Cryptography-Digest Digest #981, Volume #11 Thu, 8 Jun 00 23:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Cryptographic voting (Greg)
Re: Enigma Variations (John Savard)
Re: Cryptographic voting (Greg)
Re: Solution for file encryption / expiration? ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: XTR independent benchmarks ("Paulo S. L. M. Barreto")
Re: Multiple encryptions (Greg)
Re: ZKPs in practice? ("Paulo S. L. M. Barreto")
Re: Question about recommended keysizes (768 bit RSA) ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Cryptographic voting (zapzing)
Re: PGP Self-Decrypt ("Paul Pires")
Re: Multiple encryptions (Greg)
Re: Cryptographic voting ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: Some dumb questions ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Cryptographic voting (Greg)
Re: Retail distributors of DES chips? (zapzing)
Re: Some dumb questions (Jim Gillogly)
Re: Cryptographic voting ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: My lastest paper on Block Ciphers ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: My lastest paper on Block Ciphers (tomstd)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 01:01:43 GMT
> Really? Where? ...
What I said is documented.
In fact, some people began to video tape these individuals getting on
and off the buses and IIRC a court said that they could not do this and
that alone created a stir.
--
Tyranny is kept at bay by guns and will. Our government
knows we have the guns, but they don't know if we have
the will. Nor do we.
The only lawful gun law on the books- the second amendment.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Enigma Variations
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 01:32:27 GMT
On Thu, 08 Jun 2000 05:33:34 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>John Savard wrote:
>> ... The SIGABA machines were closely guarded, ...
>However, we did lose one for a while (the truck that was transporting
>it was stolen while the drivers were in a restaurant). The machine
>was recovered; a subsequent (panicky) investigation determined that
>the incident was a simple vehicle theft and that the machine had not
>been compromised.
Yes, and that incident is recounted in David Kahn's _The
Codebreakers_, of course.
John Savard (teneerf <-)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/
------------------------------
From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 01:23:51 GMT
> I don't understand your sentence about the constitution. I don't think
> the constitution of the US mentions legal tender in any form (although
> it has been a while since I have read it)....
The constitution specifically says that only the federal government may
mint coins. Since a private corporation is doing this, the state of NV
decided to ignore the constitution as well.
Now I would like to put aside your point that this is a historical
practice since the bill itself stated in very clear terms that the
state of NV refused to follow the constitution on these grounds unless
and until the federal government chose to begin following the
constitution as it should be doing. In other words, the NV state
legislature said, "IF YOU WON'T FOLLOW THE LAW, THEN WE WON'T."
> However, you can mint your own currency, and no one will stop you.
But you won't because you know your ass will be in the slammer by night
fall.
> And I bet he went to the bathroom the day before he was assassinated.
> Coincidence? I don't believe so.
I know this may be difficult for you, but try to follow along. I was
discussing why it would make sense to me that NV would be full of
computerized voting these days based upon the obvious history of events
in the US.
> From what I have read of Kissinger, wasn't he a Harvard
> professor at the time?
He was a new world order nut that no doubt had an opportunity - one
opportunity - to explain to Kennedy that the goal of the UN was to
destroy the US constitution and enslave us to a dictatorial one world
government structure. That was enough for Kennedy.
> ...but I don't think he interacted with JFK much...
no, not much. Once was enough for Kennedy. Look, don't take my word
for it. Do the research.
> For that matter, I can't find out when the NWO was *started*
I'll give you a clue - before you were born. In fact, the man who
started it (in essence) died knowing that what he was starting would
not come to fruition until after he died. He predicted about 100 years
would be required to achieve the goals he laid down. It is (IIRC) just
over 100 years. Some say any time now, but I don't think so...
> Searching for this information is painful, since most
> webpages with "NWO" in their names refer to wrestling.
A good place to start is www.devvy.com. If you are serious about
learning this stuff...
> This thread should be moved to alt.conspiracy. Please follow up there
> unless you can tie your responses into cryptography or mathematics.
I would disagree. If someone is talking about a cryptographic voting
system, they must understand what the goals are that must be met by
their design. To do that, one must understand the powerful forces that
want to undermind and control the outcome of the votes. Thus, you
enter into politics. And this is NOT conspiracy. It is at best
theoritical, and at worse obvious (which is what I would say).
In other words, even if you wanted to believe this stuff does not
happen today, that there is no one in America, not one, who is in power
that wants to subvert our voting system, then you must at least keep in
mind that these things ARE POSSIBLE and account for preventing them in
designing such a voter system. But, alas, many of these things are too
well documented to be just theoritical.
--
Tyranny is kept at bay by guns and will. Our government
knows we have the guns, but they don't know if we have
the will. Nor do we.
The only lawful gun law on the books- the second amendment.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 21:46:07 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Solution for file encryption / expiration?
Will Dormann wrote:
> Hello!
>
> I work for a web site that provides books for free in PDF format on the
> internet. Most of our material is public domain, but in order to attract new
> authors, my boss is wanting to look into some sort of "protected" format.
> (Which cannot be displayed after a certain amount of time, and I guess
> encrypted to prevent copying too)
The idea of limiting the user's ability to see the content is flawed for two
reasons. First, it is impossible to create uncrackable software. You can make
it very, very hard, ie., practically impossible, but the cost of creating such a
container is extremely high.
The other reason is that once your viewer has rendered the text it can be
captured and manipulated to make copies.
>
>
> 1) Is this practical?
No.
> I would assume that this would require a speical
> software viewer?
That's the usual (flawed) approach.
> (which he would want me to program myself). This would
> make it a platform-specific item, too, I would assume.
No, you can use cross-platform development tools to handle various display
platforms (X11, Mac, Windoze) all from the same source.
> Currently books are
> in PDF format, which just about anybody can view.
>
> 2) Is it possible? I'm from the school of "If it can be viewed, it can be
> copied!" And as for the file "expirint" (not viewable, say, after 30
> days)... You've got me!
>
> 3) Would anybody in their right mind even attempt such a project at $8 /
> hour?!? (boy, I need a new job!)
No, because you would not succeed
>
>
> TIA for any comments, suggestions, etc...
> (CC my E-mail if at all possible)
Suggestion: rather than displaying the document, print it.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 22:39:12 -0300
From: "Paulo S. L. M. Barreto" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: XTR independent benchmarks
Roger Schlafly wrote:
>
> Wei Dai wrote:
> > That structure is already present in GF(p^6) and is not imposed by XTR.
> > The reason it can represent a field element by only 2 subfield elements
> > is because it works in a multiplicative subgroup of size p^2-p+1, which
> > every GF(p^6) has. The question is whether discrete log in GF(p^6) is
> > really as difficult as in a prime field (when the two fields have about
> > the same order)? I think there is definitely room for doubt.
>
> There is also the possibility that discrete logs in the subgroup
> of GF(p^6) is much easier that in the entire GF(p^6).
Answer to Wei Dai:
I can't see any fundamental difference between working in (subgroups of)
GF(p^6) and GF(2^m), where the size of p^6 is roughly equal to that of
2^m. Please correct me if I am wrong: the best attack known against DL
in GF(2^m) has the same complexity as the best attack against DL in
GF(r) where r ~ p^6 except for the constant factor in the exponent.
Answer to Robert Schlafly:
This doesn't seem to be possible: isn't the complexity of DL in GF(p^6)
bound by the complexity of DL in the largest subgroup due to
Pohlig-Hellman attacks?
As for Don Johnson, his comments are obvious: he certainly has far too
many patents on EC to be happy about any competing cryptosystem :-)
However, his argument involving NIST's curves -- as if selection by NIST
was any irrevocable proof of security -- is clearly sophistry (remember
SHA-0? it was flawed).
Paulo Barreto.
------------------------------
From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Multiple encryptions
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 01:30:55 GMT
> How can this be?
It escapes me too...
It seems to me that you should be able to use a simple 40 bit key space
encryption program using 10 keys and the result should be more powerful
than a 256 bit key. I would assume this because there is no way to
know when you have found just the first key since the results are
randomly appearing binary. I have had mixed reviews on this strategy
as well.
If someone could explain how E and D together could be weaker than
either one IN A TRULY LOGICAL SCENARIO, I also would like to know.
--
Tyranny is kept at bay by guns and will. Our government
knows we have the guns, but they don't know if we have
the will. Nor do we.
The only lawful gun law on the books- the second amendment.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 22:48:33 -0300
From: "Paulo S. L. M. Barreto" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ZKPs in practice?
"David A. Wagner" wrote:
>
> In article <8g43a3$sd4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > The recent question on "an introduction to zero-knowledge proofs"
> > had me thinking : where have zero-knowledge proofs been implemented
> > in the real world?
>
> I believe Schnorr signatures have their roots in an efficient
> zero-knowledge proof of identity. (Fiat-Shamir signatures, too.)
> But I might have the details wrong -- it may be some notion related
> to zero-knowledge, and not strictly speaking zero-knowledge, so don't
> trust me here.
Are you sure? Schnorr signatures are fundamentally based on the DL
problem; in fact, there's hardly any difference between Schnorr and
Nyberg-Rueppel signatures.
Paulo Barreto.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Question about recommended keysizes (768 bit RSA)
Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2000 00:39:39 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> The VAX was a very good number cruncher but really poor performance as a
> multi-user system..terminal IO was terrible....
Generalizations like that are useless. If your VAX was equipped with
a KMC11B loaded with suitable front-end code, terminal I/O was very
good.
Even with the lowly DZ11, a carefully written device driver (mine :-)
would work a *lot* better than a naive one.
The main things that the VAX-11 deserves credit for in the history of
computing, as I see it, are (1) the "main machine" for development of
the most fundamental Internet protocols and (2) popularization of UNIX.
I'm not sure what any of this has to do with cryptology.
------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 01:38:02 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Greg wrote:
>
> > A person cannot be compelled to identify himself (according to the
> > SCOTUS) but we must have a mechanism in place to ensure that each
> > person casts only one vote and no more. This is one of the easiest
and
>
> This sounds like demanding a perpetum mobil. The only way to ensure
> absolutely correct voting seems to require at the minimum nonforgeable
> ID cards or their equivalents that uniquely map to the physical
persons,
> I conjecture. BTW, I am surprised to learn that the US voting system
is
> so vulnerable at its foundation.
Surprisingly, I think I have come up with a protocol
that will fulfill this requirement, to a certain
extent, but it needs a trusted party to set it up.
Say there are N voters. The trusted party (T) produces
a large number of sets of N public/private key pairs.
Each time an election is held, one set will be used up
(in this sense it is like OTP). Each voter gets exactly
one private key from the set, and each voter gets all
the public keys.
People broadcast their votes anonymously, they are
encrypted with their private keys, and they have some
sort of standardized header for identification
purposes. After the votes are cast and everyone is
sure all the votes have been seen, people broadcast
anonymously their private keys. After that, anyone
can claim they made any vote they want, and noone
could know differntly, but everyone will know the
outcome of the election.
Unfortunately there is a vulnerable period between
when people broadcast their votes and when they
broadcast their public keys. I think this could
maybe be fixed, but I'm not sure how.
I would also like to get rid of T, but not
sure how to do that either.
--
If you know about a retail source of
inexpensive DES chips, please let
me know, thanks.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Paul Pires" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: PGP Self-Decrypt
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2000 18:55:22 -0700
Could you give me a link to where I might find more information on this? I
tried the PGP page and got hopelessly overwhelmed. Is it such a small
freebee that it is not discussed alone? Norton announced a similar utility
using Blowfish awhile ago and then it simply vanished from their site. I
want to track this one down before it vanishes too.
Thank you
Paul
Tom McCune <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:y5V%4.12150$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> In article <8hovgh$h9e$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, AllanW <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> >I've heard that new versions of PGP have a "self-decrypt" mode
> >that lets you send encrypted data to someone without PGP. But
> >how does this work?
> >
> >If the recipient doesn't need PGP, then this can't support
> >public-key encryption, right? Does it ask for a password?
> >
> >If it uses a password to decrypt, isn't it vulnerable to
> >brute-force attacks?
> >
> >If it doesn't even need a password, doesn't that mean
> >that it can be "decrypted" by anybody that receives it?
>
> It does require a passphrase - it is conventional encryption.
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.1
> Comment: My PGP Page & FAQ: http://www.McCune.cc/PGP.htm
>
> iQA/AwUBOUAd6A2jfaGYDC35EQIlGgCeLF/K+n3ArOKv4eiPIEGy1DbQ4aUAoNaH
> kFWZL3DZ9mDtg906e6ZRoewv
> =i4JD
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
------------------------------
From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Multiple encryptions
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 01:46:30 GMT
> How can this be?
It escapes me too...
It seems to me that you should be able to use a simple 40 bit key space
encryption program using 10 keys and the result should be more powerful
than a 256 bit key. I would assume this because there is no way to
know when you have found just the first key since the results are
randomly appearing binary. I have had mixed reviews on this strategy
as well.
If someone could explain how E and D together could be weaker than
either one IN A TRULY LOGICAL SCENARIO, I also would like to know.
--
Tyranny is kept at bay by guns and will. Our government
knows we have the guns, but they don't know if we have
the will. Nor do we.
The only lawful gun law on the books- the second amendment.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 22:19:03 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
Greg wrote:
> > > A person cannot be compelled to identify himself (according to the
> > > SCOTUS) but we must have a mechanism in place to ensure that each
> > > person casts only one vote and no more. This is one of the easiest
> and
> >
> > This sounds like demanding a perpetum mobil. The only way to ensure
> > absolutely correct voting seems to require at the minimum nonforgeable
> > ID cards or their equivalents that uniquely map to the physical
> persons,
> > I conjecture. BTW, I am surprised to learn that the US voting system
> is
> > so vulnerable at its foundation.
>
> Read Vote-Scam by Devvy Kidd (www.devvy.com) and you would be
> absolutely amazed as to how fragile and corrupt our system is.
>
> There is an element of logic that a person should have to identify
> themselves in order to vote. On the other hand, to assign a penalty to
> the task of identification is to forfeit's one's right to self
> incrimination. That, I believe, is the crux of the matter.
>
> When people hear about "Meranda", they think "your rights explained by
> a peace officer". But in fact, the Meranda decision was far more
> brutal against government interference in our lives than most realize.
> The most significant portion of the Meranda decision stated that the
> government cannot compell a person to identify themselves and that
> people are not required to carry identification of any sort on their
> person, even when walking the streets late at night. But that is
> another story.
First, the Miranda decision is spelled that way. Second, I believe that
citizens are required to identify themselves upon request, but are not
required to produce identification of any kind.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Some dumb questions
Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2000 01:24:39 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> Further, if OTP is employed two times, it's likely, in my view, that the
> use of two same or overlapping segments are done at widely separate
> timepoints and therefore the pool of messages containing these is quite
> large and hence the chance of hitting such favourable pairs is
> correspondingly low, I suppose.
You can work out the arithmetic; with modern computing it is entirely
feasible to compare many thousands of ciphertexts against each other
using the kappa test.
------------------------------
From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 02:07:03 GMT
> Surprisingly, I think I have come up with a protocol
> that will fulfill this requirement, to a certain
> extent, but it needs a trusted party to set it up.
The trust factor will keep the system suspect.
Let me go back to my voter U voting V...
U must assure that a voter only votes once, but does not identify the
voter explicitly. This said, U must derive from part of the physical
body that is not going to change, and is readily readable. Retna scans
come to mind.
A person never has to register if we say that anyone in the US can vote
(and in practice, we do). They merely have to put their eye up to the
scope and get a print out. No names, no address, etc. The system
makes certain they don't double vote anywhere.
(If and win a person must identify themselves, then their full name and
address can be used to derive the public and private keys.)
In other words, you can say that voter with retna scan
0188275183019261847182 voted only once, but you have no idea who that
person is. The person knows. They are given their private and public
keys from the retna scan (the number above is the public key).
Then the act of authenticating and publishing the votes is trivial.
--
Tyranny is kept at bay by guns and will. Our government
knows we have the guns, but they don't know if we have
the will. Nor do we.
The only lawful gun law on the books- the second amendment.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Retail distributors of DES chips?
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 02:10:50 GMT
In article <8hos9n$eir$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In article <8hh379$k4h$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Well, not exactly. At least, that's what I'm hoping.
> > For the system I'm working on, the computer would
> > basically have an "encrypted hard drive" which
> > would mean that there would be hardware encryption
> > between the RAM, Processor, etc. and the HD and/or
> > floppy drive. Basically, the RAM, CPU, etc. is
> > "inside" and the HD and floppy are "outside". It
> > works if there is no possible residue left in RAM.
> > I don't like having to assume that, but there is
> > no choice.
>
> The good people at OpenBSD.org are working on a way of making their
swap
> area encrypted so that RAM contents exist in plaintext only in RAM and
> in the CPU. There are also several projects dealing with encrypted
> filesystems that work with Linux. Maybe you could mix the OpenBSD
> encrypted swap with the linux encrypted filesystem to get basically
what
> you are wanting, but without dealing with hardware. It could be a lot
> cheaper.
Or, better yet, just get alot of RAM so that a swap
area is unneccessaty.
>
> > Perhaps there is something that could be done after
> > the computer is turned off, to get rid of any
> > information that might be lingering in RAM.
> > like powering it up on and off several times.
> > Perhaps with lower than recommended supply voltage.
> > (Does anyone know anything about that?)
>
> Well, if you have access to the OS source, you could have it malloc()
> many many blocks of RAM and fill the contents with prng output, maybe
> several times over depending on how paranoid you are.
Ah but I do not trust the OS you see.
That is why I was looking for a hardware
solution.
--
If you know about a retail source of
inexpensive DES chips, please let
me know, thanks.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Some dumb questions
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2000 02:22:28 +0000
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> Jim Gillogly wrote:
>
> > ... use a kappa test: slide the two
> > ciphertexts against each other and count the number of coincidences
> > at each offset ...
>
> I guess that flattening the frequency distribution with some appropriate
> techniques would provide sufficient immunity to such techniques.
> Further, if OTP is employed two times, it's likely, in my view, that the
> use of two same or overlapping segments are done at widely separate
> timepoints and therefore the pool of messages containing these is quite
> large and hence the chance of hitting such favourable pairs is
> correspondingly low, I suppose.
"Some appropriate techniques" are not obvious, and "sufficient immunity"
will presumably depend on the value of the data. For example, simply
doing a Vigenere with key COMERETRIBUTION or MANCHESTERBLUFF will flatten
the distribution, but will still fall apart if the coincidence is checked
at varying offsets. In addition, it's normally not safe to assume the
widely separate times and large number of messages will save you. Consider
again VENONA as a counterexample. Comparing each pair of messages is an
N^2 problem, granted, but each test is cheap and the potential payoff is
enormous: you've gotten a peek into the enemy's most secret traffic.
As Robert Morris (pere) said (paraphrased from memory), "Never underestimate
the amount of time, money, and effort an opponent will expend in order to
read your traffic."
--
Jim Gillogly
20 Forelithe S.R. 2000, 02:16
12.19.7.5.0, 13 Ahau 3 Zotz, First Lord of Night
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 22:32:52 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Cryptographic voting
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Unfortunatly, I am having trouble understanding what you are talking
> about.. your sentences are quite jumbled. That said, it is quite
> possible I am not understanding what you are saying, but I think in some
> cases you are incorrect. Specific comments in the text.
>
> (BTW, when looking for information on "meranda" you will do better to
> search for "Miranda".)
>
> In article <8hov6o$gu4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > And I wonder how many people refuse to vote because of this. Did you
> > know that NV state legislature was composed of many patriotic men and
> > women who passed a bill (though I do not know if it actually became
> > law) to mint their own coins? They were going to mint their own
> Nevada
> > silver dollars with real silver and fling it in the face of the US
> > government. Their position was, "Unless and until you abide by the US
> > constitution to coin money exclusively, neither shall we abide by the
> > same." In other words, they were saying that the US must not allow
> the
> > FED to coin money or they would coin money also. And since their
> coins
> > used real sivler there would be a true dual economy competing for
> > Americans to operate under. And since the FED note is no longer based
> > on precious anything but are merely debt, NV coins looked real good.
>
> I don't understand your sentence about the constitution. I don't think
> the constitution of the US mentions legal tender in any form (although
> it has been a while since I have read it).
It does grant the power to coin money to the Federal gov't.
> Had Nevada decided to mint
> their own money, it would be a continuation of an old practice. Even as
> recently as roughly 1900 banks were issuing their own notes.
Invalid conclusion. Bank notes are not money. They are money substitutes. By
constitutional fiat "money" means specie, specifically gold and silver.
The phrase "legal tender" has no constitutional basis but it is the operative
phrase for the first of the three purposes of money (medium of exchange, store
of value, and unit of account).
> I am not
> sure when people got tired of talking to a bank away from their home
> state to get their gold, but I think nearly everyone living in the US
> will agree a common united states currency is a Good Thing.
Nearly everyone living in the United States is incompetent to have an opinion
on the value of a common currency. Note that we've always had a single
currency, dollars. Bank notes are simply a more convenient substitute (thus
"money substitute") for constitutional currency. Just like checks are more
convenient than paper, and plastic is more convenient than checks.
>
>
> However, you can mint your own currency, and no one will stop you. If
> they choose to honor it, of course, it up to them. Many societies around
> the country are based on the ideas of a new currency, one based on hours
> of work in an effort to be more fair than one based on a fixed amount of
> serial numbers in circulation.
>
> The decision to move off the gold standard was a difficult one to make,
> but those in charge at the time did it to prevent the united states from
> being screwed when other countries were asking for *lots* of gold. Our
> economy could have been destroyed. Of course, we don't know what would
> have happened, but the results certainly don't seem too bad currently.
Your facts are at extreme variance with mine. ;-)
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 22:44:23 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: My lastest paper on Block Ciphers
tomstd wrote:
> I have just finished the Draft of my latest paper. It's called
>
> "On Cryptographically Strong F Functions"
>
> And is available (sorry) only in Word97 format at
>
> http://tomstdenis.com/ffunctions.zip
>
> There are probably tons of little mistakes, I have yet to have
> anyone proofread it...
>
> I am open to critiques :)
Can I suggest that you use a file format that 1) is portable, and 2) less
hostile?
------------------------------
Subject: Re: My lastest paper on Block Ciphers
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2000 19:46:12 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Trevor L. Jackson,
III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>tomstd wrote:
>
>> I have just finished the Draft of my latest paper. It's
called
>>
>> "On Cryptographically Strong F Functions"
>>
>> And is available (sorry) only in Word97 format at
>>
>> http://tomstdenis.com/ffunctions.zip
>>
>> There are probably tons of little mistakes, I have yet to have
>> anyone proofread it...
>>
>> I am open to critiques :)
>
>Can I suggest that you use a file format that 1) is portable,
and 2) less
>hostile?
At: http://wheel.compose.cs.cmu.edu:8001/cgi-bin/browse/objweb
You can translate documents, I don't guarantee it will format my
file properly... if you must there is an unzipped copy of the
paper at
http://tomstdenis.com/ffunctions.doc
it's in word97 (ms-word) format.
Tom
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