Cryptography-Digest Digest #343, Volume #11 Wed, 15 Mar 00 17:13:02 EST
Contents:
Re: Improvement on Von Neumann compensator? (Scott Nelson)
Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference (Tim Tyler)
Re: new/old encryption technique (wtshaw)
Re: Improvement on Von Neumann compensator? (Scott Nelson)
Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference (Bryan Olson)
Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference (Tim Tyler)
Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference (Bryan Olson)
Re: Crypto Patents: Us, European and International. ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference (wtshaw)
Re: Weaknesses in Solitaire Algorithm Found (wtshaw)
Re: Cipher Contest ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: how to introduce hs students to cryptography (Doug Stell)
Re: pedagogical provably stupid protocols ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Improvement on Von Neumann compensator? (Bob Silverman)
Re: Universal Language (drickel)
Number 28 of a series (wtshaw)
Really Interested, Where do I look for ... (jack)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Nelson)
Subject: Re: Improvement on Von Neumann compensator?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 20:17:02 GMT
On 14 Mar 2000 22:59:47 EST, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon) wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Nelson)
>wrote:
>
>>Yes, measuring the total time between events is much better
>>than just using the least significant bit (a.k.a. latching
>>an oscillator.)
>>
>>If you measure time with infinite precision, and make the same
>>ridiculous independence assumptions that you must for the
>>Von Neumann compensator to work,
>>then this will produce unbiased bits.
>>If time is measured with finite precision,
>>then it's necessary to reject equal length timings,
>>but it will then theoretically produce unbiased bits.
>
>Would it not also answer Mike Rosing's observation that "The Von
>Neumann method will stop sending output if the system locks up
>and this proposal won't."?
>
If you reject equal length timings,
then the timing method can lock up too.
It's also theoretically possible for an event to never
occur, which could also be considered a lock up of sorts.
>>However, it's exceptionally unlikely that you are dealing
>>with actual independent events.
[snip]
>
>Hmmm. how about a von neumann compensator to remove such
>residual bias?
>
Unless you can absolutely guarantee that the events are
100% independent, Von Neumann's method won't produce
perfectly unbiased bits.
In real systems, you just can't get that.
That's why it's better to use a hashing function.
SHA1 doesn't care what kind of bias you have;
interdependence, sequency, frequency, offset -
it doesn't matter. Other "cheaper" hashing functions
like CRC or even XOR will do the same, though secure
hashing functions tend to be a little better at
retaining entropy. Hashing functions also have
the nice properties that they finish in a deteministic
amount of time, and you can do away with almost
all the other processing.
Scott Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
- Don't forget to vote on sci.crypt.random-numbers
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 20:04:15 GMT
John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter) wrote, in part:
:>Cipher systems which change ciphers must coordinate cipher changes on
:>both ends. It would be insane to do this as unciphered plaintext.
:>The opponents have no ability to force particular ciphers by changing
:>the ciphertext because changed ciphertext will be detected.
: But you see where this is heading. If all ciphers are insecure, except
: when multi-ciphering is used, then the negotiation cipher is insecure
: unless you negotiate the negotiation, and then...
: Of course, you've already addressed this point, by noting that one
: enciphers the negotiation using a longer key, and more encipherment
: steps, than are necessary when the algorithms are from a large pool,
: unknown to the attacker.
There's also the issue that the negotiation is very short and involves
very little transfer of information.
The information can undoubtedly be presented in a condensed form, so it's
plaintext characteristics can be concealed effectively.
Often, the probability of a break depends on the quantity of plaintext
transmitted under a single key. As this is small, it should be possible
to make this element of the system rather formidable to break into.
The consequences if the attacker breaks in are that he knows the order of
the cyphers. If the message is signed - or even if the encryption key
is not recovered by the break - any active attack is still defended
against.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
If it's God's will, who gets the money?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: new/old encryption technique
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 13:40:32 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Matthias Bruestle) wrote:
> If you have a good RNG you need not do ROT-XX games but can use e.g. XOR.
>
You suppose a binary based equivalent for characters in your set...totally
unnecessary.
--
Imagine an internet on an up and up basis, where there are no subversive techniques to
rob a person of their privacy or computer
functionality, no hidden schemes used to defraud anyone. :>)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Nelson)
Subject: Re: Improvement on Von Neumann compensator?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 20:28:47 GMT
On Wed, 15 Mar 2000 Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>Probably a very dumb question: Is it possible with today's techniques
>to get random values out of Brownian motions?
>
If you can measure it, and it has noise,
then you can use anything as a random generator.
Measuring brownian motion is a bit tricky, but in
principle a camera attached to microscope should
be able to detect it. The picture could be digitized
and distilled with SHA1. A lot like lavarand.
( http://lavarand.sgi.com/ )
It might be possible to do it cheaper -
a hall effect transistor in a fluid with
suspended magnetic particles might work.
(Then again, it might not.)
But it's doubtful that you could ever
approach the speed and cheapness of a reverse
bias diode, or other "electrical" noise sources.
------------------------------
From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 20:20:11 GMT
John Savard wrote:
> Bryan Olson wrote, in part:
>
> >A cipher is secrecy mechanism, and does not imply
> >authentication.
>
> Does not necessarily imply authentication. Presumably, a cipher
> technique including authentication is what is proposed.
I think "imply" already contains the "necessarily".
Clearly the solution to the problem Joseph Ashwood
observed is the authentication mechanism.
> This is criticising Terry Ritter for not dotting every i and crossing
> every t. Such criticism is legitimate, were it applied to a finished
> encryption product being offered for sale, since security does depend
> on covering all bases. Applying it to a conceptual sketch - even
> something on a website, instead of a brief description in posts -
> doesn't seem to make as much sense.
I agree, and I think the several people who have observed
the problem have pointed it out in a fair and reasonable
way. My first note on it was a response to you on May 6, in
which I simply noted that the authentication of the cipher
choice is more important than the secrecy. Now I think the
criticism is valid because the need to dot this particular
"i" has already been so clearly established.
--Bryan
--
email: bolson at certicom dot com
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 20:23:17 GMT
Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Terry Ritter wrote:
:> Bryan Olson wrote:
:> >There is the seed of a reasonable proposal there: design a
:> >cipher with three layers each of a different structure and
:> >each somewhat larger than needed to resist all known attacks
:> >absent the other layers. This is a plausible approach to
:> >defending against unknown attacks and a defensible tradeoff
:> >between resources and confidence in security.
:>
:> That might be a good proposal for a new cipher design. But my
:> proposals are not about new cipher designs, but instead address how to
:> use the ciphers we already have.
: The point is that the composition of three ciphers is a
: cipher. The distinction is artificial; it's only in your
: mind and not in the encryption function. It makes no sense
: to say any cipher a single point of failure while the stack
: is not. The set of ciphers contains the set of stacks.
Very frequently, the distinction is a real one, and not in Terry Ritter's
mind.
Few encryption functions can be broken into independent components, each
of which appears to be independently strong.
If you build such a structure, you're creating a cypher stack - much like
Terry's - but with a fixed order. Terry's proposals are directed at
constantly changing chphers.
It's also true that a "constantly changing cypher" - with the components
negotiated into stacks from a pool is *also* a cypher.
However, while you /may/ be able to point to a cypher with three
independently keyed components, I doubt you can point to one with
multiple independently keyed, constantly changing components.
Terry's proposals do not appear to be based on a false distinction between
a cypher stack and a cypher. The system he is proposing genuinely seems
to offer a different approach to strength from conventional cypher design.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://www.mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You'll get what's coming to you - unless Parcelforce gets involved.
------------------------------
From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 20:44:20 GMT
Terry Ritter wrote:
> Cipher systems which change ciphers must coordinate cipher changes on
> both ends. It would be insane to do this as unciphered plaintext.
> The opponents have no ability to force particular ciphers by changing
> the ciphertext because changed ciphertext will be detected.
SSL-3 and TLS negotiate ciphers, and the first negotiation
is in plaintext. The choice is (subsequently) authenticated,
which removes a flaw in a previous version of SSL. What is
insane about that? (O.K.- there's still a possible
objection in that the authentication mechanism is negotiated
too.)
We can, and often do, authenticate messages without
enciphering them. In many cases enciphered messages are
vulnerable to undetected modification (without breaking the
cipher). The solution to this particular problem is
"signature", not "cipher".
--Bryan
--
email: bolson at certicom dot com
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 15:59:23 -0500
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Crypto Patents: Us, European and International.
Paul Koning wrote:
> "Trevor L. Jackson, III" wrote:
> >
> > Eric Lee Green wrote:
> > ...
> > > As for witnesses and/or patent notebook records, it's amazing that we don't
> > > have more illegally obtained patents than we do, given how easy it is to forge
> > > records and/or find witnesses willing to perjure themselves for money...
> >
> > How easy is that? Typically it is very hard to persuade innocent people
> > to expose themselves to the threat of a federal felony conviction.
> > In most cases perjury is heavily penalized.
>
> Hm, I seem to remember a high profile case about a year ago that
> contradicts that. :-)
That's why I wavered and said "in most cases..." ;-)
>
>
> Anyway, there are many invalid patents out there. Some may be
> innocent mistakes -- I can imagine that the person filing the
> application may not have realized the lack of novelty.
>
> Others are so obviously bogus that I would argue no reasonable
> person could have failed to know that the application violated
> the "novel and non-obvious" rule.
The key concept in this statement is "reasonable person", by which I assume you mean a
person able to judge whether such-and-such invention would be obvious to a
practitioner in the field. Unfortunately this concept is flawed. It requires the PTO
to keep it staff up to date in all possible engineering fields. The PTO doesn't have
the budget, and _can't_ have the staff (remember their staff has to work for the
government) capable of that kind of insight.
>
>
> Take a look at this one:
> http://patent.womplex.ibm.com/details?patent_number=5446889
> I have my opinion on which of the above two categories I
> would put this one in... :-)
Well, if I worked for Unisys I might have nothing better to do than file junk patents.
This is another case like the XOR mechanism for drawing and undrawing in video
memory. More than obvious, _trivial_. I doubt they could collect anything on it
because they cannot defend it. First-year programming courses were covering this kind
of thing 25 years ago. Now recovering a damaged coral ring might be worth protecting.
>
>
> This doesn't get into the question of notebooks, admittedly.
Junk patents do not inhibit the protection of true discoveries, so I consider them to
be harmless errors.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 14:00:39 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Albert Yang
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The other part is Pedigree. When you have people like Bruce, Eli, Ron,
> IBM designing the ciphers, there is a few things that are generally
> pretty safe to assume.
>
Assume that they are human. Assume that each of them knows different
things. Assume that the variety of talents, be they considerable, do not
completely overlap. Also, assume that each of them does not know
precisely what the other knows. Assume that each makes mistakes, and
learns from the experience.
Conclude that they might have all missed something, which will come as no
surprise to any of them. This means that others might come up with
something good as well.
The same argument for pedigree is often in the guise of "student of,"
etc. But, it should come down to simply what works and what doesn't.
Reality does not hinge on anything but itself. If you must judge by
pedigree, you don't have a sufficient handle on the subject itself. And,
it is wrong to prejudice yourself against being scientifically
open-minded.
As mentors, it is best to teach each student to pilot their own ship
instead of planning every voyage, as crypto itself has uncharted areas.
--
Imagine an internet on an up and up basis, where there are no subversive techniques to
rob a person of their privacy or computer
functionality, no hidden schemes used to defraud anyone. :>)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Weaknesses in Solitaire Algorithm Found
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 14:15:58 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Albert Yang
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> THEEN OMYIS NOWHE RE
>
> So does this say "The Enemy is Now Here"
> or does it say "The Enemy is No Where"
>
This is a classic argument for improving on the character set to include
all that is necessary to remove as much confusion as possible. Like lots
of others ciphers, Solitare is best left for recreation.
Yes, the message can be written redundantly or in different words, a
burden on the sender. I suggest using 25 characters for words and one for
division. W is good for division and VV for the actual letter, since
there are only a half-dozen words or so that have two v's, and their use
will always be obvious, or they can be avoided.
You can also get away with J for comma, Q for question mark, and X for
period, making implied punctuation not a problem either. Savvy?
--
Imagine an internet on an up and up basis, where there are no subversive techniques to
rob a person of their privacy or computer
functionality, no hidden schemes used to defraud anyone. :>)
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Cipher Contest
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 13:12:57 -0000
I'd prefer a continual contest, every time a new analysis is
completed the ordering is reconsidered. On first
introduction the placement would have to be done based on
intuition, because only a minor amount of analysis will
likely have been performed. It's a fairly simple matter to
create a cipher that can withstand 6 weeks of analysis (~240
hours), and is still weak. In fact history is littered with
such ciphers. Just start the contest, revise the rules as
needed (for example if your key space is larger than the
factorial of the block space your cipher is eliminated).
Oh and 64/128/128 is fine with me.
Joe
"Mike Rosing" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Adam Durana wrote:
> >
> > I think we will go with 64, 128, 128. I thought about
what was suggested,
> > 32, 64, 128, but 32 bits just seemed to small. I'll
update the web site
> > unless of course anyone objects to this. Don't start
designing ciphers yet!
>
> That's OK by me. The only reason for the 32 was to show
how brute force
> actually works in reasonable time. Then it'd be straight
forward to
> show
> how analysis compares directly with brute force. But it's
simple enough
> to estimate this too.
>
> > I feel we are coming close to finalizing the
requirements but they are not
> > finalized yet. I wouldn't want to see anyone designing
a cipher and then
> > have the requirements change. I've already received one
complete entry, but
> > since the block sizes are going to be changed now I
don't know if this
> > person's cipher will be in the category he wants. So
don't let this happen
> > to you! Once we get the requirements finalized I will
make an announcement,
> > a call for entries, and then you should start designing
your ciphers. I
> > figure about 2 weeks, maybe less, should be enough time
for people to design
> > and submit their ciphers. So the deadline for ciphers
will be 2 weeks after
> > I make that announcement. Anyone think 2 weeks is too
short?
>
> Not if we get more chances later. For those chomping on
the bit it's
> probably
> too long. If the total cycle is 6 weeks from announce to
pick winner,
> then
> take a 2 week break and do it again. Is 6 contests a year
too many? If
> we can have different catagories each contest, I wouldn't
think so.
>
> Patience, persistence, truth,
> Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Doug Stell)
Subject: Re: how to introduce hs students to cryptography
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 21:05:05 GMT
On 15 Mar 2000 10:31:09 -0800, Andru Luvisi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>"Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>[snip]
>> I agree in general with this sentiment. It is insane to try to
>> teach youngsters professional-level *any*thing. They need material
>> they can readily *master* (if they apply themselves), not
>> frustration.
>[snip]
>
>That all depends on the "youngster". Although this is fine for most
>students, *requiring* that all students follow your
>works-for-most-people speed and level will still frustrate the slow
>ones and frequently bore the bright kid in the front row and turn him
>into an underachiever.
Any teacher knows that you will always frustrate the slow ones and
bore the bright ones, especially if the class has a heterogeneous
background. The key is to find the right balance and an approach that
is best for the middle majority and not too bad for the students at
either extreme. This is true for almost every subject and crypto is
worse than most in this respect.
I do know for certain that if you teach lots of number theory to even
professional level people after lunch, all but one in the class will
sound asleep. (I'm only the course facilitator for this module.) After
talking that presenter into reorganizing his material to a) always
make the number theory applicable to a purpose and algorithym and b)
feed them the math in small chunks, only half the class was asleep.
BTW, I get written critiques from each student on each module of a
40-hour course and the public key module typically has 34 people who
hate the presentation and slept versus 1 person who loved it and
wanted more.
Another major point has to do with teaching style. Some teachers and
students want a high information transfer efficiency. Others want to
have fun and do lots of exercises. Although I am in the first
category, I find that most students, even professionals, now want the
fun & games, touchie-feelie type of course. I suspect that this is
even more true for kids. Material must be hightly interesting and
captivating.
doug
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: pedagogical provably stupid protocols
Date: 15 Mar 2000 21:26:25 GMT
The idea was good, but the definition should in my opinion be something like
this:
Assume that each key k of a cipher E is kn-bit. E is then secure-1 iff:
0. k > 1 and n is sufficiently large (say n > 128 at least).
1. For each n-bit message m there is an equivalence relation Rm over the keys,
such that each class defined by Rm contains 2^n keys and (k Rm k') iff
(E_k(m) = E_k'(m)).
2. For each pair of n-bit messages m, m' and each key k, there is at least one
key k' such that (k Rm k') iff not (k Rm' k').
In a previous article, John Myre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>David A Molnar wrote:
>>
>> Does anyone know of any simple examples of protocols which can be
>> "proved" or otherwise convincingly and *correctly* argued as "good" --
>> but according to a fatally flawed definition of goodness?
>
>Here's one that I like, although it probably isn't simple enough.
>
>Recall Biham and Anderson's BEAR and LION? They actually proved
>them secure, under certain assumptions. The notion of security
>was that you couldn't figure out the key. However, the LION
>definition allowed a usage[1] where the key did not affect the result
>at all; the proof holds (you still can't find the key!) but you
>don't have much secrecy.
>
>As you say, the problem is in the definitions.
>
>John M.
>
>[1] The trick is to try to use LION on a very short message; where
>the size of the right part is zero. This, of course, has nothing
>to do with the intended use of LION, where the right part is very
>large. A similar weakness exists for BEAR, and even "very short"
>(non-zero, but only a few bits) right sides are a problem.
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------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Improvement on Von Neumann compensator?
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 21:34:37 GMT
In article <8akkcr$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon) wrote:
>
> Recently we had a discussion about turning certain time related
physical
> effects that are believed to have a random component (time between
zero
<snip>
> I recently heard of another method: measure the time between a pair
> ov events, then do it again. If the first time measurement is longer,
> call it a one. If the second time measurement is longer, call it a
> zero. Would this be a better scheme than the Von Neumann compensator?
>
It seems to suffer from some of the same problems...
How accurately do you measure the time interval??? Could it be
that we conclude T1 > T2, but that in actuality T1 is just slightly
less than T2 because of measurement error ?
Just asking....
>
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Universal Language
From: drickel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 12:19:36 -0800
Boris Kazak said that Russian has six cases.
Which is also what i was taught. But i remember reading about
remnants of a seventh (vocative?) case being present in some
expressions, which might be what the previous poster was thinking
of.
david rickel
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Number 28 of a series
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 14:57:33 -0600
I had the request some time ago to make create a few base translation
ciphers that had binary application; here is another one that does that:
Okinawa takes a list of 7 bit numbers and converts them to alphabetic
letters. Input is actually in lists of numbers, 0 to 128, since there is
not a clean way to otherwise do that for 7 bits.
You can use 1 to 128, or 0 to 127, since the plaintext base of Okinawa is
actually 129. you might choose 0 or 128, whichever is compatible, to
indicate a message end, or nulls to fill out a message to complete blocks.
Okinawa actually handles blocks of two to ten digits, 28/56/84/112/140
bits. Output being a multiple of three characters, up to fifteen per
block. An intermediate base seven step means that 5 to 25 hepits may be
transposed according to a key. The other key is one of substituting the
normal alphabet used in ciphertext.
As poor as ASCII is for a source of 7-bit characters for encryption, it is
still there for easy, perhaps too easy, use. Any list of the 0 to 128
allowed numbers can be encrypted, but the example here is in presentation
using safe and filtered ASCII codes.
The efficiencies of 129 to 7 and of 7 to 26 are 99.0% and 95.6%.
Use this sentence to make the optional keys for Okinawa 25.
Okinawa 25 uses plaintext groups of ten numbers, and produces ciphertext
groups of fifteen characters, shown in traditional groups of five.
Subs(Ok): zscviktudnweo bfxpmalgyjhqr
Trans(Ok): uhoma ljdys fprqk inbxc wtevg
Pt: Encrypt these words.
69 110 99 114 121 112 116 32 116 104
101 115 101 32 119 111 114 100 115 46
Ct: sifjt hwkns tkamo ghoyq axcmc sihzx
Next up is an Orson Welles favorite.....wish he was still around.
--
Imagine an internet on an up and up basis, where there are no subversive techniques to
rob a person of their privacy or computer
functionality, no hidden schemes used to defraud anyone. :>)
------------------------------
From: jack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Really Interested, Where do I look for ...
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 21:45:17 GMT
Hello. I am 21, and been out of school for a while now (starting college
this summer). I can program in c, c++, perl, etc on Linux...the
programming part is something i can work with, but the math is something
i need help in.
So what i am asking is:
1.) Where can i find on the web the higher
math info i need to know on the web? Most
of the info i found is not a teaching aid
or tutorial. I looked but most of the
stuff i found didn't "teach". I don't want
to wait till i learn it all in college.
2.) Some good info on crypto analysis.
3.) Also, even some advice on starting off
in the right direction. I think this is a
field
i'd liketo get into, and the more i
learn, the more fun it looks and more i
want to learn it.
So _ANY_ help would be nice. Feel free to email me if you'd like.
Thanks,
-Jack
ps- I already found www.counterpane.com, BTW. Any other sites would
be great!
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