Cryptography-Digest Digest #385, Volume #11 Wed, 22 Mar 00 02:13:01 EST
Contents:
Do you think I'm ready? What do I need? ("RecilS")
Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...) (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference (Terry Ritter)
Re: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...) (Jim Geary)
Problem Using the CryptoAPI and JCE ("Jason Bock")
Re: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...) (Jim Geary)
Re: pgp key collision (Gregory G Rose)
Re: Download Random Number Generator from Ciphile Software (Anthony Stephen Szopa)
Re: Opinions? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...) (Mike Caro)
Re: Factoring Large Numbers - I think I figured it out! (Paul Rubin)
Re: Factoring Large Numbers - I think I figured it out! (Ben655)
Re: Do you think I'm ready? What do I need? (David A Molnar)
Re: Factoring Large Numbers - I think I figured it out = NOT! ("Richard Anthony
Hein")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "RecilS" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Do you think I'm ready? What do I need?
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 00:17:37 -0500
I'm presenting my situation to everyone with hopes that someone can steer me
to a good path.
Basically I'm 16years old with a very good working knowledge of programming
(c++ or vb and some ASM). I'm in Algebra II at the moment but I'm studying
calculus in my free time and use many more advanced functions for motion
path functions and things of that nature.
I've come up with my own ciphers which invariably end up looking something
like a Vernon variety, using unique sources for keys (translated images,
etc), many of which are time-sensitive as well. I've got a good hold of
communications (winsock mostly) and am now writing my own stenography
utility.
Do you think I should attempt higher-level algorithms before I've gotten
into calculus or wait? I think I could handle it but there are alot of
skills I'm missing
Do you think that variations of the Vernon cipher using 'garbage' data are
effective?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Crossposted-To: rec.gambling.poker
Subject: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 06:33:27 +0100
Mike Caro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I would have no objection to Planet Poker making their random number
> algorithms public. There are two arguments about that, though. One is that
> publishing the inner workings of the pseudo-random shuffles invites people
> to try to decipher the logic. While I know the methods used and don't
> think people would have much success, you've got to admit that publishing
> gives scoundrels some minor advantage over not publishing.
But if you don't show "your" work and some one does manage to figure it
out then you have a situation where a few people can spend a very long
time taking other peoples money. If you on the other hand show all your
source and make sure that the right people look at it then it's a much
greater chance that a good guy will find possible weaknesses before a
bad guy does.
May I ask how much crypto-related programming you've done earlier?
/Tony
--
/\___/\ Who would you like to read your messages today? /\___/\
\_@ @_/ Protect your privacy: <http://www.pgpi.com/> \_@ @_/
--oOO-(_)-OOo---------------------------------------------oOO-(_)-OOo--
DSS: 0x9363F1DB, Fp: 6EA2 618F 6D21 91D3 2D82 78A6 647F F247 9363 F1DB
---���---���-----------------------------------------------���---���---
\O/ \O/ �1999 <http://www.svanstrom.com/?ref=news> \O/ \O/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: NIST, AES at RSA conference
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 05:45:03 GMT
On Tue, 21 Mar 2000 23:51:47 GMT, in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
in sci.crypt Albert Yang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>WOW, I can't believe how this thread has run away!
>
>I think the arguement being presented is the answer to the question:
>
>which is stronger?
>
>f(f(f(x))) or g(h(j(x)))
>where f,g,h,j are crypto algorithms. The answer is, it depends. Since
>based on Terry's arguement, the use of the same algorithm, even with
>increased rounds or times, is still a single point of failure. Good
>arguement.
>
>Bruce, I think addresses this in an essay somewhere. Talking about
>putting all your eggs in one basket, and watching that basket very
>carefully.
Yes, and I for one found that to be irritating nonsense: Cryptography
is perhaps the only product where we cannot see what we get. We spend
design effort and CPU cycles to attain security, but we don't know
whether the cipher per se actually *is* secure. We cannot see what
our opponents do to our ciphers, so we *cannot* "watch that basket."
Implying that we can is false and misleading.
>3 bad algorithms used in secession doesn't not in any way, compensate
>for just one good algoirthm. Now what is a "good" algorithm? Don't
>know how to answer that, but I can tell you from my personal experience,
>what is a "reasonably secure" algorithm, IMHO, and that's good enough
>for me.
Let me just note that any particular cipher one thinks is "good
enough" could be a permanent part of the cipher stack for any
particular user. We thus are not forced into a false dichotomy
between using "one good algorithm" and "3 bad ones."
I think if we were to explain to real users that the scientists in
this field simply do not have the same kind of control over ciphers as
one expects in every other product, those users might not feel that
what we have is "good enough" for them.
It is scarcely unusual to have redundant layers of security: Prisons
often have multiple fences. We keep our safes behind locked doors.
>From my view, it takes incredible arrogance to assert -- without proof
-- that our ciphers are so strong that they need no other layers.
That is a very strange approach for security in practice.
>So while I see Terry's arguement as a valid one, I don't see it
>being that significant of one. So will a file encrypted by Serpent,
>RC6, Rijndael, Twofish, and Mars, be as stronger than one that is say,
>encrypted 5 times with Twofish all with different keys? Probably not.
>But then at least if twofish was a point of failure, the other
>algorithms might not be cracked by the same thing. True.
>
>If I was protecting national secrets, would I throw more resources at
>determining what "reasonably secure" should be? Probably. But when
>some of the best cryptographers in the world take a crack at it, and
>can't break it, that gives me a few warm fuzzies. That's all I'm
>saying.
But you almost started out saying something different: One part of
the issue is "resources." So how much are users willing to pay for a
potential increase in security? Well, it certainly is true that we
expect three ciphers to take three times as long as one, but we are
doing this on ever-faster machines. In my opinion, even using three
ciphers falls well within what modern users would be willing to pay
for end-to-end security. (A ciphering server might be another
matter.) In that sense, the conventional wisdom of a single-cipher
approach has not kept up with the decrease in cost of ciphering which
is the byproduct of modern computing. We can *afford* to do more.
Another part of the equation is risk. Now, each of us has some
information at risk, but AES is expected to be used widely throughout
society. There is thus more at risk than love letters, or any one
individual or company. At risk is whatever privacy we might hope to
have in an information society. We really, really, don't want to be
mistaken about this.
>I can write a secure algorithm. But then I couldn't decrypt it. But we
>take things that we know, Feistel rounds make for a guarantee that the
>algorithm is reversible, that's all that it promises. How strong the
>rounds are, that's up to the cryptographer. But we have building blocks
>and we build a better algoirthm each time. That's it.
Well, yes, I agree. That's it. We get what we get. But when we get
a car like that, we know how it drives. In contrast, we have no idea
how well ciphers keep our information from those who do not disclose
their results. Extrapolating from the results of academic peer review
into strength against motivated professionals is just invalid.
---
Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
------------------------------
From: Jim Geary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: rec.gambling.poker
Subject: Re: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2000 22:47:15 -0700
It's a basic precept of security programming that you're opponent
understands your algorithm. I think Mike's jiggy with that, but
perhaps the operators above him at PP are a little more removed
from understanding this than he is, and maybe have nightmares about
redisassembling the rng. And as long as Tony is cross-posting over
to s.c., I'll mention that I'm still waiting for that cyber.not=20
file to magically show up in my mailbox to see why geary was in=20
the data dictionary.
Of course, I'm also waiting for that gwyn webpage. :)
Jim Geary
jimgeary.com - something to bore everyone
On Wed, 22 Mar 2000, Tony L. Svanstrom wrote:
> Mike Caro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>=20
> > I would have no objection to Planet Poker making their random number
> > algorithms public. There are two arguments about that, though. One is t=
hat
> > publishing the inner workings of the pseudo-random shuffles invites peo=
ple
> > to try to decipher the logic. While I know the methods used and don't
> > think people would have much success, you've got to admit that publishi=
ng
> > gives scoundrels some minor advantage over not publishing.
>=20
> But if you don't show "your" work and some one does manage to figure it
> out then you have a situation where a few people can spend a very long
> time taking other peoples money. If you on the other hand show all your
> source and make sure that the right people look at it then it's a much
> greater chance that a good guy will find possible weaknesses before a
> bad guy does.
> May I ask how much crypto-related programming you've done earlier?
>=20
>=20
> /Tony
> --=20
> /\___/\ Who would you like to read your messages today? /\___/\
> \_@ @_/ Protect your privacy: <http://www.pgpi.com/> \_@ @_/
> --oOO-(_)-OOo---------------------------------------------oOO-(_)-OOo--
> DSS: 0x9363F1DB, Fp: 6EA2 618F 6D21 91D3 2D82 78A6 647F F247 9363 F1DB
> ---=F4=F4=F4---=F4=F4=F4-----------------------------------------------=
=F4=F4=F4---=F4=F4=F4---
> \O/ \O/ =A91999 <http://www.svanstrom.com/?ref=3Dnews> \O/ \O/=
=20
>=20
>=20
------------------------------
From: "Jason Bock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Problem Using the CryptoAPI and JCE
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2000 23:50:48 -0600
I'm having a problem getting the Windows world and Java to talk (any
suprises there? ;) ). I'm trying to encrypt some text by creating a hash
value via the SHA algorithm, creating a key with that hash value via the DES
algorithm, and subsequently creating my ciphertext with the key.
Here's the problem. Say my text is "Here's some text to encrypt.", and my
password is "FearFactory". If I create a hash value given the password, I
get the same value in both worlds (in hex):
E0839567833BE35BF4345D651BA8571A0D9434E4
So far, so good. However, when I create the encrypted text, things diverge.
Here's the result I get via the CryptoAPI (in hex):
8AE5D736959D7B148C55BAFF31C0CF89C14315CE62707D7EC520FB919C79DF9D
And here's the result in the JCE world (in hex):
8AE5D736959D7B14F8996B1BE6AC438080034D3B9835C9AB8EE41D109994B081
Note that the first 8 bytes are the same; after that, nothing matches. Also
note that I can look at the key information in Java (i.e. its content in
bytes), but the CryptoAPI doesn't let you see that information as far as I
can tell (although I may be wrong on this). Therefore, I can't tell what
the difference is between the two generated keys.
I didn't want to paste the code right now (to save on space), but if someone
has an idea as to what the problem is and/or is willing to figure out where
the discrepancy lies, I'd be more than happy to post my test code. If you
have any insight into this problem, I'd greatly appreciate your help.
Regards,
Jason
------------------------------
From: Jim Geary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: rec.gambling.poker
Subject: Re: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...)
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2000 22:50:33 -0700
your. there's something permanently wrong with my wiring.
Jim Geary
jimgeary.com - something to bore everyone
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Gregory G Rose)
Subject: Re: pgp key collision
Date: 21 Mar 2000 21:59:05 -0800
In article <8b9j18$j4l$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Davis Ford <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>can anyone tell me what the probability is for pgp key id collision?
It depends what you mean by "probability". The
key-ID for an RSA key is just the least
significant bits of the modulus, and can be
easily created to have any desired key ID... see
for example the key with "0xDEADBEEF" as its
key-ID.
Older PGP used 32 bits for the external interface
to the key ID, and after approximately sqrt(2^32)
keys are created you have a high probability that
two of them will have the same key-ID. That is
about 65,000 keys.
Internally I believe PGP actually uses 64 bits to
keep track of the key ID, so really nasty
collisions won't be likely until everyone on earth
has a key.
Anyway, whenever you ask questions about
probabilities of coincidences, the answer is
usually "By the Birthday Paradox, about sqrt(N)".
Greg.
--
Greg Rose INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
QUALCOMM Australia VOICE: +61-2-9181 4851 FAX: +61-2-9181 5470
Suite 410, Birkenhead Point http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Drummoyne NSW 2047 B5 DF 66 95 89 68 1F C8 EF 29 FA 27 F2 2A 94 8F
------------------------------
From: Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Download Random Number Generator from Ciphile Software
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2000 21:25:50 -0800
Doug Stell wrote:
>
> On Mon, 20 Mar 2000 23:12:16 -0800, Anthony Stephen Szopa
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >Doug Stell wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, 20 Mar 2000 01:31:15 -0800, Anthony Stephen Szopa
> >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Again, OAR-L3 random number generation software is only intended to
> >> >generate random digits or numbers for statistical modeling and computer
> >> >simulations.
> >>
> >> This statement is a very clear hint that it is not cryptographically
> >> strong and is of little use to anybody in this newsgroup. If it is a
> >> component of a larger cryptographic package, this statement also casts
> >> sersiou doubt on the strength of that package.
> >
> >If we assume you know all the possible reasons for the statement
> >then we may accept your conclusion. Please, tell us what I am
> >thinking at this moment to prove that you may actually know why the
> >statement was made so your conclusion may be considered seriously?
>
> How does anyone know what anyone else is thinking? We can only try to
> interpreted the words you offer us. Both expression and interpretation
> are risky.
>
> When someone says that a thing "is ONLY intended for X" and the
> requirements for X are a lot less than the requirements for Y, then I
> can only assume that the auther is stating that it is probably not
> intended and/or suitable for Y.
>
> Statistical modeling, simulations and communications test equipment,
> X, frequently use random number generators that are statistically
> sound, but cryptographically weak. I've built products where the
> receiver can quickly sync its PRNG to the transmitter's PRNG. This
> PRNG provided a fine statistical test of a communications system, but
> is cryptographically worthless. These random number generators
> generally do not have the requirement that it should be infeasible to
> guess the next output value, knowing the algorithm and all of the
> previous values. They may even have the requirement that you can gues
> the next output value.
>
> So, what is your intent of the statement; "Again, OAR-L3 random number
> generation software is only intended to generate random digits or
> numbers for statistical modeling and computer simulations?" Is it also
> intended for cryptographic purposes or not?
1) We should make a distinction between the random number
generation software that can produce practicably unlimited unique
sequences of random numbers between 0 - 255 and random digit
sequences, from the random digit generator. The random digit
generator generates the random digit sequences that can be
themselves input, or are used to create random triplet sequences for
input, for further extensive processing.
The final random digit sequences or random number sequences are
created by further extensive processing of these original sequences
using as many as ten different methods. The result is a practicably
unlimited supply of unique random digit / unique random number
sequences.
2) There is a case made for the suitability of the random number
generation process for cryptological purposes in the Theory,
Processes 1, and Processes 2 Help files. Let us know if you can
find any holes in the logic of this case, or the reasons why you
are still not convinced.
3) OAR-L3�: ORIGINAL ABSOLUTELY RANDOM - LEVEL3 Version 4.1
random number generation software is exactly the same software as
OAP-L3: Original Absolute Privacy - Level3 encryption software
except there is absolutely NO encryption or decryption capability.
Not only have the encryption and decryption GUI forms, menus,
buttons, etc. been deleted, but also, the encryption and decryption
source code has been deleted, then the entire package recompiled.
So there is no way to enable any encryption or decryption methods or
capabilities using OAR-L3.
4) My intention for making OAR-L3 random number generation software
available is to generate random digits or numbers for statistical
modeling and computer simulations.
Perhaps someone else may have some other purpose in mind such as
using it to pick their lucky lotto numbers.
I can assure you that I am the last person who wants to make the
encryption software police feel they are sorely running around with
their thumb up their ass.
If you are still puzzled perhaps someone else in this news group can
help you out.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Opinions?
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 06:01:08 GMT
In article <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
om>,
Johnny Bravo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> But hidden variables aren't the way our universe works--it really is
> random, right down to its subatomic roots. In 1964, the physicist John
> Bell proved a theorem which showed hidden variable (little clock in the
> nucleus) theories inconsistent with the foundations of quantum mechanics.
> In 1982, Alain Aspect and his colleagues performed an experiment to test
> Bell's theoretical result and discovered, to nobody's surprise, that the
> predictions of quantum theory were correct: the randomness is
> inherent--not due to limitations in our ability to make measurements.
>
John Bell formally showed that any objective
theory giving experimental predictions
identical to those of quantum theory would
have to be nonlocal. However, a numerical
statistical correction (a probability invariant
of a quantum state) was recently found for
Bell's inequality. One of the implications is
that Bell's inequality is not a strong enough
reason to rule out local realism. There are
also experiments which suggest violations of
Bell's inequality but, like Doug Gwynn wrote in
his last message, it is "well established
through experiment that local causality does
not hold *in general* [my emphasis]". (at least
for the experiments appropriate to this
subject) BTW, Bell's inequalities have a very
essential role in some quantum cryptography
schemes.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Mike Caro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: rec.gambling.poker
Subject: Re: Open source or not. (Was: Re: Planet Poker Claims...)
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 06:16:36 GMT
On Wed, 22 Mar 2000 06:33:27 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony L.
Svanstrom) wrote:
>Mike Caro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> I would have no objection to Planet Poker making their random number
>> algorithms public. There are two arguments about that, though. One is that
>> publishing the inner workings of the pseudo-random shuffles invites people
>> to try to decipher the logic. While I know the methods used and don't
>> think people would have much success, you've got to admit that publishing
>> gives scoundrels some minor advantage over not publishing.
>
>But if you don't show "your" work and some one does manage to figure it
>out then you have a situation where a few people can spend a very long
>time taking other peoples money. If you on the other hand show all your
>source and make sure that the right people look at it then it's a much
>greater chance that a good guy will find possible weaknesses before a
>bad guy does.
>May I ask how much crypto-related programming you've done earlier?
>
> /Tony
Tony --
It is my policy not to respond to messages that were posted to more
than one newsgroup. But since you're a contributor in good standing at
rec.gambling.poker, I will tell you that I had nothing whatsoever to
do with developing any of the algorithms that Planet Poker uses to
generate pseudo-random numbers. And Planet Poker had nothing to do
with them, either.
I did have something to do as a consultant with recommending the way
these algorithms were called and when and how they were used and any
additional levels of intrigue that may have been added. I cannot vouch
for the security of these methods (or anyone else's) beyond any doubt
because I don't know for sure some of the specifics. I have requested
that I not know them -- for reasons that some may appreciate.
I was asked to recommend solutions for a particular problem, which I
did -- and my solutions for that problem are valid. I will vouch for
those. Furthermore, I am personally not convinced that publishing the
methodology would result in more security. In fact, I have talked with
several advisors who have said that doing so would be a mistake, no
matter what your degree of confidence.
I don't think computer-generated pseudo-random numbers are safe beyond
a doubt, but some can be almost that safe. I have stated that I would
tend to trust the deals at Planet Poker and other reputable sites a
lot more than I would trust some real-life dealers in real-life
casinos.
I also specifically challenge the idea that "atomic decay" methods of
random number generation are a superior solution. While I'm intrigued
with that and other analog means of dealing cards, I am ambivalent
about whether that actually makes people more suspect of the random
numbers. If you go that route you have to take management's word for
the numbers in all cases (excluding the possibility of showing that
results are outside reasonable probability). With pseudo-generation,
you at least could prove (not that this is likely to happen) to
impartial parties that the cards were selected exactly as they should
have been. Don't laugh -- this actually became an issue in my ORAC
nationally televised challenge in 1984. I offered to let the computer
generate the cards and have others later see the code and the random
seed to make sure they could trust the computer. But I ended up having
to use an optical scanner and trust a live dealer -- which I really
never felt right about.
And just for the record, I have privately discussed by phone or
corresponded with both of the parties cited in these discussions as
being more open about their methods -- well, in advance of them making
public statements. I respect both of these parties, and I'd be
surprised if they've said anything negative about me in this regard.
Straight Flushes,
Mike Caro
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Factoring Large Numbers - I think I figured it out!
Date: 22 Mar 2000 06:25:20 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Johnny Bravo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> He is going off the deep end and saying that he can do it with a special
>microchip but somehow a computer can't execute the instructions. If
>anything, he is looking for gullible people to scam money from them to
>build a 'prototype' that can factor a 10 digit number after some number of
>months of work, then get a lot more money and spend the next ten years
>living the high life while his bogus project never comes to fruition. As
>has been pointed out several times, any PC can factor a few thousand 10
>digit numbers in a second.
Well, I gotta say, if Richard has a scheme for implementing Shor's
algorithm on a microchip, that's something that a computer wouldn't be
able to execute, and would be a fantastic advance useful for all kinds
of things other than factoring, and even a 10 digit demonstration
would be extremely impressive (a group at MIT is working on 2 digits).
But somehow I'm not holding my breath.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ben655)
Subject: Re: Factoring Large Numbers - I think I figured it out!
Date: 22 Mar 2000 06:31:31 GMT
On 22 Mar 2000 01:01:22 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Xcott Craver) wrote:
"Rather, if you really had a fast factoring method, it would be in your best
interest to disclose it as soon as possible. This is not something you can
make money off of, but such a discovery would make you famous. Hence your goal
would be publication rather than secrecy.
<SNIP>
In reality, there is no million dollars waiting for someone who discovers an
impossible way to trisect an angle with a straightedge and compass;
or, epsilon more feasibly, someone who discovers a short proof of
Fermat's Last Theorem."
Scott, I beg to disagree about the financial aspects. It does NOT beg the
imagination to think that NSA would pay substantially more that a puny million
dollars to be the sole possessor of such knowledge.
My advice to Mr. Hein would be: Seek professional help to protect your
intellectual property in whatever way you can. If Scott is right and it is not
commercially valuable then you can always publish later.
Regards,
Steve Rosenberg
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Do you think I'm ready? What do I need?
Date: 22 Mar 2000 06:12:21 GMT
RecilS <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> like a Vernon variety, using unique sources for keys (translated images,
> etc), many of which are time-sensitive as well. I've got a good hold of
By "Vernon variety" I'm guessing you mean a Vernam cipher - a one time pad
XORed or otherwise combined with a plaintext?
You might want to be careful about relying on images for one-time pads.
First, if it's an intelligible image, it may not be "random enough" in any
useful sense. Maybe more important, if your adversary can guess what
images you have access to or what images you could create, you might
have a problem.
It's tough to say without knowing more about what you mean by
"translated", or what these images are. Just be aware that the one time
pads rely entirely on the unpredictability of the pad...
> communications (winsock mostly) and am now writing my own stenography
> utility.
> Do you think I should attempt higher-level algorithms before I've gotten
> into calculus or wait? I think I could handle it but there are alot of
> skills I'm missing
Depends on what you mean by "higher-level algorithms." Many algorithms
used in cryptography do not require a knowledge of calculus to implement.
I learned (and implemented) RSA before I knew calculus.
------------------------------
From: "Richard Anthony Hein" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Factoring Large Numbers - I think I figured it out = NOT!
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 01:24:24 -0500
Ooops. Made a mistake. Sorry. Now I feel really dumb. You guys were all
right. Think I will blow my brains out now.
But there is commercial value in being able to factor huge numbers quickly.
Asking what it's value is seems to me to be like asking what the value is in
multiplication. I always assumed that it would allow us to solve previously
unsolvable problems, enable us to simulate nature, and to be able to sort
through possible answers quickly, which I think will be one of many things
needed for quantum computers to become a reality. Well, I am probably wrong
about all of that too. The only way to know is to do it.
Hope you all feel really good about being right and got some kicks out of
insulting me. That's Usenet for ya.
Richard Hein
------------------------------
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