Cryptography-Digest Digest #404, Volume #12 Thu, 10 Aug 00 21:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Destruction of CDs (Mickey McInnis)
Re: Destruction of CDs (Eric Smith)
Re: EGD based on Yarrow for Windows?? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: newbie question on public key lengths (tomstd)
Re: 1-time pad is not secure... (Jerry Coffin)
Re: Random Number Generator (Jerry Coffin)
Re: Final Secret Conversation (seriously the last one) (Jerry Coffin)
Re: newbie question on public key lengths (John Myre)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (John Myre)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Tim Tyler)
Re: EGD's.. (Anthony David)
Re: 1-time pad is not secure... ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Destruction of CDs (Dave Hazelwood)
Re: newbie question on public key lengths ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: 1-time pad is not secure... ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Destruction of CDs (tomstd)
Re: Knowing when you've cracked an encryption ("David C. Barber")
Re: Destruction of CDs ("Paul Pires")
Pentium III h/w RNG ("David C. Barber")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mickey McInnis)
Subject: Re: Destruction of CDs
Date: 10 Aug 2000 22:02:16 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
writes:
|>
|>
|> Mickey McInnis wrote:
|> >
|>
|> > Melting/burning would be better, but I would be concerned about toxic
|> > byproducts. Stir the resultant puddle or ashes.
|>
|> Dumb question: Of what kind of chemical materials are CDs made?
|>
|> M. K. Shen
I think:
The plastic is polycarbonate. (Lexan is one brand name.)
The reflective layer is usually a thin layer of aluminum.
There is a thin "laquer" layer on top of the aluminum.
There may be another coating, and printing on top of the lacquer for
the label.
CD-R and CD-RW's add a few other layers, including
"Dye" layers, that are probably some sort of plastic with
a small amount of dye.
--
Mickey McInnis - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
All opinions expressed are my own opinions, not my company's opinions.
------------------------------
From: Eric Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Destruction of CDs
Date: 10 Aug 2000 15:21:48 -0700
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Dumb question: Of what kind of chemical materials are CDs made?
IIRC, the substrate is polycarbonate, the reflective layer is aluminum,
there's a lacquer layer on the top, and silkscreened ink over that. The
top (non-reading) side of the disk is much more prone to damage than
the bottom.
CD-R media is somewhat different. I imagine that they still use a
polycarbonate substrate, though.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: EGD based on Yarrow for Windows??
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 21:48:56 GMT
Ian Upright wrote:
> I'm looking for an Entropy Gathering Daemon ...
http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
------------------------------
Subject: Re: newbie question on public key lengths
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 15:34:57 -0700
"Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>There's some very fuzzy issues there, but in general, in n-bit
RSA the
>modulus is size n-bits, the public exponentis of size g-bits
(determined by
>programmer/RNG/just about everything but is not necessarily
dependent on n),
>and the private exponent is between n-g and n+g in size. None
of these are
>firm and I have known people who referred to the size of the
key in bits by
>the sum of the modulus bits plus the bits of the public
exponent, people who
>refer to it by the size of the certificate, etc. But in general
we refer to
>it by the size of the modulus.
it's appropritate to describe n-bit RSA as the modulus size
since the only practical known attacks (when all else is well)
is factoring.
However if your d exponent is under N^.292 then factoring may
not be the only method. If the distance between your two
factors is under 2^64 then fermat may win, etc...
Make sure your primes are in fact prime and at least 500 bits
each. Make sure the distance is at least 2^128, make sure
that 'd' will be >N^.3, etc...
Tom
===========================================================
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 1-time pad is not secure...
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 16:49:05 -0600
In article <8muoki$994$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
[ ... ]
> The problem with "physically-generated" numbers is that if you
> don't do it right, you may have a very slight bias in the distribution
> of the numbers. Consider, for instance, a coin flip with a coin with
> a 51% chance of heads. Given cleartext that you think goes with
> an intercepted ciphertext, you can produce a "trial key". If the
> message is long enough, you can say with some probability that
> you have the correct cleartext because the trial key shows the
> bias you're looking for.
This has a number of major problems (at least most of the time). The
most obvious is that this requires the attacker to know things about
the key. If I simply grab a coin out of my pocket, I might end up
with a small bias. There is, however, no way for the attacker to
know this, and without knowing it I'm hard put to believe that he can
exploit it either.
It might be possible for statistics about the ciphertext to be
combined with guessed statistics of the plaintext to yield matching
guesses on the key, assuming a typical Vernam cipher is used. OTOH,
using a different type of cipher (I.e. a different method of
combining the key material with the plaintext) can make this
substantially more difficult, if possible at all. Second, all it
gets you is a fairly direct reflection of your guesses about the
plaintext statistics; with most ciphers, guesses, cribs, etc., affect
enough of a decryption that it's fairly easy to decide whether a
particular guess was right or not. In this case, you get no such
confirmation.
Finally, there are well-known methods of removing systematic bias
from a source in any case. When using a physical source of random
input, there's certainly nothing that says you can't process it to
ensure that what you're getting really is random and free of
predictability (e.g. introduced by measuring equipment).
--
Later,
Jerry.
The Universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Random Number Generator
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 16:49:11 -0600
In article <8mtu40$9ck$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
says...
> Alex Random Number Generator
>
> The objective of this algorithm is to map finite
> key/seed to an infinite sequence of random bytes.
This, of course, is impossible.
> - 16 byte Key/Seed
> - 57% Avalanche Effect
> - 760Kbyte/sec performance
> - 64 Kbyte generated random string shows Null ZIP
> compression
A 16-byte key is large enough that although the sequence must
eventually repeat, it shouldn't happen soon enough to care about.
We've already gone over (in almost ridiculous detail) how stupid it
is to make statements about performance without qualifying the
statement as to the situation in which that particular level of
performance was obtained. Avalanche normally applies to ciphers, not
PRNGs, so it's hard to even guess at what you mean by "57% avalanche
effect", though unless you're measuring something _really_ unusual,
57% is probably a pretty BAD number to get: for most obvious things
you'd measure, you'd want outputs as close to either 50 or 100% as
possible, and only numbers within .001 or so of those would be good
enough to keep from rejecting the generator outright.
> - The probability to find in random sequence 0/1
> value bits is exactly 50%
This shows a lack of bias, but that's a long ways from being a
comprehensive test of a PRNG.
You PRNG fails some of the FIPS 140-2 tests fairly regularly. It
fails quite a few of the DieHard tests very consistently. Your PRNG
is clearly NOT suitable for cryptographic use.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The Universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Final Secret Conversation (seriously the last one)
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 16:49:09 -0600
In article <8mtdl7$thl$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
> A Master and Disciple are next to a waterfall observing the scenery...
[ ... ]
> Master: Would it be as painful as living in an illusion created
> by your mind?
Ah, such as the illusion of security provided by your software?
> Master: You can continue to be here listening to me, but one day
> you will only know what I know. If you leave you can gain
> other knowlege, and in the future become my Master, for I shall
> want to learn from you as well.
Since you apparently believe you're teaching people something, it's
refreshing to find that at least you realize that everybody else
would be much better off ignoring what you have to say, and going out
to learn something vaguely related to reality instead of wasting
their time on the purely illusory security provided by your cipher.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The Universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: John Myre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: newbie question on public key lengths
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 16:50:42 -0600
Joseph Ashwood wrote:
>
> There's some very fuzzy issues there, but in general, in n-bit RSA the
> modulus is size n-bits, the public exponentis of size g-bits (determined by
> programmer/RNG/just about everything but is not necessarily dependent on n),
> and the private exponent is between n-g and n+g in size. None of these are
How can the exponent be larger than the modulus?
> firm and I have known people who referred to the size of the key in bits by
> the sum of the modulus bits plus the bits of the public exponent, people who
> refer to it by the size of the certificate, etc. But in general we refer to
> it by the size of the modulus.
<snip>
Agreed.
JM
------------------------------
From: John Myre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 16:44:20 -0600
Terry Ritter wrote:
>
> On Thu, 10 Aug 2000 13:47:13 -0600, in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> in sci.crypt John Myre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >Terry Ritter wrote:
> ><snip>
> >> * THERE IS NO QUESTION that if we select x0 at random, sooner or
> >> later we *WILL* select a short cycle.
> ><snip>
> >
> >No.
> >
> >If an event has sufficiently low probability, then it is perfectly
> >sane and reasonable to design a system assuming it will never
> >happen. The system will have a finite lifetime. Depending on
> >the actual probabilities, it is certainly possible that the
> >unlikely will in fact fail to happen at all.
>
> No. This discussion has not been concerned with practical weakness
> per se, but instead the claim that such a system is "proven secure."
That may be the overall discussion, but I snipped stuff for a
reason. I wanted merely to caution readers that the one statement
Terry made at the top was simply false. That caution does not prove
that BBS is secure; in fact I was not referring specifically to BBS
at all.
This thread is a debate. Most of the posters seem to think they
know what the correct conclusions are. I am addressing myself to
those readers who are just trying to decide what to believe. I
think it is reasonable to single out a statement within a debate
when the statement is incorrect, without attempting to replace the
statement or reformulate an entire argument.
No doubt some consider that I am using a debating trick; I seem to
recall that term cropping up. No doubt some people make decisions
on what to believe based entirely on cut-out pieces of a debate,
without actually thinking it through. Nonetheless, I deem it
proper to contribute comments on details.
> The examples have amply demonstrated that such a system may be weak.
> So we find that the "proven strength" did not in fact imply strength
> in every case, just in most cases.
>
> The issue is "proof," and to understand that we need to know what
> happens in *every* case, not just a handwave representing the majority
> of cases. Claiming that reduced BB&S is secure in every x0 selection
> is obviously just plain wrong.
I don't see anyone actually claiming that. Maybe there are some.
What I've seen in this thread is a claim that the security of BBS,
and the nature of the "proof", makes individual x0 properties
irrelevant. That is, the claim is that the probability of
"weakness" is "negligible", which is to say, a "weak" x0 will
happen so seldom that there is no point in worrying about it.
The theoretical arguments merely make this technically precise.
> Knowing that, we can see that the most
> the proof can possibly mean is that in *other* cases, BB&S is strong.
> In practice, the whole reason for using BB&S is to get a proof of
> strength; most people probably think means that there simply are no
> weaknesses.
That may be so, but I'm not convinced that the short cycles
have much to do with this. See below on terminology.
> Yet here we have a case -- and there is no reason to
> think that short cycles are the only case -- where the system *is*
> *unarguably* *insecure*, and that case is known but not even checked
> for. In this situation, a claim of "proven secure" would be
> inappropriate.
>
> I suggest "proven almost never weak."
<snip>
There are really two, almost independant, problems here. One is
the problem of terminology. Claims of "proven strength" are, of
course, problematic when we assume that the decision maker does
not actually understand what the BBS paper "proves". It is
reasonable to try to explain it in "layman's terms". I disagree,
however, that "proven almost never weak" is any better. It still
contains the terms that generate the confusion in the first place
("prove" and "strong/weak").
Second, there is the problem of whether the known short cycles are
relevant for the technical claims made for BBS. I don't
understand the math well enough to judge for myself. Still, I
find the arguments in favor of ignoring the short cycles
convincing: the actual claims made for BBS strength do not depend
on eliminating short cycles. Since short cycles can exist, the
BBS strength claim cannot be interpreted as a guarantee that the
opponent can never break any particular sequence. There is a way
to eliminate some "weak" cases (by selecting the BBS parameters
in the careful way defined in the BBS paper). In doing so, however,
we do not get any better guarantee of strength, in the sense of
the proofs in the BBS paper. It might in fact be better, but the
guarantee isn't any better.
JM
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 23:28:05 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: I have just do an example with p=11, q=19, n=209. There is
: a cycle of length 4: (38, 190, 152, 114). Taking the LSB,
: we have all 0's. [...]
A potentially useful observation. Next, the "special" issue ;-)
--
__________ Lotus Artificial Life http://alife.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://mandala.co.uk/ Namaste.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: EGD's..
From: Anthony David <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: 11 Aug 2000 09:58:09 +1000
Ian Upright <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Where do I find out more about the exact protocol of the EGD daemon?
Check out Peter Guttmam's paper:-
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/random.pdf
> Is /dev/random and /dev/urandom also the same protocol?
>
> Ian
>
--
=========================================================
Gambling: A discretionary tax on | Anthony David
those who were asleep during high | Systems Administrator
school mathematics classes |
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: 1-time pad is not secure...
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 23:59:22 GMT
40 messages in the thread within 16 hours! I am truely STUNNED! :)
I'm surprised that people brought up Chaos Theory because it just
reassures my point. If our world is chaotic, there's no such thing as
pure randomness. Every event will fall on "the 2-spiral" in a larger
scope. So it's like computing 1/x, we're chasing the impossible zero
with increasing computational power. OTP is only computationally
secure.
And here's my original conclusion that nobody commented on. Since the
key is random, if someone attacks the scheme at the key generation
level, OTP is the LEAST secure because of its enormous key length.
Well, just imagine encrypting the Netscape 4.74 installation file,
19Megabytes. The key has 160,000,000 binary digits. That's like
010101100..............................................................
.......................................................................
Oh Boy! If you can only guess some small key patches with some
certainty, there are 160,000,000 places for you to try them out!
Let me try to solve this one:
1, 4, 18, 23, 0, 7, X. What is 'X'?
A 2-digit number with 90% certainty. Between 10-40 with 80% certainty.
If the list is much longer, more characteristics will emerge like this
individual doesn't pick 5 or 9 as often...
--Sisi
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Destruction of CDs
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2000 08:23:15 +0800
Earlier I had posted quite a bit about dissolving such CD's in a
solvent.
This is the best way. No muss, no fuss, no pollution and no
pieces left over for forensics....kinda like dissolving a body
in acid. When its gone...its gone.
On Thu, 10 Aug 2000 08:55:57 -0400, Thomas Kellar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>There was a thread on this topic a couple of weeks ago.
>I received an advertisement for a device that shreds
>CDs. If anyone is interested the company name/address is
>
>Schleicher & Co. of America, Inc.
>5715 Clyde Rhyne Dr.
>Sanford, NC 27330-9909
>
>ph: 1 800 775 7570 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>They claim their "501 CD shredder" can eliminate 800 to
>1200 CDs or credit cards per hour.
>
>A disinterested party. (Actually uninterested, I would burn them
>myself.)
>
>Thomas
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------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: newbie question on public key lengths
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 17:18:41 -0700
> How can the exponent be larger than the modulus?
The only requirement is that e be prime relative to p and q, so there are an
infinite number of possibilities, please note that I never said it was
reasonable to do, just that it is possible. Just as a person (I actually
knew a person who did this, and it wasn't me) could shoot themselves in the
foot repeatedly with a nail gun, but it's not a reasonable thing to do.
Joe
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 1-time pad is not secure...
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 17:28:14 -0700
> 40 messages in the thread within 16 hours! I am truely STUNNED! :)
I guess we proved that you are special to us.
> I'm surprised that people brought up Chaos Theory because it just
> reassures my point. If our world is chaotic, there's no such thing as
> pure randomness. Every event will fall on "the 2-spiral" in a larger
> scope. So it's like computing 1/x, we're chasing the impossible zero
> with increasing computational power. OTP is only computationally
> secure.
Actually the more important theory that was brought up was quantum theory
where we do have information that indicates that unless you can predict the
future you can't predict the future of the bit-stream.
>
> And here's my original conclusion that nobody commented on. Since the
> key is random, if someone attacks the scheme at the key generation
> level, OTP is the LEAST secure because of its enormous key length.
> Well, just imagine encrypting the Netscape 4.74 installation file,
> 19Megabytes. The key has 160,000,000 binary digits. That's like
> 010101100..............................................................
> .......................................................................
> Oh Boy! If you can only guess some small key patches with some
> certainty, there are 160,000,000 places for you to try them out!
But how do you verify it? Let's make it a bit more real. If I encrypt a
plaintext P with 3DES, there exists a (XOR)OTP that will generate the
plaintext (because under OTP all possible ciphertexts are possible, and 3DES
must generate a subset of that). How would you begin to generate that pad?
Of course you have only 1/(2^64) possible values to guess, so please feel
free.
> Let me try to solve this one:
> 1, 4, 18, 23, 0, 7, X. What is 'X'?
> A 2-digit number with 90% certainty. Between 10-40 with 80% certainty.
> If the list is much longer, more characteristics will emerge like this
> individual doesn't pick 5 or 9 as often...
Except that is he is using a OTP usable RNG, than all numbers in the output
range are equally probable so 5 and 9 will occur with equal likelihood to
all other numbers. So lets put some reasonable restrictions on it, say the
maximum value is 31. Then the likelihood of a double digit number showing up
next would be 21/32. But the likelihood of guessing the value will be 1/32,
regardless of the level of knowledge you have about the system. Your
observations are actually the reason for the requirement that given symbols
0-(n-1) and (n+1)-inf the symbol at n can be determined with no likelihood
above 1/(number of symbols), for all n. If you can prove or disprove the
existance of such a system I'd certainly be intersted in seeing it. Of
course there have been proofs that make progress, for example Kosmogrov
proved that you cannot determine whether or not a stream is truly random
based on the stream, it must be proven from the generator.
Joe
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Destruction of CDs
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 17:27:18 -0700
Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>Earlier I had posted quite a bit about dissolving such CD's in a
>solvent.
>
>This is the best way. No muss, no fuss, no pollution and no
>pieces left over for forensics....kinda like dissolving a body
>in acid. When its gone...its gone.
Um the solution will be what's left... the cd is not gone.
Tom
===========================================================
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
------------------------------
From: "David C. Barber" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Knowing when you've cracked an encryption
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 17:31:56 -0700
Seems to me that you might well spend more time on the analysis of the
result to determine if you've decrypted it properly, then on each decryption
iteration. As such, if the bulk of the time is spent analyzing the
decryption result, that becomes an important factor in the speed of the
solution, and in the science -- yet it seems so little discussed.
(I'm reminded of a Nova presentation on the Enigma machine. They
interviewed a couple women who had wired up rotors for a bulk cracking
machine. The women didn't know what the rotors were for, or anything about
ciphers, but they were warned if they ever talked about what they were doing
that they didn't understand anyway, they would be immediately killed.
Anyway, afterwards there was a picture of a whole wall of rotor machines --
at least a couple hundred -- clicking along in parallel, trying out
combinations by mechanical brute force. BUT THEY NEVER EXPLAINED what this
big cracking machine was doing. Yeah, it was running through a lot of
combinations of rotor positions, but what criteria were they searching for?
What would cause the machine to halt after finding some answer for them?)
*David Barber*
"Jerry Coffin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> In article <8mso3t$4ct$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
> > A problem I never see discussed is: How do you know when you've
successfully
> > cracked an encryption?
> >
> > You're in one of these cracking contests and brute forcing the cipher,
but
> > what does one use to determine that you have successfully found the key?
> > Are there any on-line references to this subject? It must be its own
kind
> > of science.
>
> That depends. If you have any known plaintext, the problem simply
> doesn't exist, since you can compare the decoded ciphertext to the
> known plaintext (or depending on how you're doing things, you might
> encrypt the known plaintext and see if it matches the cipher text).
>
> In a ciphertext-only attack, some fairly trivial statistical analysis
> is normally adequate to determine whether something "looks like"
> plain text or not. The most trivial test, but one that's often more
> than adequate, is to simply test frequencies of individual
> characters. With an incorrect key, different characters will be used
> with fairly similar frequency, but with a correct key you'll see
> substantial differences in frequency of usage.
>
> In some cases, you have to get sophisticated and look at frequencies
> of usage of digraphs, trigraphs, etc.(I.e. groups of two, three or
> more letters). Note in particular that there are quite a few
> digraphs, trigraphs, etc., that are SO rare that nearly as soon as
> you encounter them, you can nearly eliminate that key from further
> consideration unless there's a chance that what you're looking at was
> encoded as well as enciphered (I.e. that the plaintext being fed to
> the cipher is NOT really plain text at all).
>
> In this case, you have to break the code along with the cipher. That
> basically involves figuring out the length of the code groups and
> then attacking the code groups in a roughly similar fashion. At one
> time, when relatively weak ciphers were the general rule, this was
> quite common. I'd be at least mildly surprised to see such a system
> in use today except, maybe, by somebody who's interested in old
> ciphers and codes.
>
> --
> Later,
> Jerry.
>
> The Universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
From: "Paul Pires" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Destruction of CDs
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 17:36:42 -0700
Solvents aren't pollutants? Counteract arsenic by adding cyanide?
What's the energy density of polycabonate?
Here's the plan.......
Stack cd's.
Duct tape into a cylinder and pipe lots of pure O2 into central cavity.
Light.
Amaze your friends and attract chicks.
Paul
Dave Hazelwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> Earlier I had posted quite a bit about dissolving such CD's in a
> solvent.
>
> This is the best way. No muss, no fuss, no pollution and no
> pieces left over for forensics....kinda like dissolving a body
> in acid. When its gone...its gone.
>
> On Thu, 10 Aug 2000 08:55:57 -0400, Thomas Kellar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
> >There was a thread on this topic a couple of weeks ago.
> >I received an advertisement for a device that shreds
> >CDs. If anyone is interested the company name/address is
> >
> >Schleicher & Co. of America, Inc.
> >5715 Clyde Rhyne Dr.
> >Sanford, NC 27330-9909
> >
> >ph: 1 800 775 7570 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >They claim their "501 CD shredder" can eliminate 800 to
> >1200 CDs or credit cards per hour.
> >
> >A disinterested party. (Actually uninterested, I would burn them
> >myself.)
> >
> >Thomas
>
>
>
> -----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
> http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
> -----== Over 80,000 Newsgroups - 16 Different Servers! =-----
------------------------------
From: "David C. Barber" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Pentium III h/w RNG
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2000 17:39:09 -0700
The Pentium III is supposed to have some RNG function in it. A couple times
I'd heard that some analysis would be done with it, and even if it was less
than perfect, that that could be "fixed" with proper use. In the end, I
never saw any analysis, though I'm sure some must have been done. Anyone
have information and/or pointers on how well this function works?
*David Barber*
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