Cryptography-Digest Digest #265, Volume #11 Mon, 6 Mar 00 12:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: RC4 and salt ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Can someone break this cipher? ("Wesley H. Horton")
Re: online-Banking: 128-Bit SSL or Java-Applet ? (Paul Rubin)
Re: Passphrase Quality ? (Guy Macon)
Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent (John Savard)
Re: Passphrase Quality ? (jungle)
Re: differential cryptanalysis (John Savard)
Re: math error? NOT AT ALL ... (Anton Stiglic)
The Voynich manuscript ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent (Mike Andrews)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: RC4 and salt
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 14:34:44 GMT
David A. Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: No, that's not the standard method (I hope not, anyway!), and to me it
: sounds scary and quite possibly insecure. (See Roos' RC4 analysis.)
I was led to this URL for Roos' analysis:
http://turing.vironix.co.za/public/andrewr/Cryptography.htm
The machine does not seem to exist. Anyone out there know a working
site to find this paper?
Thanks,
Charles R. Wright
------------------------------
From: "Wesley H. Horton" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Can someone break this cipher?
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 08:59:23 -0600
Mary-Jayne,
I think you missed my point. My point is this:
If you have a cipher system which is being used to protect sensitive
information, you should invest at least the anticipated value of the
information, to ensure your information remains unavailable.
Case in point, If I am sending confidential information which is worth
$10.00 I need to make sure that for that amount of money, no one is
going to break my cipher. Now, I could afford a $10.00 loss, so I could
use any one of several simple systems.
Now, lets change the equation a bit, let us use as an example,
information regarding the commission of a crime. Let us say that the
information, if made available to the police and justice system would
lead to the conviction of a crime with a mandatory 10 years in prison.
Would you anticipate, that a group such as the FBI would be able to
mobilize the manpower to crack most simple cipher systems ---Would you
bet 10 years of your life on it?
Lets us consider a more significant case, military ciphers and codes.
Do you remember the lesson of the Germans and Japanese during W.W.II?
The Germans were sure that the enigma was secure. Their delusion cost
them thousands of lives and possibly the war. The Japanese, while a
little more cautious, had significant losses due to allied crypto
efforts. The only system that was not broken during W.W.II was the
American SIGABA. Even then, American cryptographers were very vigilant.
Let us assume you are going to publish your cipher and sell a computer
version of it. How long do you think it would take someone to decompile
the program and discover the algorithm? Would your cipher continue to
stand up to scrutiny? Are you willing to risk a significant lawsuit
that your cipher is safe?
Try enciphering 5000 "A"s or better yet 10,000. Are there any repeats?
Why not post such an encipherment. If your system is secure, it should
be able to withstand examination after such a posting.
Better yet, after making such a posting, change the key and encipher
another 5,000 or 10,000 "A"'s.
You are asking people to devote a significant amount of time and effort
to break a cipher which you have devised and are offering no reward. I
don't know too many people interested in cryptography who are willing to
spend hours of their time, just so you can say "I out smarted you!" The
simple question is why should anyone bother (And please do not think
that this is a personal attack, it is not.)
Regards,
Wesley Horton
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: online-Banking: 128-Bit SSL or Java-Applet ?
Date: 6 Mar 2000 15:10:07 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Phil <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>As developer of ecommerce-applications (online-banking related) I have to
>evaluate the best method of SECURE TRANSMISSION and USER AUTHENTIFICATION.
>
>The 2 most realistic Alternatives are:
>
>No 1: Java Applet solution with 128-Bit encryption (maybe with port-hopping)
>No 2: 128-Bit Browsers (now available even outside of the US.)
This is a total no-brainer. Using a special applet for what you're doing
is just about completely crazy.
Use SSL. Every online bank that I know of does this. If you need 128
bits, use a server-gated cryptography certificate (Verisign Global ID).
These are available to banks and shift most 40-bit browsers (NS or IE
version 4.x or later, and IE 3.x with a service pack) up to 128 bits.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Subject: Re: Passphrase Quality ?
Date: 06 Mar 2000 10:19:05 EST
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Stephen P.) wrote:
>tell them to use some poem as the passphrase !? no, sorry, i'm left
>muddled. but i do have a question about all this. how can i go about
>generating a password that i can't remember but can easily produce if at my
>machine? and .. please .. don't tell me to go ask alice.
Simple. write it on a postit note and stick it on your monitor.
That's what millions of workers do every day when faced with idiot
MIS departments that force them to use hard to remember passwords.
For the rest of us who have a choice, here is one good method
Write a sentence that you will remember. Something never published.
Something hard to guess but easy to remember, like "how can i go about
generating a password that i can't remember but can easily produce?"
how
can
i
go
about
generating
a
password
that
i
can't
remember
but
can
easily
produce?"
h
c
i
g
a
g
a
p
t
i
c
r
b
c
e
p
Your password is hcigagapticrbcep.
Easy to remember, hard to guess.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 08:47:15 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote, in part:
>In order to protect our intelectual property (software) from decompiling
>freaks, we need to build our crypto software in a tamper resistent
>device for our network crypto cards.
You may indeed need to do this to protect software from being copied,
but you don't need to do it so that you can do encryption securely -
publicly known algorithms can do this.
Tamper-resistance is sometimes done in industry by putting chips in
potting compounds; I've heard a substance used by dentists is quite
good; but I'm not sure that chipmakers offer this sort of thing to
commercial customers.
John Savard (jsavard<at>ecn<dot>ab<dot>ca)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Subject: Re: Passphrase Quality ?
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 15:46:31 GMT
now I'm sure that this subject is not & will not be clear for you ...
Guy Macon wrote:
>
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (jungle) wrote:
> >
> >IMO you did get all this wrong ...
> >my way is to never remember pass text ...
> >you will not spit a dummy only when you don't know the dummy,
> >is it clear now for you ?
> >
> 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
===================
> mimsy were the borogoves, and the mome raths outgrabe.
>
> is also it clear now for as well you ?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: differential cryptanalysis
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 08:51:49 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote, in part:
>In a previous article, Julien Carme <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>Given E a blocks cypher, using a n-bits key K.
>>Imagine now that, for each block Bi, instead of encrypting it with K,
>>you generate a n-bits random number Ri, and you use K'=K^Ri as new key.
>
>Do you mean K'=K^Ri or do you mean K'=K^Ri mod N?
He means K'=K xor Ri, not K'=K to the power Ri, modulo or not. (^ is
used as an XOR operator in C, and a 'contents of address' operator in
Pascal, although it serves for exponentiation in BASIC, which was even
more appropriate when it was an up-arrow instead of a caret.)
John Savard (jsavard<at>ecn<dot>ab<dot>ca)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: math error? NOT AT ALL ...
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 10:52:09 -0500
==============545F41E38AC04AD0A7A579CA
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
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I don't know if it's wort replying to this, but here goes.
If you have a password system where a password is composed
of 10 items, each item having 4 chars, then the total amount of
different passwords that may exist in that system is 4^10, that
is 4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4 = 4^10 (an *not* 4x10).
Why, just think of it this way, when you create a password, you start
by choosing the first item, for which you have 4 possibilities, and then
you choose a second (4 possibilities for that one), and then.... and finaly
you choose a last item (4 possibilities for that one). A simple rule of
thumb is that an *and* translates into a multiplication in probability.
If you don't understand this, try working it out with a password of
length 2, that is you need to choose 2 items, for each item you have
4 possible choices, see how many possible passwords you can get.
If the possible chars are {a,b,c,d}, then the valid passwords are:
aa, ba, ca, da, ba, bb, bc, bd, ca, cb, cc, cd, da, db, dc, dd
which makes 2^4 = 16 possibilites (*not* 2x4).
And a final thing, nPr = n!/ (n-r)!*r!
I can't explain you that here, you need any descent calculus book
for that.
Anton
jungle wrote:
> I will do again, this time specially for you ...
>
> he is building pass from 10 words, each word is = 2 random char ...
>
> my assumption is, that each word is = 4 random char, not 2 ...
>
> therefore the key space is 4 [ char ] x 10 [ words ] = 40 char long ...
>
> for the 40 char long pass, key space for brut force is
>
> nPr = n!/(n-r)! ; when n = 40 & r=40 [ 26 lower case + 14 other characters to
> simplify calculation !!! ]
> nPr = 40! = 8.2 x 10 ^ 47 >>>> 8.2 x ( 10 to power 47 ) >>>>> 10 to power 48
>
> the ball is in your court ...
==============545F41E38AC04AD0A7A579CA
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<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
I don't know if it's wort replying to this, but here goes.
<p>If you have a password system where a password is composed
<br>of 10 items, each item having 4 chars, then the total amount of
<br>different passwords that may exist in that system is 4^10, that
<br>is 4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4 = 4^10 (an *not* 4x10).
<br>Why, just think of it this way, when you create a password, you start
<br>by choosing the first item, for which you have 4 possibilities, and
then
<br>you choose a second (4 possibilities for that one), and then.... and
finaly
<br>you choose a last item (4 possibilities for that one). A simple
rule of
<br>thumb is that an *and* translates into a multiplication in probability.
<br>If you don't understand this, try working it out with a password of
<br>length 2, that is you need to choose 2 items, for each item you have
<br>4 possible choices, see how many possible passwords you can get.
<br>If the possible chars are {a,b,c,d}, then the valid passwords are:
<br> aa, ba, ca, da, ba, bb, bc, bd, ca, cb, cc, cd, da, db,
dc, dd
<br>which makes 2^4 = 16 possibilites (*not* 2x4).
<p>And a final thing, nPr = n!/ (n-r)!*r!
<br>I can't explain you that here, you need any descent calculus book
<br>for that.
<p>Anton
<br>
<br>
<p>jungle wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>I will do again, this time specially for you ...
<p>he is building pass from 10 words, each word is = 2 random char ...
<p>my assumption is, that each word is = 4 random char, not 2 ...
<p>therefore the key space is 4 [ char ] x 10 [ words ] = 40 char long
...
<p>for the 40 char long pass, key space for brut force is
<p>nPr = n!/(n-r)! ; when n = 40 & r=40 [ 26 lower case + 14 other
characters to
<br>simplify calculation !!! ]
<br>nPr = 40! = 8.2 x 10 ^ 47 >>>> 8.2 x ( 10 to power 47 ) >>>>>
10 to power 48
<p>the ball is in your court ...</blockquote>
<pre></pre>
</html>
==============545F41E38AC04AD0A7A579CA==
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: The Voynich manuscript
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 16:15:17 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RULES IN THE Voynich MANUSCRIPT
by
Antoine CASANOVA
________________________________________________________________________
___
Address
=======
6, Allee des erables, 93140 BONDY (France).
E-mail
======
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Summary
=======
>From the transcriptions of Captain Prescott Currier and William
F.
Friedman, we show that the terms of the Voynich manuscript are built
with
synthetic rules. The results which we obtain could lead us to
consolidate
the John Tiltman's assumption according to which the Voynich
manuscript
would be written with a synthetic universal language.
Key words
=========
Voynich manuscript, ciphers, ciphered manuscript, rules, structure,
term.
Theory
======
In the Voynich manuscript, it was noted by Currier [2] and by Tiltman
[3]
[5] that "words" or "sentences" differ from each other by only one
symbol,
as 8AR differs from SAR, although this characteristic is found in
the
written natural language, one does not note it within the same
proportion.
The assumption raised by Tiltman, and according to which the
written
language of the manuscript is probably a synthetic universal
language,
could be the cause of this characteristic.
Indeed, in the universal language of Raymond Lulle but also in
the
universal language of Athanasius Kircher, Dalgarno or Wilkins, the
words
and the sentences are successively repeated and differ only on
the
substantive, the adjective, the verb of the proposal or on another
symbol
used as a changer of reference [4].
However, until now, it has not been proven yet that the Voynich
manuscript
was written with a synthetic language. Indeed, the manuscript may not
be a
real cryptogram for one could just as easily support the thesis of the
use
of a phonetic written form.
We propose here to show that the terms of the Voynich manuscript are
built
with synthetic rules which exclude the assumption of a written
natural
language.
Method
======
The method suggested rests on the calculation of the Hamming
distance
between the terms of the manuscript [1]. We extract the terms from
the
Voynich manuscript and we gather them according to their dimension.
We
obtain groups of terms. Each term has as many positions of substitution
as
it contains letters. In each group of terms we enter the Hamming
distances
equal to the unit on each possible position of each
term.
Results
=======
At the conclusion of the operation of accounting we come to a table
with
two entries: The dimensions of the terms and the possible positions of
the
substitutions of letters within each term. At the intersection of
these
entries is the accounting of the Hamming distances equal to the
unit.
>From the two transcriptions, reviewed and corrected by the EVMT, made
by
Captain Prescott Currier and by William F. Friedman, we obtain two
series
of results which are shown in Table 1 and in Table 2.
Term \ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Position
3 177 55 108
4 247 150 117 154
5 269 131 163 112143
6 130 67 86 49 52 70
7 40 21 27 29 17 11 18
8 1 2 6 6 2 2 2 3
Table 1 Currier's transcription. On the basis of 4415
terms.
Term \ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Position
3 194 120 158
4 397 308 195 253
5 459 263 315 208 276
6 238 143 171 164 121 170
7 81 40 58 42 38 43 43
8 8 2 9 5 8 9 5 7
Table 2 Friedman's transcription. On the basis of 6195
terms.
To obtain more precision on the terms made up of seven and eight letters
we
synthesize these two tables in only one and we obtain the following
table:
Term 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 7,14 3,18 5,00
4 12,00 8,37 5,80 7,57
5 13,50 7,21 8,78 5,89 7,69
6 6,79 3,83 4,71 3,76 3,13 4,33
7 2,21 1,12 1,55 1,33 1,00 0,94 1,10
8 0,15 0,08 0,28 0,22 0,17 0,19 0,13 0,18
Table 3 Calculation based on the proportion of terms of
each
transcription.
By considering the decreasing order of the ratios one obtains the
table
below. It describes the priorities or the order of the substitution of
the
letters within the terms. The diversity obtained by substituting
the
letters within the terms creates all the words of the dictionary used
to
write the text of the manuscript.
Term 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 1 3 2
4 1 2 4 3
5 1 4 2 5 3
6 1 4 2 5 6 3
7 1 4 2 3 6 7 5
8 6 8 1 2 3 4 7 5
Table 4 Order of the substitution of the letters within the
terms
of the manuscript.
We translate the table with inequalities to reveal the
synthetic
construction of the terms.
Term
3 > <
4 > > <
5 > < > <
6 > < > > <
7 > < > > > <
8 > < > > < > <
Table 5
We read them this way: For a word of three letters the first position
is
more substituted than the second position �>� and the latter is
less
substituted than the third position ' < '. the structure is as follows:
' >
< '.
Rules
=====
The manuscript contains terms with structures which are well ordered
and
dependent on one another.
>From Table 4, one notices four rules governing the constitution of
the
terms comprising three, four, five, six and seven
letters:
1. The first letter of a term is the most substituted. It represents
the
most important manpower of the various positions.
2. The penultimate position within a term is the least substituted
position.
3. The third letter is the second letter which is the most substituted
when it does not occupy the penultimate position within the term
(Except for a term made up of eight letters for which we do not
have
sufficient statistical data to reveal its structure, Cf. Table 1 et
Table 2).
4. The last position is systematically more substituted than the
penultimate letter of the term.
The remarks 1 and 2 lead to the following table:
Term 1 2
3 4 5 6 7
3 1 3
2
4 1 2
4 3
5 1 4
2 5 3
6 1 4
2 5 6 3
7 1 4
2 3 6 7 5
Table 6
Rule 1 A term has the first position which is the
most
substituted.
Rule 2 The penultimate position within a term is the
least
substituted position.
These two rules are impossible to circumvent for the construction
of a
term. They have priority over any other rule.
Table 5 shows us that the terms are built with the same logic
of
calculation.
Rule 3 One passes from a term of dimension (n) to a smaller
or
larger term by withdrawing or by adding a unit to all
the
positions [2,n] of the initial term.
Let us detail this operation and apply this methodology.
Application of the rules
========================
Example 1 Research of the structure of a term made up of 5
letters starting from a term of 6 letters.
Let us start by writing the order of the substitution of the letters
for a
term made up of n=6 letters. The order is written as
such:
1 | n-2| n-4 | n-1 | n | n-3
If one wishes to know the order of the substitution of the letters
for a
term made up of n=5 letters then we realize the following
operation:
A 1 n-2 n-4 n-1 n n-3
B 0 1 1 1 1 1
A+B 1 n-2+1 n-4+1 n-1+1 n+1 n-3+1
Result 1 n-1 n-3 n n+1 n-2
The result of the operation cannot be lower than the unit or higher
than
the dimension of term (n), then the order (n+1) is
impossible.
Thus, there remains the following order:
1 | n-1 | n-3 | n | n-2
Which is the order of the substitution of a term made up of five
letters
(n=5):
1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3
Example 2 Research of the structure of a term made up of 4
letters starting from a term comprising 5 letters.
This operation is possible for all the terms. But it is advisable
to
respect Table 6, Rule 1 and Rule 2. Indeed, when we compute the order
of a
term comprising four letters (n=4) we come to a result false for
the
suppression of an impossible order (n+1) justifies the order
(n).
We draw up the following table:
A 1 n-1 n-3 n n-2
B 0 1 1 1 1
A+B 1 n-1+1 n-3+1 n+1 n-2+1
Result 1 n n-2 n+1 n-1
If we do not comply with the two basic rules we obtain the false
result:
1 | n | n-2 | n-1 = 1 | 4 | 2 | 3
For indeed the construction { 1 | n | n-2 | n+1| n-1 } does not comply
with
the second rule. (n) must be in place of (n+1) and therefore the (n)
cannot
be in a second position. Thus, the construction becomes:
1 | n-2 | n| n-1 = 1 | 2 | 4 | 3
Example 3 Research of the structure of a term made up of 3
letters starting from a term comprising 4 letters.
We continue this reasoning by seeking the structure of a term made up
of
three letters (n=3).
A 1 n-2 n n-1
B 0 1 1 1
A+B 1 n-2+1 n+1 n-1+1
Result 1 n-1 n+1 n
The case is identical to that of the determination of a term made up
of
four letters starting from a term comprising five letters. We notice
here
that (n+1) is impossible. According to the rule the penultimate position
is
necessarily occupied by (n). Here, the last position is taken by (n),
this
case is not allowed thus the construction of the term only can be: 1 |
n |
n-1 which is indeed the order: 1 | 3 | 2.
Example 4 Explanation of an uncertainty. Research of the
structure of a term comprising 8 letters starting from a term
made up of 7 letters.
We feel however uncertain about the order of the substitution of
the
letters in a term made up of eight letters (n=8, cf. Counts 3). We
are
going to determine if the fifth position is indeed smaller than the
sixth
position.
The construction of a term made up of seven letters is: 1 | n-3 | n-5 |
n-2
| n-1 | n | n-3. To determine the order of a term made up of eight
letters
we withdraw this time a unit instead of adding it. The operation is
thus
made:
A 1 n-3 n-5 n-2 n-1 n n-4
B 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
A-B 1 n-3-1 n-5-1 n-2-1 n-1-1 n-1 n-4-1
Result 1 n-4 n-6 n-3 n-2 n-1 n-5
1 | n-4 | n-6 | n-3 | n-2 | n-1 |n-5
The (n) does not appear, but according to the rule the penultimate
position
is the least substituted position. Thus (n) is found integrated in
this
construction:
1 | n-4 | n-6 | n-3 | n-2 | n-1 |n | n-5
This sequence would be the order of the substitution of a term made up
of
eight letters (n=8).
1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 7 |8 | 3
Conclusion
==========
The terms of the Voynich manuscript are built from synthetic rules
which
exclude the assumption from the use of a natural language for its
writing.
However, the rules which we have put forward could be the expression
of a
progressive modification, inspired from the discs of Alberti, from
the
encryption used by the writer(s) of the manuscript.
But we must conclude that currently it is not possible yet to know
this
enigma for we have only come to the stage of the research of the
structures
of terms, words, sentences and of texts of their interactions
and
connections. As soon as we establish the building sets of this
handwritten
text we will be able to move to the following stage of research
for
inductive analogy between the internal structures of the manuscript and
the
possible natural languages underlying with the handwritten
text.
Bibliography
============
[1] Antoine CASANOVA, Ph. D, University PARIS 8 (France), M�thode
d�analyse
du langage crypt� : Une contribution � l��tude du manuscrit de
Voynich,
Paris, 1999.
[2] Captain Prescott H. CURRIER, Some Important New Statistical
Findings,
Seminar on 30th November in Washington D.C, 1976.
[3] John H. TILTMAN, Interim report on the Voynich MS :
Personal
communication to W. F. FRIEDMAN, 5 may 1951.
[4] Umberto ECO, La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura
europa,
Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1994.
[5] Mary E. D'Imperio, The Voynich manuscript -An elegant enigma,
Fort
Meade, Maryland, National Security Agency, Central Security Service,
1978.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike Andrews)
Subject: Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2000 16:42:56 GMT
John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote, in part:
:>In order to protect our intelectual property (software) from decompiling
:>freaks, we need to build our crypto software in a tamper resistent
:>device for our network crypto cards.
: You may indeed need to do this to protect software from being copied,
: but you don't need to do it so that you can do encryption securely -
: publicly known algorithms can do this.
: Tamper-resistance is sometimes done in industry by putting chips in
: potting compounds; I've heard a substance used by dentists is quite
: good; but I'm not sure that chipmakers offer this sort of thing to
: commercial customers.
It's my understanding that IBM not only pots its crypto chips for the
mainframe crypto features, but also has conductors embedded in the
potting compound, so that attempts to abrade or erode the potting
compound mechanically or chemically will break a conductor and seroize
the chip.
IIRC, IBM does chip-fab for others, and may be willing to license
this protective technology.
--
"From empirical experience, your Exchange admin needs to put down the crack
pipe and open a window to disperse the fumes." -- Joe Thompson, ASR
------------------------------
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