Cryptography-Digest Digest #221, Volume #11 Tue, 29 Feb 00 16:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: "imparting cryptographic information to individual photons"??? ("Trevor Jackson,
III")
Re: Q: 'Linear encipherment' (Mike Andrews)
Re: On jamming interception networks (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Cryonics and cryptanalysis (Tim Tyler)
Re: Can someone break this cipher? (Tim Tyler)
Re: OAP-L3 Encryption Software - Complete Help Files at web site (Tim Tyler)
Re: NSA now has a FAQ (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: brute force attack on a 128 bit SSL key? ("Lyalc")
Zip file decrypt (Patrick Braunsberger)
Re: OAP-L3 Encryption Software - Complete Help Files at web site (Jerry Coffin)
I know one person from Finland who is actually one extremely intelligent ("Markku
J. Saarelainen")
Re: Q: 'Linear encipherment' (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: IDEA question. ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Best language for encryption?? (wtshaw)
Re: Want to poke holes in this protocol? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Zip file decrypt (Robert Reynard)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 14:21:55 -0500
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: "imparting cryptographic information to individual photons"???
David Ross wrote:
> Anyone know anything about this? From an article on pages 120 & 122
> of the Feb. 21 2000 issue of 'Aviation Week & Space Technology'.
>
> (note - the 'NIS' referred to is the 'Nonproliferation and
> International Security' division at the Los Alamos National
> Laboratory. H. Terry Hawkins is mentioned as its Director.)
>
> One NIS project --- supported by the National Security Agency --- is
> focused on quantum encryption techniques, which eventually could
> become the ultimate information protection mechanism. "We're
> imparting cryptographic information to individual photons and passing
> them through fiber optic cables," Hawkins said. "We can pick up the
> photon at the other end of the cable and look at the encrypted
> information contained in it. Under the Heisenberg uncertainty
> principle, you cannot stop that photon along its path and read the
> information without altering the information. It's the only method we
> know that is absolutely secure."'
>
> There is a lot of present tense verbiage in this paragraph - is
> this stuff actually being done right now?
>
> Dave Ross
Yes, but all of these systems require a parallel channel to confirm some
of the traffic so that a Man-In-The-Middle cannot split the line in two
and emulate each end to the other end.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike Andrews)
Subject: Re: Q: 'Linear encipherment'
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 19:15:23 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
:>
:> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
:> > 1. What is a 'linear encipherment'?
:>
:> Kahn should have said, "vector".
: Unfortunately I am also ignorant of the concept 'vector' in
: cryptology. Understandably, the term could not be found in the
: index in Kahn's book. I also failed to find it in a few crypto
: textbooks that I have, including F. L. Bauer's, which seems to
: cover classical cryptology fairly well. Would you please (1) give
: the definition of 'vector' alias 'linear encipherment', eventually
: with a mini-example, (2) give a literature reference where the
: term 'vector' is used? I know 'vector' only in the context of
: linear algebra.
I'm certain that 'vector' in this context has the meaning usually
associated with 'vector' in linear algebra; the Hill schema is just
linear algebra as an implementation of a cryptosystem.
:> > 2. ... When Kahn claimed that one is less secure than the
:> > other, wasn't he basing his argument on different amounts of
:> > key materials?
:>
:> No, re-read his entire discussion. He pointed out that there
:> is a different amount of what we now call "diffusion" of the
:> plaintext through the ciphertext.
: Following your kind advice, I have re-read Kahn's text but
: unfortunately once again faialed to find an answer to the question
: I raised. Consider what he wrote:
: This is because the linear encipherment employs a greater
: number of arbitrary key constants in its equations.
: Doesn't the phrase 'employs a greater number of arbitrary key
: constants' mean 'uses a larger key'? If yes, then, as I said in
: my original post, Kahn's point concerning comparative strength
: is invalid. If no, would you please elaborate his sentences,
: in particular the above one, eventually with a mini-example, to
: clearly point out where my misunderstanding stems?
Here, I must confess, I'm at a loss to understand exactly what
Kahn really meant. I _do_ wish he had an accompanying answer book
and appropriate worked examples. Since he doesn't, I'll have to
do the work myself. That's what my degree's in, so it shouldn't
take more than a few years. ;=)
--
"I sense much NT in you. NT leads to Blue Screen, Blue Screen leads to downtime,
downtime leads to suffering. NT is the path to the Dark Side."
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On jamming interception networks
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 20:38:58 +0100
Jerry Coffin wrote:
>
> > > My point is that the vast majority of people are
> > > *not* targets of surveillance, and in particular communication
> > > strictly between US citizens is not targeted by US intelligence
> > > agencies except under certain limited, controlled conditions
> > > (such as when there is probable cause that the persons are
> > > involved in espionage or terrorism).
> >
> > As far as I am aware, what you said IS virtually the 'official'
> > position. If you believe that, I certainly can't argue to convince
> > you of the opposite.
>
> I think Doug is (mostly) right, though I think it's dictated far more
> by practicality than the law. The simple fact is that there's just
> WAY to much communication going on for it to be practical to monitor
> it all. Even if Echelon has done a LOT to let a computer help pick
> out the conversations and such that are interesting, you've STILL got
> to pick your targets carefully, or you end up with a _huge_ amount of
> garbage to try to pick the few nuggets of real information out of.
Certainly, where good targets can be located, it would be a folly
to ignore these and instead either look at everything or randomly
pick a certain percentage of the whole traffic. Such targets are
certainly followed with priority. But besides these definitely
interesting targets it is evidently a reasonable strategy to also
look at some of the rest materials as long as the resources permit.
(Why let machines be idle sometimes and not run to their full
capacity?)
> > As I said, the problem is not only (1) what the criteria are but
> > also (2) how the criteria are applied in practice. (2) is no
> > less important than (1).
>
> There ARE likely to be differences between the two, but I'd bet that
> to a large extent the differences tend toward the real criteria being
> even more restrictive than the official ones. It all comes back to
> bandwidth: the NSA is really a relatively small agency with
> comapratively limited capabilities. They've _got_ to be as
> intelligent as possible in choosing their targets to have any hope of
> accomplishing anything.
>
> Compare the probably size of the NSA's budget to that of a large but
> much more mundane organization, and you quickly realize that the NSA
> simply can't afford to spend much time, effort or money on wild goose
> chases.
I am not considering any particular national agency. If anything,
I am considering machineries on the scale of the legendary Echelon,
which is an multi-national project. ('Legendary' because its
existence was, or maybe still is, denied.)
I don't agree with your view of the difference between real and
'official' criteria, i.e. the direction (sense) of difference.
Operators are humans. What if a few of these are corrupt and use
the machinaries to carry out economical espionages in return for
money to earn a better living, although such activities are
not on the list of their 'official' duties? There are certainly
'controls'. But controls of such machineries are understandably
more difficult and less likely to be perfect than other
undertakings of the government, I am afraid.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Cryonics and cryptanalysis
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 19:23:51 GMT
John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
:>If you think this will work, here's a marketing scheme for you - used by
:>the ancient Egyptians, no less.
: They invented the chain letter? Something I didn't know about history!
That's why it's called a "pyramid" marketing plan ;-)
: However, I don't think that this works the same way; it is a question
: of responsible behavior, not foolish behavior. If cryonics is seen to
: "work", it will ultimately be handled by the government in most
: countries, even if not in the U.S., just like the rest of medical
: care, or the telephones or the post office.
If it becomes possible, I'm sure unfreezings will happen. Cryogenic
corporations will no-doubt eventually build their businesses by quoting
"revival" statistics, for those whose problems can be cured by modern
technology.
I doubt that the unfreezers will be motivated by the prospect of averting
their own deaths, though.
:>Motiviating people not to contribute to the population problem is tricky,
:>due to the way folks are built. [...]
: I'm thinking that if it becomes popular, we might well have a
: population control movement that becomes powerful enough to cause
: countries to attack other countries that don't get with the program.
Eeeek!
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
When you leave, take someone with you.
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Can someone break this cipher?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 19:38:21 GMT
John <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[without a description, no one will bother to analyse your system]
: That seems like a paradox. If nobody will bother without doing
: it "the right way," could their not be some good "stuff" out
: there that nobody knows about.
Perhaps. Knowing that something's good is an important prerequisite for
using it in secure applications. If nobody has any good reasons to
beleive a system is actually strong, it is unlikely to see serious use.
: If you want security, isn't it better if nobody knows how it works?
No. If nobody knows how it works, nobody knows *if* it works,
probably including you.
Do deploy a system which has not had the opportunity for its working
to be examined in detail by others invites disaster.
: I know that there is no link between the two ideas of releasing the
: details, but let's assume someone was able to verify a good encoder.
: If they did the right tests, etc. If they were sure of the security, and
: they really wanted security, what would be the advantage
: of "leaking" the details? [...]
This question is not useful, because there *are* no foolproof tests for
security.
You can't just do the equivalent of immersing the cypher and looking for
bubbles.
Or rather - you /can/ do this - but the absence of bubbles does not imply
an absence of leaks.
It's better to release the details, and have a whole army of people attack
the cypher on your behalf, before you place your trust in it.
Probably the majority of cypher systems that are proposed have serious
flaws. Unless you are prepared to invite scrutiny from all sides, you
can't easily tell if your system is among these.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Real programs don't eat cache.
------------------------------
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OAP-L3 Encryption Software - Complete Help Files at web site
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 19:49:29 GMT
In sci.crypt Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Tim Tyler wrote:
:> How is /anyone/ supposed to evaluate the security of the project, when
:> there's no source code available?
:>
:> I don't rate the "description" of the algorithm as being very coherent,
:> either. For example, there's lots of stuff abouit "rotating sets",
:> without specifying the direction of rotation. I doubt the information
:> provided is sufficient for a third-party to write either a decryptor or an
:> encryptor.
: If I wrote a program that says it will add any two numbers and
: give you the result all you would need to do is run it with test
: data and see if it works.
: This is what you can do with OAP-L3. All the test data and
: explanations are provided.
Test data is practically worthless in crypography.
It's not much use for seeing if an addition program works correctly,
either.
For security, you need comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the
system.
It is not possible to produce the same result by providing "test data".
While there are tests for insecurity, there are no tests for security.
A lack of demonstrable insecurity through pssing some test or another is
not equivalent to demonstrating something is secure.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
That's just peanuts to space.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: NSA now has a FAQ
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 20:54:37 GMT
In article <89h1db$3sg$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Nuno Jaime Cardoso <
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> You liked it??
>>
>> I Loved it. I am Portuguese so, NSA doesn't have that big efect on me but, I
>> realy loved this question:
>>
>> "Lately, I've seen NSA/CSS a lot in movies and on TV. Do you
>> assassinate people? Do you secretly perform experiments on us?
>>
>> Because we work with highly sensitive information, we are
>> frequently the
>> subject of speculation - and highly imaginative and
> creative
>> fictitious
>> pieces in the media. However, it is important to
> distinguish
>> fiction from fact.
>> The fact is that the Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333)
> strictly
>> prohibits any
>> intelligence agency from conducting these unethical
>> activities, and we
>> strictly abide by the Order. "
>>
>> I don't know mutch about US recent History but, that makes me want to say:
>>
>> "I am not a murderer, I am not a murderer" :)))))
>>
>The NSA actively gathered intelligence on
>American citizens until the 1970s. On the
>History Channel, Lt. Col. Dan Marvin told about
>his days as an assassin for the Green Berets
>and that he was requested to kill a U.S. Naval
>Officer in 1965. Former Army seargent
>Clifford Stone has also spoken about U.S.
>Goverment- led assassination of American
>citizens. Nowadays, for the sake of the
>security of deep black projects, a hitman
>would be contracted from the private WFO
>(work for others contracting) sector. This is
>done for reasons of cover-up, i.e. plausible
>deniability, and major governmental entities
>like the NSA are not knowingly involved in
>this kind of activity.
I don't think this is ture. The US government has
hitmen directly on the pay roll. You could even call
the sniper who killed the unarmed woman holding a
baby at Ruby Ridge a hit man. He was so good at killing
moms with babies that he was specificly assigned to
Waco where once again the FBI needed a killer not afraid
of killing unarmed women with babies. Who knows how
many women and children the FBI has had him kill for
Uncle Sam.
I expect to see more cover ups in the news on Waco in the
near future. It least the FBI does a good job of hiding evidence
and it rebarrels the guns of its killers when they get the job
done as in Waco. I would be willing to bet the reinactment
of the shooting will prove the FBI correct in that it will show
that they were not firing. Of course the testing will be a setup
and special gun powder will be used to get the results the
FBI wants. And yes my mom worked for the FBI they are above
the law anybody who thinks other wise is stupid.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website NOT FOR WIMPS
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott rejected paper for the ACM
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/dspaper.htm
Scott famous Compression Page WIMPS allowed
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
"The road to tyranny, we must never forget, begins with the destruction of the
truth."
------------------------------
From: "Lyalc" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: brute force attack on a 128 bit SSL key?
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2000 07:09:00 +1100
Give the man a cigar!
lyal
John E. Kuslich wrote in message ...
>The correct answer is about twenty seconds.
>
>This is the amount of time it would take to install a trojan on the target
>machine which would create a back door for the plain text recovery.
>
>Never take them head - on. :--)
>
>JK http://www.crak.com Password Recovery Software for QuickBooks and more
>
>
>
>Michael Sierchio <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>>
>> Applied Cryptography, EFF and AWT produced, for the cost of $250,000, a
>> DES cracking machine which checks 90 G keys/s. Since the brute force
>> search of the keyspace can be distributed, it's reasonable to talk
>> about keys searched per dollar per second (or hour, or year).
>>
>> Assume the following:
>>
>> Such a machine could be built for RC4, Blowfish, etc.
>>
>> the machine would cost $10,000
>>
>> the machine could check 1 T k/s (1 Million Million keys per second)
>>
>> Then we can search approx. 3.16 x 10^15 keys/$-year
>>
>> If a brute force key search will find the key on average after searching
>> half the key space (2^127), then note that
>>
>> 2^127 keys / 3.16 E 15 keys/$-y == 5.39 E22 $-y
>>
>> In other words, if these machines were plentiful, and you could spend
>> the estimated total currency supply of the US (ca. $600,000,000,000),
>> it would take roughly 9 E 10 years, or about 15 times the life of
>> the universe.
>>
>> NOTE: I have ignore the effect of Moore's Law -- which is not a
continuous
>> but a discrete function -- which if it were to hold would imply a
doubling
>> of keys / $-y every 1.5 years. I'll work on those calculations and get
>> back to you... ;-)
>
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 21:23:35 +0100
From: Patrick Braunsberger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Zip file decrypt
Hi there !
I urgently need a zip file decrypted.
A Brute Force attack would take too long i think because the password is
9 characters (minimum).
Are there any other ways to find the password ?
Exists an application which can "share" the task to many other computers
in the internet ?
Can somebody help me ???
By the way: I need that for LEGAL purposes !
Patrick
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy
Subject: Re: OAP-L3 Encryption Software - Complete Help Files at web site
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 13:22:34 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
[ ... ]
> Test data is practically worthless in crypography.
Yes and no. It's very helpful in verifying that you've implemented
an algorithm correctly. It usually tells you essentially nothing
about the algorithm itself though. A sufficiently bad algorithm will
typically produce output with measurable statistical anomolies, but a
statistical analysis will really only separate the algorithms that
are almost certainly bad from those that are only very likely to be
bad.
> A lack of demonstrable insecurity through pssing some test or another is
> not equivalent to demonstrating something is secure.
No, but having some regression vectors for the encryption algorithm
itself is still pretty darned useful. Much as you've implied above,
it won't guarantee that the implementation is always correct, but at
least if the output is wrong, you know something needs fixing...
--
Later,
Jerry.
The universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: "Markku J. Saarelainen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
alt.politics.org.cia,soc.culture.nordic,soc.culture.russian,soc.culture.soviet
Subject: I know one person from Finland who is actually one extremely intelligent
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 20:40:24 GMT
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: 'Linear encipherment'
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 21:48:02 +0100
Mike Andrews wrote:
>
> I'm certain that 'vector' in this context has the meaning usually
> associated with 'vector' in linear algebra; the Hill schema is just
> linear algebra as an implementation of a cryptosystem.
Could you provide a mini-example showing 'vector' encryption?
Please show what are the 'elements' of the 'vector'. I suppose
one doesn't call 'any' sequence of numbers a 'vector' in the
present context. One 'can', of course, but doing that doesn't
convey any particular meaning relevant to crypto, I am afraid.
(I mean such 'vector' encryption should have some features that
distinguish it from other encryptions.)
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: IDEA question.
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 20:38:40 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Chris DiTrani) wrote:
> I wrote a little utility to en/decrypt files using IDEA, building the
> encryption key from a user provided pass phrase. In order to confirm
> that a file is being decrypted with the correct pass phrase, I encrypt
> a block containing known (but not secret) data and append it to the
> file before encrypting the file (so this block is encrypted twice). I
> can look at the block after decrypting the file to confirm (to some
> certainty). My question is, am I appreciably weakening the encryption
> with this approach? Is there a better way?
>
What kind of information is in the block of known information that
you're first encrypting?
csybrandy
> Thanks,
>
> CD
>
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Best language for encryption??
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 14:11:29 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Douglas A. Gwyn"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> You have really mischaracterized those programming languages,
> apparently from lack of familiarity with all of them except
> (perhaps) BASIC.
That does not answer the lack of standardization that one sees in
contrived C++ coding that attempts to solve petty problems in infinite
convoluted ways.
>...however, it *can* be achieved in any language
> that is not too crippled. Choosing a programming language is
> an issue that has many relevant factors to be considered, none
> of which did you address. (Nor shall I, as that thread would
> have little relevance to sci.crypt.)
C does some things quite well, but it is weak in some handy crypto areas.
One is faced with reinventing the wheel to get many routine things done.
>... If you know BASIC, feel
> free to use it, but even if you manage to overcome all the
> obstacles it puts in the way of implementing RSA (hint: you
> need a bignum library), the result will be much slower than
> if you had chosen any of several other possible languages.
I don't know about that. Perhaps your knowldege of BASIC is shy, at least
the power that is in the product I use. I'll continue to learn on the C
level, but the obtuse ways of doing some things with it make it a rather
immature in abilities. That is why you need C++, which you should be able
to do without. I do use a compiled BASIC, not interpreted.
--
Many are waking up to the reality of insecurity; imagine that!
You can work against it....or go back to sleep and become a victim.
Users have the right to know if software can abuse their privacy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Want to poke holes in this protocol?
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 20:50:27 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Johan Hoogenboezem schrieb:
> > I'm using the key generation that comes with cryptix.org's cleanroom
> > implementation of Sun's Java Cryptography Extension. I'm using RSA
(1536-bit
> > key) for the public-private key encryption and Blowfish (128-bit
key) for the
> > symmetrical part. I am considering El-Gamal for the public-private
key
> > encryption though, because I might have picked up a bug in the
implementation
> > of the RSA algorithm. I'm not sure yet. If you think of anything
else, I'd be
> > happy to know about it
>
> Hmm I would suggest El-Gamal, because its free (even if RSA will be
free
> soon,
> too, end of June if I remember correctly), and Twofish or one of the
> other AES
> candidates for symmetric encryption, because Blowfish works only with
a
> 64 bit
> blocksize. You know that DES can be broken today just because of its
> small 64
> bit blocksize ? You can buy machines for brute-force attacks which can
> break
> any DES-encrypted message in about a week. Really, Blowfish is not
what
> I
> would be using for my money ! Twofish is as free as Blowfish, btw. The
> other
> AES candidates are not, at least they state it not in that way.
Uh, I hate to tell you this, but it's not the small block size that is
the reason DES can be brute-forced, it's DES's 56 bit key size.
Blowfish does not neccessarily have this weakness because you can have
keys up to 448 bits, thought typically seen using 128 bit keys.
>
> But the major problem in your protocol (besides good random numbers of
> course,
> I just hope thats not the problem here) is how does the bank get B's
> public
> key ? You see, B has to generate its public/private key, but a man in
> the
> middle can always simulate 'I'm B' with an own public/private key. I
> would
> suggest that you think a little more about that point. You need a
> validation.
>
> For example, if you give your client the public key of your bank, he
or
> she
> may send his or her public key encrypted with the public key of the
> bank. Then
> the man of the middle, if he cannot alter the public key of the bank
> which you
> gave B, will fail, and you have an authentification. But you have to
be
> sure
> the client get the correct bank key ! It would be good if you send
your
> software to him on a physical CD or such. That is really hard to fake.
>
That is a good idea, as long as you got the right CD. Lord knows what
kind of mischief can occur if someone created their own custom CD's and
slipped them into the bank's collection :-)
csybrandy
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Robert Reynard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Zip file decrypt
Date: Tue, 29 Feb 2000 16:07:47 -0500
Patrick Braunsberger wrote:
>
> Hi there !
>
> I urgently need a zip file decrypted.
>
Try Peter Conrad at http://www.unix-ag.uni-kl.de/~conrad
------------------------------
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