Cryptography-Digest Digest #302, Volume #12 Fri, 28 Jul 00 04:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Can Anyone Recomend A Good Intro Text (Wade Reiber)
Enigma with Transpostion (German Mechanisation) (UBCHI2)
Re: Enigma with Transpostion (German Mechanisation) (Jim Gillogly)
IDEA Encryption (George)
Re: How is the security of Outlook Express encryption ? ("CMan")
Re: 8 bit block ciphers (Mack)
Re: Selecting cipher - which one to use? (Mack)
Re: generating S-boxes (Mack)
Re: Crypto jokes? (potentially OT) ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: BassOmatic symmetric block cipher, any help ? (jungle)
Re: Skipjack ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: BassOmatic symmetric block cipher, any help ? (Paul Rubin)
Re: counter as IV? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: generating S-boxes (Terry Ritter)
Seeking simple, free crypto app (Pegwit?) ("Ed Suominen")
Re: Elliptic Curves encryption (Terry Ritter)
Re: IDEA Encryption ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Selecting cipher - which one to use? (Runu Knips)
Another PURPLE Question (Charles Petersen)
Re: Seeking simple, free crypto app (Pegwit?) (jungle)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Wade Reiber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Can Anyone Recomend A Good Intro Text
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 03:45:25 GMT
Tim Tyler wrote:
>
> John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> : On Mon, 24 Jul 2000 02:58:31 GMT, Wade Reiber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> : wrote, in part:
>
> :>I'm looking for a good introductory text on crytography.
> :>Any recommendations? The best one I've seen so far seems to be Bruce
> :>Schneier's "Applied Cryptography".
>
> : "The Codebreakers", by David Kahn, which covers the history of the
> : subject in depth.
>
> This is a pretty amazing work, which deserves more than one mention on
> this thread - though it's not exactly an orthodox introductory text.
>
> No doubt some of its popularity comes from the fact that it's such an
> engaging read.
True. I read a few chapters a few months ago, but finals were coming and I
decided that I needed to pass my UNIX programming course more...Now that I've
got more time, I'm hoping to do some more reading on the subject.
>
> Another highly readable volume is Simon Singh's "The Code Book". This
> work has had some technical criticisms levelled against it here, but for
> a beginner's book on cryptography that's hard to put down, IMO it excells.
> --
> __________ Lotus Artificial Life http://alife.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> |im |yler The Mandala Centre http://mandala.co.uk/ Legalise IT.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (UBCHI2)
Date: 28 Jul 2000 03:49:21 GMT
Subject: Enigma with Transpostion (German Mechanisation)
Could Bletchley have cracked enigma if there were a daily change in
transposition keys? Other than the issue of time, why were enigma substitution
encipherments never transposed.? The answer lies in a culturally related
disposition towards mechanisation.
The advantage of a combined substitution-transposition cipher was apparent to
the Germans. They initiated the use of field ciphers of double transposition
during WWI. Transposition would have eliminated the cracking capacity of the
bombes or slowed them down so solutions were not tactically useful.
The answer must be that the pursuit of totally mechanical procedures by the
Germans prevented enhancement of the encipherment procedures and security. The
Germans felt that mechanisation combined with large mathematical possibilities
would protect them. How many Germans died as a result of a simple cultural
proclivity towards mechanisation? How many Allied soldiers and civilians
survived due to this cultural bias in its expression in cryptography?
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Enigma with Transpostion (German Mechanisation)
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 05:02:15 +0000
UBCHI2 wrote:
> The advantage of a combined substitution-transposition cipher was apparent to
> the Germans.... Transposition would have eliminated the cracking capacity of the
> bombes or slowed them down so solutions were not tactically useful.
Obviously if they'd known their traffic was being read they could have
taken steps. Interesting questions to ask are whether they should have
known, and how quickly they might have fielded a new system. The continued
success of ULTRA was due less to German arrogance than to Allied cleverness
in providing cover stories for each decrypt resulting in an "action item",
allowing the Germans to continue to entertain the hypothesis that Enigma was
unbroken. They had a lot of suspicions, but never a smoking gun that they
could take upstairs.
> The answer must be that the pursuit of totally mechanical procedures by the
> Germans prevented enhancement of the encipherment procedures and security. The
> Germans felt that mechanisation combined with large mathematical possibilities
> would protect them. How many Germans died as a result of a simple cultural
> proclivity towards mechanisation? How many Allied soldiers and civilians
> survived due to this cultural bias in its expression in cryptography?
Do you feel equally outraged and dismissive toward the Allies for their
reliance on the mechanisation combined with large mathematical possibilities
represented by Typex and SIGABA? If not, why not?
--
Jim Gillogly
Sterday, 5 Wedmath S.R. 2000, 04:54
12.19.7.7.9, 10 Muluc 12 Xul, Fifth Lord of Night
------------------------------
From: George <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: IDEA Encryption
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 0:12:42 -0500
I'm new to this group, but I have read Applied Crypt. by Mr. Schneier. I was
wanting to if there was a site I could go to that has a good cryptanalisysm
of IDEA encryption. I have been told it is the strongest cipher to break,
and I have been wanting to give it a shot myself. Please let me know where I
can find some information. I look forward to contributing my new ideas here
and interacting with other users that take an interest in the field of
crypto. :)
--
-George
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: "CMan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How is the security of Outlook Express encryption ?
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2000 22:11:19 -0700
I ran one of those sniffer programs on my PC (Windows 98). I was surprised
to see my very private user name and password go out of my machine IN THE
CLEAR during every request for mail from my ISP. This of course is a
problem with the protocol, not with Outlook. Makes you kind of wonder what
else is going out on that network connection.
Of course any ".exe" on my system (I think I have more than two or three)
could have installed a trojan and could be sending secret little messages
with my password to anywhere in the entire world without my knowing about
it!!!
It is so easy to write a little sockets based server app that runs as a
patch to another application (like BackOrfice), completely undetectable by
any means other than a socket sniffer...
These damn little PC's just leak and leak and leak. It's almost if they were
developed before networks and security was a consideration at all!! :--))
There will eventually have to be PC's and Secure PC's. The Secure PC will
not have a network connection and will be built into a vault. You walk up to
the vault and plug in a TEMPEST keyboard and TEMPEST monitor. You run your
cute little apps, you see the results on the screen and you turn the thing
off. (Still, "rubber hose cryptanalysis" might still be a
problem...hmmm...)
JK
Edward A. Falk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:8lo0tt$hl1$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Damn, I need to get my eyes checked. For a moment there, it
> looked like you said "security" and "Outlook Express" in
> the same line.
>
> --
> -ed falk, [EMAIL PROTECTED] See
*********************#*************#*
> http://www.rahul.net/falk/whatToDo.html
#**************F******!******!*!!****
> and read 12 Simple Things You Can Do
******!***************************#**
> to Save the Internet **#******#*********!**WW*W**WW****
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack)
Date: 28 Jul 2000 06:07:22 GMT
Subject: Re: 8 bit block ciphers
>Mack wrote:
>> I am looking into skipjack.
>
>
>The following might help you.
>
>
Thanks for the code post.
Saved me some typing in that table :)
This generally confirms (for me at least)
that the idea I am working on is not
That far out there.
It seems that skipjack is simply using a
16-bit 4 round cipher to make a 16-bit
lookup table.
Which is similar to what I am doing with an
8 bit lookup table.
What is the best current cryptanalysis of
Skipjack?
Does anyone know the criteria for the F table?
Mack
Remove njunk123 from name to reply by e-mail
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack)
Subject: Re: Selecting cipher - which one to use?
Date: 28 Jul 2000 06:15:24 GMT
>
>If you want, you can talk about your needs. However, if you are trying to
>protect anything significant, I strongly urge you not to take the advise of
>some guys on a newsgroup, but instead find a good security consultant.
>
>--
>poncho
>
>
That last sentence there has a rather bad paradox.
Just couldn't help posting about it.
Mack
Remove njunk123 from name to reply by e-mail
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack)
Subject: Re: generating S-boxes
Date: 28 Jul 2000 06:27:14 GMT
>i was wondering about how one generates S-boxes. i'm talking about
>bijective S-boxes, ie permutations. none of that 'first 2048 binary digits
>of pi / e / root 2' business here, thank you very much. i am right in
>thinking bijective S-boxes are used, right? not as Feistel F-functions
>(mostly), but elsewhere.
>
>i know a good S-box should have various properties, eg avalanche,
>nonlinearity, etc. let's abstract these into a quality measure (call it
>q), where 0 is rubbish (eg the identity permutation) and big values are
>wonderful.
>
The three usual criteria are the SAC, Nf (minimum hamming distance)
and Max Xor entry. When you are working with high SAC, high Nf,
and low Max Xor entry it is rather difficult to get them all.
You could simply multiply SAC level and Nf then divide by Max Xor entry.
>my main question is this: is there a transformation which can be applied
>to a permutation (eg swapping two entries) that will lead to small changes
>in q? if, so i imagine simulated annealing would be good at finding good
>S-boxes.
Yes swapping leads to small changes. Yes you can find fairly good
S-boxes this way. I am experimenting with this.
>
>is there a transformation that always leads to increases in q? in that
>case, making good S-boxes is trivial (i'm guessing no such transform
>exists).
>
>tom
>
>
Transformations of a permutation generally make the hypothetical
value q gravitate to some mean for random permutations.
So no making good S-boxes is not trivial.
Mack
Remove njunk123 from name to reply by e-mail
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Crypto jokes? (potentially OT)
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 02:34:48 -0400
Tim Tyler wrote:
> Many of the details were unclassified in 1997 - that's how we know
> about it today. Some documents also appear to have been
> unclassified - see the quote from Ellis, 1987 on p.292, for example.
Yes, and at one point I saw them somewhere on the Web, possibly
via the GCHQ site.
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: BassOmatic symmetric block cipher, any help ?
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 02:12:50 -0400
I don't have his book [ the one about PGP ? ] ...
I searched for Eli Biham review of BassOmatic cipher, nothing surfaced ...
do you know any links for this subject ?
Paul Rubin wrote:
>
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >any help on the BassOmatic symmetric block cipher ?
> >
> >it has been used with 256 byte [ ??? ] block size for the plaintext and the
> >ciphertext ...
> >the key size of up to 256 bytes [ ??? ] was used to & CFB mode ...
> >
> >I have difficulties to find any info & reviews about it ...
> >
> >has it been compromised ?
>
> Hee hee, see Simson Garfinkel's book on PGP, or the PGP 2.x or later docs
> for more info about this.
the reference to BassOmatic seems to disappeared from the surface after v10 did
hit the release version ...
> Basically Phil went to a cryptography conference and asked Eli Biham
> during lunch in the cafeteria to look at BassoMatic. Biham pretty
> much shredded it in less than ten minutes. Phil switched to IDEA for
> PGP 2.x and "got religion" about cipher design, swearing off designing
> his own ciphers from then on.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Skipjack
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 02:42:04 -0400
"David A. Wagner" wrote:
> Has anyone looked at the 256-element Skipjack S-box to see if it can
> be expressed with less memory?
As near as I can tell, you're essentially asking whether it is (non)
random in Chaitin's sense.
> ... I wonder whether it is possible to build such a cipher.
Sure, S-boxes and other components might be generated from smaller
parameter sets. In fact they might be generated from the key.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: BassOmatic symmetric block cipher, any help ?
Date: 28 Jul 2000 07:09:33 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I don't have his book [ the one about PGP ? ] ...
>I searched for Eli Biham review of BassOmatic cipher, nothing surfaced ...
>
>do you know any links for this subject ?
You might be able to dig up a copy of PGP 1.0 or something. I doubt
if there are any links. Biham almost certainly never published
anything about Bassomatic. It wouldn't have been worth it. It was
just a crappy and insecure cipher designed by an amateur, the kind of
thing we see here on sci.crypt all the time. He just looked at it for
a few minutes in a cafeteria, saw a number of problems with it right
away, and was kind enough to explain to Phil why it was no good. Phil
got the message (unlike some sci.crypt posters) and switched to a
cipher designed by people who knew what they were doing. Phil has
told the story many times as a cautionary tale.
Bassomatic is maybe of slight historical interest, but basically no
technical interest.
What's gotten you interested in it? Just wondering.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: counter as IV?
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 03:10:32 -0400
John Myre wrote:
> Would "related key" cryptanalysis count? I presume that you
> were not thinking of using the IV to modify the key, but to
> use in some more traditional mode (e.g. CBC)?
Well, as I posed the question the counter wasn't used as a
one-shot IV for a chaining mode, but did directly modify the
key (slightly differently) for each successive block in an
otherwise unchained mode. I would be interested in any
reference concerning "related key" cryptanalysis that shows
how such an attack could be *practical* (e.g., needing "only"
2^48 controlled plaintexts to recover a 64-bit key doesn't
qualify as a practical attack when the only thing the enemy
can do is eavesdrop on a channel not under his control).
Feel free to modify the question to: What advantage is there
in one-shot random IVs (with your choice of chaining mode)
which have to be communicated in the clear, over just using the
next value of a counter (also known to the enemy) for the IV?
(Some ways of using an IV are not equivalent to producing a
related key.) In other words, what does the "randomness" buy
you, given that the IV is known to the enemy?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: generating S-boxes
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 07:17:15 GMT
On 28 Jul 2000 06:27:14 GMT, in
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, in sci.crypt
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack) wrote:
>[...]
>So no making good S-boxes is not trivial.
A lot depends upon the size of the box. I would say that large random
"8-bit" boxes almost can't be bad. And small random "4-bit" boxes
almost can't be good. And if just we want 4-bit boxes, we can take
them from DES.
A lot also depends upon how the box is used. Not all ciphers have the
same requirements. Personally, I like to see the S-boxes participate
in keying, thus minimizing any "key schedule" weaknesses or algebraic
attacks based on known S-box contents.
The real problem is that we probably do not know all of the
characteristics which make a good box. We cannot expect any
particular construction to produce a strong box for an unknown
weakness. But we can expect random constructions to not have the sort
of special structure upon which some attacks might be based.
---
Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
------------------------------
From: "Ed Suominen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Seeking simple, free crypto app (Pegwit?)
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 00:16:36 -0700
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
I am looking for a simple, free crypto app. that I can send to
clients. Initially, I am *very* impressed by Pegwit for windows
(http://disastry.dhs.org/pegwit). It seems simple and effective, and
I really like the fact that I could send it to clients as a single
executable file (only 124KB)! After guiding a couple of folks through
the PGP install and key generation process, with a lot of frustration
and wasted time, I'd really like to avoid that hassle in the future.
And now that I'm hearing rumblings about PGP 7.0 possibly having a
time-trapped license, I'd like to find an effective alternative.
Hushmail is pretty cool, and I like the Java portability, but it
requires both users to have an account. The whole point here is to
make it really easy for the person who could care less about crypto
technology but wants their communications kept secure in view of
Carnivore, Echelon, et al.
I'd appreciate any comments on the latest release of Pegwit. It can
be downloaded from http://disastry.dhs.org/pegwit/pegwitw099full.zip
and its executable verifies against a Thawte Freemail-certified PGP
signature of [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Specifically, I'm wondering how "computationally infeasable" it is
for an attacker to obtain your private key (just your passphrase
with Pegwit) from the 256-bit Pegwit public key. (Isn't that kind
of short?) I don't want to memorize yet another passphrase, but
I'm not sure I trust a "good" passphrase to Pegwit just yet. I've
copied the author on this post in hopes he may have some comments.
Ed Suominen
Registered Patent Agent
Web Site: http://eepatents.com
PGP Public Key: http://eepatents.com/key
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Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.3
iQA/AwUBOYEzN6mKuMvNCWDGEQKDeQCg2NO+PkRC4oWjOTPqSiLyW3fcQJYAoJKN
RTKGL/AnMr+KAp4Jga7AUQ0F
=eB4E
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Elliptic Curves encryption
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 07:24:59 GMT
On Thu, 27 Jul 2000 13:54:18 -0600, in
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, in sci.crypt Jerry
Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>[...]
>Another possibility would be if you consider the strength of a PK
>algorithm more dependable than the strength of a symmetric algorithm.
>The problems underlying the PK algorithms have been studied enough
>that in most cases we have at least some idea of a lower bound on the
>complexity of a solution.
Well, there are plenty of ideas, but a remarkable lack of proof.
I suggest that there is no proof of strength because we do not know
that the methods are strong. Simply having looked at the problem for
a long time is in no sense a mathematical proof, nor does it testify
in any sense to the complexity of the underlying problem.
I suggest that a belief in PK strength is unwarranted and has no basis
in mathematical fact.
---
Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: IDEA Encryption
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 00:28:05 -0700
I will go on record right now as stating that IDEA is not
the strongest cipher, that crown belongs to One Time Pad
(which don't even bother attacking it offers absolute data
confidentiality).
As to where to find out about IDEA:
(from http://www.r3.ch/o_files/products/idea/)
Patents
The international patent application is published with
number WO 91/18459 dated Nov. 28, 1991. The US patent number
is 5 214 703 with date of May 25, 1993. The European patent
number is EP 0 482 154 B1 with date of June 30, 1993. The
Japanese patent is pending.
And you can get the source code from:
http://www.r3.ch/o_files/products/idea/download.html
As to what I'd consider more difficult to cryptanalyse, the
short list is:
MARS, RC5, RC6, Twofish, Rijndael, 3DES, Serpent,
Blowfish......
Enjoy, if you make significant headway against any of them
(with the exception of 3DES, where you will have to reduce
it below about 2^112) you will gain instant recognition in
the crypto community. Of course I'd say that almost everyone
on this group is looking at at least one of the list
thinking that maybe, just maybe, they can find an attack (I
personally chose RC5, and RC6).
Joe
"George" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I'm new to this group, but I have read Applied Crypt. by
Mr. Schneier. I was
> wanting to if there was a site I could go to that has a
good cryptanalisysm
> of IDEA encryption. I have been told it is the strongest
cipher to break,
> and I have been wanting to give it a shot myself. Please
let me know where I
> can find some information. I look forward to contributing
my new ideas here
> and interacting with other users that take an interest in
the field of
> crypto. :)
> --
> -George
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 09:27:10 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Selecting cipher - which one to use?
Helger Lipmaa wrote:
> Runu Knips wrote:
> > Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > > Runu Knips wrote:
> > > > (a) Don't use IDEA. It uses only 64-bit blocks, uses multiplications and
> > > > even worse it is PATENTED and you'll have to pay (much !) money for using
> > > > it.
> > >
> > > I understand what you said except 'multiplications'. What's inherently
> > > wrong with using multiplications? Thanks.
> >
> > Well, nothing, except that they're expensive, slow (except
> > if you give them many gates of course), and can be used for
> > timing attacks.
>
> IDEA is actually very fast on the Pentium III.
I know, who cares ? I already said it depends upon the gate count you
are able to spend for them. In general, multiplications are slow. So
I prefer to avoid them.
------------------------------
From: Charles Petersen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Another PURPLE Question
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 01:05:08 -0700
Can a question really be purple? does it have a color associated with
it? anyway...
I'm still working on this infernal PURPLE simulator. Despite my lack of
wirings and good information im trying to throw together a 'reasonable
facscimile' of the machine. I got something that _encrypts_ in a way
very similar to the PURPLE. However, decryping is being a real bitch.
In the real machine simply typing in the cipher text with the same
settigns would decode it. I don't understand how that works at all.
With the Enigma it's rather obvious why it would work, with the SIGABA
it just sends it back the other way. But the PURPLE doesn't appear to
do either of these things. So how did it work? I think it has
something to do with teh fact that each wiper only had 25 contacts
instead of 26 but I'm really not sure...help?
Thanks for anything you can offer.
Charles Petersen
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Seeking simple, free crypto app (Pegwit?)
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2000 04:08:54 -0400
PeekBoo is about 45 kB ...
1/3 of pegwit ...
Ed Suominen wrote:
> I am looking for a simple, free crypto app
with your requirements, nothing can overtake PeekBoo ...
> that I can send to
> clients. Initially, I am *very* impressed by Pegwit for windows
> (http://disastry.dhs.org/pegwit). It seems simple and effective, and
> I really like the fact that I could send it to clients as a single
> executable file (only 124KB)! After guiding a couple of folks through
> the PGP install and key generation process, with a lot of frustration
> and wasted time, I'd really like to avoid that hassle in the future.
correct thinking ...
> And now that I'm hearing rumblings about PGP 7.0 possibly having a
> time-trapped license, I'd like to find an effective alternative.
>
> Hushmail is pretty cool,
cool, yes but not secure, end of the story ...
> and I like the Java portability, but it
> requires both users to have an account. The whole point here is to
> make it really easy for the person who could care less about crypto
> technology but wants their communications kept secure in view of
> Carnivore, Echelon, et al.
>
> I'd appreciate any comments on the latest release of Pegwit. It can
> be downloaded from http://disastry.dhs.org/pegwit/pegwitw099full.zip
> and its executable verifies against a Thawte Freemail-certified PGP
> signature of [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Specifically, I'm wondering how "computationally infeasable" it is
> for an attacker to obtain your private key (just your passphrase
> with Pegwit) from the 256-bit Pegwit public key. (Isn't that kind
> of short?) I don't want to memorize yet another passphrase, but
> I'm not sure I trust a "good" passphrase to Pegwit just yet. I've
> copied the author on this post in hopes he may have some comments.
------------------------------
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