Cryptography-Digest Digest #312, Volume #12 Sat, 29 Jul 00 14:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Skipjack [ was, 8 bit block ciphers ] (jungle)
Re: CD destruction (Dave Hazelwood)
Re: CD destruction (Dave Hazelwood)
Re: IExplore AutoComplete crypto-algorithm ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Question.How to avoid weak curves? (David A Molnar)
Re: Question.How to avoid weak curves? (DJohn37050)
Re: Elliptic Curves encryption (DJohn37050)
Re: Just Curious. Are girls/women interested (DJohn37050)
Re: Elliptic Curves encryption (DJohn37050)
Re: A naive question (Simon Johnson)
Re: Enigma with Transpostion (German Mechanisation) (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Just Curious. Are girls/women interested (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Just Curious. Are girls/women interested ("Ed Suominen")
Re: Hash function? (tweaked) (Boris Kazak)
Re: How secure is Pegwit? ("Ed Suominen")
Re: JavaCard vs Multos security (Matthias Bruestle)
Re: Elliptic Curves encryption ("Ed Suominen")
Re: A naive question (Boris Kazak)
Re: substring reversal (Boris Kazak)
MS Word Encryption - Eliminate Password Guessing Attack ("CMan")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Skipjack [ was, 8 bit block ciphers ]
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 07:38:52 -0400
Mark Wooding wrote:
> jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > the published v2 from May 1998 has TEST vectors included ...
> > it wouldn't be very difficult to verify identical results ...
>
> Indeed. But has anyone actually done this?
IMO,
they will not be stupid to open algorithm that will prove that is is FALSE ...
they are better than that ...
------------------------------
From: Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: CD destruction
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 21:17:08 +0800
On Thu, 27 Jul 2000 07:14:03 GMT, Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> What material are CD's made out of ? Polycyanate?
>>
>> Whatever it is there must be a solvent for it.
>>
>> MEK? TCE? Gasoline?
>>
>> Get the solvent and dissolve the CD!
>
>Somehow, the way you said that made me think of the alphabet
>soop that had letters floating to the top spelling out words... :)
Ha ha good one !
It seems that CD's are made of polycarbonate.
This is good news !
I used to be a Chemist before I became a Programmer <grin>
and I remember Mickey McInnis (who posted above) from my IBM
days. Hi Mickey! He used to be quite a programmer himself
and contributed a lot of really good code to the IBMPC disk.
Anyway, if my memory serves me correct the TCE I mentioned above
will dissolve polycarb.
TCE is 1,1,1 trichloroethane or methyl chloroform and is perhaps
the most commonly used solvent in the world. It is commonly called
"trichlor" and should be easily obtainable at home depot ? or
a paint store?
It's main use is as a degreaser. I also think they used to use it
(and may still) for drycleaning although I believe they might have
switched over to perchlor.
It is non-flammable and almost non toxic (unless you bathe in it
or drink it) so its pretty safe. It does have an odor, you know
like the one at the dry cleaners ?
I have no idea how long it would take to actually dissolve a CD
and since I am not in the USA right now it is difficult for me to
test it out.
Perhaps one of you can do so ?
I suggest using a METAL can like a clean empty paint can or
something with a lid and immersing the CD under about two inches
or so of TCE.
Check it once a day or so. You can use a screwdriver to
swish the CD around through it hole to see if it is "soft" or
falling apart.
With any luck it could be gone in minutes but I am betting it
will be hours and maybe a day.
I am sure there are solvents that will take out polycarb in
minutes but they might be difficult to obtain, be extremely
flammable (like ether), or more toxic.
TCE on the other hand is readily available and is safe so you
can do this in your garage.
You will know it is done when the alphabets float to the top!
I hope somebody can try it and post the results back here.
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From: Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: CD destruction
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 21:53:14 +0800
I just found out that TCE is an ozone depleting substance and
therefore was subject to a 1994 ? law requiring it to be phased
out of use.
This means it may not be so readily available as it used to be
or perhaps even not at all by now.
I shall look for a substitute but if anyone out there has access
to some please try it as the results will still be useful in giving
a clue as to whether a close substitute will work - like
trichloroethylene.
On Thu, 27 Jul 2000 03:50:24 -0400, jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>Greg wrote:
>>
>> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>> Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> > What material are CD's made out of ? Polycyanate?
>> > Whatever it is there must be a solvent for it.
>> > MEK? TCE? Gasoline?
>> > Get the solvent and dissolve the CD!
>>
>> Somehow, the way you said that made me think of the alphabet
>> soop that had letters floating to the top spelling out words... :)
>
>beautiful analogy ...
>
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,fr.misc.cryptologie,alt.security
Subject: Re: IExplore AutoComplete crypto-algorithm
Date: 29 Jul 2000 13:23:07 -0000
In comp.security.misc [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> What kind of crypto-algorithms are typical for Microsoft to use,
> apart from propietary (bad)ones such as the flamed PPTP?
rot13 I assume. well, if they can implement it without bugs, that is.
<grin>
--
Grobbebol's Home | Don't give in to spammers. -o)
http://www.xs4all.nl/~bengel | Use your real e-mail address /\
Linux 2.2.16 SMP 466MHz / 256 MB | on Usenet. _\_v
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Question.How to avoid weak curves?
Date: 29 Jul 2000 14:28:14 GMT
Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> DJohn37050 wrote:
>> See IEEE P1363 and P1363a.
> How? The Web site seems to be restricted to just committee members.
Joining the mailing list will give you the password; you can
immediately unsubscribe afterwards. This should give you access to the
P1363 document. The password isn't a Big Secret or anything; I think that
it's there to satisfy IEEE rules about working groups.
Now that 1363 is on its way to becoming a standard, maybe you'll need
some kind of new password to access it in the future.
Note that you can also view the research contributions without needing to
join anything, with one or two exceptions.
-David
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Subject: Re: Question.How to avoid weak curves?
Date: 29 Jul 2000 15:14:43 GMT
Yes, the password mechanism is to allow monitoring of interest and to meet some
IEEE rules. And you can cancel immediately after getting what you want, if you
want.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Subject: Re: Elliptic Curves encryption
Date: 29 Jul 2000 15:18:35 GMT
Complexity of code is another advantage of ECC over alternatives, in my mind.
No secret primes means no secret prime code.
Almost ALL the complexity is in picking a good curve and NIST has given 15.
Even if you want to use your own curve, it can be audited publicly by others to
meet all current known security requirements.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Subject: Re: Just Curious. Are girls/women interested
Date: 29 Jul 2000 15:19:50 GMT
Also, Kaisa Nyberg of NR sig fame.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Subject: Re: Elliptic Curves encryption
Date: 29 Jul 2000 15:25:42 GMT
Any proof is given in a context of definitions and assumptions. For example,
the famous parallel postulate; if violated, it leads to different geometries.
So ANY proof depends on its assumptions. For example, are the integers
infinite? If reality is finite, as it seems to be, there is a number that is
SOOOOOO big that one cannot be added to it as the computation simply cannot be
done.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
Subject: Re: A naive question
From: Simon Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 08:36:31 -0700
Bruce says in Applied Cryptography, that double transposisition
holds up quite well, for a hand cipher. I was wondering how its
possible to do double transposisition?
I would have thought that doing two transpositions would be
equivelent to one transposition, i.e. it forms a group....
wouldn't this be as easy to break as just the one transposistion?
===========================================================
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Enigma with Transpostion (German Mechanisation)
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 18:02:28 +0200
John Savard wrote:
> Given the idea of a message as an array of symbols, the Enigma
> plugboard changed the values of symbols in the array, it did not move
> them to other positions in the array. Of course, the values in an
> S-box can themselves be thought of as subject to a transposition
> (i.e., the Ohaver method) - but their action on the message is still
> one of substitution.
Maybe I misunderstood. But I don't yet see how a substitution
(in general) can be interpreted as a transposition. (Could you
please explain or give a pointer to the Ohaver method?) On
the other hand, a transposition of n elements is a mapping of
the set of these to itself and so can be considered to be a
special case of substitution (a vector of n elements is, as one
entity, substituted by another such vector). On the other hand,
if, in accordance with common terminology, transposition of
characters is compared with substitution of characters (in the
sense of mono-/poly-alphabetical substitution of these), then
the former seems to be less advantageous in general. (Bazeries
wrote his very strong opinion on this.) Nonetheless, transposition
of bytes or computer words seems to be valuable in addition to
encryption processing on the level of bits. (I have just initiated
a thread 'On granularity of encryption operations' for discussion
about this.)
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Just Curious. Are girls/women interested
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 18:08:19 +0200
Paul Rubin wrote:
> Off the top of my head, Jennifer Seberry, Shafi Goldwasser, Cynthia
> Dwork, Hilary Orman, and yes, Dorothy Denning all come to mind.
> All of them (usually) have the good sense not to post here though.
Your last sentence is very noteworthy and should provide food for
reflections.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: "Ed Suominen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Just Curious. Are girls/women interested
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 09:04:46 -0700
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:8ltmh2$mcg$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> in cryptography? Is there any female poster on this board? Any
> prestigious woman in the field at all? Thank you for your response.
>
See the following paper on the Square cipher I'm checking out, which was
co-authored by a Joan Daemen. I supposed it's possible that "Joan" is a
man's name in Belgium or some other foreign country, but it seems more
likely to be a woman.
http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~cosicart/pdf/VR-9700.PDF
--
Ed Suominen
Registered Patent Agent
Web Site: http://eepatents.com
PGP Public Key: http://eepatents.com/key
------------------------------
From: Boris Kazak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Hash function? (tweaked)
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 16:29:15 GMT
Boris Kazak wrote:
************************
> Core procedure.
>
> A byte is read from the hashed message (file) into some
> temporary variable.
*************************
Correction: the phrase is to be read as:
> A byte is read from the source message (file) into some
> temporary variable. (Obviously it is not yet hashed...)
Best wishes BNK
------------------------------
From: "Ed Suominen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: How secure is Pegwit?
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 09:35:55 -0700
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
"Rob" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:1Wpg5.38568$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I just discovered Pegwit (and PegwitW for Windows) which I believe
> are based on the Square cipher. Source code is included.
> Has the source code and cipher for Pegwit and PegwitW for Windows
> been closely scrutinised by encryption experts?
> If so, how secure are Pegwit and PegwitW for Windows?
Rob, I just discovered PegwitW myself, and am very impressed with it
initially. I posted an essentially identical question to yours a few
days ago ("topic collision"?) Here is what I have learned from the
responses and digging into the software and code a bit. Corrections,
comments, and clarifications to the points below would be most
welcome!
1. Pegwit uses GF(2^255) elliptic curve encryption. This is a strong
type of encryption (it does not use 2^m composite curves) that is
roughly equivalent to the 128 bit symmetric key encryption of PGP. It
has the advantage of a short (256 bit) key that is not much longer
than the 160 bit fingerprint of a DH/DSS PGP key.
2. The encryption is performed by the Square cipher, which has been
around for a while and has evolved into the Rijndael cipher, which is
a finalist for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). That would
make me feel that it's pretty good stuff, although one poster [1] to
sci.crypt has recently pointed out that its security may be somewhat
suspect in view of a recent "Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael."
3. In Pegwit, your passphrase *is* your private key. So you'd better
make it a good one. From my own research into strong passphrases,
I've found that it's tough to get a passphrase with better than 65
bit entropy. I hope to soon publish a system I've come up with for
easily generating very secure, memorizable passphrases, but that's
another topic. DICEWARE [2] is a very secure passphrase generation
system, though I find it somewhat cumbersome to use and don't
particularly like the resulting passphrases.
4. Pegwit claims to use SHA-1 and the Nyberg-Rueppel for signatures.
I assume that this makes it secure for digital signatures, which is
also important for my planned application.
4. Pegwit does not appear to compress the plain text before
encryption. PGP does so, and this would seem to be a security
weakness. But I honestly don't know how big of a deal it is.
5. Very important for my application, Pegwit and the Windows GUI
version are absolutely, completely free. The Windows GUI version
takes up just a single executable file, which makes it very
attractive for me to distribute to clients. I had considered
licensing a bunch of copies of PGP and having each new client install
their own copy, but the hassle of installation and the cost of
licensing a probably make that impractical. Pegwit seems to provide a
good alternative.
[1] Mark Wooding, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[2] Arnold Reinhardt (http://diceware.com)
Ed Suominen
Registered Patent Agent
Web Site: http://eepatents.com
PGP Public Key: http://eepatents.com/key
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iQA/AwUBOYMHc6mKuMvNCWDGEQLI6QCgySJKaxkkRRdQcrTFztwwwAR02EAAnR8R
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Matthias Bruestle)
Subject: Re: JavaCard vs Multos security
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 15:47:29 GMT
Mahlzeit
Daniel James ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> MULTOS is now looking like a better bet than JavaCard from just about all
> angles
So where can some cards and DK be bought? Where to get the
documentation? Is there a DK for Linux/Unix?
Mahlzeit
endergone Zwiebeltuete
--
PGP: SIG:C379A331 ENC:F47FA83D I LOVE MY PDP-11/34A, M70 and MicroVAXII!
--
Das Leben ist zu kurz um eine lange Leitung zu haben.
------------------------------
From: "Ed Suominen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Elliptic Curves encryption
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 09:44:58 -0700
"Greg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:8lu1vi$ugk$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > In my experience with ECC over GF(p) or GF(2^n), it has slower
> > verfication performance vs. RSA by an order of magnitude. ECC has
> shown
> > faster signing performance and appears to scale to larger key lengths
> > much better.
Couldn't slower verification performance actually be considered a benefit,
since it would slow down a brute force attack?
Ed Suominen
Registered Patent Agent
Web Site: http://eepatents.com
PGP Public Key: http://eepatents.com/key
------------------------------
From: Boris Kazak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: A naive question
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 16:53:25 GMT
Simon Johnson wrote:
>
> Bruce says in Applied Cryptography, that double transposisition
> holds up quite well, for a hand cipher. I was wondering how its
> possible to do double transposisition?
>
> I would have thought that doing two transpositions would be
> equivelent to one transposition, i.e. it forms a group....
> wouldn't this be as easy to break as just the one transposistion?
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------
>
> Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
> Up to 100 minutes free!
> http://www.keen.com
========================
Example - make transposition in groups.
First transposition - message divided in groups
of 49 characters (7x7 square), each group processed identically.
Second transposition - the resulting transposed
message is divided in groups of 100 characters (10x10 square),
each group processed identically.
As a result, you will have a complex transposition with the
period of 4900 (your message can be shorter than that).
If not yet satisfied, make one more round, this time with
11x11 square.
Best wishes BNK
------------------------------
From: Boris Kazak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: substring reversal
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 17:15:23 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > An alternative way is to write down the numbers of the quadrants
> > where successive holes have been punched. In case of Mr. Silvan's grille
> > the
> > sequence will be:
> >
> > 3 1 2 3 2 1 4 1 3 2 3 1 1 4 3 2
>
> I don't understand this. Could you please explain the first three digits
> above as example? (The order of punching the holes is immaterial,
> isn't it?)
-----------------------------
Take the grille and assign numbers to the quadrants:
--------------
| | | in clockwise rotation
| 1 | 2 | order
| | |
---------------
| | |
| 4 | 3 |
| | |
---------------
Then, taking the original Mr. Silvan's grille, you can easily see
that hole #1 was punched in quadrant 3, hole #2 was punched in
quadrant 1, hole #3 - in quadrant 2, etc.
So this string gives you the numbers of quadrants where the holes
are punched.
>
> > Finally, the combination of Vigenere polyalphabetic substitution
> > with
> > a subsequent grille permutation is to be taken VERY seriously...
>
> Multiple encryption with algorithms of fairly different nature
> (similarly for employing different operations in one algorithm) is in
> principle always a good idea, I believe, whether that be in classical
> or in modern cryptography. Some people seem to be of the
> opinion though that there should be one universal algorithm for all
> purposes.
>
> M. K. Shen
------------------------
I would like to see a serious attempt at cracking a 480 character
long
message processed first with 11-character Vigenere substitution and then
permuted through a 10x12 grille.
Best wishes BNK
------------------------------
From: "CMan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: MS Word Encryption - Eliminate Password Guessing Attack
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2000 10:14:58 -0700
It is now well known that MS Word encryption encrypts the document password
with RC4 using a 40 bit key. That is to say, there are 40 bits of entropy
in the key. The actual key is longer because a counter byte is appended to
cause periodic re-keying of the encryption engine and this value is hashed
to produce a 128 bit RC4 key. The encrypted key and a password salting
variable are stored in the Word document in a structured storage stream
called "1Table" There are three 128 bit variables used for this.
While 40 bit encryption is not world class, is does provide a pretty good
protection against a brute force key search. Even on an cluster of four 450
Mhz Celerons, key recovery can take as long as 15 days (assuming only one
key at a time is being recovered) and costs several hundred dollars per
recovered file. Keys are salted with a "random" variable so recovery of one
key only recovers one file. There is no publicly available software to do
this key searching. One must retain a file recovery service to take
advantage of this weakness. Since these services normally are busy
recovering files, actual calendar time to recover a file could take
substantially longer.
Password guessing software exists which will recover short passwords (four
to five characters) or dictionary words in a few hours but these programs
fail miserably for well chosen passwords. Some passwords would not likely
be guessed for millions of years.
It occurred to me that MS Word encryption could be markedly improved if the
short dictionary attack could be neutralized. In the process of thinking
about it I realized that there is a simple way to EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE the
possibility of password guessing while also providing a "Master Password"
capability to Word Encryption. Here is how it works:
1) The three 128 bit variables of hashed password contained in the encrypted
Word document can normally be used in a password guessing attack by
selecting a trial password, hashing the password with a stored variable,
computing a key, decrypting the other two variables and hashing one half of
the result to see if the trial password is valid.
2) Even a single one bit change in any of these variables defeats password
guessing since it is unlikely that any password will result in a hash
collision after any bit is changed.
3) By taking a new Master Password, hashing this with a "random" salt and
XORing the resulting 128 bit hash with the three 128 bit variables from
"1Table" and storing the salt in the document, it then becomes possible to
EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE password guessing and to provide the file with a
Master Password. This is especially true if the hashing process is
deliberately made to be recursive and therefore consume a second or two of
computer time.
The neat thing about this concept is that the alteration of the Word file is
very small and does not interfere with the Word file structure to the extent
that there is any risk that Word will barf after the file is altered.
Anyone who has fed Word with a damaged file will quickly find the room
illuminated with a nice blue glow...:--) The BXA Nazis cannot complain
because the 40 bit Word encryption of the file contents has not been
altered. If NSA needs to read the file, they can do so in a few minutes
(per file), recovery of one file does not help recovering any others. (This
vulnerability could be reduced by other techniques, but that is a subject
for further discussion at a later time).
Once a Master Password has been applied, Word will attempt to open the
document as usual, see the encryption bit set and ask for a password. Of
course once a Master Password has been added, there is no hope of the user
entering a valid password until the Master Password hash has been XORed out.
It takes knowledge of the Master Password for this to happen. An attacker
cannot do a password guessing attack because each password guess takes a
second or two and there are a bazillion possible passwords (actually
passphrases - the key entropy is 128 bits).
Once the Master Password is removed, Word will accept the document password
and open the undamaged file.
This offers a really nice way to send a powerfully encrypted document via
e-mail and not have to worry about the possibility of recovery by
commercially available password recovery software. The further advantage of
the application of a Master Password allows managers of critical information
to set up a tiered password system that requires the acquiescence of two
people with separate passwords to allow access to a file.
A Windows demo program that performs this function is available at
http://www.crak.com . The program is called MasterPass.exe and is only 61K
(thank you lcc-Win32) in size. It has been limited to application of only a
three character password (not strong encryption) so I don't have to deal
with the Jackboots at BXA. You can encrypt a Word document as normal, apply
a Master Password and try your favorite password guessing software till you
are blue in the face.
I would like any comments you have on this new concept. Source code for the
password hashing algorithm will be released shortly. The security of the
MasterPass software DOES NOT depend on obscurity but only of the quality of
the hash function used (MD5 used recursively)!! My e-mail address is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (please remove the numbers from this
address before using).
A version of the software that is NOT limited to three character passwords
will be available to residents of the USA and Canada in a few days.
John E.Kuslich
--
CRAK Software
http://www.crak.com
Password Recovery Software
QuickBooks, Quicken, Access...More
Spam bait (credit E. Needham):
root@localhost
postmaster@localhost
admin@localhost
abuse@localhost
webmaster@localhost
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
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