Cryptography-Digest Digest #515, Volume #10 Fri, 5 Nov 99 22:13:03 EST
Contents:
Re: Re: How protect HDisk against Customs when entering Great Britain (CoyoteRed)
key ring crypto (Tom St Denis)
Re: How protect HDisk against Customs when entering Great Britain (AllanW)
Re: Montgomery vs Square-and-Multiply speed (Bob Silverman)
Re: Q: Removal of bias (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Preventing a User from Extracting information from an Executable (Pawe� Krawczyk)
Re: Some humble thoughts on block chaining ("karl malbrain")
Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation (Matthew
Montchalin)
Re: my own crypt function (Tom)
Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation (Alan Morgan)
questions on smart cards (David Bernier)
Re: Your Opinions on Quantum Cryptography (jerome)
Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation (John Savard)
Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation (Scott Nelson)
Re: Your Opinions on Quantum Cryptography ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Your Opinions on Quantum Cryptography (Bill Unruh)
Re: Hash with truncated results (Tom St Denis)
Re: The Code Book Challenge (Arthur Dardia)
DES in Xilinx FPGA ("Kwong Chan")
Re: Lenstra on key sizes ("Roger Schlafly")
Re: How protect HDisk against Customs when entering Great Britain (DigitAl56K)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (CoyoteRed)
Subject: Re: Re: How protect HDisk against Customs when entering Great Britain
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 20:29:38 GMT
Reply-To: this news group unless otherwise instructed!
On Fri, 5 Nov 1999 16:37:43 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>CoyoteRed wrote:
>> Child pornographers deserve nothing less that the abuse that they,
>> themselves, dish out.
>
>The abuse is done by the parents/guardians of the children,
>not by the viewer of photos.
True. However, the viewers are the ones with the demand, the abusers
are the ones with the supply. They go hand-in-hand.
If there wasn't any demand...
Same with most of the other vises, except this is against defenseless
individuals and that's where I draw the line.
--
CoyoteRed
CoyoteRed <at> bigfoot <dot> com
http://go.to/CoyoteRed
PGP key ID: 0xA60C12D1 at ldap://certserver.pgp.com
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: key ring crypto
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 20:26:22 GMT
I caved in and added the key ring crypto to peekboo. It will seed rc4
using your password and the time(NULL) and encrypt the cache, public
and private keys.
Check out the website:
http://www.cell2000.net/security/peekboo/index.html
The source:
http://www.cell2000.net/security/peekboo/pb_backup.zip
The executable:
http://www.cell2000.net/security/peekboo/peekboo.exe
[for win32]
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: AllanW <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss,comp.security.pgp.tech
Subject: Re: How protect HDisk against Customs when entering Great Britain
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 20:34:02 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Scotty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> How about the following process:
> 1)defragment the drive.
> 2)Use scramdisk calling the file by some random name eg A22487B2.B11
> 3)Wipe all free space,blank directory entries (hence choice of name)
and
> file tails with BCWipe
> 4)Use touch to set your access, creation and modify date/time on the
> scramdisk file to be the same as BCWipe uses when it wipes bank
directories.
> 5)Exit windows and delete it using DOS.
> 6)Don't do anything else to the system.
> 7)Undelete it using DOS when you get to your destination.
Take this a step further.
Write a utility that deletes a file, adding all of it's
clusters to the bad-block list and saving the cluster numbers
somewhere. The "somewhere" could be a marker plus a list of
numbers appended to some existing .EXE file, like PING.EXE or
WINHELP.EXE. Some virus-checking programs will complain when
the utility tries to modify another .EXE file, but it should
be easy to turn virus-checking off while the utility runs and
back on as soon as it's finished. If it's done right, the
program that's modified would continue to run normally. And
since the blocks are marked as bad, there's no problem with
normal use of the computer, even if that means creating new
files.
To recover the file, read the program file to recover the
cluster numbers, remove them from the bad block list, and
re-create the file at those same clusters. Then optionally
reset the .EXE file back to what it used to be.
I think that Windows NT/Win2000 has a system call to get
the current cluster numbers of a file no matter what file
system is in use (FAT-x, NTFS, etc.). Unfortunately, I don't
think that creating a new file at a specific location is
supported, and I'm almost certain that there's no facility
for manipulating the bad block list. This means that the
utility would have to have intimite knowledge of each
supported file system.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] is a "Spam Magnet," never read.
Please reply in newsgroups only, sorry.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Montgomery vs Square-and-Multiply speed
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 20:38:44 GMT
In article <7vvdj2$6d0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Does anyone know what the speed difference between a Montgomery ExpMod
> and a Square-and-Multiply ExpMod is? (by ExpMod I'm referring to an
> "a^b mod c" type of operation).
>
> I'm trying to write my own ExpMod in C for large numbers, but the
> Montgmery seems too complicated. But I'd just like to know what the
> performance difference will be before I start coding, because if the
> Square-and-Mul is too slow, then it doesn't make sense to put any
effort
You seem to have some confusion.
Firstly, Montgomery's algorithm is not an algorithm for modular
exponentiation. It is an algorithm for modular multiplication. It is
typically used as a subroutine WITHIN an algorithm for modular
exponentiation. The alternative is to write a general multiply routine
and accompany it with a general routine for multi-precision division
with remainder. Or you can use Barrett's method.
Secondly, I have never hear of the "square and multiply" ExpMod. If you
mean the binary algorithm, please refer to it by that name. We need to
use common terminology if we are to communicate effectively.
There are many ways of doing ModExp using Montgomery multiplication.
One can use the binary method, binary-trinary, m-ary, sliding window,
balanced trinary using NAF, etc. etc. Which you choose depends on many
factors: your machine architecture, length of the exponent, how much
time and effort you want to spend on coding, etc.
However, Montgomery's modular multiply generally does give a fair
performance improvement. It is worth doing.
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: Removal of bias
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 21:55:58 +0100
Scott Nelson wrote:
>
> On Thu, 04 Nov 1999 20:52:20 +0100, Mok-Kong Shen
> >Scott Nelson wrote:
> >> Assuming a biased bit which is '1' .75 and '0' .25
> >> (entropy = 0.8112781)
> >> Using XOR to combine N bits,
> >> 1 bits: Entropy = 0.8112781
> >> 2 bits: Entropy = 0.9544340
> >> 3 bits: Entropy = 0.9886994
> >> 4 bits: Entropy = 0.9971804
> >> (after 12 bits, it's 1.0 to seven places.)
> >
> >Is is possible to do an analogous computation for the von Neumann's
> >device? Thanks.
> >
> Well, yes and no.
> Von Neumann's method doesn't produce a deterministic number of
> bits from a stream of biased bits.
> Thus it's not quite the same - however, assuming independent
> but biased bits which are '1' .75 and '0' .25 _on average_
> Von Neumann's method will produce .1875 bit of entropy per
> biased-bit processed. These just add up;
> 1 biased bits: average entropy = 0.1875
> 2 biased bits: average entropy = 0.375
> 3 biased bits: average entropy = 0.5625
> 4 biased bits: average entropy = 0.75
>
> In another thread, Tony T. Warnock pointed out that Von
> Neumann's method can be expanded. Using that method,
> groups of 4 biased bits will produce _on average_
> 1.289 bits of entropy. Taken in groups of 20, you can get
> slightly more than 12 bits of entropy (about .6 unbiased
> bits per biased bit.)
Allow me a stupid question: What could one say as a rule of thumb
about XORing and the (extended) von Neumann's device for the
practice, i.e. which method is to be preferred? Thanks.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Pawe� Krawczyk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Preventing a User from Extracting information from an Executable
Date: 5 Nov 1999 21:12:55 GMT
Chad Hurwitz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The other suggestion was to use multi layered P-Code which i don't know
> what that is, does anyone have any URL references?
For a very frustrating (to crack :) code taking similiar approach, see
http://www.suddendischarge.com/cgi-bin/download.cgi?file:escpu.zip
This was authored several years ago by Solar Designer and is written
in assembly language.
--
Pawel Krawczyk, CETI internet, Krakow. http://ceti.pl/~kravietz/
------------------------------
Reply-To: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "karl malbrain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Some humble thoughts on block chaining
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 1999 13:20:36 -0800
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Douglas A. Gwyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> : John Savard wrote:
> : > It is a fact, though, that most of today's stream ciphers do just XOR
> : > to a plaintext bitstream, ...
>
> : I don't know where you get that idea, but that is not true of
> : military-strength stream ciphers.
>
> I should be clearer. Most of the stream ciphers discussed in the open
> literature seem to do this; I can't recall one example of a stream cipher
> - other than non-ECB modes of block ciphers - in Applied Cryptography that
> does otherwise.
>
> Terry Ritter seems to be just about the only one out there to be working
> with stream ciphers that involve whole-byte substitutions.
Can either of you explain the difference between the result of a
`whole-byte' substitution and the result of an XOR? Where do you come up
with notions like this??? No wonder D Scott has had so much trouble.....
Karl M
------------------------------
From: Matthew Montchalin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math,sci.misc,sci.physics
Subject: Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 1999 13:44:53 -0800
| >>After N digits, there is zero chance of 41*N zeros in a row.
| >>This is true for all values of N.
After 2 digits, there is zero chance of 41*2 zeroes in a row? Well, yes,
but you are using the wrong formula to make your point.
After N digits, the likelihood of N zeroes in a row out of a universe
equal to N is inversely proportional to N squared. Thus, if N = 2, the
likelihood of 2 zeroes in a row out of a universe of 2 is equal to 1/2
squared, i.e., 1/4.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom)
Subject: Re: my own crypt function
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 02:23:56 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Fri, 05 Nov 1999 13:24:01 GMT, Tom St Denis
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In article <7vu1ps$o3p$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> "David Beckwith" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Hi,
>> I want to write my own crypt function to encrypt passwords. Can
>> somebody explain to me how to do this? Do you know any good tutorial
>sites
>> to get me started? For starters I want to emulate a function
>like "crypt"
>> in Perl or UNIX.
>> Thank you very much,
>> David :)
>
>Should look up David Scotts methods to be the first to implement *real*
>crypto.
I'd back off on that assertion for a while, Tom. After Scott's last
post his scheme has come to be smoke and mirrors - not at all along
the lines of the discussion you and I have been having (which has been
largely fun and informative, BTW).
>
>[note: Definition of real may vary from user to user, and/or be non-
>existsntant in others].
>
>Tom
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alan Morgan)
Crossposted-To: sci.math,sci.misc,sci.physics
Subject: Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation
Date: 6 Nov 1999 00:09:20 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alan Morgan) wrote, in part:
>
>>Not true (or rather, unknown). No one knows if there are 41 quintillion
>>zeros in a row after the quintillionth digit.
>
>Apparently there IS a proof that this can't happen.
Well, that's what I get for trying to run with the big dogs.
Alan
------------------------------
From: David Bernier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: questions on smart cards
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 23:02:58 GMT
I'd like to have some introductory Web references
on smart cards. I don't know how much smart cards
compare with credit cards, though I do know that
credit card issuing companies lose millions (billions?)
a year in credit card fraud. I know that one
technique relies on swiping the magnetic strip of
the credit card through a detector and essentially
cloning it. Also, PIN's typically have 4 or 5
digits, or no more than 20 bits... PIN's
can be forgotten, often creating awkward situations.
They can be read while they are being typed into
keyboard-type devices. Some people write down their
PIN's which compromises the security of the credit
card. Suppose smart cards had to be used with a
128 bit "PIN" or password; how many people could
remember reliably such a password? It's like
remembering a sequence of 21 random characters from
the standard 64 UUENCODE set... Would 128-bit
passwords be assigned or chosen? If they were chosen
by the user, would there be a check for sufficient
randomness in the PIN or password?
My main question is what protocols, procedures, etc
are recommended with smart cards, and what is the
current maximum-value information designed to
be protected using a smart card? I couldn't
imagine using a smart card to buy $100,000 of stock,
say, in a public (or private...) place where there could
be pin-hole cameras, electro-magnetic radiation
detectors, and whatever else may have been invented or
later will be. So if AES is used with smart cards,
aren't the biggest risks in the physical security, not
the (eventual) AES algorithm?
David Bernier
--
http://homestead.deja.com/mathworld/fish_school.html
http://homestead.deja.com/mathworld/primes_slow.html
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (jerome)
Subject: Re: Your Opinions on Quantum Cryptography
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 23:10:07 GMT
On Fri, 05 Nov 1999 16:49:59 -0500, Anton Stiglic wrote:
>I don't beleive it will always be as akward and expensive to set up
>links to do quantum key exchanges. They already have the technology,
>they did it over 1km, and 10kms, they are now testing stuff with
>satelite dishes. Saying that this will be to expensive is like that
>quote
>about computers 'I see a market of about 2 people' sort of stuff.
it was '5 computers'
>It would not at all be like just burning CD-ROMs, filling them with
>random bits, it's a public key exchange that I beleive will come to
>be inexpensive as technology improves.
the need of a dedicated physical device is the lack of flexibilty
which will reduce the use of the quantum cryptography.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Crossposted-To: sci.math,sci.misc,sci.physics
Subject: Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 23:41:09 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alan Morgan) wrote, in part:
>Not true (or rather, unknown). No one knows if there are 41 quintillion
>zeros in a row after the quintillionth digit.
Apparently there IS a proof that this can't happen.
For the square root of 2, there is a maximum limit to how good any
rational approximation to it can be, because its continued fraction is
repeating.
For pi, there apparently is also a limit, called Mahler's theorem,
which says that for any rational number p/q, | pi - p/q | is greater
than q to the -42 power.
But since there _can_ be 15 zeroes in a row after the quintillionth
digit, pi can still be normal.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Nelson)
Crossposted-To: sci.math,sci.misc,sci.physics
Subject: Re: Proposal: Inexpensive Method of "True Random Data" Generation
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 23:38:05 GMT
On 5 Nov 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alan Morgan) wrote:
>Scott Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[in reference to decimal digits of PI]
>>
>>After N digits, there is zero chance of 41*N zeros in a row.
>>This is true for all values of N.
>
>Not true (or rather, unknown). No one knows if there are 41 quintillion
>zeros in a row after the quintillionth digit. If your point is that
>there are no *known* cases where it happens then I will point out that
>there are no known cases where <pick some 30 digit sequence that does
>not appear in the first 59 billion decimal places of pi> appears and
>our expections of normal numbers would indicate that it has a 1 in
>small-ass-chance probability of appearing. Since it doesn't appear,
>clearly pi isn't normal. Bah.
>
>As far as I know, pi has passed all tests for normality (normalcy?) so
>far. No one bleives that that is conclusive, but it seem premature to
>say that pi is *not* normal.
>
As has already been pointed out, the fact that there
can't be 41 quintillion zeros in a row after the quintillionth
digit is not enough to prove PI is not "normal."
However, there can't be. I'm not talking tiny chance,
or no known sequence exists, I'm talking 0 chance.
Nada - impossible.
It's a consequence of a theorem of Mahler (1953) which states;
for all integers p, q > 1,
-42
|pi - p/q| > q
This says that pi cannot have a rational approximation
that is extremely tight.
You can read the full discourse in the rec.puzzles archive at
http://einstein.et.tudelft.nl/~arlet/puzzles/sol.cgi/probability/pi
or any of the many other places the rec.puzzles archive is stored.
Scott Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Your Opinions on Quantum Cryptography
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 1999 22:46:37 GMT
John Savard wrote:
> But quantum cryptography, although useful in some specialized
> circumstances, is no real improvement on just burning a CD-ROM filled
> with true random numbers, and delivering it by hand to your
> correspondent.
The claim is, interception could not go undetected,
which is not the case for CD-ROM exchange.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: Your Opinions on Quantum Cryptography
Date: 6 Nov 1999 00:45:39 GMT
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John
Savard) writes:
]Quantum computing would be _immensely_ useful, and is urgently needed
]in many disciplines.
HOw would it be immensely useful? What problems could you solve (other
than discrete logs, which are not that interesting a problem).
]But quantum cryptography, although useful in some specialized
]circumstances, is no real improvement on just burning a CD-ROM filled
]with true random numbers, and delivering it by hand to your
]correspondent. Thus, since setting up a quantum crypto link is likely
]to be at least as awkward and expensive as that, I think it is
]legitimate to feel that _quantum cryptography_, specifically, is not
]badly needed.
Well, one of the proposals is to use it for key exchange with
sattelites. It would be hard and very very expensive to deliver that
CDRom to your TV sattelite.
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hash with truncated results
Date: Sat, 06 Nov 1999 00:49:23 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> in IPSec, the result of the hash functions are often truncated to
96bits
> (for MD5 or SHA1). As far as i know SHA1 is considered stronger
mainly
> because of his digest size of 160bits versus 128bits for md5.
>
> are there any reasonable fact to believe that SHA1 truncated to 96bits
> is stronger or weaker than MD5 truncated to 96bits.
If I can break md5/sha when it's truncated to 96 bits, I can break the
full algorithm as well. Md5 has collisions [realistic or not is
another matter] which puts it just below sha on the [uninformed ranking
list].
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Arthur Dardia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The Code Book Challenge
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 1999 19:54:36 -0500
I'd think that once someone scans it in they'd be kind enough to post
the data in various formats (ie: .pdf, .txt, .html) for others to use.
I know it's a contest and this would save his "enemies"
some time, but compared to the rest of the work that has to be done,
this step is miniscule. Share the wealth. :)
David Pearce wrote:
> Peter Wilkinson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > I have just started. Anyone know where to get the encrypted text
> > in machine readable form. Typing all that stuff in is going to be
> > quite a trial...
> >
>
> Scan it or type it in by hand. That's part of the challenge...
>
> DHP
--
Arthur Dardia Wayne Hills High School [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP 6.5.1 Public Key http://www.webspan.net/~ahdiii/ahdiii.asc
------------------------------
From: "Kwong Chan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: DES in Xilinx FPGA
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 1999 09:56:09 +0800
Hi there,
Where can I find information on the implementation of
DES in the Xilinx FPGA?
------------------------------
From: "Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Lenstra on key sizes
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 1999 16:39:30 -0800
Bill McGonigle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> In article <7vu424$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Roger Schlafly"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > So far (in the open literature) a 512-bit RSA key has
> > been broken, but the largest discrete log attack has been
> > 283 bits (EuroCrypt '98). It looks to me like 512-bit
> > discrete log (SDL in the paper's terminology) is a whole
> > lot more secure than 512-bit RSA.
>
> Do we know people are trying as hard on discrete logs? Lack of a
> successful attack doesn't mean security, right?
There has been a lot of work on DL, and the best RSA attacks
have DL analogues. So most of the work on attacking RSA has
carried over to RSA attacks also. Remember also that the first
DL public key system was DL based, so crypto people and
others have been thinking about it a long time.
As Bob S. points out, NFS algorithms that apply to RSA and DL
require more work for DL. The Lenstra-Verheul paper is based
on present knowledge, and from what we know now, DL is
harder than RSA for the same bit size.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DigitAl56K)
Crossposted-To:
alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss,comp.security.pgp.tech,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server
Subject: Re: How protect HDisk against Customs when entering Great Britain
Date: Sat, 06 Nov 1999 01:33:46 GMT
>I'm considering to be crossing border of Great Britain [ GB ] very soon on
>business & pleasure trip.
No-one comes here for pleasure at this time of year ;)
>My friend did tell me that GB is scanning in / out coming computers for some
>specific data / images / information. I'm privacy advocate & can not allow this
>invasion of privacy to occur to me & my possessions.
Never heard of that, I don't think they can scan your disks unless
they have reason to suspect illegal material contained on it, however
I am not a lawyer.
>I'm using PGP day in / day out but excluding PGPdisk. I'm protecting my files
>by PGP on folders or / and individual files routinely.
>
>I need now to implement more advance disk protection to protect myself when
>entering GB.
>- From my knowledge, we have 2 comparable products : PGPdisk & Scramdisk. Please
>provide advise which I should implement to achieve the best hide & camouflage
>results.
No need for PGP Disk.
Install WinZip and move all important files/folders into the zip file
with the "Save extra folder info", "Recurse subfolders", "Include
system&hidden files" enabled.
Once the Zip file has been successfully created encrypt it using PGP
to your private key, selecting to erase the original copy. Next run a
PGP Free Space Wipe on the original drive.
>The points of interest are:
>- - I do not like to create precedence at the border.
I don't think customs will even want to look at your notebook.
>- - Very possible, when Customs can not scan / read info, they may opt for
>detention / seizure & this will ruin my trip.
Even if you were detained without absolute proof of illegal data on
your PC, which would be impossible to obtain you would not have to
decrypt the data and therefore customs would be forced to hold you
indefinately (not very likely I think!) or let you go.
>- - The best will be to camouflage the encrypted disk / partition / folders and
>not to have encrypted disk / partition / folders readily visible / recognize by
>Customs Scan as ENCRYPTED.
Like I said, customs can't prove encrypted data is illegal and hence
can't force you to decrypt it.
>- - I need the appropriate balance between encrypt & camouflage.
What the hell is on your hard drive dude?
>- - Where the camouflage should play more important role than encryption.
Wrong - if illegally camoflaged material was to be found they could
detain you and make you decrypt then encrypted info.
Encryption stands up much stronger.
>- - I'm encrypting now my files but I'm not implementing camouflage technique.
That's the best way
>- - Should be applicable to HD, CD-rom, CD-RW, CD-R [ Iomega ZIP when possible ]
Zip file technique as above works just fine.
>With the above preferences what I should implement to protect my privacy ?
PGP
>Any other techniques should I use ?
None, however posting here first might have customs looking out for
you! Ever thought of that?... ;)
You might want to use PGPi though as US export restrictions stop you
taking the normal PGP (which most of the world has anyway) out of the
country.
-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-
Visit the DigitAl56K Website
http://www.digital56k.free-online.co.uk
Get AVDisk v4 for F-Prot (Software section)
-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-==-
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