Cryptography-Digest Digest #14, Volume #12 Tue, 13 Jun 00 00:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Finding prime numbers (tomstd)
Re: Evidence Eliminator Dis-Information Center ("Klaus Daehne")
Re: Evidence Eliminator Dis-Information Center ("donoli")
Re: new public key? (Bryan Olson)
Re: Session key transmission ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Evidence Eliminator Dis-Information Center ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
SBOX finder client (tomstd)
Re: Multiple encryptions (Bryan Olson)
Re: Finding prime numbers (Bryan Olson)
Interesting Magazine Article (Mike, Copperhead) (John Savard)
Re: Digits of pi in Twofish (wtshaw)
Base Encryption (TRULY secure) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Base Encryption (TRULY secure) (tomstd)
Re: Session key transmission ("Lyalc")
Re: Base Encryption (TRULY secure) (Paul Rubin)
University Job Bank - http://www.UJobBank.com (UJobBank.com)
Re: Base Encryption (TRULY secure) (Ryan Phillips)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Finding prime numbers
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 18:08:29 -0700
In article <8i3v16$uo4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, AllanW <allan_w@my-
deja.com> wrote:
>Suppose I had an algorithm so that, given a prime number P(n),
>I could find the next prime number P(n+1) extremely quickly.
>Let's say it was as quick as four or five integer additions.
>(I don't actually have such an algorithm, but let's say I did.)
>
>I'm guessing that an algorithm like this would make brute-force
>attacks on private keys easier. Given a public key it would be
>possible to derive the private key in a practical amount of
>time, unless people started using much bigger keys than they
>normally do now. And of course once the attacker had the
>private key they could use it any way they wished.
>
>Is that right?
Yes, if you can find primes in linear time then you should be
able to factor much quicker, espescially RSA style naturals.
I don't have a proof for that, but I am just guessing it's true.
However, it's been proven that finding primes can't be done with
some deterministic polynomial (I think, again I am more then
likely wrong).
Tom
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------------------------------
From: "Klaus Daehne" <klausd @ surfnetusa.com>
Crossposted-To:
alt.security.pgp,comp.security.firewalls,alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.privacy
Subject: Re: Evidence Eliminator Dis-Information Center
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 18:16:10 -0700
How many rookies do you think have wiped their HD's with FORMAT or FDISK?
Who's to blame? MS? Crappy program? (well, they are, at least fdisk)
But no, someone didn't know what they were doing.
Having used EE for awhile now, I am convinced that whatever whiner had wiped
their HD and blames it on EE, either had a system that was already messed up
(the clueless DO screw up their systems!), or they screwed up, and are
either too emberassed or too clueless to admit it.
What's easier than to blame someone else when you are pissed for having
pulled a bonehead move?
Hey, almost happened to me, when I realized that by default, EE wipes *.bak
files. Caught it just in time before it did real damage. Had I missed it, I
would have had to bang my head into the wall, but this program is loaded
with features, and if you don't check'em all before you say "go wipe",
there's noone to blame.
"donoli" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:4ff15.1937$GX4.2799@news02...
> I just wouldn't take a chance on wiping out my HD, even if it only
happened
> the 2 times mentioned early in the thread.
> donoli.
------------------------------
From: "donoli" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
alt.security.pgp,comp.security.firewalls,alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.privacy
Subject: Re: Evidence Eliminator Dis-Information Center
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 01:37:00 GMT
Klaus Daehne > wrote in message ...
>
>
>How many rookies do you think have wiped their HD's with FORMAT or FDISK?
>
>Who's to blame? MS? Crappy program? (well, they are, at least fdisk)
>But no, someone didn't know what they were doing.
>
###############
That's who EEsupport blamed it on, MS. Didn't he say it was because the guy
used IE 3 and recommended IE 5 instead? If he can blame it on MS, so can
the other rookies.
IMO the EEsupport guy is a rookie. As I said before he's trying to put out
the fire w/ gasoline. Every time he posts he looses another potential
customer.
donoli.
###############
------------------------------
From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: new public key?
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 01:34:51 GMT
G. Orme wrote:
> In that format yes. My main point was whether expressions
> like these had ever been used in cryptography, where
> functions that are easy to do one way and hard to do in
> reverse are useful. The best example of this of course is
> RSA which depends on factorizing a large number N, though
> it is much easier to find two suitable factors to make N
> hard to factorize.
One way functions are common (though we cannot prove they
exist). Hash functions are better examples than RSA.
What is special about RSA and what is hard about devising a
public key cryptosystems is the one way /trap door/
function. The OWTDF upon which RSA is based is not
factoring; it is f(x) = x^e mod N. It's easy to compute and
if given the factors of N, easy to invert. There is no
known tractable algorithm for the inverse if the
factorization of N is unknown.
> In the same way one can select 2 number, the Ath root
> of B (B exp 1/A) , and give say the first 100 digits
> as N. it is hard to take those 100 digits and find
> the values of A and B.
Alas, it's not the same at all. You may be right that it's
much harder in one direction than the other, but a one-was
function does not immediately provide a public-key
cryptosystem.
Merkle showed how to build more-or-less-public-key signature
schemes from arbitrary one-way functions. The techniques
are much less elegant than true public key systems in that
the keys get used up in generating signatures.
--Bryan
email: bolson at certicom dot com
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Session key transmission
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 18:50:56 -0700
I think the way Schneier formulated this paragraph it really does not
make much sense. But it does make sense to say that generating and
distributing n(n-1) secret keys is a cumbersome process that perhaps can
be compromised more easily than a public encryption system.
Joseph Poe
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> I have difficulty to fully understand the following from
> Schneier's AC, p.33:
>
> With symmetric crpytography, the data encryption key
> sits around until it is used. If Eve ever gets her hand
> on it, she can decrypt messages encrypted with it. With
> the previous protocol [employing public key], the
> session key is created when it is needed to encrypt
> communications and destroyed when it is no longer needed.
> This drastically reduces the risk of compromising the
> session key. Of course, the private key is vulnerable
> to compromise, but it is at less risk because it is only
> used once per communication to encrypt a session key.
>
> Certainly, if the communication partners have no way of
> obtaining a shared secret key, then using public key is
> a necessity. Suppose, however, they have a secret key. Then
> they can use that as a master key to create the session key
> when it is needed through encrypting a random number with
> an algorithm (the same as used to encrypt the message proper
> or a different one) and prefix the random number to the
> ciphertext (obtained with the session key). The receiver first
> uses the random number to get the session key and then
> decrypts the ciphertext. In that way, the risk of the master
> key being compromised would be the same as that for the
> private key, I suppose. (On the other hand, I can see an
> essential advantage of the public key in case n persons need
> to communicate with one another, since only n private keys
> need be kept secret, while there are n(n-1) secret keys
> (n(n-1)/2 different ones) with symmetric cryptography.)
>
> Thanks for you help in advance.
>
> M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To:
alt.security.pgp,comp.security.firewalls,alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.privacy
Subject: Re: Evidence Eliminator Dis-Information Center
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 01:50:24 +0100
On Mon, 12 Jun 2000 18:16:10 -0700, "Klaus Daehne" <klausd @
surfnetusa.com> wrote:
>
>
>How many rookies do you think have wiped their HD's with FORMAT or FDISK?
>
>Who's to blame? MS? Crappy program? (well, they are, at least fdisk)
>But no, someone didn't know what they were doing.
>
>Having used EE for awhile now, I am convinced that whatever whiner had wiped
>their HD and blames it on EE, either had a system that was already messed up
>(the clueless DO screw up their systems!), or they screwed up, and are
>either too emberassed or too clueless to admit it.
>
>What's easier than to blame someone else when you are pissed for having
>pulled a bonehead move?
>
>Hey, almost happened to me, when I realized that by default, EE wipes *.bak
>files. Caught it just in time before it did real damage. Had I missed it, I
>would have had to bang my head into the wall, but this program is loaded
>with features, and if you don't check'em all before you say "go wipe",
>there's noone to blame.
>
EXACTLY!
Well said.
- Thistle -
------------------------------
Subject: SBOX finder client
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 18:56:50 -0700
You can get a rudimentary copy of the sbox finder GUI client
thingy at
http://tomstdenis.com/sf.html
It doesn't use TCP/IP to send the packets (since there will be
barely any at all if any). It will dump the data to
your "C:\windows\desktop" directory (if windows is not in that
directory please make both directories).
Sorry there is no other ports at this time (I know somebody is
gonna comment). However the FULL source code is given and it's
a very dirty hack of SBOXGEN anyways..
Please give it a try, and if you decide to run the program on
your machine let me know. I will document all the people
running it on my webpage.
If you have problems using it let me know.
Tom
* Sent from RemarQ http://www.remarq.com The Internet's Discussion Network *
The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!
------------------------------
From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Multiple encryptions
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 01:57:05 GMT
AllanW wrote:
> We have some encryption program E,
[...]
> what we really do is take our
> data files and encrypt them with D. Then we take the D
> output and feed that into E.
[...]
> I've heard that this hypothetical case is a bad idea, and
> not just because of any false sense of security. Someone I
> respect tells me that the result is actually LESS secure
> than using either D or E alone.
If the keys are independant, then against ciphertext-only or
known plaintext, the composition must be at least as strong
as the first cipher applied, but there's a theoretical
possibility that the chain is not as strong as the second
cipher. See:
Ueli M. Maurer and James L. Massey. Cascade ciphers:
The importance of being first. Journal of Cryptology,
6(1):55-61, 1993.
Against chosen plaintext, (again assuming independent keys)
the composition must be at least as strong as the stronger
of the two.
--Bryan
--
email: bolson at certicom dot com
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Finding prime numbers
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 02:08:52 GMT
AllanW wrote:
> Suppose I had an algorithm so that, given a prime number P(n),
> I could find the next prime number P(n+1) extremely quickly.
> Let's say it was as quick as four or five integer additions.
> (I don't actually have such an algorithm, but let's say I did.)
>
> I'm guessing that an algorithm like this would make brute-force
> attacks on private keys easier.
Do you consider the known sub-exponential time factoring
algorithms to be "brute-force"?
> Given a public key it would be
> possible to derive the private key in a practical amount of
> time, unless people started using much bigger keys than they
> normally do now.
It's not obvious to me how to make any use of the efficient
next-prime function. Since we have algorithms that can find
the almost-certainly next prime in polynomial time, a
next-prime oracle could not reduce the time from
super-polynomial to polynomial.
--Bryan
--
email: bolson at certicom dot com
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Interesting Magazine Article (Mike, Copperhead)
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 02:39:22 GMT
An "Invention and Technology" special by American Heritage magazine
has an article on "Breaking Codes Without Computers", which talks
about many of the special-purpose codebreaking machines used by the
U.S. during World War II. The author has a book coming out this
October.
John Savard (teneerf <-)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Digits of pi in Twofish
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 20:05:32 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(S. T. L.) wrote:
> <<Hippocracy is claiming that since you are MS Certified you can
> speak about good security.>>
>
> Ah, government by hippopotami.
That too. Pardon the type but the mental comparison is appropriate.
>
> -*---*-------
> S.T.L. My Quotations Page at *** http://quote.cjb.net *** is being
> REORGANIZED. Comments are welcome. *392* quotations and growing!
> Now playing: Half-Life Now learning: C programming (Hello, World!)
--
Hippocracy is claiming that since you are MS Certified you can
speak about good security.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Base Encryption (TRULY secure)
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 02:51:11 GMT
Sorry for the recent lapse in communication. Some of you have
inquired about the source for base encryption. I have found that
releasing it to the public domain is not feasible (monetary
wise for me). If anyone is interested, I am willing to provide
source and working code for any base encryption routine and application
and customize it for any type of company and requirements on a
"for hire" basis.
Information on Base Encryption:
http://www.edepot.com/baseencryption.html
As for Dynamic BioLanguage. (the language that is based on
an emulation of DNA/cell structures) I can do that too. (that
seemed to have generated some interests as well).
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Base Encryption (TRULY secure)
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 20:04:52 -0700
In article <8i47ip$4l4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
>
>
>Sorry for the recent lapse in communication. Some of you have
>inquired about the source for base encryption. I have found
that
>releasing it to the public domain is not feasible (monetary
>wise for me). If anyone is interested, I am willing to provide
>source and working code for any base encryption routine and
application
>and customize it for any type of company and requirements on a
>"for hire" basis.
Bite me. I will use a free cryptographically secure block
cipher. Stop peddling your fairy-dust.
>Information on Base Encryption:
>http://www.edepot.com/baseencryption.html
SPAM SPAM SPAM.
Tom
* Sent from RemarQ http://www.remarq.com The Internet's Discussion Network *
The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!
------------------------------
From: "Lyalc" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Session key transmission
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 13:32:19 +1000
A simple interpretation:
Schneier's AC, p.33 is saying that symmetric key and public key technologies
both have the same storage problem for ongoing security and reliability.
A similar storage issues arises for certain public keys - the wrong root
public key at a relying party's system may authenticate any certificate or
digital signature, regardless of issuer, in an "open" certificate
environment.
At the end of the day, public and symmetric key based security
infrastructures have the same physical and or logical security issues for
the technology.
Lyal
Mok-Kong Shen wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>
>I have difficulty to fully understand the following from
>Schneier's AC, p.33:
>
> With symmetric crpytography, the data encryption key
> sits around until it is used. If Eve ever gets her hand
> on it, she can decrypt messages encrypted with it. With
> the previous protocol [employing public key], the
> session key is created when it is needed to encrypt
> communications and destroyed when it is no longer needed.
> This drastically reduces the risk of compromising the
> session key. Of course, the private key is vulnerable
> to compromise, but it is at less risk because it is only
> used once per communication to encrypt a session key.
>
>Certainly, if the communication partners have no way of
>obtaining a shared secret key, then using public key is
>a necessity. Suppose, however, they have a secret key. Then
>they can use that as a master key to create the session key
>when it is needed through encrypting a random number with
>an algorithm (the same as used to encrypt the message proper
>or a different one) and prefix the random number to the
>ciphertext (obtained with the session key). The receiver first
>uses the random number to get the session key and then
>decrypts the ciphertext. In that way, the risk of the master
>key being compromised would be the same as that for the
>private key, I suppose. (On the other hand, I can see an
>essential advantage of the public key in case n persons need
>to communicate with one another, since only n private keys
>need be kept secret, while there are n(n-1) secret keys
>(n(n-1)/2 different ones) with symmetric cryptography.)
>
>Thanks for you help in advance.
>
>M. K. Shen
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Base Encryption (TRULY secure)
Date: 13 Jun 2000 03:41:27 GMT
In article <8i47ip$4l4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>Sorry for the recent lapse in communication.
It's quite ok. Nobody missed it. :)
------------------------------
From: UJobBank.com <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.chem.analytical,sci.econ,sci.electronics.design
Subject: University Job Bank - http://www.UJobBank.com
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2000 03:44:13 GMT
For your information
You can search/post academic and non-academic jobs for free at
the University Job Bank website:
http://www.UJobBank.com
In addition, you may also search/post grad asst and post-doc jobs at
http://www.GradAsst.com
http://www.Post-Docs.com
Please share the information with your colleagues and friends.
--
============================================
Find a job at the University Job Bank
http://www.UJobBank.com
====== UJobBank = Jobs for U ===========
============================================
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Ryan Phillips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Base Encryption (TRULY secure)
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 21:00:27 -0700
No thanks...
In article <8i4ah7$9ip$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
> In article <8i47ip$4l4$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> >Sorry for the recent lapse in communication.
>
> It's quite ok. Nobody missed it. :)
>
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