Cryptography-Digest Digest #121, Volume #11 Mon, 14 Feb 00 15:13:02 EST
Contents:
Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :) (Guy Macon)
Re: Predicting the next random number (Guy Macon)
Re: Large Floating Point Library? ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: help DES encryption (John Myre)
Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys? ("Al Manint")
Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :) ("Dave VanHorn")
Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :) (Bob Silverman)
Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Which compression is best? (Toby Kelsey)
Re: Guaranteed Public Key Exchanges (Mike Rosing)
Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :) (Mike Andrews)
Re: Large Floating Point Library? (Mike Rosing)
Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys? (James Felling)
Re: New standart for encryption software. (Albert P. Belle Isle)
Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys? (Johnny Bravo)
Re: Quastion about RSA function. Help!!!! (Mike Rosing)
Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys? (Johnny Bravo)
Re: Which compression is best? (Tim Tyler)
Re: UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law (zapzing)
Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys? (Jim)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp.discuss,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :)
Date: 14 Feb 2000 11:16:43 EST
In article <889455$ivh$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bob Silverman) wrote:
>
>In article <888hp2$6sp$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>>
>> I wonder how long it'll take them to notice...Hhhm, would you
>> trust RSA with your data security now? ;)
>
>Will anyone trust YOU now???
>
>Our website address is www.rsasecurity.com and has been so
>for some time. www.rsa.com is no longer a valid URL.
>
Is this what I can expect if I become an RSA customer?
No admisssion of fault and lame attempts to cover up
security breaches? You should put a full disclosure about
exactly how you screwed up on your website and you should
stop trying to blow smoke up my ass about who owns www.rsa.com.
BTW, I found the link "RSA Laboratories Unveils Innovative
Countermeasure To Recent Denial of Service Hacker Attacks"
to be particularly clueless. Yahoo and Ebay can already
set their servers to ignore traffic from the attacking sites
without RSA's "Innovative" help. The problem is that
rejecting the traffic uses up resources. You folks are
addressing the wrong problem.
Are you really a mole who is trying to drive customers to PGP?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Subject: Re: Predicting the next random number
Date: 14 Feb 2000 11:19:12 EST
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(John Savard) wrote:
>
>On Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:16:39 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote, in part:
>
>>Hey, I was just curious, but if someone came up with a way to predict
>>the numbers from ANY pseudo random number generator, would the NSA
>>come and take them away for some reason that I can currently fathom???
>
>They'd have to stand in line behind Las Vegas.
>
>John Savard (teneerf <-)
>http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/index.html
I was under the impression that Las Vegas never uses Pseudorandom.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 11:27:40 -0500
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Large Floating Point Library?
Clockwork wrote:
> There are numerous large integer libraries, but does anyone know of a large
> floating point library?
There are several packages that implement quad-precision floating point values.
Some use paired doubles and can represent numbers such as 1+1e-200 and others
simply provide a wider mantissa.
A search for "quad" should turn up several such libraries.
------------------------------
From: John Myre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: help DES encryption
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:33:57 -0700
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> Paul Koning wrote:
> > NIST publishes a book that spells out a detailed set of validation
> > procedures, including some that will help isolate problems.
> > It's NIST Special Publication 800-17, "Modes of Operation Validation
> > System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures". ...
>
> Which unfortunately is not available in on-line format;
> it can be ordered in printed form.
What's wrong with 800-17.pdf at the same site as below?
> A similar document for 3DES *is* available on line:
> http://csrc.nist.gov/nistpubs/800-20.pdf
J.M.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp.discuss,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :)
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 16:39:48 GMT
Bob Silverman seems to have written:
> Will anyone trust YOU now???
>
> Our website address is www.rsasecurity.com and has been so
> for some time. www.rsa.com is no longer a valid URL.
So why is it mirrored as an exact duplicate at www.rsa.com then? Why
isn't www.rsa.com marked as an invalid adress. I cannot confirm the hack
the original poster was talking about, but it seems a bit odd to me to
reply that www.rsa.com is no longer valid while it apparently is directly
mirrored from www.rsasecurity.com.
Or do you want to tell us that its not YOU who is mirrowing the site?
And just for curiosity: Can anyone confirm the hack on www.rsa.com or was
this a hoax?
Regards,
John Stone
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Al Manint" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp,misc.survivalism
Subject: Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:54:48 -0600
No - it is not impossible to break PGP - you just have to try every
combination. Is it worth the effort? Become educated - read the code and
do the math.
--Al
tiwolf <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> You are assuming that you and everyone else here know the full extent of
> current computer power and storage mediums. You are also assuming that
there
> are no mathematical programs that do away with the needs for the PGP
codes.
> You assume a lot. I for one know nothing about computer and crypto
breaking,
> but I do know that give resources and time nothing is truly impossible.
> Johnny Bravo wrote in message
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> >On Sun, 13 Feb 2000 13:46:34 -0800, "tiwolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >>You are assuming that they would be using current disks as a meduim for
> >>storage,
> >
> > Ok, for the sake of argument I'll pretend that the NSA has a
> >sooper-seekrit storage medium, so compact that they can fit 512 bits of
> >information onto a single atom. There are not enough atoms in the
> >Universe to store all the 512 bit PGP keys. When you are talking about
> >the 4096 bit keys you would run out of room even if you managed to fit
> >4096 bits of info onto the smallest known sub-atomic particles.
> >
> >>or that they would even need the whole lot of keys in the first
> >>place.
> >
> > Without the keys, how can the lookup your key? That is what this
thread
> >is about.
> >
> > Johnny Bravo
>
>
------------------------------
From: "Dave VanHorn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp.discuss,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :)
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 17:04:34 GMT
> And just for curiosity: Can anyone confirm the hack on www.rsa.com or was
> this a hoax?
I saw the quoted text when pulling up that address here.
DNS is from @home's servers.
I did not note the IP that I was reading, just the link
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp.discuss,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :)
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 17:08:30 GMT
In article <889b4k$o9p$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Bob Silverman seems to have written:
> > Will anyone trust YOU now???
> >
> > Our website address is www.rsasecurity.com and has been so
> > for some time. www.rsa.com is no longer a valid URL.
>
> So why is it mirrored as an exact duplicate at www.rsa.com then? Why
> isn't www.rsa.com marked as an invalid adress.
Hi,
I don't run the web site, but I believe that the mirror site will be
phased out over time. I only wanted to point out that it was the mirror
that was hacked. It is quite possible that we did not (or do not) take
the same security precautions with the mirror site as with the primary,
since the mirror site is not permanent (or so I understand).
I will try to find out exactly what happened.....
Bob
I cannot confirm the hack
> the original poster was talking about, but it seems a bit odd to me to
> reply that www.rsa.com is no longer valid while it apparently is
directly
> mirrored from www.rsasecurity.com.
>
> Or do you want to tell us that its not YOU who is mirrowing the site?
>
> And just for curiosity: Can anyone confirm the hack on www.rsa.com or
was
> this a hoax?
>
> Regards,
>
> John Stone
>
> Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
> Before you buy.
>
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp.discuss,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :)
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 17:58:11 GMT
While we're on the subject, why doesn't the RSA web site use any of the
authentication certificates (i.e. Verisign)? Wouldn't that satisfy
everyone's curiosity as to whether the web site is legit or not?
In article <889cqc$pkl$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <889b4k$o9p$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Bob Silverman seems to have written:
> > > Will anyone trust YOU now???
> > >
> > > Our website address is www.rsasecurity.com and has been so
> > > for some time. www.rsa.com is no longer a valid URL.
> >
> > So why is it mirrored as an exact duplicate at www.rsa.com then? Why
> > isn't www.rsa.com marked as an invalid adress.
>
> Hi,
>
> I don't run the web site, but I believe that the mirror site will be
> phased out over time. I only wanted to point out that it was the
mirror
> that was hacked. It is quite possible that we did not (or do not)
take
> the same security precautions with the mirror site as with the
primary,
> since the mirror site is not permanent (or so I understand).
>
> I will try to find out exactly what happened.....
>
> Bob
>
> I cannot confirm the hack
> > the original poster was talking about, but it seems a bit odd to me
to
> > reply that www.rsa.com is no longer valid while it apparently is
> directly
> > mirrored from www.rsasecurity.com.
> >
> > Or do you want to tell us that its not YOU who is mirrowing the
site?
> >
> > And just for curiosity: Can anyone confirm the hack on www.rsa.com
or
> was
> > this a hoax?
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > John Stone
> >
> > Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
> > Before you buy.
> >
>
> --
> Bob Silverman
> "You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him
think"
>
> Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
> Before you buy.
>
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Toby Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Which compression is best?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 01:45:03 +0000
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Douglas A. Gwyn
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes
>When the purpose of compression is to remove redundancy in order
>to suppress clues from the statistical characteristics of the
>plaintext source language, you simply want the highest degree of
>compression you can get (subject to your resource limitations).
Not necessarily true. Generally speaking, the more restricted the
domain of discourse, the better the possible compression. However, if
you use a compression method highly optimised for a specific subject,
and the choice of algorithm is not secret (ie part of the key), then the
mere topic of discussion may be valuable information for the attacker
(akin to publishing the list of phrases in your code book). Thus the
chosen method must take account of how much the attacker is assumed to
know already about your messages, or the optimisation kept secret.
I doubt this applies to any current compression method though, which are
not specialised beyond English text.
Toby
--
Toby Kelsey
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Guaranteed Public Key Exchanges
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:33:47 -0600
No Brainer wrote:
> Since the beginning of the Internet, hasn't there yet been a method that
> duplicates the paper in the example above? For example, is there a 100% secure
> way to download a public key or executable using x509.3 cert's and CA's etc etc?
> At least if you can download the public key securely then you know you have the
> key of the person (as long as you trust the person who has given you the e-mail
> address)?
The difference between paper (books, news, magazines or whatever) and
electronics
(phones, pagers, internet, whatever) is fundamental: electronics takes
power.
Paper is passive, electronics is active. It's not possible (or
desireable)
to replicate what paper does.
But you need to think about your question, and compare it to other
things
you do that *are* similar. When you tell someone something, how do you
know
what they will do with the information? You don't tell your boss things
you'd tell your wife (and many times vise versa :-)
The real question is: Who do you trust with what and why? There is a
reason
why getting a passport is a pain in the butt. As you get more and more
security,
you go thru more and more pain. *Nothing* is 100% secure!! Downloading
a public key can go from "I don't know" to "I'm pretty damn sure", but
no
matter how much pain you go thru, it can still be defeated.
If it's worth it to a company, they can publish their public key (or
it's
finger print) in many places. If it's worth it to you, you can publish
your
public key or the fingerprint on your business card. By using multiple
channels you increase the probability that the correct keys are
exchanged.
You actually do this many times while you build up trust in anything
else,
you just don't think about it as a "protocol". Why did you trust your
bank?
Why does your bank trust you? If you break it down into all the tiny
steps
needed to write a computer program, you'll be amazed at how many steps
you
actually took, and how many channels you went thru!
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike Andrews)
Subject: Re: Funniest thing I've seen in ages - RSA.COM hacked :)
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 18:45:52 GMT
In sci.crypt Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snippage]
: Our website address is www.rsasecurity.com and has been so
: for some time. www.rsa.com is no longer a valid URL.
http://www.rsa.com certainly works from here, Bob. If you
think it doesn't, then you need to come argue with my
Netscape browsers.
--
...the read microsoft client. Also doubles as a mail-reader and a
reminder service (remind me). Now with the read fast option!
-- Ingvar
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Large Floating Point Library?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:09:24 -0600
Clockwork wrote:
>
> There are numerous large integer libraries, but does anyone know of a large
> floating point library?
I'm actually working on one just for the hell of it right now. I'd
appreciate
help in testing it :-) (send e-mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] if
interested)
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: James Felling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp,misc.survivalism
Subject: Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:08:29 -0600
tiwolf wrote:
> You are assuming that you and everyone else here know the full extent of
> current computer power and storage mediums.
No he is not. He is assuming that the storage devices the NSA uses are made of
atoms( a fairly safe assumption), and they can store 512 bits per atom with in
the storage system( a very generous amount -- ridiculously so), and that all
atoms in the storage device are used for this purpose.( This is so far beyond
present day tech so as to be laughable)
> You are also assuming that there
> are no mathematical programs that do away with the needs for the PGP codes.
True. If the codes have all been completely broken we are screwed. Mind you
that probably means that the NSA is capable of breaking any code in existence in
near zero time. I feel that they are ahead of the present tech by a bit, but I
don't think they are that far ahead. What you say seems to imply that any
coding now used is fatally comprimised -- since there are other large and well
funded intelegence organizations devoted to SIGINT/ coding this certianly
implies that any major government can read anything they want off of any
encrypted file they wish. Since the governments in question are not behaving in
a manner indicitive of this I feel thqat you r assertion is unfounded.
>
> You assume a lot. I for one know nothing about computer and crypto breaking,
Yep.
>
> but I do know that give resources and time nothing is truly impossible.
Really? So Godel's incompleteness theorem is totally invalid, and a precise
decimal expression of pi (all the way to the "end")can be made if I throw enough
money at it, and one can construct all regular polygons with compas and
straightedge
Thanks for your illuminating post.
>
> Johnny Bravo wrote in message
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> >On Sun, 13 Feb 2000 13:46:34 -0800, "tiwolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >>You are assuming that they would be using current disks as a meduim for
> >>storage,
> >
> > Ok, for the sake of argument I'll pretend that the NSA has a
> >sooper-seekrit storage medium, so compact that they can fit 512 bits of
> >information onto a single atom. There are not enough atoms in the
> >Universe to store all the 512 bit PGP keys. When you are talking about
> >the 4096 bit keys you would run out of room even if you managed to fit
> >4096 bits of info onto the smallest known sub-atomic particles.
> >
> >>or that they would even need the whole lot of keys in the first
> >>place.
> >
> > Without the keys, how can the lookup your key? That is what this thread
> >is about.
> >
> > Johnny Bravo
------------------------------
From: Albert P. Belle Isle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: New standart for encryption software.
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 14:12:06 -0500
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sun, 13 Feb 2000 23:34:55 -0500, "Trevor Jackson, III"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> Although our source code is available for review under NDA, any
>> INFOSEC professional knows that spiking cryptosystem implementations
>> at the object code level is a much greater threat than "backdoors"
>> spelled-out in well-documented source code. Hence, the emphasis on
>> testing performance of the cryptosystem, rather than trusting pretty
>> source code listings.
>>
>> (Of course, that doesn't seem to inhibit the calls by sci.crypt
>> posters to "show me the source code." Any professional spiker would be
>> all too happy to get the resulting "seal of approval" <g>.)
>
>You have mixed (possibly confused) two distinct problems that haunt
>software offered by untrusted implementors. First, and unquestionably
>foremost, is the threat of incompetence. An implementor may design a weak
>cipher, or poorly implement a strong cipher, or perfectly implement a
>strong cipher but overlook a security weakness in some supporting aspect
>of the software. Source code inspection -- peer review -- addresses these
>kinds of threats.
>
Perhaps you do, but I know of no "black bag jobs" that involved
replacing source code. I also don't have access to all of MSFT's
source code but, again, perhaps you do.
If you re-read the first line of the above quote from my original
posting, or the past four days worth of subsequent postings in which I
clearly restated our belief in the _necessity_ of source code review,
I fail to understand how my insistance on their not being _sufficient_
for INFOSEC against professional attackers could be construed as the
straw man you're attacking - i.e., discouragement of source code
reviews by qualified reviewers.
I certainly don't discourage the use of seat belts, but as I always
told my children, they won't protect you against all hazards. Can that
be somehow construed as my offering an inducement to ignore them?
>The second kind of threat is that of a malicious vendor who purposefully
>implements a weakness or a back door. This is a dramatically smaller
>threat. And, BTW, one that source code review _does_ reduce, because it
>is quite hard to hide such a back door from an inspector able to recreate
>the binary. Given the same tools the binaries should be close to
>indistinguishable. And a debug script that works on one ought to produce
>the same log when applied to the other. So even patched binaries are not
>hard to uncover.
>
With your carefully stated qualifying "givens," I'd agree that a
single, crudely-spiked executable file _could_ be caught out (if you
add the proviso that it be inspected on a trusted system with all
compilers, linkers, debuggers, report generators and other tools
included in the evaluation of what constitutes a TCB).
However, large file sets, installed to multiple directories (running
as both applications and services), with the possibility of chained
aliasing between them, can present a more challenging "INsecurity
through obscurity," to coin a phrase.
Spiking supposedly standard OS function libraries (MFC*.DLLs, for
instance), whose accompanying debug (.MAP) files are always "updated"
along with them, could give such statements about the ease of spiking
detection a rather embarassing quality.
Patching and using KERNEL32.DLL's IsDebuggerPresent() function affords
some interesting possibilities on NT platforms, and there's always
that old favorite ReadProcessMemory().
Then there are really sophisticated attacks ;-)
Consequently, I think that _many_ "patched binaries are not hard to
uncover," might be a bit more prudent statement in the context of a
discussion of countermeasures to _professional_ spiking (not
"malicious vendors" - whose business plan must be really strange) of
object code purporting to spring from peer-reviewed source code - in
which context I, at least, would be a bit more paranoid.
>>
>>
>> Then there's all those "wiping" programs that leave plaintext
>> scavanged into the _interior_ slack spaces of Word or Excel files....
>> But that's another story for another time.
>
>Don't complain until you have your pagefile.sys working from a scramdisk
>partition.
Somehow use a Win9x VxD to get NT to run paging files from a 16-bit
"compatibility-mode" logical drive volume?
???
Albert P. BELLE ISLE
Cerberus Systems, Inc.
================================================
ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE with
Forensic Software Countermeasures
http://www.CerberusSystems.com
================================================
------------------------------
From: Johnny Bravo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp,misc.survivalism
Subject: Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 14:15:52 +0000
On Sun, 13 Feb 2000 23:45:53 -0800, "tiwolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>You are assuming that you and everyone else here know the full extent of
>current computer power and storage mediums.
You are incorrect, I'm assuming that the limit for computer storage is
less than 4096 bits of information per quark. Seems a pretty safe
assumption, if you can even posit a possible theoretical method for
storing and retrieving data in a more compact manner than 4096 bits in one
quark I'll concede the point.
>You are also assuming that there
>are no mathematical programs that do away with the needs for the PGP codes.
That is not the topic under discussion. I didn't mention anything about
orbital mind control lasers that can read your thoughts and send them to
the NSA either.
>You assume a lot.
Ahem.
>I for one know nothing about computer and crypto breaking,
Then how can you know that I'm assuming a lot if you have no idea what a
reasonable assumption is?
>but I do know that give resources and time nothing is truly impossible.
Really? Give any possible method you can think of for finding the
biggest prime number. Assume infinite resources and time. Take all the
screens you need, and feel free to write it in plain english, just an
outline will do.
Johnny Bravo
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Quastion about RSA function. Help!!!!
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 13:18:51 -0600
ant wrote:
>
> Who knows why Y^d(mod n) is the reverse function for original RSA
> function : X^e(mod n).
Because d*e = 1 mod phi(n), so the two operations cancel.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: Johnny Bravo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp,misc.survivalism
Subject: Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 14:19:35 +0000
On Sun, 13 Feb 2000 23:50:38 -0800, "tiwolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>You are assuming that it can't be done now with current technology, I will
>not make that assumption.
The topic under discussion is the possibility of pre-computing every
possible key in advance and looking them up. There is no way to do so,
not even with imaginary technology. Not unless you are god.
>I will assume that anything is possible
Poor assumption, many things are impossible.
>knowing that governments are always looking to gain more power and want to
>know why people would want to keep secrets from the government. Government
>is more than willing to waste large portions of the public's money on
>breaking any code that they cannot now break.
It takes more than money to complete an impossible task, it takes
divinity. Been any godhood's for sale on Ebay lately?
Johnny Bravo
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Which compression is best?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 19:00:19 GMT
Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: [EMAIL PROTECTED] schrieb:
:> As I've read here, it's good to compress before you encrypt the data.
: Not everything which you can read here is true. Especially this
: thought is totally wrong.
I completely disagree with the second sentence here. Compressing before
encryption can genuinely help. It even pays for itself in processing
time, because the resulting message is shorter and needs less work to
encrypt ;-)
:> Now I've got 2 questions about this:
:> 1) From a security perspective, how important is compression?
: If you compress your data before encrypting, the encrypted data has
: a known structure which can, for example, be easier tested in a
: brute-force attack, and maybe helps the decrypter in other attacks,
: too.
Totally the reverse should apply. This is the primary point in
compressing in the first place. The resulting file has /greater/
entropy-per bit, and thus more closely approaches a random file.
: Every little change in an encryption algorithm, especially "little
: improvements" like compression, will almost always weaken security.
More utter nonsense ;-/
If anything, adding compression should be compared to multiple encryption
- or diffusion - rather than to tweaking something within the encryption
device. It adds another layer of potential confusion, and should not
weaken what's already there.
:> 2) Are there special compression algorithms that are specifically well-
:> suited in combination with block cyphers?
: No. Just use the best compression you can get (bzip2 ?) if you want
: to save space.
I don't consider this to be good advice. Saving space is not
why you compress before encrypting. Also, compression ratio is not
the only consideration when compressing before encryption.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Few women admit their age. Few men act theirs.
------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 19:18:50 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> "vrml3d.com" wrote:
>
> > >
> > > could imprison users of encryption technology for forgetting or
losing
> > >
> > > their keys.
> >
> > Ummm... does that mean it would be illegal to posess a file full of
random
> > numbers? Such a file would be indistinguishable from an encrypted
file, and
> > when asked to produce the "key" you would invariable come up short.
Oh no!
> > The radio is making static again! quick, throw it out the window.
:)
> >
> > --Steve
>
> You may also want to trim off the low-end bits of all of your wav
files. If
> they are all zero it will be hard to claim that you stored information
in them.
>
>
Not to mention the fact that most
abstract art has now become illegal
in Britain.
Of course, if it were America,
then you could just establish
the "Church of Random Numbers"
and probably get away with it.
--
Do as thou thinkest best.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.pgp,misc.survivalism
Subject: Re: Does the NSA have ALL Possible PGP keys?
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 19:30:14 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sun, 13 Feb 2000 23:45:53 -0800, "tiwolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I for one know nothing about computer and crypto breaking,
Obviously!
--
Jim,
nordland at lineone.net
amadeus at netcomuk.co.uk
------------------------------
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