Cryptography-Digest Digest #437, Volume #11 Tue, 28 Mar 00 14:13:00 EST
Contents:
Charitable Fond "Medic" ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Start of Cipher Contest (csybrandy)
Basic C tools .. where? (Dave Hamilton)
Re: Examining random() functions (Tim Tyler)
Re: NIST publishes AES3 papers (Uri Blumenthal)
Re: OAP-L3: Answer me these? (Tim Tyler)
Re: DES question (Mike Mccarty Sr)
Re: Sunday People 26/3/2000: "FORGET YOUR PASSWORD... END UP IN JAIL" ("BIG ONE")
Re: The lighter side of cryptology (JimD)
Re: one-way hash functions with 256-bit output (Bill Unruh)
Re: NIST publishes AES3 papers ("Brian Gladman")
Is it really NSA ?! ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Re-seeding PRNG's in central key distribution systems (Tim Tyler)
Re: ecc equation (Steven C. Den Beste)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Charitable Fond "Medic"
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 15:57:59 GMT
Dear Friends,
The Novocherkassk Regional Charitable Non-Commercial Public Fond for
medical workers "Medic" was founded and registered in Rostov Regional
Justice Department, Russia on July 20, 1999, license #2875.
Medical workers are the least provided and most unprotected in our
society, because of low salary, which ranges from $10 to $50 US and
extremely high responsibility for their duties both to community and
law: about 200 laws and orders can bring Russian medical workers to
trail, but only three are intended to protect them.
All money sent to the Novocherkassk Regional c Non-Commercial Public
Fond "Medic" will be used for charity and social activity for medical
workers.
We and all medical workers are sincerely appreciate to everyone among
our friends for support and help.
Our address and bank account:
Novocherkassk Regional Charitable Non-Commercial Public Fond "Medic",
INN: 6150030100
US Dollars Bank Account: 40703840600000000081 in Center-Invest
Rostov-on-Don Bank
Correspondence Account: 30101810100000000762
BIK: 046015762
Telephone: +7-(863-52)-444-60
With best regards to all our friends,
President of Novocherkassk Regional Charitable Non-Commercial Public
Fond "Medic",
Alexander N. Litvinov
Office #41,
Larina 22
Novocherkassk City
Rostov Region
RUSSIA, 346411
e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
P.S.
This newsgroup will be removed from our mailing list if moderators call
or write us.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: csybrandy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Start of Cipher Contest
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 11:10:24 -0500
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
What is the web site?
csybrandy
Adam Durana wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I haven't had a chance to update the web site yet, but I would like to go
> ahead and start the contest. As it stands now there is no deadline for
> ciphers. All ciphers will be put into a list ordered by the date they were
> submitted. When a weakness is found in a cipher in the listing it will be
> removed from the list. The author has the option to fix the problem and
> resubmit it, but this is not required. Besides the requirement that an
> entry have no known weaknesses, the entry must also be a block cipher. The
> resource requirements for the cipher must be justified if they are extreme.
> This is to avoid people submitting ciphers that use a huge amount of
> resources for no good reason, i.e.. 1024 rounds, 50mb of tables, etc. All
> submissions should be accompanied by a paper describing the cipher, this
> paper will cover design decisions and such things, and any analysis done.
> ALL CIPHERS SHOULD BE ANALYZED BEFORE BEING SUBMITTED. I am well aware that
> a lot of us lack the skills or understanding to do some of the advanced
> attacks such as linear and differential analysis. So do the best you can,
> basically show the proof that convinced you the cipher was secure. The
> paper is the meat of the submission, so participants should spend more time
> on that then any other part. Poorly written papers will make analysis much
> harder so entries with poor papers maybe removed from the listing until the
> author revises the paper. Submissions should also include reference code in
> ANSI C. The source code should include basic routines such as: cipher_init,
> cipher_block_encrypt, cipher_block_decrypt, cipher_encrypt, cipher_decrypt,
> and cipher_cleanup. cipher_block_en/decrypt should en/decrypt a single
> block of data. cipher_en/decrypt should be able to encrypt an entire array
> of blocks. If cipher_clean is not needed by your entry it does not need to
> be included. If you do not fully understand the requirements for the source
> code part of the submission, I will be posting some sample source code on
> the web site to further explain this. And finally the submission should
> include test vectors. So a submission will consist of 3 parts: paper,
> source code (one file), and test vectors (text file). One thing about the
> paper please use a standard document format, not all of us have Microsoft
> Word. So please use either a text file, an Adobe pdf or a postscript file.
> If you can submit your paper in more than one format that would be great.
> All submissions should be sent in an archive format, zip file or tarball
> please. If you have any questions please don't hesitate to email me or post
> them. Entries should be emailed to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Entries
> should not be sent to me! I will send you a message once your entry has
> been received. I will setup a listing of the ciphers on the web site soon.
> Failure to comply with any of the requirements will delay your cipher from
> being entered into the listing. So do it right the first time.
>
> Good luck!
>
> - Adam
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dave Hamilton)
Subject: Basic C tools .. where?
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 16:51:42 GMT
Newbie question
If you have a CT .. no prior knowledge of the method used .. are there
a basic set of tools you use to determine what you are dealing with
and quickly solve substitution or ROT13 type ciphers?
C Source would be nice .. since I'm a 30 year C programmer
TIA
Dave
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Examining random() functions
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 16:34:17 GMT
_Andy_ <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:Johnny Bravo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:> See the tests in the DieHard test suite. [...]
: Thanks. That's exactly the kind of tool I'm looking for. Would one
: expect a RNG to pass all these tests? [...]
It depends on what you want to do with it.
If you're using if for cryptography, it should pass all the tests you can
think of, not just those in Diehard.
Diehard comes with several simple RNGs that pass all of its tests.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<-- Press here to reveal you're an idiot.
------------------------------
From: Uri Blumenthal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NIST publishes AES3 papers
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 12:05:58 -0500
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"David A. Wagner" wrote:
> > Not necessarily - because plenty of analysis has
> > been done on DES with independent subkeys. So
> > one can utilize the results.
>
> Yup. If we can convince ourself that the new key schedule
> gives us something close enough to independent subkeys,
> then I agree that we can reuse existing analysis on DES.
Let's see. First, can we convince ourselves that subkeys
produced by a cryptographically strong pseudorandom
generator are "close enough" to independent?
Second, can we convince ourselves that
using DES (or better 3DES :-) engine
in PRNG mode produces cryptographically
strong stream? That's exactly what DES/SK
is doing - 32 plain straightforward DES
rounds using pseudorandom subkeys
(which the user can't set directly
to avoid all the related-key-ness pits :-).
Comments? Or would you like to see the "official"
description (aka the paper of 1997)?
--
Regards,
Uri
-=-=-==-=-=-
<Disclaimer>
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OAP-L3: Answer me these?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 16:43:55 GMT
In sci.crypt Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: If frequency is the same as bias, why did they apply the word
: bias to describe the same thing in a science?
The premise is wrong - frequency is not the same as bias.
AFAICS, no-one said that it was.
: Do you know the name of this news group? It is sci.crypt. It
: refers to cryptography. My definition of "bias" is the one in
: the field of cryptography. [...]
No, it is not. IIRC, *your* definition of bias encompassed any and all
predictable regularities. If you continue to use it in this context,
you will find yourself at cross purposes with many people here.
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Be good, do good.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike Mccarty Sr)
Subject: Re: DES question
Date: 28 Mar 2000 17:09:41 GMT
One can do better than that.
1
let A = [1 - ---]
64
2
Then you have
56 56 56
2 -1 56 1 (2 -1)(2 -2) 1 2
A = 1 - (2 -1)(---) + --------------(---) ...
64 2! 64
2 2
56 64 8
Since 2 /2 = 1/2 = 1/256, this is approximately exp(-1/256), or
0.996 roughly. In fact, adding the first two terms gives 0.996101379,
while exp(-1/256) = 0.996101369.
So it is "close to 1", but I wouldn't say "very, very close to 1".
Mike
In article <8bpu83$cpp$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
)
)> Question: If a DES key encripts 64 bit plaintext to 64 bit
)> ciphertext, can one say that this is the only key that
)> corresponds to this pair? Why? Thanks.
)>
)If you assume that for a fixed plaintext DES supplys a random
)output as different keys are applied to it you can work out what is the
)probability of a particular plaintext-ciphertext pair being unique.
)So for a fixed plaintext with a key K1 the chances of another key K2
)chosen at random giving the same ciphertext is 1/(2^64). Hence the
)chances of it not giving the same ciphertext is 1-(1/(2^64). Therefore
)the chances of no other key giving the same ciphertext is
)(1-(1/(2^64)))^((2^56)-1)
)which is approx
)(1-(1/(2^64)))^(2^56)
)which is a very, very close to 1, but not quite equal to 1.
)
)Neil.
)
)
)Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
)Before you buy.
--
----
char *p="char *p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
This message made from 100% recycled bits.
I don't speak for Alcatel <- They make me say that.
------------------------------
From: "BIG ONE" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
uk.media.newspapers,uk.legal,alt.security.pgp,alt.privacy,uk.politics.parliament,uk.politics.crime,uk.politics.censorship
Subject: Re: Sunday People 26/3/2000: "FORGET YOUR PASSWORD... END UP IN JAIL"
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 16:30:58 +0100
Reply-To: "BIG ONE" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
Geordie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:8blmck$24j9$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> NoSpam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > http://www.people.co.uk/shtml/NEWS/P28S1.shtml
> >
> > FORGET YOUR PASSWORD... END UP IN JAIL
> >
> > INTERNET FURY AT STRAW
> >
> > BIG Brother wants to know your computer password - and he'll
> > throw you in jail if you don't tell him.
> >
> > Home Secretary Jack Straw aims to make it a criminal offence to
> > refuse to tell police or secret services the way into your
> > personal computer.
> >
> > And you could go down for two years, even if you've only
> > forgotten the
> vital
> > word.
> >
> > Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill, any data you
> > have
> stored
> > will be presumed to be incriminating unless you can prove
> > otherwise. Civil liberties groups are furious over the
> > controversial new legislation, which is part of the Government's
> > bid to crack down on computer fraud, internet terrorism and child
> > porn.
> >
> >
> > America, France, Ireland and Germany have already rejected
> > similar laws.
> >
> > www.fipr.org/rip#media
> >
> What this means in effect, no one will want to use encryption in
> case they forget their password and end up in jail. This means that
> any attempt at privacy by the British computer user when using
> electronic communications will carry with it real risks. The old
> Soviet Union would have been proud of this law as I'm sure they and
> other repressive totalitarian states still existing around the
> world would welcome Jack Straw on to their Central Committee as
> Security Minister.
>
> The most frightening thing is he can get away with it. There seem
> to be no organised protest to this attack on fundamental right's to
> privacy. Well maybe this just goes to prove, as I have often
> suspected, that we are the most intolerant and authoritarian
> country in the Western world.
>
> Geordie
>
>
Any one know how to complain I seem to be in sh*t
P.s. what's my PGP password?
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bWhEnjd/5YZ/BlyDfiokCu21
=TKsu
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
Subject: Re: The lighter side of cryptology
Reply-To: JimD
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 17:26:36 GMT
On Mon, 27 Mar 2000 16:55:54 -0500, csybrandy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>"Mary had a crypto key, she kept it in escrow,
> and everything that Mary said, the Feds were sure to know."
> -- Sam Simpson, July 9, 1998
>
>Pulled it off the scramdisk homepage. Hope they don't mind.
I used to have that one for a signature block, substituting
'Pigs' for 'Feds'.
--
Jim Dunnett.
dynastic at cwcom.net
He who laughs last doesn't
get the joke.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: one-way hash functions with 256-bit output
Date: 28 Mar 2000 18:31:25 GMT
In <8bp0lr$72i$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(David A. Wagner) writes:
]In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
]stanislav shalunov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
]> Right now, a lot of people simply concatenate MD5 and SHA1 outputs.
]> That doesn't seem to be a good solution, because these two functions
]> contain conceptual similarities in design.
]And, with respect to secrecy, the security you get is only as
]good as the weaker of the two components, which is not ideal.
](If either MD5 or SHA1 leak a bit of information on the input,
]then their concatenation will, too.)
They are hashes. The input is usually attached, and they used to sign
it. Leaking is usually not a problem. the question as a hash is whether
it is as easy to find a hash collision for SHA1 and MD5 as it is for
either alone. I would very strongly suspect that it is far more
difficult. Whether it is 128 bits more difficult however might be open
to question (but whether it matters might also be open to question).
Even CRC64 and MD5 should be a far stronger hash than MD5 on its own.
------------------------------
From: "Brian Gladman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NIST publishes AES3 papers
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 19:25:37 +0100
"Bruce Schneier" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> On 23 Mar 2000 15:36:06 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050) wrote:
>
> >Only free if sole winner is not true. NIST has always said there might
be many
> >winners.
> >Don Johnson
>
> They have not always said that. They started saying that recently,
> and hopefully it will not happen.
They have said this for at very least a year.
Brian Gladman
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Is it really NSA ?!
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 18:38:06 GMT
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
just few days after i wrote about PegwitW (which i made from Pegwit)
i got interesting record in webserver's log file:
208.153.72.142 - - [28/Mar/2000:09:12:48 +0200] "GET /pegwit/ HTTP/1.0" 200 3257 "-"
"SpookWeb v1.0b (NSA)"
so i wonder if it really is NSA ?!
pros:
* User-Agent field: SpookWeb and NSA
* they did not visit my webserver before
* major search engines did not find "SpookWeb"
* it is not search robot because it also downloaded images and counter (search engines
does not do that)
cons:
* why should NSA put strings like that in User-Agent field
* it downloaded only executable, but not source code
any1 seen "SpookWeb" or know what it is ?
==
Disastry http://i.am/disastry/
remove .NOSPAM.NET for email reply
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Comment: disable line wrap before check this signature
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=rEmi
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Re-seeding PRNG's in central key distribution systems
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 18:40:41 GMT
Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Tim Tyler wrote:
:> Bryan Olson wrote:
:> : Correct, and the requirements on PRNGs for key generation
:> : are even stronger. Specifically, even given the state
:> : of the PRNG, one should not be able to determine previous
:> : outputs. This is not usually a requirement on stream-cipher
:> : PRNGs, and thus a strong stream cipher is not automatically
:> : good for key generation. One should not, for example, use
:> : RC4.
:> [...] I don't see why this requirement is a necessary one for
:> a PRNG used for key generation.
: Are you familiar with "ephemeral keys" or "forward secrecy"?
I know what these terms mean. I can see the relevance of forward
secrecy. I am less certain of connection with "epheremeral keys".
At a guess, perhaps these are used as some type of seed of the PRNG.
:> If you have the *entire* internal state you can predict
:> future output. This would be very bad. Attackers should
:> not be able to obtain the entire internal state of the
:> PRNG in the first place.
: Be carefull not to confuse "in the first place" with "ever".
: In a lecture, Whit Diffie noted a disadvantage of
: cryptographic protection, compared with other measures, is
: that compromised keys can reach backward through time.
: Cryptographers have learned to destroy secrets as soon as
: possible.
It's not so much a compromised key, as a compromise of the RNG
from which the key is derived. Compromise of the RNG can be done
by a legitimate key-holder.
While its true that the ability to work backwards as well as forwards
from a poistion where the RNG state is known, this is true for
stream cypher applications as well as key-distribution applications.
If a known plaintext in the middle of the message can be used to recover
the internal state, then this will only compromise the latter part of the
message.
I'd agree that, with stream cyphers, no-one bothers much about this issue.
:> The ability to work "backwards" from such an internal
:> state might make the disaster /slightly/ worse, I
:> suppose - but most effort should probably be directed
:> at avoiding the disaster in the first place.
: Exposure may be no disaster at all. Specifically, if we have
: forward secrecy we need only detect exposure when it happens
: or is likely to have happened - a strictly weaker condition
: than preventing exposer.
There are lots of "but"s that spring to mind here:
Early keys can be compromised at a later date - in which case detection
of the compromise is of little relevance. Detecting a compromise by the
enemy in something like an RNG is notoriously difficult anyway.
Having siad this, the ability to generate keys "backwards" *is* a definite
weakness. Then again, so is the ability to generate keys "forwards".
I guess the moral of the story is to avoid deterministic key-generation
programs where possible ;-)
--
__________
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://mandala.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Umbilical cord: baby bungee.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Steven C. Den Beste)
Subject: Re: ecc equation
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2000 19:01:01 GMT
I heard a rumor that Bob Silverman posted this:
>In article <smWC4.69430$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>"Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> lordcow77 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>> > >Well that's just the thing I can't find any descriptions of any
>> > >of the algorithms online. Even if I don't understand the
>> > >algorithm I may be able to implement it.
>> >
>> > Firstly, I do not believe that you will be able to implement
>> > even Schoof's original algorithm with the level of mathematics
>> > knowledge that you currently seem to have. There is some heavy
>> > algorithm wizardry to make the algorithm run at even a
>> > reasonable speed and the math used is essentially on the cutting
>> > edge of research in that field. Secondly, even if you were able
>> > to produce a working implementation, it would not really be
>> > productive as others have already done the same. Thirdly, you
>> > will gain practically nothing by such an exercise after spending
>> > many hours that could be far more productively spent doing other
>> > activities.
>>
>> No offense, but f@@@ you. Who are you to say I am a know-nothing?
>
>I want to be gentle about this. I really do.
>
>(1) He did not say you are a know-nothing. You are a high school
>student, right? He said you would be unable to implement Schoof's
>algorithm with your level of math knowledge; a different thing
>entirely.
>
>(2) There are no cookbook descriptions of Schoof's algorithm and
>none of the Atkins/Elkies extensions which make it practical.
>
>(3) The level of math required is beyond that of most with a B.S.
>degree in math; one needs to know a good deal of abstract algebra (to
>understand isogenies), know the difference between local and global
>fields, understand p-adic arithmetic, algebraic number theory, etc.
>etc. The math is quite deep.
>
>The prior poster was not trying to be insulting; he was being HONEST.
>
>May I suggest you get hold of the following:
>
>H. Cohen
>A Course in Computational ALgebraic Number Theory, Springer-Verlag
>
>This book is SUPERB.
>If you can read this, you can probably handle Schoof's algorithm.
>
>*I* have never implemented Schoof's algorithm (never found the time),
>and it would take me quite a bit of work to learn the details.
>
>
>
> In my
>> current library I have implemented RSA, several symmetric ciphers, a
>> secure-PRNG, etc...
>
>All of these involve very elementary mathematics and number theory.
>
>
>
>> So don't say I don't know what I am doing.
>
>I'm sorry, but *I* could not possibly have implemented Schoof's
>algorithm even after I finished my undergrad degree in math.
>
>The simple fact is that you are not even aware of the level of math
>involved. Others are not trying to belittle you. You need to study
>math for a few more years before you even become aware of what it is
>that you don't currently know.
As with most universities, various buildings at the one I went to had
inspirational inscriptions and quotes over some of the doors of the older
buildings.
The one over Kidder Hall said this: "Your education is complete when you
discover how little you know." -- Thomas Jefferson.
Interestingly enough, Kidder Hall was where the Department of Mathematics
was located.
I've been a software engineer for 25 years; I've implemented (or even
invented) things that some of you would find astounding. I'm a smart guy.
But even though I'm fascinated with 3D, every time I take a look at the math
involved in doing it right I get lost. That's because I never studied linear
equations, and I don't know how to use matrices. When I look at the
algorithms, I instantly get swamped in a sea of equations I can see but
can't understand; they're not formulae to me, they're just black lines and
arbitrary symbols on a page. I do no better than I do looking at printed
Russian (which I don't speak). I know there's meaning there, but I don't
have the faintest idea what it is.
Sometimes in Computer Science we demonstrate that a problem is insoluble by
demonstrating that it is "isomorphic to the stopping problem". At that
point, we stop looking.
I know I'm getting off topic here, but an example would be automatic
analysis of a program to determine if it contains "dead code", code which
will never execute and thus could be deleted without penalty. That is
certainly desirable, and it seems as if it should be straightforward, but
such an analysis is in fact isomorphic to the stopping problem, and thus
there exists no general algorithm capable of always doing this in finite
time on any computer which can be simulated by a Turing Machine. But if you
don't understand what "isomorphic" means, or what a "Turing Machine" is, or
what the "stopping problem" is, then this explanation means nothing whatever
to you -- it's just words in a row. Theory of Computing has its own language
and to understand some of the words and terms requires intense study.
Without these terms, it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain why such a
thing can't be done (say, to a pointy-haired boss). To people who DO know
what they mean, the explanation I just made is sufficient. (The argument is
that we insert a "Halt" in the code which we think might be dead, and then
analyze to see if the Halt ever gets executed. The code is dead if the
machine doesn't halt.)
I've gotten responses akin to "No, you're just lazy. If you'd work at it
some more, I think you could come up with a practical solution." No, you
don't understand: there IS no solution. Not even Saint Babbage could create
one.
But to someone without the proper grounding, it's very difficult to explain
why.
For some things there are no shortcuts. To understand them you simply have
to understand the language in which they are written. I can't do 3D because
I don't "speak" matrix. Without that, I don't have a prayer. (Which is why
I've never attempted it.) I can't explain some issues in theory of Computing
to some people, because they don't speak the language and won't understand
the explanations.
In some cases it can take years of study to learn enough to even ask
meaningful questions about something, let alone understand the answers.
I also think it's important to distinguish between "knowledge" and
"intelligence". (As the old saw goes: "Ignorance can be cured; Stupid is for
life.") Lack of knowledge is correctable; stupidity is permanent. It's no
reflection on your basic intelligence, and it is not an insult, to say that
you don't have sufficient knowledge to understand a given issue. (That's
different than saying "You'll NEVER understand it because you're too stupid
to acquire the knowledge needed.")
========
Steven C. Den Beste [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Home page: http://home.san.rr.com/denbeste
CDMA FAQ: http://home.san.rr.com/denbeste/cdmafaq.html
"I'm a 21st century kid trapped in a 19th centure family"
-- Calvin
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