com/
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Webmaster for http://NewsReader.Com/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: VICTORY??? (was: crypto export rules changing)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 18:43:03 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>
>> Don't worry Ben the AES product will be weak enough that the NSA will
>> be able to read the message encrypted with it.
>
>I'm so sick of you saying that the AES candidates are weak. If they are so
> weak
>scott, then why don't you break them? All of them.
>
I sick of people so stupid they can't realize that if had had half the
budget and resources of the NSA I could. But guess what I only have
a 33Mhz 486 so it will not get done. But you can go ahead and hold your
breath if you feel like it. I have given examples of why they are weak
compared to my method. That is not to say mine is nescessialy stronger
in all areas. But it does point out that the others are defintely not designed
to be the most secure. Any one with a brain can see error recover in the
3-letter block chaining methods is mostly of help only to groups like the NSA
if you don't have the ability to see that then use the AES stuff with the weak
NSA approved chainning. You don't have to have secure files if you don't
wish to.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: More New Stuff COMPRESS before ENCRYPT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 16:11:47 GMT
SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Updated my page on Adaptive One to One Huffman compression
: and have source code with examples at my site. This is the
: kind of compression one should do before one encrypts if one
: is to use compression.
: http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
Your points about avoiding headers and the like are good - however
the statement above reads like you are advocating "Adaptive One to One
Huffman compression" *in particular* for compression before encryption.
I suspect that considerations of maximum compression ratios - and
possibly the desirability of recovering data from corrupted encrypted
compressed files - will mean that different compression techniques are
appropriate for different data types.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Noam Chomsky is an anti-semantic.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: More New Stuff COMPRESS before ENCRYPT
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 19:03:48 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>: Updated my page on Adaptive One to One Huffman compression
>: and have source code with examples at my site. This is the
>: kind of compression one should do before one encrypts if one
>: is to use compression.
>
>: http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
>
>Your points about avoiding headers and the like are good - however
>the statement above reads like you are advocating "Adaptive One to One
>Huffman compression" *in particular* for compression before encryption.
>
>I suspect that considerations of maximum compression ratios - and
>possibly the desirability of recovering data from corrupted encrypted
>compressed files - will mean that different compression techniques are
>appropriate for different data types.
Yes I am sure that there should be others. But the Adaptive huffman
was the first one in which I was able to incoporate the "one to one"
feature. I am sure this can be done for arithmetic but I am not there yet
and I am not done with variations of Huffman. But I have asked on many forms
if anyone has a compression program or method that is implimentted as
one to one. I don't think much thought has been given in this area. But it
should be obviuos to even those with an average IQ (unless they have total
faith in the crypto gods to think for them) that if your going to compress
then the compression method itself should not be of such that it leaks
information to an attacker. One sure way to do this would be to insure
that no information is added to the file. I thinnk that a complete mapping
would show no information added by the compression.
Maybe some one more familar with low IQed people can explan the
concept. Or at least some one who knows how to write. I have an extermely
high IQ I was a member of MENSA for a while but not for my writting abilites.
I won the high chess championship of by High School very year I was in
HIgh School. But I liked strange games like moving all the pawns. What ever
was considered bad. I even went to the NAtional Science Foundation speical
summer classes in Flagstaff Arizona. So I am no dummy at math. BUt as
any fool can see. I can't write worth shit. Never could. What I am trying to
say is that if one of you can write. At least try to show people why one to
one compression is so valuable if one is going to compress anyway
before compression ocurs.
Basically one to one copression allows all finite files to be compressed
note ( even pkzip when it compressed already compressed files they get
longer). It allso allows every finte file to be uncompressed and each
compression decompresstion is unique. IT basically is a reversible transfrom
for any finite file. It is just called compression since it is used to make
a certain class of file smaller. THe rest can get longer. Fortunately the
files used to convwy information mostly belong to class that gets smaller.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel)
Subject: Re: Crypto 3.5
Date: 18 Sep 1999 17:21:29 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] () writes:
>I can see that from the other thread, which starts with one of your posts.
>
>I should have made my question clearer. I might have misinterpreted your
>original post in this thread, but it seemed to me that you were implicitly
>claiming that there was something one could see - just by going to the web
>site, without doing the actual cryptanalytic work that Casimir did - that
>would give one reason to be suspicious of that program.
>
Nope, just going to the web site isn't enough: you have to do some
work.
>Perhaps its author had produced something in the past that I was
>unfamiliar with, but was well known. Or there was some erroneous claim on
>the page that I missed.
>
>Or the smiley at the end of the post could have meant something else -
>that the site looked like it was about a secure program, but that was
>about to be shown as not being the case.
Yup.
Joe
__________________________________________
Joe Peschel
D.O.E. SysWorks
http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
__________________________________________
------------------------------
From: Geoff Thorpe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Second "_NSAKey"
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 19:25:48 +0100
Hi there,
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> *obvious* questions: How could MS possibly "lose" the primary key
> (yet retain the backup key)? We're talking about data here, that
> can readily be copied and backed up in various physical locations,
Just a thought, but for something so "important" (a signing key that
protects Windows from malicious code is kind of like a cheese-slice that
protects elephants from comets), they might have decided (as some CAs
do) to generate the private key inside hardware, in which case the key
is buried within tamper-proof confines. In this case a back-up key might
protect against destruction of the other. This might give the argument a
shred of legitimacy but not much ... still, it's a thought. This is all
I can come up with to match their argument with reality - the keys exist
in an "or" rather than "and" relationship, so there's no protection
against either getting compromised so the only plausible explanation
could be the "loss of key" one.
Still, the whole thing smells a bit fishy so perhaps there's little to
be gained by trying to make sense of the press releases.
Cheers,
ME
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: More New Stuff COMPRESS before ENCRYPT
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 19:11:44 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>: Updated my page on Adaptive One to One Huffman compression
>: and have source code with examples at my site. This is the
>: kind of compression one should do before one encrypts if one
>: is to use compression.
>
>: http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
>
>Your points about avoiding headers and the like are good - however
>the statement above reads like you are advocating "Adaptive One to One
>Huffman compression" *in particular* for compression before encryption.
>
>I suspect that considerations of maximum compression ratios - and
>possibly the desirability of recovering data from corrupted encrypted
>compressed files - will mean that different compression techniques are
>appropriate for different data types.
THis is the short anwser. Yes consideration of maximun compression
ratio for the class of files your compressing alwasys has to be a major
consideration.
As far as recovering data from a corrupted encryted compressed file.
This is a losing game. Yes take a large ascii text file use PGP to encrypted
it. THen mode a few bytes near the middle of a file. Try to use PGP to
recover it you can't.
Error recovery belongs in the tramission of files or the use of RAID disks to
store the data. see slip up of MR BRUCE in has book page 226. AT least
in this small part of book he gives some truthful advice. Not so sure though
about rest of book.
So called error revcovery in modern enccryption is nothing more than
a back door to help groups like the NSA break the system. Since the
reality is the average user can't really take advantage of them if there
are errors in your PGP file of compress encrypted data.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: some information theory
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 19:15:59 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>Anti-Spam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>: Tim Tyler wrote:
>
>:> One definition of what constitutes "randomness" mentions that random
>:> data is generally incompressible. Conversely, incompressible data should
>:> look random - if there's any order in it it will be fodder for a better
>:> algorithm that identifies that order and squeezes it out.
>
>: I follow your statements about compressed data/files "looking" like
>: random binary.
>: You're assertion is that compressed data/files may pass some of the
>: statistical tests for random binary strings ( the five tests from the
>: Handbook of Applied Cryptology, for example).
>
>: Random data is generally not compressable. OK. BUT, the converse is not
>: a true statement - "compressed data should look random." ( If A implies
>: B, then NOT B implies NOT A.)
>
>I wondered if anyone would debate the syllogism's logic when I posted ;-)
Hay I don't know how to pronounce "syllogism" but i did fault you
logic if you weren't to lazy to read it.
>
>That random data is typically incompressible does not necessarily imply
>that incompressible data looks random.
>
>However the latter statement /is/ true.
>
>If you have a set of N target data strings in need of compressing, the
>optimum compression technique (in terms of size) is essentially to map
>these strings onto the integers from 1 to N.
>
>Given a string taken at random from the starting set, the resulting
>"compressed file" will be indistinguishable from random.
>
>The above only deals with finite numbers of strings - but the idea
>applies equally to unbounded streams of data.
>
>: That is, if random data is not compressable, then compressible data is
>: not random data. That is the "flip" side of random data not being
>: compressible.
>
>Sorry - I don't see it.
>
>: An example - use a static huffman code [...]
>
>This demonstrates cases where Huffman compression can fail to produce
>random-looking files. Such a case makes no difference to the thesis
>that maximally compressed files are indistinguishabe from random data.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
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NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: rec.arts.sf.written,alt.cyberpunk
Subject: Re: Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon: Crypto Cop-Out
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 19:30:10 GMT
A while ago Steve Schear wrote, regarding "Assasination Politics"
> >There is substantial frustration by many
> >global citizens that many governments and their minions routinely
> >violate the
> >basic human rights of their citizens and that, for economic and
> >political reasons, their own democratic governments are either
powerless
> >to stop
> >the carnage or do so only after thousands or even tens of thousands
are
> >killed. If a 'democratic' means of 'encouraging' an end to these
> >criminals were
> >easily accessible to the average Netizen I believe enough would
> >participate to make this a new global political force to be recconned
> >with.
I find myself oddly sympathetic to Schear's sentiments here. Terrible
genocides like what's going on in East Timor make my blood boil, and
the fantasy of being able to email a few dollars to an anonymous kitty
dedicated to identifying and setting bounties on the industrial and
military leaders organizing the slaughter is powerful. But at some
point, the cycle of violence has to end not with more violence but with
reconciliation, dialogue, and as much forgiveness as the victims can
muster up. Politics and democracy in other words, not killing. The
quotes around 'democracy' in Schear's post are significant.
Assasination Politics is not democracy, but another nerdly cop-out.
Still, I must disagree with Ian that that the political-leader
assasination market wouldn't change much with anonymous ecash.
Schear's real assertion isn't that the anonymous payout changes things,
but the collection of the kitty. Right now, only the ultra-wealthy can
come up with enough money to finance assasinations that have a
reasonable hope of succeeding. If a "grassroots assasinator" could
somehow establish itself with a reputation of really carrying out the
assasinations it advertises with money anonymously contributed by
ordinary folk, this would shift the balance of power of who is ordering
assasinations in the first place. My issue is with the ethics of
assasination. And I agree with Ian that assasinating political leaders
(especially the paranoid dictatorial kind) is damn hard.
Moving down the food chain a couple of notches, to the merely ultra-
wealthy, this class of human beings also has has bodyguards and
fortified houses, and other safeguards in place -- though they lack
armies and extensive security forces. The elimination of cash drops
would facilitate kidnapping, making it a somewhat more tempting crime;
so the lifestyles of the rich and famous would suffer because they
wouldn't be able to out as much. Ecash-facilitated blackmail, an
"infocrime" with no physical component would also be a problem as one
can't defend yourself against blackmail with high walls. Overall
though, I surmise that the power elite would do okay under
Cryptanarchy, though they fare marginally better under our present
system.
As I think Ian tangentially implies, however, hits against ordinary
folk might well be significantly facilitated. Forget Assasination
Politics, where masses of virtual normal humble folk scrape together
their pennies to get rid of nasty immoral political leaders. How about
nasty immoral political leaders call on their backers (same guys who
fund their political campaigns) to put together anonymous bounties on
journalists who write muckracking articles about them. And the nasty
political leaders maintain plausible deniability: "Though I disagree
with such-and-such journalist's attacks on my integrity, I deplore the
tactics of the cowardly parties who have posted the bounty on him and
beg them to retract it." A world of Salman Rushdies. Heaven forbid.
Ordinary citizens would also be more affected by perfect-crime
terrorism than state infrastructure. Government buildings are jam-
packed with metal detectors and police nowadays, but population centers
-- like the Moscow apartment buildings that were recently destroyed --
are relatively easy targets. (Obviously, the terrorists wouldn't
identify which complex they are going to bomb.) If I were a terrorist
trying to blackmail a people, I would threaten to bomb insecure but
precious places like apartment complexes and day care centers. In
fact, this IS what terrorists do, though usually their demands are
"retreat from our territory" or "set some of our leaders free", not
"give us a lot of money so we can develop better weapons and fight you
more effectively."
Moving on...
thomaspazhartman --
> >>Imagine this. Terrorists announce that they have planted a big
bomb in
> >>an important heavily-populated building somewhere in the world.
Unless
> >>50 million anonymous dollars are posted to such and such newsgroup,
> >>encrypted with such and such key, within half an hour, the bomb goes
> >>off. The money can come from anywhere, as long as it clears. The
> >>leaders of the first world refuse to negotiate with the terrorists.
> >>The bomb goes off and hundreds of people die. A week later the
> >>terrorists post another message asking for money (digitally signed
so
> >>that there can be no doubt that this is the same group of bad guys).
> >>
> >>Plausible deniability sounds pretty feeble at this point. They
don't
> >>call it perfect crime for nothing.
> >
Steve Schear --
> >Such crimes can already be committed without anonymous digital cash.
> >Instead of the above scenario they merely ask that an leading U.S.
> >corporation (e.g., Microsoft, Intel or Cisco) announce dramatically
> >lower quaterly results. The criminals have been buying up put
options or
> >indexes over several months using otherwise normal accounts under
phoney
> >names.
> >The announcement causes a significant price decline and the criminals
> >cash
> >out their positions. Tracing them down could be on a scale comperable
> >with
> >the digital cash scenario.
Ian --
> In general, that example shows that while you can perform the "perfect
> crime" very simply with e-cash (in terms of collecting payment
anonymously,
> but you can also perform a possibly as "perfect" crime without e-cash
if
> you are a skilled planner with the right idea and organization.
>
If Steve Schear is correct about the potential for perfect crimes with
the financial infrastructure already in place today (manipulating
futures markets by blackmailing large corporations into releasing false
earnings statements), perhaps such a crime has already occured.
Could the recent Moscow bombings have been an example of this? Perhaps
a terrorist group made futures-market-manipulating demands in secret to
the Oligarchs who control most of the wealth in Russia. Perhaps the
Oligarchs said no, and then regretted it when the threats were carried
out, and then carried it again (two apartment complexes got blown up).
But the Oligarchs would not make the terrorists' threats public because
it would make the Oligarchs look bad; and the same would go for the
terrorists who committed the monstrous act.
I don't really believe this could have happened, but offer it as
reduction ad absurdum. That is, if Steve Schear's futures-manipulating
idea is correct, criminals might already be doing that sort of thing --
and law-abiding folk should be tightening international infrastructure
against opening futures-trading accounts under false IDs in sketchy
Caribbean countries.
However, I have a feeling he is not correct about this, and that my
original comments
--thomaspazhartman wrote
> >> Private
> >>bankers will help criminals do their thing, but only up to a point.
> >>And the criminal always runs the risk of the private banker exposing
> >>his or her identity to the authorities.
> >>
> >>Okay, maybe not the master criminal's identity, but his agent's. At
> >>some point there's usually some kind of face to face contact.
about money laundering in private banking apply equally to opening
futures trading accounts under phony names in sketchy jurisdictions.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 19:53:06 GMT
David Wagner wrote:
> I think you (and another poster) misread his question.
> You're thinking of the case where the number of elements in the set
> is _less_ than the length of the bitvectors, ...
SVD works in any case.
> Extra elements don't hurt you; Gaussian elimination still works.
So long as there is no inconsistency in the input matrix.
------------------------------
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