Cryptography-Digest Digest #682, Volume #10 Sat, 4 Dec 99 19:13:01 EST
Contents:
Archive (Arthur Dardia)
Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES (Brian Chase)
Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate? ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate? ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: Any negative comments about Peekboo free win95/98 message encryptor ("Trevor
Jackson, III")
Re: DNA based brute-force attacks? (James Pate Williams, Jr.)
Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate? ("r.e.s.")
Re: Elliptic Curve Public-Key Cryptography (Bodo Moeller)
Re: Archive (Scott Nelson)
Re: NSA competitors (John Savard)
Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate? ("r.e.s.")
Re: Any negative comments about Peekboo free win95/98 message encryptor (Lame I.
Norky)
Re: Archive (Lame I. Norky)
Re: Archive (Lame I. Norky)
Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES (Guy Macon)
Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate? (Guy Macon)
Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES (John Savard)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Arthur Dardia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Archive
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 16:04:04 -0500
I've searched deja.com, but I cannot find the thread that occured about
1 or 2 months ago on the programmer who needed our help to get his job
by writing a program that calculates the number of perfect shuffles
needed to return a deck of n cards to the original order. I want to
re-read this thread. Any ideas?
--
Arthur Dardia Wayne Hills High School [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP 6.5.1 Public Key http://www.webspan.net/~ahdiii/ahdiii.asc
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Brian Chase)
Subject: Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1999 21:47:07 GMT
In article <829ohn$lea$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>(My shock and horror at discovering that Lampson had gone over to the
>Dark Side was mitigated by observing that he seems to be physically more
>than 3000 miles away from Redmond. Also, maybe he'll do some good, such
>as teaching the people responsible for ActivX that authentication is not
>the same as authorization....no, never mind.)
Speaking on matters of paranoia, my particular paranoid tendencies seem to
note that Microsoft hires up quite a few of the computing history greats.
I don't really see that they're making use of this talent as is evidenced
by the really horrible quality products Microsoft puts out. The only
conclusion I've been able to reach is that Microsoft hires these people to
keep them off the market, doing otherwise productive work which might
compete with Microsoft interests.
The more I find out about the design weaknesses of Microsoft products, the
more convinced I am that Microsoft's presence in this world is adversely
effecting the progress of humanity. I really hate them.
-brian.
--
--- Brian Chase | [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://world.std.com/~bdc/ -----
For these reasons, and hundreds of others, I am forced to conclude that a
virtual frog is not as much fun as an actual frog. -- K.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 17:07:43 -0500
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate?
r.e.s. wrote:
> "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
> : r.e.s. wrote:
> [...]
> : > In the scenarios under discussion, an opponent cannot
> : > introduce a message key of his own making because he doesn't
> : > have the key for inserting it into the ciphertext.
> :
> : What does hiding a block cipher under an OTP buy you that the OTP alone
> does
> : not? In what sense is your message kay a key to the message if it is not
> a key
> : to a hidden cipher?
>
> The point under discusssion in the thread is that a "pure OTP" is
> not secure when used to send identical plaintext to two different
> recipients, because it may compromise the key of one of them. Any
> addition or change to the OTP, serving to remedy this, will result
> in something other than a "pure OTP". Adding a mesage key is just
> one possible attempted remedy.
As a matter of fact your premise is invalid. An OTP is secure when sending
indentical plaintext's to two different recipients. By secure I mean one
cannot recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. You seem to be enlarging the
term secure to include other kinds of attacks. Naturally, is is not secure in
any sense when the opponent can obtain a copy of the key. It is not secure in
the sense of authentication if the opponent can obtain a copy of the plaintext
by stealing it before it is sent or by stealing it after it is received.
An attack by theft of the plaintext is hardly an attack upon the cipher.
if such an attack were mounted against a fielded system, authentication is the
least of the attendant problems. Anyone who can obtain the plaintext of a OTP
message is not going to betray that capability by forging a message to an
alternate recipient. They will just continue using their special access to
evade the OTP rather than "break" it.
Yes, an OTP is secure when
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 17:08:57 -0500
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate?
r.e.s. wrote:
> "Guy Macon" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
> : [EMAIL PROTECTED] (r.e.s.) wrote:
> : >"Guy Macon" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
> : >:
> : >: Maybe it's my background as an engineer, but if I was actually
> : >: implementing an OTP (instead of using PGP and just discussing
> : >: OTP as a learning experience), I would go full overkill on the
> : >: randomizer, XORing in everything from the number of microseconds
> : >: between keystrokes to a the digitized output of my local AM
> : >: station, the theory being that if any one of my "random" inputs
> : >: is true random, the OTP will be random. I would then pad my
> : >: plaintext to a standard length and XOR it with the OTP (which will
> : >: probably be on a CD-R). If (given the limitations that have been
> : >: pointed out) an OTP is unbreakable, how can it be strengthened?
> : >
> : >By "strengthen" I meant incorporate another stage of encipherment
> : >to produce a cipher (now no longer an OTP) that, in various attack
> : >scenarios, is more secure than an OTP alone. By "OTP alone" I mean
> : >direct transmission of XOR'd bits, granting "true" randomness of
> : >the key. (And "implementation" was intended to include modes of use.)
> :
> : Let me rephrase that and see if I understand. You are saying to
> : take the OTP I described (which is unbreakable when used for
> : two way communication between trusted parties) then taking the
> : result and using it as the plaintext for an encryption system
> : that is in theory breakable but has other good qualities that
> : address various methods of beating OTP without trying to decode
> : an OTP encrypted message.
>
> No.
> The point under discusssion in the thread is that a "pure OTP" is
> *not* secure when used to send identical plaintext to two different
> recipients, because it may compromise the key of one of them. Any
> addition or change to the OTP, serving to remedy this, will result
> in something other than a "pure OTP".
See previous post.
There is NO possible protection againt the Karnak Attack. From this we
should conclude that all encryption is insecure? I think not.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 17:10:34 -0500
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Any negative comments about Peekboo free win95/98 message encryptor
Lame I. Norky wrote:
> "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >It appears to work for Underwriter Labs. The brand name is worth something to
> >consumers. So the vendors pay for it to enhance their sales. UL preserves
> >their integrity because it is their only product. One compromise in a safety
> >standard that came to light would destroy their brand name's value.
>
> This is an incredible coincidence! The following is the very next message
> that I happened to read after this one, over on the alt.home.automation
> group: news:82bine$[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sorry, I get "no such message". Can you post a summary or an alternate URL?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (James Pate Williams, Jr.)
Subject: Re: DNA based brute-force attacks?
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 22:26:18 GMT
On Sat, 4 Dec 1999 20:15:08 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Brian Chase)
wrote:
>I know there's lots of talk about using quantum computing to break crypto
>problems, but has there been much discussion of using DNA based computing
>to do the same? There's a 1994 article from _Science_ which discusses
>using DNA to solve the traveling salesman problem.
>
>An online version of the article is available at:
> http://www.hks.net/~cactus/doc/science/molecule_comp.html
>
>Does anyone know of work being done to break crypto using these types of
>techniques? Or are there fundamental problems with crypto that make them
>unlikely candidates for being solved with DNA computing?
>
>-brian.
>--
>--- Brian Chase | [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://world.std.com/~bdc/ -----
>For these reasons, and hundreds of others, I am forced to conclude that a
>virtual frog is not as much fun as an actual frog. -- K.
Here is an article I wrote to sci.crypt back on 07/16/1999 entitled
"Re: Molecular Computing and DES" which may be of interest:
In 1995 Boneh, Dunworth, and Lipton wrote a paper:
http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs.html
called "Breaking DES Using a Molecular Computer".
In it they describe a molecular biological attack
using a liter of solution and approximately four
months of chemical work-up. Their algorithm can be
applied to most 64-bit ciphers. They also describe a
chosen-plaintext attack that requires less time. Has
the key experiment been openly performed?
==Pate Williams==
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.mindspring.com/~pate
------------------------------
From: "r.e.s." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate?
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1999 14:38:54 -0800
"Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
: There is NO possible protection againt the Karnak Attack.
: From this we should conclude that all encryption is insecure?
I said no such thing.
--
r.e.s.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bodo Moeller)
Subject: Re: Elliptic Curve Public-Key Cryptography
Date: 4 Dec 1999 22:29:32 GMT
DJohn37050 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> [...] When e = 3, one knows half the bits of the private exponent.
> This does not allow an attack by itself, but could be used to
> synchronize a power attack, for example.
> [...] If the private key is encrypted using a symmetric cipher,
> this means I give the adversary some known plaintext/ciphertext
> pairs, this is undesirable.
There is no need to store d or to use it for decryption; using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem, all you need is the factors p, q
and d's residues modulo p - 1 and modulo q - 1.
Many implementations keep d around with the rationale that it can be
computed from the other numbers, anyway; if the known plaintext in the
upper part of d is considered a problem, then it's an implementation
problem, not an inherent problem of small-exponent RSA.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Nelson)
Subject: Re: Archive
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 22:52:20 GMT
On Sat, 04 Dec 1999 Arthur Dardia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I've searched deja.com, but I cannot find the thread that occured about
>1 or 2 months ago on the programmer who needed our help to get his job
>by writing a program that calculates the number of perfect shuffles
>needed to return a deck of n cards to the original order. I want to
>re-read this thread. Any ideas?
>
It's still on deja.com, I just checked.
Try the power-search option, the Subject was
"Perfect Shuffle Algorithm"
(put "Perfect and Shuffle and Algorithm" in the subject field)
I limited my search to sci.crypt, but that's
probably unnecessary.
Scott Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: NSA competitors
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 22:47:49 GMT
On Sat, 04 Dec 1999 18:13:27 +0000, CLSV <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I'm wondering if there is any knowledge about non-US
>government institutes that are specialized in cryptography and
>cryptanalysis? I'm thinking about countries that invest a lot
>in mathematical education like China, Russia, India.
The Russian one, under the acronym FAPSI, now even has a web site too.
On the other hand, the Chinese agency - known as the "technical
department" - is very secretive.
------------------------------
From: "r.e.s." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate?
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1999 15:09:21 -0800
"Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
: r.e.s. wrote:
[...]
: > The point under discusssion in the thread is that a "pure OTP" is
: > not secure when used to send identical plaintext to two different
: > recipients, because it may compromise the key of one of them. Any
: > addition or change to the OTP, serving to remedy this, will result
: > in something other than a "pure OTP". Adding a mesage key is just
: > one possible attempted remedy.
:
: As a matter of fact your premise is invalid. An OTP is secure when
: sending indentical plaintext's to two different recipients.
: By secure I mean one cannot recover the plaintext from the ciphertext.
It's good to note that you're using a narrower definition
of "secure". I don't consider a cipher secure if it allows
an opponent to recover *or alter* the plaintext undetected.
: You seem to be enlarging the term secure to include other kinds of
: attacks.
Your usage is more restricted, yes.
: Naturally, is is not secure in
: any sense when the opponent can obtain a copy of the key.
: It is not secure in the sense of authentication if the opponent can
: obtain a copy of the plaintext by stealing it before it is sent or
: by stealing it after it is received.
:
: An attack by theft of the plaintext is hardly an attack
: upon the cipher.
On the contrary, if a cipher lends itself exceptionally
well to forgery through the theft of some plaintext, I
would call that a weakness of the cipher.
--
r.e.s.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lame I. Norky)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Any negative comments about Peekboo free win95/98 message encryptor
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 23:29:20 GMT
"Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Sorry, I get "no such message". Can you post a summary or an alternate URL?
It's too long and totally off-topic to post here, so I emailed it to you.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lame I. Norky)
Subject: Re: Archive
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 23:40:16 GMT
(Posted and emailed)
Arthur Dardia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I've searched deja.com, but I cannot find the thread that occured about
>1 or 2 months ago on the programmer who needed our help to get his job
>by writing a program that calculates the number of perfect shuffles
>needed to return a deck of n cards to the original order. I want to
>re-read this thread. Any ideas?
I can help a little. If the thread was called, "Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?"
then I found some of the responses:
From: Randy Poe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
Date: Sat, 09 Oct 1999 14:44:24 -0400
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tcus8$5tl$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tkt0m$4ab$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Dave Knapp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kevin Buhr)
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
Date: 14 Oct 1999 12:16:59 -0500
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tis97$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "Dann Corbit" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tis97$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
I hope this helps!
--
"Lame I. Norky" is actually [EMAIL PROTECTED] (2483 519067).
0123 4 56789 <- Use this key to decode my email address and name.
Play Five by Five Poker at http://www.5X5poker.com.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Lame I. Norky)
Subject: Re: Archive
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 23:41:14 GMT
(Posted and emailed)
Arthur Dardia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I've searched deja.com, but I cannot find the thread that occured about
>1 or 2 months ago on the programmer who needed our help to get his job
>by writing a program that calculates the number of perfect shuffles
>needed to return a deck of n cards to the original order. I want to
>re-read this thread. Any ideas?
I can help a little. If the thread was called, "Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?"
then I found some of the responses:
From: Randy Poe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
Date: Sat, 09 Oct 1999 14:44:24 -0400
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tcus8$5tl$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tkt0m$4ab$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Dave Knapp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kevin Buhr)
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
Date: 14 Oct 1999 12:16:59 -0500
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tis97$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "Dann Corbit" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Newsgroups: sci.stat.math,sci.math,sci.crypt
References: <7sp3cs$6k0$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <7tis97$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Perfect Shuffle Algorithm?
I hope this helps!
--
"Lame I. Norky" is actually [EMAIL PROTECTED] (2483 519067).
0123 4 56789 <- Use this key to decode my email address and name.
Play Five by Five Poker at http://www.5X5poker.com.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Subject: Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES
Date: 04 Dec 1999 18:38:25 EST
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(wtshaw) wrote:
>Love is blind, or at least figure that it has astigmatism.
Love is blind, but Marriage is a real eye opener.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Why Aren't Virtual Dice Adequate?
Date: 04 Dec 1999 18:57:20 EST
In article <82bpkh$398$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (r.e.s.) wrote:
>The point under discusssion in the thread is that a "pure OTP" is
>*not* secure when used to send identical plaintext to two different
>recipients, because it may compromise the key of one of them. Any
>addition or change to the OTP, serving to remedy this, will result
>in something other than a "pure OTP".
I must be missing something here (probably a lack on my part).
Let's say that A uses pure OTP to send identical plaintext to B and C.
A has a large random pad labeled [A->B] and another labeled [A->C].
B has an identical copy of pad [A->B] that was securely transfered.
C has an identical copy of pad [A->C] that was securely transfered.
ATTACKER can monitor or modify all communication between A, B, and C.
ATTACKER knows everything except the acyual values of the pads or
the plaintext.
Given these assumptions, ATTACKER cannot decode the plaintext or
insert his own message and have it correctly decoded.
Now let's say that ATTACKER finds out what the plaintext is before
it is sent to B (maybe from A, maybe from C). Under *any* crypto
system he will have "decoded" the message to B. In the case of
pure OTP he can stop the real message to B and insert his own.
Knowing this, A never sends identical messages. A is already padding
the messages to obscure the length, so he just randomly chooses how
much of the padding to put in front or behind. A should get the
random number for this from a small section of his pad, which is never
used again, so that B knows where to snip. This is still pure OTP,
but never has the problem described because identical plaintext is
never sent to two different recipients.
Thinking about this, It seems that just adding an extra space character
between two words somewhere in the message to either A or B would stop
this particular attack. Everything after the space would be garbage
if ATTACKER fails to guess where the space was added. In real life I
would use the random amount of prepadding method and encrypt the whole
thing with PGP, but it seems that trivial changes to the plaintext are
enough to stop the attack you describe.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: NSA should do a cryptoanalysis of AES
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1999 23:47:42 GMT
On Sat, 04 Dec 1999 01:34:11 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(John Savard) wrote:
>Instead of CFB, CBC, OFB mode and so on, the following double-DES mode
>would take advantage of the strength of DES, and yet allow a very
>large key:
>For each block that is enciphered, produce one 64-bit pseudorandom
>number by means of a combination of counter mode and OFB mode. (DES
>encrypt the previous output XOR the counter.)
>Use the 64-bit pseudorandom number in encryption of a block as
>follows:
>XOR the block with one of 16 whitening vectors. (4 bits)
>Perform a substitution on the eight bytes of the block, using one of
>eight substitution tables for each byte. (24 bits)
>XOR the block with one of 16 whitening vectors. (4 bits)
>Encrypt the block using DES with a second key.
>XOR the block with one of 16 whitening vectors. (4 bits)
>Perform a substitution on the eight bytes of the block, using one of
>eight substitution tables for each byte. (24 bits)
>XOR the block with one of 16 whitening vectors. (4 bits)
>This form of encryption uses the strength of DES, but also allows the
>use of a very large key. DES in the middle prevents deductions from
>being made about the whitening part. The whitening items being chosen
>from tables prevents the pseudorandom DES output from being studied.
I liked this idea so much - of course, it's really only a variation of
the "large-key brainstorm" - that on my page at
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/co0409.htm
I've added a single-DES variant of this mode, having found a way to
make it work with only one DES encryption per block. Of course, with
double-DES it would be more secure.
------------------------------
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