Cryptography-Digest Digest #449, Volume #12 Tue, 15 Aug 00 11:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Proposal of drafting rules of conduct of posting (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mark Wooding)
Re: 1-time pad is not secure... ("Tony T. Warnock")
Re: Playfair-Analyze ? ("Tony T. Warnock")
Unauthorized Cancel Messages (Ron B.)
New quantum computer - any details? (Stanley Chow)
Re: Impossible Differentials of TC5 (Mark Wooding)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: PGP Algorithm (Mark Wooding)
Re: Looking for password statistical data (Anders Thulin)
Re: Proposal of drafting rules of conduct of posting ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Impossible Differentials of TC5 (tomstd)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: OTP using BBS generator? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Unauthorized Cancel Messages (fvw)
Re: 1-time pad is not secure... ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: 1-time pad is not secure... ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: New quantum computer - any details? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Crypto Related Professional Attitude (James Felling)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Proposal of drafting rules of conduct of posting
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 15:22:04 +0200
Mark Currie wrote:
>
> One advantage of harsh criticism is that it can limit noise. It makes you think
> a bit before posting. I have been taken out before for posting something that
> hasn't been thought through properly. As long as it doesn't get too retorical,
> it can serve a purpose. I disagree with pure negative feedback though. I think
> that if you take someone out, you should at least offer a constructive
> alternative to their claim.
>
> Information security is a fairly wide discipline and it is difficult to be an
> expert in all areas. Therefore poster's should not feel too bad when they are
> legitimately chastised. Readers also should note this and not be too quick to
> relegate a chastised poster to the ranks of useless novice, since the person in
> question may be an expert in other areas of crypto and may offer useful
> information in other dialogs.
>
> I do agree with you about the lack of approvals. Unfortunately a simple "yes I
> agree" could be viewed by some to be noise since in most cases it really only
> benefits the original poster.
I don't see why critisms need to be 'harsh' at all. A really
good teacher always explains to the pupils and corrects their
errors in gentle ways. At least that has been my experience
in school. Only those that are not really very good need
'supplementary tools' to polish up their images. One of the
ancient philosophers that is well-esteemed in China said
humbly that of three men in the street that is at least one
who could be his teacher. Loudly claiming that someone else
is a sheer novice void of any knowledge doesn't actually
prove that one's own knowledge is very deep but only shows
that the level of one's character is not admirably high,
if at all. One can refer a poster who asks a trivial recurring
question neatly to a book or the FAQ without adding any words
about an estimate of his knowledge, can't one? (In another
follow-up I have used the term 'exhibitionism' to refer to
the phenomenon of demonstrating one's deep knowledge level
at all available opportunities and by all means.) After all,
even the top experts aren't born experts. They were all once
novices, having no knowledges in the fields in which they
are today experts.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 13:14:00 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 12:34:25 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 12:45:51 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 12:48:20 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 12:50:54 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 12:53:22 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 12:56:30 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: 15 Aug 2000 13:04:39 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> an issue.)
Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
sieve.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: "Tony T. Warnock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 1-time pad is not secure...
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 19:23:27 -0600
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tim Tyler wrote:
> As far as physics goes, science does not appear to be in any sort of
> position to make proclamations on the issue of whether true randomness
> exists. The issue relates to issues on the very edge of theoretical
> physics - an area where not everything is known. The issue could easily
> go either way on some distant future occasion.
Is this a 50-50 proposition?
------------------------------
From: "Tony T. Warnock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Playfair-Analyze ?
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 19:27:53 -0600
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Mark T. VandeWettering" wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> JPeschel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ronny Burow) writes, in part:
> >
> >>Now i need some help with Playfair. Where can i get
> >>a simple description how to analyze a playfair-chiffre ?
> >
> >You can find the Lanaki lessons on my web site on the
> >"Crypto lessons" page. You'll also find a Playfair
> >cracking tool on the "Historical" page.
>
> If you want to "cheat", I had good luck using both genetic algorithms
> and simulated annealing type approaches. Even simpler programs can be
> effective. For instance, to solve the Playfair that was part of Singh's
> Cipher Challenge, I took my favorite bit of English prose (Bram Stoker's
> Dracula, available from Project Gutenberg). I collected counts on all
> trigrams for the novel. I then took the log of the raw counts base 2,
> and called that the score. My program proceeds by picking a random
> encoding square. It scores the square by decrypting the message, totalling
> all the scores for each trigram in the decoded message. It then searches
> for the pair of letters to swap that increases the score the most, and repeats.
> The problem with this method is that it often settles into local maxima, so
> when you can't find a better swap, I just pick two random pairs and swap them,
> and repeat. With a reasonable amount of cipher text, this was pretty
> successful, easy to code, and sufficient to break the Stage 6 code.
>
> For more fun, I went back and redid it with more "proper" SA and genetic
> algorithms.
You could use the Metropolis approach to get out of a local minimum. Just accept
that a move creates a decrease in score with a small probability.
------------------------------
From: Ron B. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Unauthorized Cancel Messages
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 13:48:54 GMT
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
It appears to me that someone is sending bogus cancel messages to
sci.crypt and the alt.security.* groups. My newsreader shows several
"This message is no longer available" messages for several legitimate
messages. This are clearly not anti-spam cancels as they are new
responses to postings. Has anyone else seen this?
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE=====
Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com>
iQA/AwUBOZlKRAzUoy7OvTSOEQJ+YACfZY2E8BKBQBHUQjSHk+kuBT1HpCUAni03
bSfMJqomL20FuJzymH03ccW2
=UhXZ
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
From: Stanley Chow <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: New quantum computer - any details?
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 13:48:55 GMT
According to "The Register", see
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/1/12589.html there is a new
5 bit quantum computer. Any details? I could not find anything on
the IBM site.
--
Stanley Chow VP Engineering [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cloakware Corp (613) 271-9446 x 223
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: Impossible Differentials of TC5
Date: 15 Aug 2000 13:55:46 GMT
tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yeah, but TC5 uses smaller and smaller feistels so it is NOT
> sufficient to send the 128-bit difference (d, 0) (64-bit
> quantities) into the structure and expect it to work.
>
> The quantity 'd' has to allow for the impossible differentials
> in the smaller feistels or it won't work.
Nope. Go back and read the derivation of the differentials again.
They're entirely independent of the nature of the F-function, as long as
it's actually a permutation of some kind.
I'm getting a bit tired beating my head against this wall now.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 16:14:31 +0200
Mark Wooding wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > My point is that at any given time, e.g. now, we'll have difficulty of
> > rigorously quantifying the 'difficulty' in question? Should we measure
> > it in terms of cpu-time of factoring the given numbers by a
> > 'particular' algorithm, or what? (The choice of the algorithm would be
> > an issue.)
>
> Cost of the cheapest implementation, in dollars, normalized according to
> running time (and probability of success, for special-purpose
> algorithms). This takes into account the heavy memory requirements and
> other similar issues raised by algorithms such as the number field
> sieve.
I am afraid that such a measure tends to be rather inaccurate
or dependent on factors that are not ubiquitously present
and hence more or less vague for the reader.
M. K. Shen
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: PGP Algorithm
Date: 15 Aug 2000 14:07:50 GMT
Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Cast5(?)
For some reason, this is another name for CAST128.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: Anders Thulin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Looking for password statistical data
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 14:09:57 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> a password of only 8 characters. Is it really that very hard
> to determine that through e.g. casting a die and remember
> the result by heart (keeping a copy in some presumably
> secure place to avoid the consequence of fading memory)?
> I mean in most cases it should work well. (I am not
> assuming very mighty opponents, etc.)
The human factor is all and everything here: if users have
the right to select their own passwords, without any
imposed restraints as to length or complexity they will select
passwords that fit themselves, not a security policy.
Even with such restrictions in place, they will find
the easiest way to comply with them, regardless of
security policy or other regulations.
Even laboratory mice take the easiest way out, if they
can.
This goes for crypto situations as well: private key theft (or
'borrowing') may be or become standard operating practice in an
office, as long as it works.
There's always a right way to do things. But if there's an easier
way to do them, 9 times out of 10 that's the way they will be done.
As to password-by-dice, assuming full disclosure of
password file: 8 digits in the range 1-6 can be tested in
short order -- a 233 MHz PII computer manages around 3000 guesses/second,
I believe, and that's slow these days. There will probable be some kind of
word dictionary attacks done before anyone tries password-by-dice,
but even so, I expect them to be tried fairly early in the process,
especially as they cover a search sub-space.
--
Anders Thulin [EMAIL PROTECTED] 040-10 50 63
Telia Prosoft AB, Hj�lmaregatan 3B, 212 19 Malm�, Sweden
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Proposal of drafting rules of conduct of posting
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 14:04:12 GMT
"Trevor L. Jackson, III" wrote:
> It's about time for the bung. Comes from a theory of child development in which
> all infants are encapsulated in a barrel at birth. One feeds them through the
> bunghole (place the spigot goes). The insulates the rugrat and houseape
> phases. At age 18 you open the barrels containing females. For barrels
> containing males you hammer in the bung.
Why bother to open the barrels containing females? You already have a
bunghole.
Now that we look at it from that perspective, why waste food in the
first place?
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Impossible Differentials of TC5
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 07:17:26 -0700
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding) wrote:
>tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Yeah, but TC5 uses smaller and smaller feistels so it is NOT
>> sufficient to send the 128-bit difference (d, 0) (64-bit
>> quantities) into the structure and expect it to work.
>>
>> The quantity 'd' has to allow for the impossible differentials
>> in the smaller feistels or it won't work.
>
>Nope. Go back and read the derivation of the differentials
again.
>They're entirely independent of the nature of the F-function,
as long as
>it's actually a permutation of some kind.
>
>I'm getting a bit tired beating my head against this wall now.
You have yet to explain how you can find the key with this
attack.
Tom
===========================================================
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 16:48:18 +0200
Mark Wooding wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > (1) Does BBS give any result of the (frequency) distribution
> > of the cycle lengths of LSB sequences so that one can have
> > a 'concrete' feeling of how likely one gets a long/short
> > cycle? (BTW, how much is exactly 'long' or 'short', in
> > relation to p, q or n?)
>
> Not that I recall.
I that case, I wonder, since one is using the LSB, what is
the sense of disputing long vs. short cycles. (We have NO
idea at all of the probability of getting cycles of LSB of
any given magnitudes. Is that right?)
>
> > (2) David Hopwood pointed out that the BBS article left open
> > the question of the relationship between the cylce lengths
> > of LSB and the cycle lengths of the direct output of the
> > congruence relation. Does this theory 'gap' have any effect
> > on the proof of the unpredictability of the LSB sequences?
> > If not, what's the (global/rough) reason? (Note that a
> > cycle length of 1 or 2 of LSB would certainly be actually
> > predictable.)
>
> No. The proof of unpredictability is a two-step thing:
>
> * firstly, it shows that, if you can predict a BBS generator with
> probability 1/2 + \epsilon then you can also decide quadratic
> residuosity with probability 1/2 + \epsilon;
>
> * and secondly, it gives a simple algorithm for `amplifying' advantage
> in deciding quadratic residuosity so that small biases can be used
> to efficiently solve QRP completely, in expected polynomial time.
Does that refer to the LSB? I guess that this is certainly
the case. But then how can it be that there is a 'gap' mentioned
above without causing any consequneces in the proof of the
unpredictablity of LSB? Note what I wrote in parentheses.
>
> > (3) Does the 'check' being disputed really prevent a certian
> > lower bound of the cycle lengths of the LSB sequences
> > (not the direct output of the congruence relation) of
> > being inadvertently 'under-run' or does the check only
> > do that in a probabilistic sense (i.e. with certain
> > probability not equal to 1)? What is that lower bound
> > actually (in relation to p and q)?
>
> It doesn't do anything of the kind.
Again, what is then the sense of arguing about long vs. short
cycles?
>
> > (4) Does the mathematics of BBS really gaurantee that there
> > is absolutely no bias or serial correlations etc. in
> > the LSB sequences? Has that been explicitly proven in
> > the BBS article? (Note that it is inconceivable that
> > any 'other' PRNG that has statistical defects qualifies
> > for use in secure crypto applications. So I believe
> > that BBS must somehow show that the LSB sequences are
> > statistically impeacable.)
>
> It shows that BBS output is indistinguishable from random data by *any*
> polynomial-time test, assuming the intracability of the QRP. The above
> are all polynomial time, so, yes, it covers them.
So it means that you only need to prove the unpredictability
and the statistical perfectness 'automatically' follows. Is
that correct? A tiny toy example of mine indicates,
however, that LSB of BBS could have poor statistical
properties, though unfortunately the size of the example
doesn't allow much to be said concretely/strongly.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: OTP using BBS generator?
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 16:48:13 +0200
John Savard wrote:
>
> Besides rejecting the all-zero pad, how far should one go, though?
>
> Presumably, on the basis that the attacker does not know that an OTP
> is being used, but will consider other, lesser, systems, one should
>
> (!)
> reject all pads that correspond to any XOR stream cipher that could be
> solved on the basis of a single message of the same size as the pad.
> (!)
>
> Thus, for example, a pad consisting entirely of a short, repeated,
> sequence of bytes should also be rejected.
>
> But if we keep going on like this, we have made the keyspace smaller
> than the message. So if the attacker knows what we're doing, he
> clearly can derive *some* information about the message. Of course, we
> will, even in a fairly extreme case, reject _less than half_ of the
> possible keypads, and so the information about the message will amount
> to no more than *a single bit*.
I think that one has at this point remember that (an ideal)
OTP is only a theoretical model and that in practice we
adopt practical means that we (with more or less subjectivity)
consider to be appropriate. One way of filtering candidate bit
sequences could be this, I suppose: Apply all statistical
tests that are available to us. If a sequence passes them all,
then use it. On the assumption that the opponent doesn't have
better and more statistical tests to discern the non-randomness
(that we are unable to discern) and hence is not able to
exploit that, we are safe, aren't we?
M. K. Shen
=============================
http://home.t-online.de/home/mok-kong.shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (fvw)
Subject: Re: Unauthorized Cancel Messages
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 14:35:41 GMT
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
>It appears to me that someone is sending bogus cancel messages to
>sci.crypt and the alt.security.* groups. My newsreader shows several
>"This message is no longer available" messages for several legitimate
>messages. This are clearly not anti-spam cancels as they are new
>responses to postings. Has anyone else seen this?
Nope, haven't seen this behaviour. But afaik, rogue cancels (or in
fact any cancels) would delete the entire article, headers and all,
so you'd never know it was there. This sounds more like a newsserver
that's expiring articles to soon, or isn't saving the bodies because
of lack of diskspace. Hmm, come to think of it, all these cases should
really delete both entries in the group headers list as the bodies,
so really those messages you're getting could be considered bugs.
However, I am aware of several ISPs that have newsservers that do
keep headers for expired messages for a bit longer.
DISCLAIMER: I've very little experience with nntp/newsservers,
ignore this message.
--
Frank v Waveren
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
ICQ# 10074100
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 1-time pad is not secure...
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 14:10:06 GMT
Guy Macon wrote:
> I was just responding to his comment that
> he wishes that it was on the Internet ...
I didn't say that.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 1-time pad is not secure...
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 14:11:11 GMT
"Mark T. VandeWettering" wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >We don't agree at all.
> >...
Please remove attribution to me when nothing that you cited
were my words.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: New quantum computer - any details?
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 17:03:05 +0200
Stanley Chow wrote:
>
> According to "The Register", see
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/1/12589.html there is a new
> 5 bit quantum computer. Any details? I could not find anything on
> the IBM site.
There was a half page report recently about obtaining 5 qubits
in the German newspaper Computer Zeitung. Someone claimed
however a higher record of 7 qubits. You may like to look
at a recent thread initiated by me on 2nd Aug. Unfortunately,
I have no longer the newspapers, so I couldn't provide
you the links to the pages with the detailed informations.
M. K. Shen
>
> --
> Stanley Chow VP Engineering [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cloakware Corp (613) 271-9446 x 223
------------------------------
From: James Felling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Crypto Related Professional Attitude
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2000 10:08:13 -0500
Actually Bruce S. used to participate here a lot more than he does now.
Certian parties who shall remain nameless engaged in personal attacks,
and other such annoying postings, and since that time it has seemed to
me as if he has been visiting the group a LOT less.
THe big names have alot on their plate, and since there are those on
these NG with a desire to "take down" a big name crypto guy, they are
much more prone to spam and nasty gram and other such counter posting
tendencies. It is my impression that they are around ( lurking
occasianally) but not very inclined to participate.
------------------------------
** FOR YOUR REFERENCE **
The service address, to which questions about the list itself and requests
to be added to or deleted from it should be directed, is:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can send mail to the entire list (and sci.crypt) via:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
End of Cryptography-Digest Digest
******************************
