Cryptography-Digest Digest #462, Volume #11 Sat, 1 Apr 00 17:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: new Echelon article (JimD)
Re: Algorithm to decypher ENIGMA? (JimD)
Re: OAP-L3: Semester 1 / Class #1 All are invited. (Anthony Stephen Szopa)
Re: Examples of topology related to crypto ? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: I will make ANY software for ANYBODY (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Re: Examples of topology related to crypto ? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: I will make ANY software for ANYBODY (Guy Macon)
Re: new Echelon article (Jerry Coffin)
Re: I will make ANY software for ANYBODY (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Re: Using Am-241 to generate random numbers (Guy Macon)
Re: new Echelon article ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: NSA ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Using Am-241 to generate random numbers (Jerry Coffin)
Implementation of Blowfish (Jan Krumsiek)
Number 34, another case of a 54 card deck... (wtshaw)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
Subject: Re: new Echelon article
Reply-To: JimD
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 18:28:01 GMT
On Fri, 31 Mar 2000 19:19:22 -0700, Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
>
>> >You save the transmission and then decrypt it
>> >on-line, or you can even decrypt in real time if you have enough computing
>> >power.
>>
>> You'd need a hell of a lot of computing power to store a 10-minute call.
>
>What makes you think that? Digital cell phones typically use only 8
>to 14 KBps, so you're looking at roughly 4.5 to 8.2 megabytes of
>storage for a 10 minute call. It obviously takes a bit of capability
>to intercept the call at all, but once you've done that, storing the
>information is pretty trivial.
OK I'll buy that, but what are you going to do with it then?
By the time you've broken the crypto and got it back to audio,
the information it contains is stale.
--
Jim Dunnett.
dynastic at cwcom.net
He who laughs last doesn't
get the joke.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
Subject: Re: Algorithm to decypher ENIGMA?
Reply-To: JimD
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 18:28:02 GMT
On Sat, 01 Apr 2000 18:30:00 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Daniel) wrote:
>On Sat, 01 Apr 2000 15:54:18 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>(John Savard) wrote:
>
>>On Sat, 01 Apr 2000 15:38:31 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Daniel)
>>wrote, in part:
>>
>>>Can someone help me to find the algorithm to cypher/decypher WWII
>>>Enigma messages? Perhaps the manner/way the Turing Bombe was
>>>designed?
>>
>>My web site carefully describes the methods that were used to attack
>>the Enigma historically.
>>
>>John Savard (teneerf <-)
>>http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/index.html
>
>
>Great! I'll have a go at it.
And there are lots of Enigma emulators around.
--
Jim Dunnett.
dynastic at cwcom.net
He who laughs last doesn't
get the joke.
------------------------------
From: Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: OAP-L3: Semester 1 / Class #1 All are invited.
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 11:39:51 -0800
Taneli Huuskonen wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Anthony Stephen Szopa
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> [...]
> >This first semester will concentrate on the random digit generator.
>
> This morning I wrote a programme that simulates breaking yours. It
> generates random digits using your method, stores output samples in an
> array, then passes the array to a subroutine that calculates more output
> digits from it (not using the permutations, of course) and checks the
> result. It's about a hundred lines of C code altogether.
>
> It wouldn't be fair to suggest any more bets, but I'm willing to
> demonstrate to you (and anyone who cares to watch) that my attack works.
>
> Taneli Huuskonen
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use
> Charset: noconv
>
> iQA/AwUBOOHqWF+t0CYLfLaVEQK7EgCfQu2HCSSFIzlSjUFxZYpQipYJY4UAn0Xx
> Di14am9mgl8BJgtMOcFUd8gi
> =12iu
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> --
> I don't | All messages will be PGP signed, | Fight for your right to
> speak for | encrypted mail preferred. Keys: | use sealed envelopes.
> the Uni. | http://www.helsinki.fi/~huuskone/ | http://www.gilc.org/
It is interesting to hear that you have written an algorithm that
you claim shows a weakness in the random digit generator.
Can I presume that you have either OAP-L3 or OAR-L3, have read all
the Help Files, and done all the tutorials in all the Help Files?
Have you used either OAP-L3 or OAR-L3 according to recommended
usage to generate a raw random digit stream directly from the
random digit generator, and proved to yourself beyond any doubt
that your algorithm can predict the random digit output of
subsequent raw random digits if you are first given a raw random
digit stream directly from either the OAP-L3 or OAR-L3 software?
How many digits from the raw random digit output from either
OAP-L3 or OAR-L3 do you need in order for you to determine all
subsequent raw random digits from the random digit generator
using only your method, while not using any knowledge of the
array sequences, in other words, by using only your algorithm
and the limited length raw random digit stream from the random
digit generator?
I realize that often one may think they have got the solution to a
problem but on closer inspection they soon find out that they were
mistaken.
Think about these questions:
(9!/10!)*100 = ?%
((10! - 9!)/10!)*100 = ?%
Guessing a digit from 0 - 9, on average, you are most probably
likely to simply guess what percent correctly?
I do not hold you to anything you have said so far.
Please let us know the answer to these very few and very simple
questions?
You'll hear from me in a few more days.
Good luck.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Examples of topology related to crypto ?
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 19:44:38 GMT
In article
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Chris Hillman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
This is related to fundamental ideas of
> Shannon which now lie near the heart of modern ergodic theory, and
also
> the new subject of ergodic Ramsey theory, and to the theory of "random
> graphs".
>
A few weeks ago in sci.crypt, I claimed that Ramsey Theory (as part
of combinatorics & graph theory) should have some role in crypto but I
didn't know what role. I am not familiar with the ergodic version.
> I assume you know that Shannon considered certain simple "linear" or
> "rational" methods of encryption, and showed how once the
cryptographer
> has a certain minimum length of codetext, the problem of breaking the
> cipher goes from impossible to tractable rather suddenly. AFAIK noone
> ever generalized this work---- I'd be very interested to hear from
anyone
> who knows otherwise.
I'm not sure what a generalization of unicity distance would imply.
BTW, in quantum crypto the amount of Shannon info potentially available
to an eavesdropper could be strictly controlled to begin with.
>
> > More specifically, I was attempting to use one- point
> > compactification, etc. to introduce the concept of limits into
> > complexity theory for problems like P/NP
>
> Hmmm.... don't get it, but do you know about Stone-Czech
> compacitification? If not, see Folland, Real Analysis--- you'll love
it,
> I promise! :-) :-)
2
I'm already familiar with S-C compactification. In the magazine
Science (vol. 275, page 1570, March 14, 1997) there is a brief write- up
by B. Citra describing Freedman's suggestion. First, think roughly of
the concept of "limit" as the residue of an infinite process. Then,
Freedman wanted to "extend the concept of computation to include
infinitely large problems, each one a limit of increasingly large,
finite instances of the problem. The trick is to define the extension so
that a particular criterion holds: Whenever the original computational
problem has a P-time algorithm, each infinite example has a solution.
The hope, then, is that for problems like the Traveling Salesman Problem
[which is NP-complete], there will be infinitely large examples without
solution." Freedman wanted to find out how to mathematically define the
notion of limit for this particular case.
I tried to begin this by considering the concept of convergence
defined generally, i.e., the idea of convergence extended to the case of
generalized sequences where the index moves over a directed set, and the
terms are in topological space. In a topological space X, the concept of
convergence of nets and that of filters can be defined. Coversely,
convergence of nets in X defines a topology of X. Infinity exists within
the context of a topological space and I was experimenting with using
one- point compactification, etc. to try to find a more fundamental
basis for Freedman's suggestion. I don't remember some of the specifics
right now but, somewhere in a closet randomly filled with papers, I have
a copy of the original email I sent Freedman, his reply, and various
notes I made. I'm not sure I made any real progress but maybe you want
to take a crack at this. If you do I'd love to hear about it. BTW,
Freedman also suggested that the idea of limits could play an important
role in other fields such as geometry.
>
> My gosh, someone who knows what a symbolic dynamical system is!!! :-)
> Did you learn this from Lind and Marcus, Introduction to Symbolic
Dynamics
> and Coding? Or from some other book?
No, I learned only a little via the web. I will read more about this
at your site. Also, you might want to check out the CA section at
//alife.santafe.edu for more on CA & how it relates to other subjects.
You might also want to read the CA thread Tim Tyler started. I would
recommend reading the whole thread through to begin with because
there is a lot of crosstalk on CAs & computability, etc. BTW, there is
also something different called quantum cellular automata which I
suspect could be made reversable via, say, partitioning. See, e.g.,
http://cism.jpl.nasa.gov/program/RCT/Applications.html
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Subject: Re: I will make ANY software for ANYBODY
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2000 21:54:47 +0200
Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Beat this, I will work for free.
Great, when can I expect the MacOS X ported to Palmcomp. hardware? ;)
/Tony
--
/\___/\ Who would you like to read your messages today? /\___/\
\_@ @_/ Protect your privacy: <http://www.pgpi.com/> \_@ @_/
--oOO-(_)-OOo---------------------------------------------oOO-(_)-OOo--
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---���---���-----------------------------------------------���---���---
\O/ \O/ �1999 <http://www.svanstrom.com/?ref=news> \O/ \O/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Examples of topology related to crypto ?
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 20:12:12 GMT
In article <8c0pb3$gla$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> It's not exactly cryptography, but Nir Shavit has a paper
> on using topology to reason about what kinds of protocols can
> run on various kinds of asynchronous architectures :
>
Thanks, I'll take a look at this. Here's another example which, at
the bottom of the page, refers to a seemingly interesting theorem by
Beutelspacher & Rosenbaum which I have never heard of:
http://www.mirageonline.it/zanella/
Then click the "interest" icon,
Then click the "short description" icon
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Subject: Re: I will make ANY software for ANYBODY
Date: 01 Apr 2000 15:34:38 EST
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony L.
Svanstrom) wrote:
>
>Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> Beat this, I will work for free.
>
>Great, when can I expect the MacOS X ported to Palmcomp. hardware? ;)
>
There is truth behind the humor here. When Linux is ported to
Palmcomp hardware it will likely be done by someone who works for free.
See [ http://www.opensource.org ].
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: new Echelon article
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2000 13:39:33 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
[ ... ]
> >> You'd need a hell of a lot of computing power to store a 10-minute call.
> >
> >What makes you think that? Digital cell phones typically use only 8
> >to 14 KBps, so you're looking at roughly 4.5 to 8.2 megabytes of
> >storage for a 10 minute call. It obviously takes a bit of capability
> >to intercept the call at all, but once you've done that, storing the
> >information is pretty trivial.
>
> OK I'll buy that, but what are you going to do with it then?
That depends on what you were monitoring and why you were
intercepting it in the first place...
> By the time you've broken the crypto and got it back to audio,
> the information it contains is stale.
Maybe. Or maybe not. It might be Jane Blow asking her husband to
pick up some sugar on the way home from work, in which case you
probably never cared about it at all (unless, perhaps, you're trying
to assasinate Joe Blow, so knowing the route he's going to take home
from work is useful). OTOH, it might be somebody telling his
comrades that they need to start getting their passport and visas if
they're going to be ready to blow up some building on (say) the
fourth of July. In the latter case, you've got a fair amount of time
to break the cipher before it's stale.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Subject: Re: I will make ANY software for ANYBODY
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2000 22:48:41 +0200
Guy Macon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> (Tony L. Svanstrom) wrote:
> >
> >Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> Beat this, I will work for free.
> >
> >Great, when can I expect the MacOS X ported to Palmcomp. hardware? ;)
> There is truth behind the humor here. When Linux is ported to Palmcomp
> hardware it will likely be done by someone who works for free.
AFAIK they got a Palmunit to start with Linux a cpl of years ago. There
wasn't much they could do with it, but it did work... Haven't heard
anything about it since then though, most likely because to just get it
to start they needed an 8meg Palmunit and at the time they only came
with 2 meg. Such a thing could get people to stop working.
/Tony
--
/\___/\ Who would you like to read your messages today? /\___/\
\_@ @_/ Protect your privacy: <http://www.pgpi.com/> \_@ @_/
--oOO-(_)-OOo---------------------------------------------oOO-(_)-OOo--
DSS: 0x9363F1DB, Fp: 6EA2 618F 6D21 91D3 2D82 78A6 647F F247 9363 F1DB
---���---���-----------------------------------------------���---���---
\O/ \O/ �1999 <http://www.svanstrom.com/?ref=news> \O/ \O/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Subject: Re: Using Am-241 to generate random numbers
Date: 01 Apr 2000 15:53:28 EST
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jerry
Coffin) wrote:
>
>In article <8c43d2$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>says...
>
>> >Trying to "transmit" the key by
>> >having two people get the same key off of a telescope is extremely
>> >unlikely to work dependably (if at all).
>>
>> And if it did work dependably, it would do so for any attacker
>> with a telescope. You might as well just post your random
>> session key in the clear to a newsgroup - either way anyone
>> who wants it can retrieve it.
>
>Well, there ARE a lot of stars out there -- OTOH, unless you have BIG
>telescope, the search for irregular and semi-irregular variables
>wouldn't be TOO terrible. If the two parties involved were at
>substantially different latitudes, that would reduce the field of
>stars to be considered as well.
There are a lot of Usenet postings too. If you depend on someone not
looking in the right place, then you are using steganographry, which
is a legitimate way to hide information but is not cryptography. No
cryptographic system is secure if the attacker has the same key that
the recipient has. If steganographry is good enough, there is no need
for a telescope and it's limited set of "random" variable stars. Just
anonymously post your key in one of the binary newsgroups and don't
say what it is.
>The universe is a figment of its own imagination.
"I used to think that the brain was the most important organ, until I
realized exactly who was telling me that" -Emo Phillips
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 16:03:20 -0500
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: new Echelon article
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > ... German companies may expend money in
> > bribery in foreign (as against national) contracts and have tax
> > deductions too. From what you wrote above, I deduce that this is
> > forbidden by law in the US.
>
> Indeed, we have a general principle that assisting someone else
> in the commission of a crime is a crime in itself.
Knowingly.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: NSA
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 21:28:53 GMT
In article <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
ing.com>,
Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The
> NSA, FBI, etc., may have lobbied for increased wire-tapping
> capability, but they've got smart enough people that they've GOT to
> realize that it's quickly getting to the point that anybody who cares
> can encrypt almost any kind communication they want to in ways that
> nobody can reasonably plan on decrypting. This wil force them to use
> less direct methods a great deal more as time goes on.
The Special Collections Service (NSA & CIA-
comprised) was formed for this purpose and is
meant to be used more invasively than usual
NSA practice.
>
> > Also I am almost 100% sure that they (maybe not officialy but people from
> > the nsa) read this newsgroup, probably not to spy on people but to get
> > information, this being one of the most (the most maybe?) famous crypto
> > related newsgroup on usenet.
>
> I really doubt that they read it with the intent or belief that
> they'll learn anything new about cryptology. They might, however,
> read other parts of Usenet for indications of people committing
> crimes -- as you mentioned, people DO have a tendency to brag, and I
> suspect most criminals are thoroughly human in this respect.
>
Myself and others have posted seemingly
original ideas in sci.crypt. Of course, some of
these notions may be too speculative, vague or
useless but, collectively, we might teach an
old dog (the NSA) a new trick or two. To return
the favor, the least the NSA could do is
contribute to the crypto humor thread I
started (it might not be illegal for them to do
this). Here's an idea of Seth Lloyd's the NSA
may not have thought how to realize (even
theoretically): The large bandwidth available
to continuous quantum computation makes it
potentially useful for quantum
communications & crypto.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Using Am-241 to generate random numbers
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2000 14:41:17 -0700
In article <8c5nk8$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
says...
[ ... ]
> There are a lot of Usenet postings too. If you depend on someone not
> looking in the right place, then you are using steganographry, which
> is a legitimate way to hide information but is not cryptography.
Rather the contrary -- here we're talking only about key
distribution. It's perfectly normal for a secret-key cipher to be
used with one key from a finite-sized set, and to use a separate,
secure channel for transmitting the key. You can question whether
this particular channel is secure (I'm certainly not convinced) but
it doesn't change the basic mode of operationa a bit: in every case,
you're depending on an opponent not guessing the correct key.
> No cryptographic system is secure if the attacker has the same key that
> the recipient has.
I don't see a fundamental difference between the attacker choosing
the correct one of (say) 2^56 different possible keys, and guessing
the correct star and observation schedule.
> If steganographry is good enough, there is no need
> for a telescope and it's limited set of "random" variable stars. Just
> anonymously post your key in one of the binary newsgroups and don't
> say what it is.
I think you're getting the fundamentals incorrect here. The only
real question is whether there are enough variable stars easily
visible from both locations to provide a large enough key that the
attacker can't reasonably exhaust your key space. That's not
fundamentally any different from any other secret-key cipher.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: Jan Krumsiek <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Implementation of Blowfish
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 21:43:31 GMT
Does anybody know where to get the (c++) source code of an
implementation of blowfish that supports the encryption of variable
size strings.
i don't really know how to correctly encapsulate the core functions.
Jan
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Number 34, another case of a 54 card deck...
Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2000 14:52:33 -0600
In review, Pinsk went from base 26 to 52 via hexits, Maas went from base
51 to 52, also via hexits. To do a complementary pair, one step above,
Lubz went from base 53 to 54 via doits, and now, Rakov does a base 27 to
54 translation, via doits.
Any pair of bases x, x+1 can be simply translated with one stage, but it
is better to have an intermediate base as above, where 6 and 12 have
convenient powers.
Considering stage efficiencies, where I really like them to be at least
90%, those for Pinsk were 85.1%, and 95.4%, the 2nd one being acceptable,
and more important than the first which is otherwise too low. For Rakov,
it's 94.9% and 93.4%...better.
27 is lots better for text than 26, at least for gross changes in bases
where group size will change between plaintext and ciphertext, where
spaces should be handled as a separate character. The work around for 26
was to drop w as a real letter, substituting w with vv and using w for a
space instead. In Rakov, just add / for isolated spaces.
Output in base 52 for Pinsk and Maas is easliy represented in a basic card
deck, while with 54 for Lubz and Rakov, you add the jokers.
Pt-Ct groups for Pinsk and Maas are both 6-5 and 12-10, with transposition
sizes of 11/22 hexits. For Lubz and Rakov, Pt-Ct groups are 6-5, 12-10,
and, 18-15 doits.
Prior to Lubz, Santa Maria was the only algorithm I have done with greater
than ten as an intermediate base, all lesser ones being clearly
represented by common number digits. In dealing with higher bases, where
0-9 are insufficient, in this case 12, the excess values have got to be
called something.
In Santa Maria, I used a more complicated method than what I have learned
to do in Lubz and Rakov, where I merely assign the next higher ascii
characters to identify them, so 0 is for the lowest one, 9 for the 10th,
colon for the 11th, and, semicolon for the12th. Merely subtract the ascii
value for 0, which is 48, as needed, and you have a base ten value for any
of the higher than 10 intermedate bases, 0 to 11 for base 12. For
following the logic, this means that some of the element representations
are familiar, 0 being a preference for element zero.
Now, purely Rakov, 25/12/54 which is my usual base translation shorthand
for Pt base/Intermediate Base/Ct base:
Let's generate a set of keys for Rakov 18 from the above sentence:
Sub1(Rv): xktmqncivyahlsz/udfbegojwrp
Sub2(Rv): VaxibKmPGc!LydQvDAMtEHRueBksFIYSjfNnZXCToJzplwgUqWhOr$
Trans(Rv): tncamdui qkolehsv bgjpwxrf
The keys were made using 105 characters, the sum of the lengths of the
three keys. They could be directly entered due to the nature of the hashes
which seek to produce permutations, the valid key being the most obvious.
Simply strip off the extra characters and hash the remainder:
xktmqncivyahlsz/udfbegojwrp
VaxibKmPGc!LydQvDAMtEHRueBksFIYSjfNnZXCToJzplwgUqWhOr$
tncamdui qkolehsv bgjpwxrf
With base translation, there are almost endless possibilities of programs
that might be useful, having the correct program is important. Perhaps
something could be noticed in the permutated strinng that might suggest a
specific program, as the / in Rakov, but not in Lubz, but it could be
inserted in the open key string in the case if Lubz, and it would be
ingored. Surely, open key strings that included /!$ would be filtered
for use in Pinsk and Maas as well.
The same thing also goes for ciphertext, where random jokers might appear,
but as Drew Carey's points, they would not really matter. Encrypt these
two sentences.
Preformat, Encrypt, as Cards, and Decrypt:
/the/same/thing/al so/goes/for/cipher textj/where/random
/jokers/might/appe arj/but/as/drew/ca reys/pointsj/they/
would/not/really/m atterx/encrypt/the se/two/sentencesx/
NqzybltfcHEk$VJ B$fzEhKkFJujHpK IKPprsPYyjz$StZ zfhHfzHHbWuXMPg
XEOpxMNlMwbpJlJ sFsmqndTCjC!iId pznPxIDIeY!msyy yDWTIdLwPwkEejy
VhgbBtPJvIIRWeI
[2]<5><A><K>{3} {K}<8>{7}{4}(9) (6){Q}\$/[10](J) (3)\$/{7}<A>(6)
{9}(Q){Q}(7)(J) <9>{J}(9)<4>(Q) (10)(Q)[4]<4><6> <7>[4][K]<K>{J}
<A>\$/[7]<8>[A] <A>{7}{9}(9){7} <A>(9)(9){3}[J] <9>[Q](A)[4]{8}
[Q](6)[3]<4><Q> (A)[2]{K}(A)<J> {3}<4>(J){K}(J) <7>(7)<7>{A}<5>
<2>{5}[8](4){J} (4)\!/{10}(10){5} <4><A><2>[4]<Q> (10)(5)(10){6}[K]
\!/{A}<7><K><K> <K>(5)[J][8](10) {5}(K)<J>[4]<J> {Q}(6){6}{J}<K>
the same thing also goes for ciphertextj where random jokers might appearj
but as drew careys pointsj they would not really matterx encrypt these two
sentencesx
The next application also has its challenges, but is only one natural
follow from these. Each time I work out a new technique, it opens the
doors to many offshoots, so as I have a full tree of next-program BT
possibilities these days. My data base of base translation algorithms is
getting huge, and takes significant effort to keep it updated and
accessable, lots of interesting possibilities.
--
Given all other distractions, I'd rather be programming.
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